Crowe v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)

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Supreme Court

New South Wales

Case Name: 

Crowe v DPP (NSW)

Medium Neutral Citation: 

[2015] NSWSC 747

Hearing Date(s): 

9 June 2015

Decision Date: 

16 June 2015

Before: 

Hoeben CJ at CL

Decision: 

Summons dismissed with costs.

Catchwords: 

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – Plaintiff committed for trial on murder charge – claim magistrate failed to properly exercise discretions under s 91 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 – Plaintiff sought judicial review by Supreme Court – danger of fragmentation of criminal process – as DPP had found a bill of indictment quashing the committal would be futile – analogous relief available from pre-trial processes – no case made for intervention by Supreme Court.

Legislation Cited: 

Crimes Act 1900 – s 61J(2)(d)
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 – s 91
Supreme Court Act 1970 – s 69

Cases Cited: 

Bagshaw v Carter & Ors [2006] NSWCA 113
Director of Public Prosecutions v Losurdo & Anor (1998) 44 NSWLR 618
Director of Public Prosecutions v PM [2006] NSWCCA 297; 67 NSWLR 46
Grassby v R [1989] HCA 45; 168 CLR 1
Hanna v Kearney (Studdert J, 28 May 1998, unreported)
Joseph Anthony Basha (1989) 39 A Crim R 337
Sergi v Director of Public Prosecutions (Court of Appeal, unreported, 10 September 1991)
V v McDonald & Ors [1995] NSWCA 487

Category: 

Principal judgment

Parties: 

Amanda Crowe – Plaintiff
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) – First Defendant
The Local Court of NSW – Second Defendant

Representation: 

Counsel:
Mr W Terracini SC – Plaintiff
Mr K McKay – First Defendant
Submitting Appearance – Second Defendant
 
Solicitors:
Oxford Lawyers – Plaintiff
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) – First Defendant
Richard Kelly, Acting Crown Solicitor – Second Defendant

File Number(s): 

2015/094756

JUDGMENT

  1. HIS HONOUR:

    Nature of proceedings

    The plaintiff has been charged with the following offences:

    (1)That on or about 29 October 2013 she did murder Mahmoud Hamzy.

    (2)That on or about 29 October 2013 she did cause grievous bodily harm to Omar Ajaj.

    (3)That between 1 October and 30 October 2013 she did conspire and agree to murder Mohammed Hamzy.

  2. In the course of committal proceedings on 10 March 2015, the plaintiff made an application to cross examine a number of prosecution witnesses under s 91 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (the s 91 application).

  3. On 16 March 2015 his Honour Still LCM refused the plaintiff’s application and delivered his reasons. The committal proceedings were adjourned to 15 April 2015. On 15 April 2015 his Honour committed the plaintiff for trial in the Supreme Court.

  4. By a Further Amended Summons filed 26 May 2015, the plaintiff seeks judicial review under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 in relation to the refusal of the s 91 application. The plaintiff seeks to quash the order of the learned magistrate, together with a further order remitting the committal to his Honour to be dealt with according to law.

  5. This judgment relates to that Further Amended Summons.

    Factual background

  6. In order to understand the application, it is…

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Details
Case
[2015] NSWSC 747
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Crowe has been committed for trial on a charge of murder and is seeking judicial review of that decision by the Supreme Court. The plaintiff argues that the magistrate failed to properly exercise his discretion under section 91 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 when he committed the plaintiff for trial. The plaintiff contends that the magistrate did not adequately consider the available evidence, and as a result, the decision to commit the plaintiff for trial was flawed. The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) opposes the application, arguing that the Supreme Court should not interfere with the magistrate's decision, especially given that the DPP has already found a bill of indictment.

The primary legal issue the court needed to decide was whether the Supreme Court should intervene in the decision of the magistrate to commit the plaintiff for trial on the charge of murder. The court had to consider whether the magistrate exercised his discretion under section 91 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 appropriately and whether there were any grounds for judicial review of the magistrate's decision. The court also needed to assess whether the relief sought by the plaintiff would result in the fragmentation of the criminal process, which courts generally seek to avoid.

The court held that it would not intervene in the magistrate's decision to commit the plaintiff for trial. The court reasoned that the decision of the magistrate had been superseded by the DPP's decision to find a bill of indictment. The court noted that the DPP had already exercised their discretion to find a bill, and any attempt to re-open the committal proceedings would be futile as it would not affect the DPP's decision. The court further emphasised the importance of avoiding fragmentation in the criminal process, a principle reinforced by historical respect for the jury and the difficulties of conducting complex criminal trials. The court concluded that the relief sought by the plaintiff would not provide a useful basis for delaying the commencement of the trial.

The Supreme Court dismissed the application for judicial review and refused to quash the committal decision. The plaintiff's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was also dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

