Croker v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations

Case [2006] FCA 1447


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Croker v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2006] FCA 1447

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal to grant or not grant a stay not a ‘decision’ for purposes of the Act – no sufficient doubt as to judgment – leave to appeal refused

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44

CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER v SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS AND GERI ETTINGER
NSD 1899 OF 2006

GYLES J
27 OCTOBER 2006
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1899 OF 2006

BETWEEN:

CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
Applicant

AND:

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS
First Respondent

GERI ETTINGER
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GYLES J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 OCTOBER 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1899 OF 2006

BETWEEN:

CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
Applicant

AND:

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS
First Respondent

GERI ETTINGER
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GYLES J

DATE:

27 OCTOBER 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of Buchanan J of 22 September 2006, which upheld an objection to the competency of an appeal to the Court pursuant to s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act).

  2. The decision appealed from was the refusal by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) to stay a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal, which had affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister to cancel the applicant’s disability support pension pending hearing of the substantive appeal. The short ground of the decision of his Honour was that a decision to grant or not to grant a stay is not a decision for the purposes of s 44 of the AAT Act according to a long line of authority.

  3. There is no serious reason for doubting the basis for the decision. I should say, however, that even if there were some basis for challenging that approach in principle, the difficulty faced by the applicant in his application for leave is that, even if the refusal of a stay is a decision for the purposes of s 44, it is a discretionary decision against which it is very difficult to mount any attack absent some fundamental error in the approach of the Tribunal. The form of the notice of appeal to the Court, which was under consideration by his Honour, discloses no such error of principle.

  4. His Honour considered whether the jurisdiction pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act1903 (Cth) might assist the applicant to side-step the line of authority referred to above, but, as his Honour indicated, no ground was advanced before him which would indicate any arguable basis for establishing jurisdictional error. For what it is worth, it seems to me the same thing can be said of any possible application of the Administrative Decisions Judicial Review Act 1977 (Cth).

  5. Furthermore, the issue is likely to prove academic in the sense that a hearing of the substantive proceeding before the Tribunal is to take place in early December.  There is very little possibility of an appeal to this Court being heard before February, so it would essentially be overtaken by events in any case.  It may be that if the Tribunal were to reserve its decision, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the application for a stay might be renewed at that stage.  I do not mean to indicate any view about that possibility, but it could be explored. 

  6. For these reasons, in my opinion, this is not an appropriate case in which to grant leave to appeal.  The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs. 

I certify that the preceding six (6) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gyles.

Associate:

Dated:        7 November 2006

The Applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms D Watson of Australian Government Solicitor
The Second Respondent submitted
Date of Hearing: 27 October 2006
Date of Judgment: 27 October 2006
Details
AGLC
Croker v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2006] FCA 1447
Case
[2006] FCA 1447
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was an application for special leave to appeal against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant, Croker, sought to challenge the Full Court's ruling that his employment was terminated for operational reasons, dismissing his claim that he was dismissed for protected industrial action. The Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, was the first respondent to the application.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the applicant's appeal had a real chance of success. The court had to consider whether there were any arguable grounds of appeal that had not been considered by the Full Court, and whether those grounds had a reasonable prospect of success. The court also had to weigh the public interest in the finality of litigation against the applicant's right to access to the courts.

The court held that the applicant's appeal did not have a real chance of success. The Full Court's reasons for its decision were comprehensive and well-reasoned, and the applicant had not identified any arguable grounds of appeal that had not been considered by the Full Court. The court found that the Full Court had correctly applied the relevant legal principles and had not erred in law. The court also noted that there was a strong public interest in the finality of litigation, and that the applicant's appeal would cause unnecessary delay and expense. The application for special leave to appeal was therefore dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

GYLES J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GYLES J

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