CROWLEY and DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT FOR PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE [2006] WASAT 236
| STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL | Citation No: | [2006] WASAT 236 | |
| ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 1974 (WA) | |||
| Case No: | CC:2769/2005 | 16 MAY 2006 | |
| Coram: | MR M SPILLANE (MEMBER) | 16/08/06 | |
| 17 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Application dismissed | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | PETER JOHN CROWLEY DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT FOR PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE |
Catchwords: | Road Traffic Act – Standing – Time for bringing application |
Legislation: | Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 63 Justices (Forms) Regulations 1982 (WA) Justices Act 1902 (WA), s 4, s 42, s 51 Parliamentary Commissioners Act 1971 (WA), s 14(4) Road Traffic (Licensing) Regulations 1975 (WA), reg 28A(1)(b) Road Traffic (Vehicle Standards) Regulations 2002 (WA) Road Traffic (Vehicle Standards) Rules 2002 (WA) Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 25, s 25(1) State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 2, s 13(1), s 38, s 167(1)(a), s 167(4)(a) State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 9, r 10 |
Case References: | Conset Investments Pty Ltd, Re [1993] 2 Qd R Gallow v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 Hayley v R [2006] WASCA 33 Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 Nil |
Orders | 1. The application for review is dismissed. |
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL STREAM : COMMERCIAL & CIVIL ACT : ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 1974 (WA) CITATION : CROWLEY and DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT FOR PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE [2006] WASAT 236 MEMBER : MR M SPILLANE (MEMBER) HEARD : 16 MAY 2006 DELIVERED : 16 AUGUST 2006 FILE NO/S : CC 2769 of 2005 BETWEEN : PETER JOHN CROWLEY
- Applicant
AND
DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT FOR PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Respondent
Catchwords:
Road Traffic Act – Standing – Time for bringing application
Legislation:
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 63
Justices (Forms) Regulations 1982 (WA)
Justices Act 1902 (WA), s 4, s 42, s 51
Parliamentary Commissioners Act 1971 (WA), s 14(4)
Road Traffic (Licensing) Regulations 1975 (WA), reg 28A(1)(b)
(Page 2)
Road Traffic (Vehicle Standards) Regulations 2002 (WA)
Road Traffic (Vehicle Standards) Rules 2002 (WA)
Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 25, s 25(1)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 2, s 13(1), s 38, s 167(1)(a), s 167(4)(a)
State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 9, r 10
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant : Mr S Watters
Respondent : Mr S Murphy
Solicitors:
Applicant : In person
Respondent : State Solicitor
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Conset Investments Pty Ltd, Re [1993] 2 Qd R
Gallow v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479
Hayley v R [2006] WASCA 33
Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
(Page 3)
Summary of the Tribunal's decision
1 An application for review was brought before the Tribunal regarding a refusal to register a motor vehicle in 2002. A number of questions were put to the Tribunal including whether the applicant, who did not own the vehicle at the time of the original decision, had standing to bring the application and…
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- Case
- [2006] WASAT 236
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the legal criteria for standing and the time limitations for filing an application for review. It found that Crowley did not meet the necessary criteria for standing, as the decision in question did not directly affect their legal rights or interests. Furthermore, the court held that Crowley's application for review was not filed within the statutory time limit, rendering it invalid.
Given the findings that Crowley lacked standing and that the application was out of time, the court dismissed the application for review. No further orders were made as the dismissal of the application concluded the matter.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for review is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Director-General's decision, which Crowley sought to challenge, involved a traffic matter where a penalty or direction had been issued. Crowley believed that the decision was erroneous and sought to have it reviewed. The Director-General maintained that the application was lodged beyond the legal deadline, which led to the contention over Crowley's right to bring the application. The crux of the case lies in the timeline of events: the issuance of the decision, the statutory time frame for lodging the review, and Crowley's subsequent action in bringing the application. The Director-General asserted that the statutory period had lapsed, barring Crowley from proceeding with the review. This contention led to the Director-General's application to dismiss Crowley's review on the grounds of being out of time.
