Crowe v The Commonwealth

Case [1935] HCA 63


54 CLR 69

[ ]

CROWE AND OTHERS

THE COMMONWEALTH AND ANOTHER

DEFENDANTS. Constitutional Law (Cth.) - Whether preference to State by law of trade or

commerce - Delegation of legislative power to Governor-General - Trade and commerce with other countries - Legislation with extra-territorial operation Regulations giving full control to board-Validity-The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), secs. 51 (I.), (XXXIX.), 99-Dried Fruits Export Control Act 1924- 1935 (No. 40 of 1924-No. 3 of 1935)-Dried Fruits Export Control (Licences) Regulations (S.R. 1935, No. 30).

Sec. 4 of the Dried Fruits Export Control Act 1924-1935 constitutes a Dried Fruits Control Board and provides that the board shall consist of (amongst others) two representatives elected by growers in Victoria and one repre- sentative elected by growers in each of the States of New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia.

Held that this section does not contravene sec. 99 of the Constitution. Nature of preference prohibited by sec. 99 discussed. Sec. 13 of the Dried Fruits Export Control Act 1924-1935 provides " For the purpose of enabling the board effectively to control the export and the sale and distribution after export of Australian dried fruits, the Governor- General may by proclamation prohibit the export from the Commonwealth of any dried fruits except in accordance with a licence issued by the Minister subject to such conditions and restrictions as are prescribed after recommenda- tion to the Minister by the board."

Held that this section contains no improper delegation of the legislative powers of the Commonwealth.

Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co. Pty. Ltd. and Meakes V. Dignan, (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73, applied.

54 CLR 70

The Dried Fruits Export Control Act and regulations made thereunder purport to control the distribution overseas of dried fruits exported from Australia and to penalise certain acts that may be done outside Australia.

Held that the Act is authorized by sec. 51 (I.) of the Constitution, and that neither the Act nor the regulations are invalid on the ground that they have extra-territorial operation.

Croft v. Dunphy, (1933) A.C. 156, applied. The regulations give the board a control which enables it to govern in detail every dealing with dried fruits from shipment to final sale, and to do 80 by means of an uncontrolled discretion.

Held that the regulations are authorized by the Act. DEMURRER.

William Joseph Crowe and others brought an action in the High Court against the Commonwealth and the Dried Fruits Control Board.

The statement of claim was, in substance, as follows :- 1. The plaintiffs are fruit merchants, residing and carrying on their respective businesses in the State of South Australia and each of them has SO carried on the like business in the said State for a number of years.

2. In the course of their respective businesses the plaintiffs (and each of them) engage extensively in the acquisition (by purchase or otherwise), and sale, of " dried fruits" (within the meaning of the Commonwealth Dried Fruits Export Control Act 1924-1935).

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AGLC
Crowe v The Commonwealth [1935] HCA 63
Case
[1935] HCA 63
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

William Joseph Crowe and others, fruit merchants, brought an action in the High Court against the Commonwealth and the Dried Fruits Control Board. The plaintiffs sought declarations that the Dried Fruits Export Control Act 1924-1935 and the regulations made thereunder were invalid, and sought ancillary relief to prevent the defendants from interfering with their businesses. The defendants demurred to the statement of claim, arguing that the Act and regulations were valid laws of the Commonwealth.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Dried Fruits Export Control Act 1924-1935 and its associated regulations were valid, or if they contravened provisions of the Australian Constitution. Specifically, the court was required to determine if the Act's provisions for the constitution of the Dried Fruits Control Board infringed section 99 of the Constitution by giving preference to one State over another. The court also had to consider whether section 13 of the Act constituted an improper delegation of legislative power, and whether the Act and regulations, by controlling the distribution of dried fruits overseas and penalising acts outside Australia, had an invalid extra-territorial operation. Finally, the court was asked to determine if the regulations, by granting broad control to the board, exceeded the powers conferred by the Act.

The court held that the constitution of the Dried Fruits Control Board did not contravene section 99 of the Constitution. The court reasoned that the method of election for board members, while not uniform across all states, did not grant any tangible commercial advantage or legal means to secure one, and that the adoption of state boundaries was a convenient method for defining electorates. The court also found that section 13 of the Act did not involve an improper delegation of legislative power, citing previous High Court decisions that upheld similar legislative schemes. Regarding extra-territorial operation, the court determined that the Act was authorised by section 51(I) of the Constitution, which permits laws with respect to trade and commerce with other countries, and that the legislation's control over export and subsequent sale and distribution overseas was a valid exercise of this power, even if it affected acts outside Australia. The court further held that the regulations were authorised by the Act, as the Act's purpose was to enable the board to control the export trade, and the regulations provided the means for this control through prescribed conditions and restrictions on licences.

The demurrer to the statement of claim was allowed, and the action was dismissed with costs.

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