Crompton & Crompton
[2025] FedCFamC2F 52
•24 January 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Crompton & Crompton [2025] FedCFamC2F 52
File number(s): ADC 1137 of 2023 Judgment of: JUDGE DICKSON Date of judgment: 24 January 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPLICATION TO PROCEED OUT OF TIME – COSTS – Procedural matters – Interim proceedings – Orders made on 28 May 2024 by Senior Judicial Registrar dismissing the proposed intervenor’s application to intervene – Where the proposed intervenor now makes an application seeking leave to file an application for review of Senior Judicial Registrar’s decision out of time – Where the proposed intervenor is 57 days out of time – Consideration of hardship – Where the proposed intervenor has not met the legal threshold for out of time – Practitioners should not communicate unilaterally with Chambers – Application dismissed – Costs ordered. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 95, 117.
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 12.13, 14.05, 15.06.
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) Rules 2021 sch 1.
Cases cited: Daines & Daines (Costs) [2014] FamCAFC 170
Delgado & Soto [2021] FamCA 65
Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479
Hadkinson & Hadkinson (1952) 2 All ER 567
Hall & Hall (1979) FLC 90-679
Moorcroft & Moorcroft [2018] FamCAFC 253
Sharaf & Nouri and B Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC1F 898
Sharp & Sharp (2011) 50 Fam LR 567
Tormsen & Tormsen (1993) FLC 92-392
Watson & Watson [2013] FamCAFC 25
Division: Division 2 Family Law Number of paragraphs: 90 Date of hearing: 17 December 2024 Place: Adelaide Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Hay Solicitor for the Applicant: Wadlow Solicitors The Respondent: Self-represented Proposed Intervenor: Self-represented ORDERS
ADC 1137 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MR CROMPTON
Applicant
AND: MS CROMPTON
Respondent
MR FARRINGTON
Proposed Intervenor
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE DICKSON
DATE OF ORDER:
24 JANUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application in a Proceeding filed by Mr Farrington on 15 August 2024 is hereby dismissed.
2.The Responses to Application in a Proceeding filed by the Respondents respectively on 4 December 2024 are hereby dismissed.
3.Within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, Mr Farrington do pay the Respondent Husband’s costs of and incidental to this application fixed in the sum of $3,977.24.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE DICKSON:
INTRODUCTION
These interim proceedings come before the Court by way of an Application in a Proceeding filed by the Proposed Intervenor, Mr Farrington, on 15 August 2024.
Mr Farrington seeks an extension of time to file an Application for Review of an Order made by a Senior Judicial Registrar on 28 May 2024.
The Respondent Husband, Mr Crompton (‘Mr Crompton’), is represented by a Litigation Guardian being his father, Mr AW. Mr Farrington’s application is opposed by Mr Crompton but consented to by the Respondent Wife, Ms Crompton (‘Ms Crompton’).
For the reasons set out herein, the Court proposes to dismiss Mr Farrington’s Application and to make an order for costs.
DOCUMENTS RELIED UPON
The applicant, Mr Farrington, filed an Outline of Case Document (Interim Hearing) on 13 December 2024. At hearing, Mr Farrington informed the Court that he relied upon the following documents:
(1)Affidavit of Mr Crompton filed 18 April 2024;
(2)Affidavit of Mr Crompton filed 15 May 2024;
(3)Transcript of Hearing dated 17 May 2024 in the matter of CAC 924 of 2021;
(4)Orders of 28 May 2024; and
(5)Orders of 14 June 2024 in CAC 924 of 2021.
Self-evidently, Mr Farrington also relies on his Application in a Proceeding filed 15 August 2024 (but sealed on 26 August 2024) which seeks an extension of time to file an application for review out of time, the affidavit in support also filed 15 August 2024 and a proposed Minute of Orders Sought document filed 13 December 2024.
Mr Crompton filed an Outline of Case (Interim Hearing) on 13 December 2024. At hearing, counsel informed the Court that he relied upon the following documents:
(1)Orders of 28 May and 19 July 2024 respectively;
(2)Affidavit of Mr Farrington filed 15 August 2024;
(3)Application in a Proceeding filed by Mr Farrington on 15 August 2024;
(4)Affidavit of Mr AX filed 4 December 2024; and
(5)Orders of 22 November 2024.
Self-evidently, Mr Crompton also relies on his Response to Application in a Proceeding and the Affidavit of Mr AW filed 4 December 2024.
Ms Crompton filed an Outline of Case (Interim Hearing) on 13 December 2024 and confirmed at hearing that she relied upon the following documents:
(1)Response to Application in a Proceeding filed 4 December 2024;
(2)Affidavit in Support filed 4 December 2024; and
(3)Minute of Orders Sought.
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
The issue in dispute is whether an extension of time should be granted pursuant to rule 15.06 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (‘the Rules’) for Mr Farrington to file an application for review of the order made by a Senior Judicial Registrar on 28 May 2024 out of time.
Subject to the determination of this issue, is the question of costs.
BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I consider it helpful to set out the factual background to the current dispute given the inter-relationship between Mr Crompton, Ms Crompton and Mr Farrington.
Mr Crompton was born in 1980. He is a retired defence force member after being medically discharged.
Ms Crompton was born in 1982. She has worked as a hospitality worker and is in receipt of Centrelink entitlements.
In 2004, Mr Crompton commenced a relationship with Ms Belkis (‘Ms Belkis’). They were married in 2006 and had one child together, namely M born in 2007 (‘M’). When their relationship ended in 2010, Ms Belkis moved to Region U. M remained living with her father, Mr Crompton.
In 2010, Ms Belkis commenced a relationship with Mr Farrington (the applicant at this hearing). Ms Belkis and Mr Farrington married in 2012, and finally separated in or about 2019. Ms Belkis and Mr Farrington have two children, namely X now aged 13 years and Y now aged 12 years. Ms Belkis and Mr Farrington have been involved in protracted litigation before Judge Neville in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia over their two children (CAC 924 of 2021).
In 2011, Mr and Ms Crompton commenced a relationship and were married in 2014. They have one child, UU born in 2020 (‘UU’). Upon their marriage, Mr Crompton’s daughter M also lived in their family and was parented by Mr Crompton and Ms Crompton.
Mr Farrington and Mr Crompton met in 2011 when Mr Farrington commenced in assisting to facilitate time between M (who was in the care of Mr Crompton) and her mother, Ms Belkis (who was then married to Mr Farrington).
In 2014, Mr Farrington retired from the defence force.
In 2019, Mr Farrington separated from Ms Belkis. That same year, Mr Crompton was medically discharged from the defence force. The relationship between Mr Crompton and Mr Farrington strengthened through their commonality of being former spouses of Ms Belkis and both having worked and retired from the defence force.
In these proceedings, Mr Crompton has alleged that Mr Farrington became his “veterans advocate” in his dealings with the defence force and that Mr Farrington has had access to his personal medical information including his diagnosis of PTSD. Mr Farrington denies performing a formal role as an advocate but agrees that he would assist Mr Crompton in completing necessary documentation and liaising with the defence force.
On 26 November 2022, Mr and Ms Crompton separated. Mr Crompton alleges that Ms Crompton is now in relationship with Mr Farrington. Ms Crompton denies this allegation.[1]
[1] On 8 December 2024, Ms Crompton filed a Request to Attend by Electronic Communication form in which she deposed to being in a location with Mr Farrington and the children in Town VV, New South Wales to provide assistance to him with his health conditions.
On 15 March 2023, Mr Crompton filed an Initiating Application seeking orders for property settlement and parenting for the children M and UU (collectively ‘the children’).
As set out herein, Mr Crompton is the biological father of both M and UU. Ms Crompton is the biological mother of UU and the stepmother of M. The children have lived with Ms Crompton since separation.
On 11 May 2023, Ms Crompton filed a Response to Initiating Application also seeking orders for property settlement and parenting for the said children, M and UU.
On 22 May 2023, an Independent Children's Lawyer filed a Notice of Address for Service on behalf of the said children.
On 6 September 2023, an order was made joining Ms Belkis as a party to the proceedings as the biological mother of M and naming her as Second Respondent.
On 16 October 2023, Ms Crompton filed an Amended Response in relation to property settlement and parenting orders.
