IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
No C1 of 2013
B e t w e e n -
JONATHON ANTHONY CROWLEY
Applicant
and
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent
THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Second Respondent
GLENN PITKETHLY
Third Respondent
Office of the Registry
No C2 of 2013
B e t w e e n -
JONATHON ANTHONY CROWLEY
Applicant
and
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent
THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Second Respondent
GLENN PITKETHLY
Third Respondent
Applications for special leave to appeal
HAYNE J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 6 JUNE 2013, AT 9.30 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
MR B.J. GROSS, QC: I appear with MR B.J.E. COLLAERY for the applicant. (instructed by Collaery Lawyers)
MR P.C.B. SEMMLER, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR G.A. STRETTON, SC, for the first and third respondents. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
MR J.E. MACONACHIE, QC: If your Honours please, I appear with MR J.D. WATTS for the second respondent, the Australian Capital Territory. (instructed by Australian Capital Territory Government Solicitor)
HAYNE J: Yes, Mr Gross.
MR GROSS: Your Honours, in relation to the question of duty of care owed by the police, although police officers are generally or ordinarily not liable for negligence in the investigation and prevention of crime, they should not, we submit, be totally exempted in all circumstances. Secondly, we say that police do not enjoy a blanket immunity from liability in negligence for causing personal injury and for a person who may possibly be suspected of a criminal offence. Thirdly, we say it is legal error to contend that regardless of the circumstances, a duty of care can never be owed to a person under investigation or suspicion regarding possible or potential offences to take reasonable care for their physical safety.
Your Honours, in the present case, the trial judge relied upon the Victorian decisions of Zalewski and Richards. Her Honour found that the injury resulted from specifically identified antecedent negligence by the police and that the two officers acted unreasonably and not in accordance with their operational training in the circumstances. In doing so, as the trial judge pointed out, she found, in effect, the facts were the same and the analysis was the same as was adopted by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Zalewski.
HAYNE J: Put as shortly as you can, what exactly was the want of reasonable care that you would assign to the police officers?
MR GROSS: Abandoning a common intent that they would deal with the plaintiff, as it were, in a negotiating mode and instead what they did was they abandoned that approach as soon as they arrived and immediately confronted him in a hostile manner which precipitated a violent reaction by him. That involved departure from first of all what Sergeant Morris had indicated should be done before they left; secondly, their…
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- Case
- [2013] HCATrans 128
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the impugned provisions of the *Migration Act* and its subordinate legislation, which conferred broad powers on the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to make decisions regarding the grant or refusal of visas, were constitutionally valid. Specifically, the applicant argued that these provisions purported to confer non-judicial power on the executive, thereby contravening Chapter III of the Australian Constitution, which vests the judicial power of the Commonwealth exclusively in the courts.
Hayne and Bell JJ, in their joint judgment, dismissed the application. They reasoned that the powers conferred by the *Migration Act* were not of a kind that could only be exercised by a court. Their Honours referred to established principles concerning the separation of powers, noting that the executive government is empowered to make policy decisions and to implement them through legislation. The Court found that the powers in question were administrative in nature and fell within the scope of executive authority, not the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Consequently, the provisions did not offend Chapter III of the Constitution.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi