FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Crowley v WorleyParsons Limited (No 2) [2019] FCA 1535
File number: NSD 1292 of 2015 Judge: GLEESON J Date of judgment: 17 September 2019 Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79 Cases cited: Dasreef Pty Limited v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588
Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705
Date of hearing: 16 September 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 20 Counsel for the Plaintiff: L Armstrong QC with G Donnellan and A H
EdwardsSolicitor for the Plaintiff: ACA Lawyers Counsel for the Defendant: W A Harris QC with R G Craig and J A Findlay Solicitor for the Defendant: Herbert Smith Freehills REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
NSD 1292 of 2015 BETWEEN: LARRY CROWLEY
Plaintiff
AND: WORLEYPARSONS LIMITED (ACN 096 090 158)
Defendant
GLEESON J:
On 20 November 2013, the defendant’s (WOR) share price fell approximately 25% following the company’s announcement of revised earnings guidance. That guidance was markedly different from the company’s mid-August 2013 announcement to the effect that the company had a solid foundation for expecting earnings growth on the FY2013 year’s figure of $322 million. The plaintiff (Mr Crowley) purchased shares in WOR in October 2013 and claims to have suffered loss by reason of his acquisition of those shares at a price that was inflated by reason of WOR’s misleading or deceptive conduct or contravention of continuous disclosure laws.
In support of his case against WOR, the plaintiff relies on expert evidence from an economist, Frank Torchio. Mr Torchio’s evidence includes an “event study” analysis, which seeks to explain the component of the change in WOR’s share price on 20 November 2013 that is attributable to company specific information, as opposed to price changes caused by general market movement.
From para 145 of his first report (report), Mr Torchio analyses the causes of what he describes as the “excess return for the 20 November 2013 event”.
At para 148 and following, Mr Torchio sets out several factual propositions, referring frequently to “the analyst consensus”. I have assumed that this expression is used in the same or a similar way to its use by WOR, that is, the average of estimates of net profit after tax published by 11 market analysts whose analysis is followed by WOR. For example, Mr Torchio states (at para 148):
Although WorleyParsons did not provide a specific range of the FY2014 underlying NPAT guidance on 14 August 2013, after its disclosure, the analyst consensus for FY2014 underlying NPAT was $368 million. Thus, analysts interpreted WorleyParsons’ guidance to mean an approximate 14% ($46 million or $368 million - $322 million) increase in FY2014 NPAT over its $322 million NPAT for FY2013.
I admitted the second sentence of para 148 as evidence only of an assumption made by Mr Torchio. To the extent that…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1535
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether the contested statements in Mr Torchio’s reports constituted opinions based on specialised knowledge, as required by section 79 of the Evidence Act. The key issue was whether these statements could be admitted as expert evidence, given the objections raised by WorleyParsons Limited. The court needed to determine whether the statements were indeed based on specialised knowledge and, if so, whether they could be admitted under the Evidence Act.
The court found that some of the contested statements in Mr Torchio’s reports were assumptions on which his subsequent opinions were based. The court ruled that these statements should be read as assumptions and granted leave for the applicant to adduce further evidence to establish their admissibility as opinions based on specialised knowledge under section 79 of the Evidence Act. The court held that certain statements, while not directly constituting expert opinion, were necessary assumptions underlying Mr Torchio’s expert conclusions. Consequently, the court allowed the further evidence to clarify the basis of these assumptions and their admissibility.
In summary, the court ruled in favour of the applicant, granting leave to adduce further evidence to establish the admissibility of certain statements in Mr Torchio’s reports as opinions based on specialised knowledge. This decision ensured that the court could properly assess the validity of the expert evidence presented in the case.
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