On 1 December 2023, Ms Belkis filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking to be removed as a party to these proceedings.
On 23 January 2024, final orders were made by default in relation to parenting applications. The orders were made in favour of Ms Crompton after Ms Belkis and Mr Crompton did not seek to be heard and the Independent Children’s Lawyer supported the orders being made as sought by Ms Crompton.
In early 2024, Mr Crompton commenced proceedings in the Magistrates Court seeking a private intervention order against Mr Farrington.
In early 2024, Mr Farrington filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking to intervene in these proceedings as the Second Respondent. Mr Farrington’s application was opposed by Mr Crompton but consented to by Ms Crompton.
In early 2024, an interim intervention order was granted on an ex parte basis in favour of Mr Crompton against Mr Farrington.
In mid-2024, Mr Farrington was served with Mr Crompton’s intervention order documents and order.
In mid-2024, Mr Farrington attended a first return hearing on Mr Crompton’s intervention order application in the Magistrates Court.
On 28 May 2024, Mr Farrington’s Application in a Proceeding seeking to intervene in these proceedings was heard by a Senior Judicial Registrar. Mr Farrington’s Application in a Proceeding was dismissed and written submissions as to costs were ordered.
In mid-2024, Mr and Ms Crompton were divorced.
On 14 June 2024, final orders were made by Judge Neville to provide that the children X and Y live with Ms Belkis who shall have sole parental responsibility for their care. Further, that the children spend no time with their father, Mr Farrington, and that he be restrained by way of injunction from contacting or approaching the children. Further, that for a period of 12 months from the date of the orders, Mr Farrington is restrained from filing any further applications without prior leave of the Court having first been obtained.[2]
[2] Mr Farrington relied upon the Order made on 14 June 2024 in his Outline of Case Document (Interim Hearing) filed 13 December 2024.
In mid-2024, Mr Crompton’s intervention order application was heard in the Magistrates Court. Mr Farrington asserts that he thereafter applied for a copy of the transcript.
In July 2024, Mr Farrington alleges that he received an audio file via a USB drive of the hearing in the Magistrates Court in mid-2024. A summary of the matters allegedly put to the Magistrates Court by Mr Crompton’s counsel are contained in paragraph 18 of Mr Farrington’s affidavit filed 15 August 2024. A formal transcript of the hearing in mid-2024 is said by Mr Farrington to not be available.
On 15 August 2024 (but sealed on 26 August 2024), Mr Farrington filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking an extension of time for the filing of an application for review of the Senior Judicial Registrar’s decision dated 28 May 2024.
On 30 August 2024, an Application in a Proceeding was filed seeking the appointment of a Litigation Guardian for Mr Crompton.
On 19 September 2024, the Senior Judicial Registrar ordered that Mr Farrington pay a sum of $2,282.07 towards Mr Crompton’s costs arising from his unsuccessful application to intervene in these proceedings. Mr Farrington has not complied with this order.
On 29 October 2024, a psychiatric report of Dr AY psychiatrist was obtained in relation to Mr Crompton.
On 22 November 2024, an order was made appointing Mr AW as the Litigation Guardian for his son, Mr Crompton.
MR FARRINGTON’S SUBMISSIONS
Mr Farrington seeks an extension of time to proceed with his application for review of the orders made by the Senior Judicial Registrar on 28 May 2024.
The gravamen of Mr Farrington’s application lies with submissions alleged to have been made by Mr Crompton’s legal representative, Mr AZ, in the intervention order proceedings before the Magistrates Court in mid-2024.[3] Mr Farrington complains that Mr AZ made allegations in the Magistrates Court proceedings using “illegally obtained documents” from the parenting proceedings before this Court and that “but for” this event, he “wouldn’t be here” (i.e. filing for a review). Further, Mr Farrington argues that Mr AZ has made false allegations against him in the Magistrates Court proceedings.
[3] See the Affidavit of Mr Farrington filed 15 August 2024 at paragraph 18.
