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New South Wales |
Case Name: | Crowe v DPP (NSW) |
Medium Neutral Citation: | [2015] NSWSC 747 |
Hearing Date(s): | 9 June 2015 |
Decision Date: | 16 June 2015 |
Before: | Hoeben CJ at CL |
Decision: | Summons dismissed with costs. |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – Plaintiff committed for trial on murder charge – claim magistrate failed to properly exercise discretions under s 91 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 – Plaintiff sought judicial review by Supreme Court – danger of fragmentation of criminal process – as DPP had found a bill of indictment quashing the committal would be futile – analogous relief available from pre-trial processes – no case made for intervention by Supreme Court. |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes Act 1900 – s 61J(2)(d) |
Cases Cited: | Bagshaw v Carter & Ors [2006] NSWCA 113 |
Category: | Principal judgment |
Parties: | Amanda Crowe – Plaintiff |
Representation: | Counsel: |
File Number(s): | 2015/094756 |
JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR:
Nature of proceedings
The plaintiff has been charged with the following offences:
(1)That on or about 29 October 2013 she did murder Mahmoud Hamzy.
(2)That on or about 29 October 2013 she did cause grievous bodily harm to Omar Ajaj.
(3)That between 1 October and 30 October 2013 she did conspire and agree to murder Mohammed Hamzy.
In the course of committal proceedings on 10 March 2015, the plaintiff made an application to cross examine a number of prosecution witnesses under s 91 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (the s 91 application).
On 16 March 2015 his Honour Still LCM refused the plaintiff’s application and delivered his reasons. The committal proceedings were adjourned to 15 April 2015. On 15 April 2015 his Honour committed the plaintiff for trial in the Supreme Court.
By a Further Amended Summons filed 26 May 2015, the plaintiff seeks judicial review under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 in relation to the refusal of the s 91 application. The plaintiff seeks to quash the order of the learned magistrate, together with a further order remitting the committal to his Honour to be dealt with according to law.
This judgment relates to that Further Amended Summons.
Factual background
In order to understand the application, it is…
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- Case
- [2015] NSWSC 747
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court needed to decide was whether the Supreme Court should intervene in the decision of the magistrate to commit the plaintiff for trial on the charge of murder. The court had to consider whether the magistrate exercised his discretion under section 91 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 appropriately and whether there were any grounds for judicial review of the magistrate's decision. The court also needed to assess whether the relief sought by the plaintiff would result in the fragmentation of the criminal process, which courts generally seek to avoid.
The court held that it would not intervene in the magistrate's decision to commit the plaintiff for trial. The court reasoned that the decision of the magistrate had been superseded by the DPP's decision to find a bill of indictment. The court noted that the DPP had already exercised their discretion to find a bill, and any attempt to re-open the committal proceedings would be futile as it would not affect the DPP's decision. The court further emphasised the importance of avoiding fragmentation in the criminal process, a principle reinforced by historical respect for the jury and the difficulties of conducting complex criminal trials. The court concluded that the relief sought by the plaintiff would not provide a useful basis for delaying the commencement of the trial.
The Supreme Court dismissed the application for judicial review and refused to quash the committal decision. The plaintiff's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was also dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The plaintiff submitted that there remained real utility in the orders sought in the Further Amended Summons in that remitting the matter to the Local Court would serve to re-establish the real possibility that she would be discharged at that stage of the process. This was because a magistrate’s decision at the conclusion of a committal proceeding had “considerable force” despite the fact that it did not bind the prosecuting authorities. The plaintiff submitted that to effectively set to one side the prospect of holding committal proceedings on the basis that a bill had already been found, would be to deprive the plaintiff of the real possibility of an early discharge. The plaintiff submitted that this was the reason why the potential availability of a Basha inquiry before trial would not be a sufficient substitute for a committal proceeding heard in accordance with the s 91 application.Consideration In circumstances where an indictment has been found, the statement of principle in Sergi v Director of Public Prosecutions (Court of Appeal, unreported, 10 September 1991) (Kirby P, Meagher and Handley JJA) remains applicable.“1 Courts of high authority have repeatedly stressed the great circumspection which should be exercised in the provision of relief which would have the effect of disturbing the conduct of a criminal trial. There is no doubt that this Court, as a supervisory court, has a wide jurisdiction to grant such relief where justice requires it. See Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75, 96. However, it is a jurisdiction to be sparingly exercised. Lamb v Moss (1983) 49 ALR 533, 545; Bacon v Rose (1972) 2 NSWLR 793, 797; Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230, CA. In part this restraint arises out of an historical respect for the jury which takes charge of the accused once the trial commences. In part, it derives from a recognition by appellate courts of the difficulties attending the conduct of complex criminal trials. In part it follows from the large provisions to challenge a conviction on appeal if at the end of a trial the accused is convicted and still complains about an interlocutory ruling. In part it is based upon a recognition of the dangers of the “fragmentation in the criminal process”. This last consideration was mentioned most recently by Mason CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 328 and 329. It is essential that more than lip service be paid to these injunctions of restraint. They apply in this case.2 Courts have also taken pains of late to stress the authority of the DPP to find a bill of indictment and the discretion which is there involved separate from the (usually anterior) exercise of discretion to commit an accused person for trial. See Director of Public Prosecutions v Kolalich (1990) 19 NSWLR 520, 527 (CCA). In the present case, the DPP has now found a bill. The order of the magistrate although historically anterior was a necessary pre-condition or a legal foundation for the DPP’s actions – see R v Leslie Robert Butler, CCA, unreported, 16 August 1991 (per Gleeson CJ, p 4). That action stands on its own footing. The decision of the magistrate committing the claimant for trial has, thus, now been overtaken by the DPP’s decision. Any order directed to the magistrate to re-open the committal proceedings could not of itself affect the DPP’s exercise of discretion to find a bill. To the contrary, the magistrate would be entitled unless the DPP elected to withdraw and revoke the bill so found, to regard the re-opened committal as entirely futile. A later finding by the magistrate on a reconsideration of s 6 properly construed that there was no evidence to warrant committing the claimant for trial would leave the DPP’s bill of indictment completely unaffected. The DPP has made it clear to this Court that he intends to present and prosecute his bill when the trial opens. Courts will not usually review the decision of a prosecutor to find a bill, at least in circumstances such as the present. See Grassby v R; R v Woolcott Forbes (1944) 44 SR(NSW) 333, 338 (FC). Therefore the relief sought by the claimant in this Court would not provide a useful basis for any order having the practical effect which the claimant seeks, namely the delay of the commencement of his trial.”