This judgment relates to that Further Amended Summons.Factual background In order to understand the application, it is necessary to provide the context within which the Crown alleges that the plaintiff’s offending occurred. The following is taken from the Crown Case Statement. It is not a statement of fact per se, but sets out the allegations of fact upon which the Crown relies. The Brothers for Life (BFL) gang was started in gaol by Bassam Hamzy and his cousins, including Ghassan Hamzy and Mohammed ‘Hamoudie’ Hamzy. The BFL became a well known criminal group mostly comprising Islamic males of Afghani and Middle Eastern background. In 2013 the BFL had two main factions, Bankstown and Blacktown. At that time, Mohammed ‘Hamoudie’ Hamzy ran the Bankstown faction and one of the co-accused, Farhad Qaumi had the leadership of the Blacktown faction. When Farhad Qaumi took over the leadership of the Blacktown faction, he was able to control and direct its criminal activities. He did so with the assistance of his two brothers, Mumtaz and Jamil. During his time in charge, the criminal activities of the BFL Blacktown faction comprised shootings at individuals, home invasions, other firearm offences, the supply of prohibited drugs and a “contract murder”. By late 2013, in addition to this offending, the BFL Bankstown and Blacktown factions became involved in a conflict as a result of Farhad Qaumi attempting to exert stronger influence over the entire BFL. A close confidant of Farhad Qaumi during this period was the plaintiff, who also had strong affiliations with members of the Bankstown BFL faction. It is the Crown case that during this struggle between the two factions, Farhad Qaumi and/or his brothers Jamil and Mumtaz, along with the plaintiff were involved in, and directed, other members of BFL Blacktown to commit multiple shootings, including a second murder, in a bid to overpower the Bankstown faction, whose members were primarily of Lebanese background. A large part of the Crown case against the plaintiff depends upon witnesses “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, “E”, “G”, “I”, “J”, “K” and “L”, who were also members/associates of the Blacktown BFL. Those persons are expected to give evidence about their knowledge of the background and the “general” nature of the activities of BFL Blacktown in the time they were involved such as conducting “drug rips”. In addition, they are expected to give first hand evidence of “specific” criminal offending that they played a role in, along with the relevant co-accused including the plaintiff, as reflected in the counts on the indictment. It is the Crown case that on 28 October 2013 the plaintiff approached Farhad Qaumi and told him that Mohammed ‘Hamoudie’ Hamzy was trying to have him killed. After making some inquiries, Farhad Qaumi told a group of the BFL Blacktown faction, which included witness L, Jamil Qaumi and Mohammed Zarshoy that Mohammed ‘Hamoudie’ Hamzy had to be killed. It was decided that the plaintiff would drive those three persons to Mohammed “Hamoudie” Hamzy’s residence because she had been to the house previously and knew the area well. The plaintiff is said to have advised the group that they would have to wait until later in the evening as Mohammed Hamzy had bail conditions requiring him to be home before 11pm. She also advised that Mohammed Hamzy and his associates always sat in the garage of his home to socialise after the curfew came into effect.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The plaintiff submitted that there remained real utility in the orders sought in the Further Amended Summons in that remitting the matter to the Local Court would serve to re-establish the real possibility that she would be discharged at that stage of the process. This was because a magistrate’s decision at the conclusion of a committal proceeding had “considerable force” despite the fact that it did not bind the prosecuting authorities. The plaintiff submitted that to effectively set to one side the prospect of holding committal proceedings on the basis that a bill had already been found, would be to deprive the plaintiff of the real possibility of an early discharge. The plaintiff submitted that this was the reason why the potential availability of a Basha inquiry before trial would not be a sufficient substitute for a committal proceeding heard in accordance with the s 91 application.Consideration In circumstances where an indictment has been found, the statement of principle in Sergi v Director of Public Prosecutions (Court of Appeal, unreported, 10 September 1991) (Kirby P, Meagher and Handley JJA) remains applicable.“1 Courts of high authority have repeatedly stressed the great circumspection which should be exercised in the provision of relief which would have the effect of disturbing the conduct of a criminal trial. There is no doubt that this Court, as a supervisory court, has a wide jurisdiction to grant such relief where justice requires it. See Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75, 96. However, it is a jurisdiction to be sparingly exercised. Lamb v Moss (1983) 49 ALR 533, 545; Bacon v Rose (1972) 2 NSWLR 793, 797; Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230, CA. In part this restraint arises out of an historical respect for the jury which takes charge of the accused once the trial commences. In part, it derives from a recognition by appellate courts of the difficulties attending the conduct of complex criminal trials. In part it follows from the large provisions to challenge a conviction on appeal if at the end of a trial the accused is convicted and still complains about an interlocutory ruling. In part it is based upon a recognition of the dangers of the “fragmentation in the criminal process”. This last consideration was mentioned most recently by Mason CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 328 and 329. It is essential that more than lip service be paid to these injunctions of restraint. They apply in this case.2 Courts have also taken pains of late to stress the authority of the DPP to find a bill of indictment and the discretion which is there involved separate from the (usually anterior) exercise of discretion to commit an accused person for trial. See Director of Public Prosecutions v Kolalich (1990) 19 NSWLR 520, 527 (CCA). In the present case, the DPP has now found a bill. The order of the magistrate although historically anterior was a necessary pre-condition or a legal foundation for the DPP’s actions – see R v Leslie Robert Butler, CCA, unreported, 16 August 1991 (per Gleeson CJ, p 4). That action stands on its own footing. The decision of the magistrate committing the claimant for trial has, thus, now been overtaken by the DPP’s decision. Any order directed to the magistrate to re-open the committal proceedings could not of itself affect the DPP’s exercise of discretion to find a bill. To the contrary, the magistrate would be entitled unless the DPP elected to withdraw and revoke the bill so found, to regard the re-opened committal as entirely futile. A later finding by the magistrate on a reconsideration of s 6 properly construed that there was no evidence to warrant committing the claimant for trial would leave the DPP’s bill of indictment completely unaffected. The DPP has made it clear to this Court that he intends to present and prosecute his bill when the trial opens. Courts will not usually review the decision of a prosecutor to find a bill, at least in circumstances such as the present. See Grassby v R; R v Woolcott Forbes (1944) 44 SR(NSW) 333, 338 (FC). Therefore the relief sought by the claimant in this Court would not provide a useful basis for any order having the practical effect which the claimant seeks, namely the delay of the commencement of his trial.”