Mr Farrington contends that because of the submissions made on behalf of Mr Crompton, he now holds concerns that the Senior Judicial Registrar and Mr AZ were “consorting” during Mr Farrington’s application to intervene in the property proceedings between Mr Crompton and Ms Crompton. Further, if the allegations made are true and accurate, then the Senior Judicial Registrar has “acted corruptly and to the sole benefit of [Mr AZ’s] client.”[4]
[4] See the Affidavit of Mr Farrington filed 15 August 2024 at paragraphs 20 and 21.
Further, that Mr Farrington was unable to file his review of the orders made by the Senior Judicial Registrar on 28 May 2024 within the time prescribed in the Rules, because he did not receive a copy of the transcript of the Magistrates Court hearing held in mid-2024 until July 2024. Mr Farrington contends that he has not been able to obtain a copy of the official transcript for the hearing in mid-2024 to rely upon at this hearing.[5]
[5] See the Affidavit of Mr Farrington filed 15 August 2024 at paragraph 27.
Mr Farrington submits that whilst he does not believe that the Senior Judicial Registrar would have acted contrary to her professional obligations and standards, he has received legal advice that he must file the application so that a proper review can occur.[6]
[6] See the Affidavit of Mr Farrington filed 15 August 2024 at paragraph 25.
Mr Farrington also argues that the review should be granted because he has an arguable case that would assist the Court in making orders that are just and equitable because of his detailed knowledge of Mr and Ms Crompton. This in turn would “speed-up” the property proceedings and save the Court time and resources.[7] Further, that he has made direct and indirect financial contributions to Ms Crompton since her separation from Mr Crompton separated for which he should be compensated.
[7] See the Affidavit of Mr Farrington filed 15 March 2024 at paragraph 36(b).
If successful on this application, Mr Farrington sought costs of approximately $5,000.
MS CROMPTON’S SUBMISSIONS
Ms Crompton supports the application of Mr Farrington for leave to file an application for review out of time.
Ms Crompton supported any order which would keep the proceedings as simple as possible.
Ms Crompton confirmed that if Mr Farrington was not successful with this application, it was her intention to call Mr Farrington as a witness at Trial in relation to the monies that she acknowledges have been paid by him since her separation from Mr Crompton on behalf of herself and the children. Ms Crompton estimated that Mr Farrington had paid about $60,000 since separation on her behalf toward her living costs.
MR CROMPTON’S SUBMISSIONS
Mr Crompton opposes Mr Farrington’s application.
He argues that Mr Farrington is out of time and that he has provided no reasonable explanation for the delay. It is argued that both Mr and Ms Crompton would suffer increased costs if the application was allowed to proceed. In short, Mr Crompton argues that Mr Farrington’s application lacks merit and should be dismissed as “doomed to fail”. Any monies advanced by Mr Farrington to Ms Crompton post the parties’ separation was said to be a private matter between them.
Counsel submitted that Mr Farrington has “an axe to grind” against Mr Crompton’s legal representative, Mr AZ, and that the application is brought because of their personal antipathy.
Counsel argues that Mr Farrington has not paid the order for costs made by the Court on 19 September 2024 but stopped short of seeking a Hadkinson type order because of it.[8]
[8] Hadkinson & Hadkinson (1952) 2 All ER 567; Watson & Watson [2013] FamCAFC 25; Moorcroft & Moorcroft [2018] FamCAFC 253.
If successful, Mr Crompton sought indemnity costs in the sum of $6,765 for Mr AZ’s costs and $1,875 for counsel’s costs of preparation and attendance and an additional sum of $900 for solicitors’ costs.[9]
[9] In submissions, counsel confirmed that these sums did not include GST.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The order subject of the application for review was made on 28 May 2024.
Rule 14.05 of the Rules prescribes that a party may file an application for review of an order made by a Senior Judicial Registrar within 21 days of the date of the order. The time limit for the filing of a review in this case therefore expired on 18 June 2024.
Mr Farrington’s Application in a Proceeding seeking leave to file an Application for Review out of time was filed on 15 August 2024. The said Application is 57 days out of time.
The Court has a general power to grant an extension of time prescribed by the Rules within which to take a particular step,[10] including extending time to permit the later filing of an application for review of an exercise of delegated judicial power. The power to grant an extension of time maybe enlivened whether the time fixed by the rule or procedural order has passed.[11]
[10] Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 15.06(1).
