SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Crossman v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 112
PARTIES:
CROSSMAN, Ian Norman
(applicant)v
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
CA No 8 of 2017
DC No 134 of 2016DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Cairns – Unreported: 15 December 2016DELIVERED ON:
31 May 2017
DELIVERED AT:
Cairns
HEARING DATE:
30 May 2017
JUDGES:
Sofronoff P and Gotterson JA and North J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order madeORDER:
Leave to appeal refused.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – OTHER MATTERS – where the applicant was convicted for disobeying the speed limit – where the applicant appealed his conviction to the District Court with his appeal being dismissed – where the applicant seeks leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under s 118 of the District Court Act – where the applicant submitted that amendments to s 124 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act were difficult to administer – where the applicant submitted that a reverse onus was imposed in the District Court hearing due to the admission of certificates under s 124 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act – whether leave to appeal the conviction should be granted
District Court Act of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 118
Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld), s 124, s 124(4), s 124(5)COUNSEL:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf
N Rees for the respondentSOLICITORS:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
SOFRONOFF P: This is an application for leave to appeal an order of a District Court judge who dismissed an appeal under s 222 of the Justices Act 1886.
The applicant was convicted on 1 August 2016 of driving at a speed of 96 kilometres per hour in a zone where the speed limit was 80 kilometres per hour. He appealed his conviction to the District Court where his appeal was dismissed. His grounds of appeal to that Court were two. First, that a covert recording by the police officer who detected his speed was inadmissible and that it had been edited so that it was misleading. Second, that the Prolaser hand held speed detector “was used outside its ‘range’ re the operator’s manual”.
Harrison DCJ, who dismissed the appeal, found that the fact that the applicant did not know that his words were being recorded did not render the recording inadmissible. That is, of course, true. His Honour also considered whether the admission of the recording had been in any way unfair. He held that the use of the recording was not unfair. On the contrary, in reliance on the decision of Atkinson J in Schulz v Johnstone [2011] QSC 221, his Honour held that by ensuring the accuracy of evidence of a relevant conversation, the recording was of…
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- Case
- [2017] QCA 112
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered the submissions made by Crossman regarding the administrative difficulties posed by the amendments to section 124 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act. It was noted that the Act itself provides for the issuance of certificates to establish the speed limit, and the Court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that these certificates were difficult to administer. Furthermore, the Court examined whether a reverse onus was imposed in the District Court hearing. It was determined that the admission of certificates under the Act did not impose a reverse onus, but rather provided evidence of the speed limit. The Court found that the applicant's arguments did not establish a sufficient ground for leave to appeal.
In light of the above considerations, the Court found that Crossman had not demonstrated that there were grounds for leave to appeal the conviction. The Court held that the applicant had not shown that the amendments to section 124 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act were difficult to administer or that a reverse onus was imposed in the District Court hearing. Therefore, the Court refused leave to appeal the conviction.
LEAVE TO APPEAL REFUSED.
Orders
Orders of the court
Leave to appeal refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicant was initially convicted in the Magistrates Court for disobeying the speed limit. He appealed his conviction to the District Court, which dismissed his appeal. The applicant now seeks leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under section 118 of the District Court Act. The application for leave to appeal is the current matter before the Court of Appeal. No prior decisions or other procedural steps are mentioned in the provided text.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether leave to appeal the conviction should be granted.
Held
1. Whether leave to appeal the conviction should be granted: The Court of Appeal refused the applicant leave to appeal his conviction.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal considered the application for leave to appeal under s 118 of the District Court Act, focusing on the applicant's arguments regarding the amendments to s 124 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act and the alleged imposition of a reverse onus during the District Court hearing. The Court examined the legislative amendments and their implications for the administration of road use management. The Court also considered the applicant's claims about the reverse onus, which pertained to the admission of certificates under s 124 and their impact on the District Court proceedings.
The Court found that the applicant's arguments did not establish sufficient grounds to warrant leave to appeal. The Court noted that the applicant's concerns about the legislative amendments did not necessarily translate to a significant error in the District Court's decision. Additionally, the Court held that the applicant had not demonstrated that the alleged reverse onus was a material factor in the District Court's judgment. Consequently, the Court concluded that the applicant had not met the threshold for leave to appeal, and the application was dismissed. The binding legal principle established in this case is that for leave to appeal to be granted, the applicant must demonstrate that the appeal has a real prospect of success and that the case presents a significant question of law or fact warranting further judicial consideration.