[2018] QCA 169
COURT OF APPEAL
SOFRONOFF P
GOTTERSON JA
RYAN J
CA No 270 of 2017
DC No 193 of 2016
CROSSMAN, Ian Norman Applicant
v
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE Respondent
BRISBANE
MONDAY, 30 JULY 2018
JUDGMENT
SOFRONOFF P: The applicant was detected travelling in a motor vehicle along Sheridan Street, Cairns at a speed of 67 kilometres per hour in a 60 kilometre per hour zone. He was issued with an infringement notice and elected to go to trial. He gave notice under s 120(7) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 that he intended to challenge the operational condition of the detection device.
The prosecution tendered the usual certificates required in such cases, namely, certificates proving that: the speed detection device was working properly at the time of the offence, that the vehicle in which the applicant was travelling was travelling at 67 kilometres per hour, that the car was 46 metres from the speed detection device when the speed was detected, that the car was registered to a man called Bignall, that an infringement notice was sent to Bignall and that Bignall nominated the applicant as the driver at the relevant time.
Senior Constable Bartlett gave evidence at the trial affirming some of these matters. A senior technical officer also gave evidence about the workings of the device. All of this evidence proved the commission of the offence. The applicant cross-examined these witnesses to no effect. He did not challenge the fact that he had committed the offence. Magistrate Bentley delivered a carefully reasoned judgment and rightly convicted the appellant. The applicant appealed to the District Court, and Judge Harrison set out in detail the evidence that I have summarised and correctly dismissed the appeal. An appeal to this Court only lies by leave. As Justice Bowskill pointed out in McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255:
“[T]his Court’s discretion to grant or to refuse leave to appeal is unfettered. It is exercisable according to the nature of the case but leave to appeal will not be given lightly, given that the applicant has already had the benefit of two judicial hearings… [Moreover,] the mere fact that there has been an error, or that an error can be detected in the judgment is not ordinarily, by itself, sufficient to justify the grant of leave to appeal – leave will usually be granted only where an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice to the applicant and there is a reasonable argument that there is an error to be corrected.”
There is no substantial injustice demonstrated here, nor is there any reasonable argument that there has been an error. The applicant’s written ground for leave is that:
“The QPS provided conflicting, confusing evidence.”
That is not true. This application has no merit. It should be dismissed.
The section is silent about the costs of applications for leave to appeal. However, s 15 of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 provides that:
“A court may…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Crossman v Queensland Police Service and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2018] QCA 169
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether there was a substantial injustice or a reasonable argument for an error in the judgment that warranted an appeal. Crossman argued that the Queensland Police Service provided conflicting, confusing evidence, but the court found this argument to be without merit. The court emphasised that leave to appeal would not be granted lightly, particularly when the applicant has already had the benefit of two judicial hearings and no substantial injustice or error was evident. The court noted that the evidence provided was consistent and did not support Crossman's claims of confusion or conflict.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Crossman's application for leave to appeal, finding it to be without merit. The court also addressed the issue of costs, noting that it had the discretion to award costs against an unsuccessful applicant for leave to appeal under s 15 of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011. However, Crossman's lawyer did not wish to pursue costs, and the court proceeded to dismiss the application. The court ordered that the application be dismissed and adjourned the proceedings.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated from a speeding offence detected by a speed detection device in Cairns. Crossman contested the infringement notice, leading to a trial where the prosecution provided evidence to confirm the offence. Magistrate Bentley convicted Crossman, and this decision was upheld by Judge Harrison in the District Court. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was made but required leave, which was denied due to the lack of substantial injustice or reasonable argument for error. The matter proceeded to the Court of Appeal to determine the application for leave to appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether leave to appeal should be granted to the applicant.
2. Whether the Queensland Police Service provided conflicting, confusing evidence.
3. Whether the Court has the power to award costs against an unsuccessful applicant for leave to appeal.
Held
1. The Court held that leave to appeal should not be granted to the applicant as there was no substantial injustice demonstrated, nor a reasonable argument that there had been an error in the decision.
2. The Court found that the Queensland Police Service did not provide conflicting or confusing evidence.
3. The Court concluded it had the power to award costs against an unsuccessful applicant for leave to appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court considered the application for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the applicant's appeal in the District Court. The Court noted that the discretion to grant or refuse leave to appeal was unfettered, and leave would not be given lightly given the applicant had already had the benefit of two judicial hearings. The Court held that the applicant's argument that the Queensland Police Service provided conflicting, confusing evidence was not true. The Court found no substantial injustice and no reasonable argument that there had been an error in the decision. Regarding the power to award costs, the Court interpreted the Civil Proceedings Act 2011, which allowed for costs to be awarded unless otherwise provided, and found no such provision in relation to applications for leave to appeal under the District Court of Queensland Act. Therefore, the Court concluded it had the power to award costs against an unsuccessful applicant for leave to appeal. The Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, and the respondent decided not to pursue costs.