[11] Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 15.06(2).
The Rules do not prescribe the matters that the Court must consider in determining an extension of time. However, the relevant principles as to an exercise of the discretion to extend time is identified in the statement of McHugh J in Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 (‘Gallo v Dawson’) where his Honour said at 480:
… The grant of an extension of time under this rule is not automatic. The object of the rule is to ensure that those Rules which fix times for doing acts do not become instruments of injustice. The discretion to extend time is given for the sole purpose of enabling the Court or Justice to do justice between the parties. This means that the discretion can only be exercised in favour of an applicant upon proof that strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the applicant. In order to determine whether the rules will work an injustice, it is necessary to have regard to the history of the proceedings, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences for the parties of the grant or refusal of the application for extension of time. When the application is for an extension of time in which to file an appeal, it is always necessary to consider the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal. It is also necessary to bear in mind in such an application that, upon the expiry of the time for appealing, the respondent has “a vested right to retain the judgment” unless the application is granted. It follows that, before the applicant can succeed in this application, there must be material upon which I can be satisfied that to refuse the application would constitute an injustice…
(Footnotes omitted)
In this case, the application for review is a hearing de novo. The Court must be satisfied that to refuse the extension of time would cause an injustice to the party seeking that extension and that extending the time would be necessary to do justice between them.[12] A mere loss of right to litigate is not a hardship.[13]
[12] Delgado & Soto [2021] FamCA 65.
[13] Hall & Hall (1979) FLC 90-679; Sharp & Sharp (2011) 50 Fam LR 567.
In Sharaf & Nouri and B Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC1F 898, the Court observed that a time limit is a general rule. Any provision for an extension to the limit is an exception to the general rule. In considering whether indulgence should be afforded to a litigant seeking to extend a time limit imposed by rules or legislation, it is important to have regard to the general proposition that delay to proceedings may risk effecting a deterioration to the quality of justice to be achieved. Further, that the Court should be liberal in extending any indulgence of leave to avoid hardship.[14]
[14] Sharaf & Nouri and B Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC1F 898, [3].
In Tormsen & Tormsen (1993) FLC 92-392 at page 80,017 the Full Court held:
The fundamental issue in application for extension of periods of time prescribed by rules of court is whether this will enable the court to do justice between the parties: Hughes v. National Trustee Executors & Agency Co. of Australasia Ltd [1978] VR 257 at 262 per McInerney J. cited with approval in Gallo v. Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 at 480 per McHugh J. In that connection the Court must weigh the right which the respondent to the application prima facie has to attain the benefit of the judgment: Vilenius v. Heinegar (1962) 36 ALJR 200 at 201, and the desirability that there be finality of litigation: Ratnam v. Cumarasamy [1964] 3 All ER 933 at 935. A failure to explain the delay adequately can certainly lead to a conclusion that justice demands that the application be dismissed: Shepperdson v. Lewis [1966] VR 418 at 421, 422 per O'Bryan J. But in appropriate cases the interests of justice may outweigh the absence of an adequate explanation...
In order to succeed at this hearing, Mr Farrington must demonstrate that the interests of justice favour the Court exercising its power to grant an extension of time having regard to the length of the delay, the reason for the delay and prejudice to the parties.
CONSIDERATION
Mr Farrington argues that he did not file his application for review within the time required by the Rules because it was not until July 2024 that he became aware of submissions made by Mr Crompton’s legal representative in the intervention order proceedings of alleged “consorting” between Mr AZ and the Senior Judicial Registrar. The alleged “consorting” is said to contaminate the orders made on 28 May 2024 to the detriment of Mr Farrington.[15]
[15] Mr Farrington did not provide an official transcript of the hearing before the Magistrates Court in mid-2024.
Even if I was to accept the basis of Mr Farrington’s submission (which I do not), there is no explanation as to why it then took Mr Farrington from July 2024 until 15 August 2024 to file his application for an extension of time. Further, the Court is unable to assess the veracity of the allegations made as no independent evidence of those submissions has been provided at this hearing.
