Crosby v Department of Natural Resources and Mines

[2007] QLC 62

LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:	Crosby v Department of Natural Resources and Mines [2007] QLC 0062
PARTIES:	Marilyn A and Peter V Crosby (appellants)
v.
Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines (respondent)
FILE NO.:	AV2005/1296
DIVISION:	Land Court of Queensland
PROCEEDING:	Appeal against annual valuation under the Valuation of Land Act 1944
DELIVERED ON:	7 September 2007
DELIVERED AT:	Brisbane
HEARD AT:	Caloundra
MEMBER	Mrs CAC MacDonald
ORDER:	The appeal is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:	Jurisdiction – land reclassified from rural residential to primary production – application to back-date re-classification to previous years – not within jurisdiction of Court – limitations under Valuation of Land Act.
APPEARANCES:	Mr PV Crosby for the appellants
Mr W Isdale, Crown Law, for the respondent

1. This appeal was lodged by Marilyn A and Peter V Crosby (the appellants) following the determination by the Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines (the respondent), under the provisions of the Valuation of Land Act 1944, of the value of land owned by the appellants at $62,500, as at 1 October 2004. 

2. The appellants purchased their property of 4.046 ha, which is located at Image Flat near Nambour, in September 1994.  They use the land for reproduction of cane sets and for grazing cows and calves during the calving period.  The valuation as at 1 October 2004 originally issued at $265,000 but was reduced on objection to $62,500.  The reason for the reduction was that the classification of the land was changed by the respondent from rural residential to primary production.  The primary production classification attracted the operation of s.17(1) of the Act which provides that, in determining the unimproved value of land exclusively used for purposes of farming, any enhancement in value because the land has a potential alternative use is to be disregarded. 

3. It is apparent from the appeal documents and from what was said at the hearing that the appellants have accepted both the revised valuation and the reclassification of their land and that those matters are not in issue in the appeal. 

4. The crux of the appellants' complaint is that they had sought reclassification of their land at or soon after the date of purchase but it was only now, with the 2004 valuation, that the reclassification had occurred.  Mr PV Crosby, who appeared on behalf of the appellants, considered that the appellants were entitled to have the reclassification backdated to the date of purchase as the property has been used continuously for farming purposes since that date.   

5. Mr Crosby submitted that the reclassification should be backdated for a number of reasons -  

   ·    in response to a request for reclassification by the appellants, he was told by a representative of the respondent department some eight years ago that the reclassification would be backdated to the date of purchase.  This did not occur;

   ·    he was subsequently told that there had been a driveby of the property by a valuer in the late 1990s but he received no notification of that at the time.  Consequently there was no proper inspection at that time;

·    the notices of valuation issued by the department did not indicate the classification of the land on which each valuation was based.  There was, therefore, a lack of transparency in departmental practice and the department was in breach of its duty of care to inform the landholder of the classification adopted by the department.  Mr Crosby assumed that the reclassification had occurred, as promised, until he undertook investigations in relation to the 2004 valuation; 

·    the departmental valuer who had reclassified the land told Mr Crosby that he had sent his request for backdating "up the line" but the appellants still had not received a satisfactory result.

1. It appears from Mr Crosby's submissions that the appellants have a genuine grievance.  However, as I explained to Mr Crosby at the hearing, I do not consider that I have jurisdiction to deal with that grievance. 

2. The matters about which a valuation appeal may be made to the Land Court are strictly limited by the Valuation of Land Act.  The Act provides, in s.42, that an owner who is dissatisfied with an annual valuation may lodge an objection in writing against the valuation within 42 days after the notice of annual valuation is given to the owner.  The appellants objected and, as noted above, their objection was allowed and the valuation reduced to the amount for which the appellants contended.

3. Section 45(1) provides that an owner who has objected pursuant to s.42 against a valuation may, if dissatisfied with the decision of the chief executive upon the objection, appeal to the Land Court.  Although this appeal appears to have been lodged pursuant to s.45(1), the appeal does not lie because one of the criteria in the subsection is not fulfilled – the owners are not dissatisfied with the decision of the chief executive upon the objection.  Indeed they have accepted that decision.  It is true that the owners are dissatisfied with the department's failure to backdate the reclassification of the land and they also submit that the respondent department has failed over the years in its duty of care to inform the landowner of the classification of the land on which the valuation is based.  However these are not matters about which an appeal can be made under s.45(1).

4. Implicitly, the appellants' submissions may be understood as a request to revalue their land back to the date of purchase in 1994.  Even if such an interpretation were adopted, it does not assist the appellants because the Court does not have jurisdiction to do that.  There has been no objection lodged under s.42 to each of the intervening valuations nor, consequently, any appeal lodged under s.45(1) in respect of those valuations. 

5. Moreover, the Court does not have the power to order the department to backdate the reclassification of the land nor to make any decision as to whether the respondent was in breach of any duty of care owed to the appellants, as alleged.  Section 66 of the Act (which applies to this appeal by virtue of s.45(9)) provides that upon an appeal, the Land Court may either affirm, reduce or increase the valuation appealed against, and make appropriate orders as to the payment of costs.  The appellants do not seek any alteration to the revised valuation as at 1 October 2004.  No power is given to the Court to make any other orders. 

6. Mr Crosby sought to avoid this result by submitting that s.17 was not limited in its operation by the constraints imposed by s.45(1).  While there are no express constraints in s.17(1) it is clear that the section only becomes relevant when a valuer is determining the   unimproved value of land under the Act.  Thus, for example, when the 2004 valuation was made the valuer was required to consider whether s.17 was applicable.  Similarly, when the valuations of the subject land between 1994 and prior to 2004 were made, the applicability of s.17 should have been considered.  If the appellants had realised in relation to those earlier valuations that s.17 had not been applied, and had objected and appealed against each valuation, the Court could have considered that issue.  However, in the absence of any properly instituted appeals against those earlier valuations, I do not have power to deal with or reconsider those valuations.

7. My conclusion is therefore that I have no jurisdiction to deal with the issues raised by the appellants in their appeal and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.

Order

The appeal is dismissed. 

CAC MacDONALD

MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT