Crowley v WorleyParsons Limited (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Crowley v WorleyParsons Limited (No 2) [2019] FCA 1535

File number: NSD 1292 of 2015
Judge: GLEESON J
Date of judgment: 17 September 2019
Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79
Cases cited:

Dasreef Pty Limited v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588

Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705

Date of hearing: 16 September 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 20
Counsel for the Plaintiff: L Armstrong QC with G Donnellan and A H
Edwards
Solicitor for the Plaintiff: ACA Lawyers
Counsel for the Defendant: W A Harris QC with R G Craig and J A Findlay
Solicitor for the Defendant: Herbert Smith Freehills

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

NSD 1292 of 2015
BETWEEN:

LARRY CROWLEY

Plaintiff

AND:

WORLEYPARSONS LIMITED (ACN 096 090 158)

Defendant

GLEESON J:

  1. On 20 November 2013, the defendant’s (WOR) share price fell approximately 25% following the company’s announcement of revised earnings guidance. That guidance was markedly different from the company’s mid-August 2013 announcement to the effect that the company had a solid foundation for expecting earnings growth on the FY2013 year’s figure of $322 million. The plaintiff (Mr Crowley) purchased shares in WOR in October 2013 and claims to have suffered loss by reason of his acquisition of those shares at a price that was inflated by reason of WOR’s misleading or deceptive conduct or contravention of continuous disclosure laws.

  2. In support of his case against WOR, the plaintiff relies on expert evidence from an economist, Frank Torchio. Mr Torchio’s evidence includes an “event study” analysis, which seeks to explain the component of the change in WOR’s share price on 20 November 2013 that is attributable to company specific information, as opposed to price changes caused by general market movement.

  3. From para 145 of his first report (report), Mr Torchio analyses the causes of what he describes as the “excess return for the 20 November 2013 event”.

  4. At para 148 and following, Mr Torchio sets out several factual propositions, referring frequently to “the analyst consensus”. I have assumed that this expression is used in the same or a similar way to its use by WOR, that is, the average of estimates of net profit after tax published by 11 market analysts whose analysis is followed by WOR. For example, Mr Torchio states (at para 148):

    Although WorleyParsons did not provide a specific range of the FY2014 underlying NPAT guidance on 14 August 2013, after its disclosure, the analyst consensus for FY2014 underlying NPAT was $368 million. Thus, analysts interpreted WorleyParsons’ guidance to mean an approximate 14% ($46 million or $368 million - $322 million) increase in FY2014 NPAT over its $322 million NPAT for FY2013.

  5. I admitted the second sentence of para 148 as evidence only of an assumption made by Mr Torchio. To the extent that…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1535
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Crowley v WorleyParsons Limited (No 2) involved a legal dispute concerning the admissibility of expert evidence in court. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, with the primary focus being on the expert opinion provided by Mr Torchio, an economist, and its admissibility under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The respondent, WorleyParsons Limited, objected to certain statements in Mr Torchio’s reports, arguing that they were inadmissible as they were not based on specialised knowledge.

The court was required to decide whether the contested statements in Mr Torchio’s reports constituted opinions based on specialised knowledge, as required by section 79 of the Evidence Act. The key issue was whether these statements could be admitted as expert evidence, given the objections raised by WorleyParsons Limited. The court needed to determine whether the statements were indeed based on specialised knowledge and, if so, whether they could be admitted under the Evidence Act.

The court found that some of the contested statements in Mr Torchio’s reports were assumptions on which his subsequent opinions were based. The court ruled that these statements should be read as assumptions and granted leave for the applicant to adduce further evidence to establish their admissibility as opinions based on specialised knowledge under section 79 of the Evidence Act. The court held that certain statements, while not directly constituting expert opinion, were necessary assumptions underlying Mr Torchio’s expert conclusions. Consequently, the court allowed the further evidence to clarify the basis of these assumptions and their admissibility.

In summary, the court ruled in favour of the applicant, granting leave to adduce further evidence to establish the admissibility of certain statements in Mr Torchio’s reports as opinions based on specialised knowledge. This decision ensured that the court could properly assess the validity of the expert evidence presented in the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Accordingly, I will read para 157 as an assumption on which Mr Torchio’s subsequent opinions are based and grant leave to Mr Crowley to adduce further evidence to establish that para 157 is admissible as an opinion based on specialised knowledge pursuant to s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act). WOR took a similar objection to the second sentence of para 158 of Mr Torchio’s first report, in which he states:Further, as discussed in ¶¶ 150-151, immediately before the 20 November disclosure, analyst consensus FY2014 underlying NPAT was $354 million. Thus, the revised guidance caused an $80 million reduction, or 23%, of the prior NPAT expectations in the market. The same reasoning applies. Accordingly, I will read the second sentence of para 158 as an assumption on which Mr Torchio’s subsequent opinions are based and grant leave to Mr Crowley to adduce further evidence to establish that the sentence is admissible as an opinion wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge pursuant to s 79 of the Evidence Act. At para 205, Mr Torchio states relevantly (concerning the computation of artificial inflation):This constant percentage inflation of 24.28% measured at the end of the Relevant Period likely underestimates the inflation percentage at the beginning of the Relevant Period. This is because analysts had a higher expectation of WorleyParsons’ future earnings at the start of the Relevant Period. The excess return of -24.28% on 20 November 2013 is the market’s reaction to an $80 million ($354-$274 million) decline or 23% ($80 million divided by $354 million) in consensus FY2014 underlying NPAT…(Emphasis in original.) WOR took a similar objection to the second and third sentences of this paragraph. Mr Crowley contends that the second sentence stands or falls with para 157, and is a comparison between the conclusions in paras 148 and 157. As I read the second sentence, it conveys no more than that the analyst consensus (being an average figure) for WOR’s future earnings was higher at the start of the “Relevant Period”. I therefore read it as an assumed fact. To the extent that Mr Torchio sought to give expert evidence by the second sentence, I do not accept that his expertise as an economist permits him to express an expert opinion about the actual expectations of analysts. As to the third sentence, it follows from my earlier rulings that Mr Torchio’s reasoning process should be articulated in order to demonstrate that the opinion is properly based on Mr Torchio’s specialised knowledge. Accordingly, I will read the third sentence of para 205 as an assumption on which Mr Torchio’s subsequent opinions are based and grant leave to Mr Crowley to adduce further evidence to establish that the sentence is admissible as an opinion based on specialised knowledge pursuant to s 79 of the Evidence Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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