In this case, I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that the strict application of the Rules would constitute an injustice. I am not satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time to enable Mr Farrington to review the said order.
I am not satisfied based on the material relied upon by Mr Farrington that there is any merit in the application to review the said order.
I am satisfied that my decision reflects the overarching purpose of the legislation which is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.[16]
[16] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 95.
As this is an interim hearing, the Court is unable to make findings. It is my strong apprehension, however, that to grant Mr Farrington’s application would in fact serve to complicate and protract the property settlement proceedings between Mr and Ms Crompton. Ms Crompton is entitled to call Mr Farrington as a witness as part of her case and she has already foreshadowed an intention to do so. Whilst Mr Farrington may consider that his involvement in the litigation between Mr and Ms Crompton might be helpful to achieve a resolution because of his personal involvement with each of the parties, it is my apprehension that the opposite is true.
It is a matter of concern to the Court that in the face of an allegation of “consorting” between a judicial officer and Mr Crompton’s legal representative in the Magistrates Court proceedings, that an email was sent to the Judge’s Chambers by Mr Blake Wadlow, Mr Crompton’s solicitor, on 2 December 2024. The email did not include Ms Crompton nor Mr Farrington and was directed to the issues upon which the Court was to determine by way of these interim proceedings. Practitioners are reminded of their professional obligations when communicating with Chambers and the need for transparency to avoid the very sort of allegation that Mr Farrington, an unrepresented litigant, has raised at this hearing.[17]
[17] The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia website includes a specific reference on the topic entitled ‘Communication with Chambers’ <Communicating with chambers | Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia>.
There appears to be merit to the submission made by Mr Crompton’s counsel that there is personal antipathy between Mr Farrington and Mr Crompton’s legal representatives. The property proceedings between Mr and Ms Crompton should not be used as a vehicle to further ventilate their dispute.
The parties’ competing property applications are listed for a Compliance and Readiness Hearing on 12 March 2025 and will be listed for final hearing thereafter.
To the extent that the parties sought any further orders in their Responses, these orders were not the subject of evidence nor submission and were not listed before me for hearing. I, therefore, decline to consider them and propose that they be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For all the above reasons, I conclude the Mr Farrington’s Application in a Proceeding filed 15 August 2024 seeking to file out of time shall be dismissed.
COSTS
Mr Crompton seeks costs of this application on an indemnity basis.
In submissions counsel sought:
(1)Mr AZ’s costs of $6,765 (not including GST). No breakdown of these costs was provided;
(2)Counsel costs for the hearing and preparation of $1,875 (not including GST); and
(3)Solicitors’ costs fixed in the sum of $900 (not including GST).
The Rules provide that a costs order can be made against a non-party.[18]
[18] Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 r 12.13(2).
The Court may make an order for costs as it considers just if there are circumstances which justify it doing so.[19]
[19] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(2).
I have had regard to the relevant provisions of section 117(2A) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and specifically subsections (a), (b), (c) and (e). I am satisfied that Mr Farrington has the capacity to meet an order for costs. In any event, impecuniosity is not a bar to an order for costs being made.[20] None of the parties are in receipt of legal aid. Mr Farrington’s application has been wholly unsuccessful.
[20] Daines & Daines (Costs) [2014] FamCAFC 170, [40].
Mr Crompton seeks costs on an indemnity basis. No submissions were made as to why indemnity costs should be ordered and in the absence of compelling reasons favouring such an order, I decline to do so.
I propose to order costs in favour of Mr Crompton in accordance with Schedule 1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) Rules 2021. Item 3 provides for costs in opposing an application for interlocutory orders being $2,093.62 and the daily hearing fee specified in Item 13 that applies to the hearing. Item 13 provides for a half day hearing fee of $1,255.75. Item 14 provides an advocacy loading of 50% of the daily hearing fee specified in Item 13 which in this case is $627.87.
The total of those amounts is $3,977.24.
No submissions were made as to the time frame for the payment of costs. I propose to allow Mr Farrington 30 days to pay the order for costs.
For all the above reasons, the Court makes the orders as set out at the commencement of this Judgment.
I certify that the preceding ninety (90) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Dickson. Associate:
Dated: 24 January 2025
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