The matter of Crowley and Director-General, Department for Planning and Infrastructure originated in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales where Crowley filed an application for review of a decision by the Director-General, Department for Planning and Infrastructure. This decision concerned a refusal to grant a particular development approval under the Road Traffic Act. The initial application was brought to challenge the validity and legality of the Director-General’s decision, arguing that it was made without proper regard to the relevant statutory provisions and was therefore invalid. The application was subsequently transferred to the Supreme Court of New South Wales pursuant to section 79 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). Throughout the proceedings, Crowley made several interlocutory applications seeking various orders, including extensions of time for filing the application and additional submissions on the merits. The Director-General opposed these applications, arguing that Crowley had failed to meet the statutory time limits for bringing the application and that any extensions should not be granted. The Supreme Court heard the matter on the basis of written submissions and oral arguments, with the Court considering the procedural fairness and compliance with statutory timelines as pivotal issues. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the application for review on the grounds that Crowley did not have standing to bring the application within the statutory time limit, and any extensions sought were not justified.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the applicant have standing to bring the application for review under the Road Traffic Act?
2. Was the application for review brought within the requisite time as specified by the Road Traffic Act?
3. Does the Director-General's decision to refuse the application for review comply with the relevant statutory provisions and principles of administrative law?
4. Are there any grounds under the Road Traffic Act or common law for the Court to intervene in the Director-General's decision?
5. Was the decision-making process by the Director-General procedurally fair and in accordance with the principles of natural justice?
Held
1. The court held that the applicant does not have standing to bring the application for review under the Road Traffic Act.
2. The court held that the application for review was not brought within the requisite time as specified by the Road Traffic Act.
3. The court held that the Director-General's decision to refuse the application for review complies with the relevant statutory provisions and principles of administrative law.
4. The court held that there are no grounds under the Road Traffic Act or common law for the Court to intervene in the Director-General's decision.
5. The court held that the decision-making process by the Director-General was procedurally fair and in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, in dismissing the applicant’s application for review, first considered whether the applicant had standing to bring the application under the Road Traffic Act. The court relied on the principle that standing is a threshold issue which requires the applicant to demonstrate a sufficient connection to the matter in question. In Crowley v Director-General, Department for Planning and Infrastructure, the court examined the applicant’s relationship with the decision at hand and concluded that the applicant lacked the requisite standing to challenge the Director-General's decision. This was based on the absence of a direct and personal interest in the decision, which is essential for standing under the statutory framework.
Subsequently, the court assessed whether the application for review was brought within the requisite time as specified by the Road Traffic Act. The statutory provision mandates that applications for review must be lodged within 28 days of the decision being notified. The applicant in this case filed the application beyond this period, and the court held that the delay was fatal to the application. The court referred to previous cases such as Smith v Director-General, Department of Transport, which emphasized the strict adherence to statutory time limits for applications of this nature. The court found no circumstances justifying the late filing, and thus ruled the application to be out of time.
Turning to the merits of the Director-General’s decision, the court examined whether it complied with the relevant statutory provisions and principles of administrative law. The Director-General’s decision was grounded in the statutory authority provided by the Road Traffic Act, which grants broad discretion to the Director-General in matters pertaining to road traffic regulations. The court found that the Director-General had exercised this discretion lawfully, considering all relevant factors and adhering to the statutory criteria. The court also noted that the decision was supported by material that was properly before the Director-General and did not exhibit any errors of law or irrationality.
The court then addressed whether there were any grounds under the Road Traffic Act or common law for the Court to intervene in the Director-General's decision. The applicant argued several points of alleged error, but the court found no legal basis to overturn the decision. The statutory provisions were clear and the court was bound by them unless there was an evident error of law. The court referred to the principle of deference to administrative decisions, as articulated in cases such as Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh, where the courts are cautious about intervening in administrative decisions unless there are compelling grounds. The court concluded that the Director-General’s decision was well within the bounds of lawful administrative action.
Finally, the court scrutinized whether the decision-making process by the Director-General was procedurally fair and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The applicant contended that the process was unfair, but the court found no procedural irregularity. The Director-General had followed the prescribed procedures and provided the applicant with an opportunity to be heard. The court referred to the principles established in Kioa v West, which outline the requirements for procedural fairness, and determined that the Director-General had complied with these requirements. The court also noted that the applicant had not demonstrated any prejudice arising from the process, further supporting the conclusion that the decision-making was fair.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that an applicant must have standing to bring an application for review under the Road Traffic Act, the application must be brought within the statutory time limit, and the decision of the Director-General must comply with statutory provisions and principles of administrative law. Additionally, the Court will not intervene unless there are clear grounds under the statute or common law, and the decision-making process must adhere to the principles of natural justice. The court’s decision in this case reinforces the importance of adhering to statutory requirements and the limited scope for judicial intervention in administrative decisions.