Croker v John Wallace McLeod trading as Sunnybrae Pastoral Company and Nils Taube Limited and Endowa Pty Limited trading as Mylora Pastoral
[2006] NSWWCCPD 39
•8 March 2006
WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION:Croker v John Wallace McLeod t/as Sunnybrae Pastoral Company & Nils Taube Limited & Endowa Pty Limited t/as Mylora Pastoral [2006] NSWWCCPD 39
APPELLANT: Kevin Frances Croker
FIRST RESPONDENT: John Wallace McLeod t/as Sunnybrae Pastoral Company
SECOND RESPONDENT: Nils Taube Limited & Endowa Pty Limited t/as Mylora Pastoral
INSURERS:First Respondent – Commercial Union Workers Compensation NSW Limited
Second Respondent – Allianz Workers Compensation NSW Limited
FILE NUMBER: WCC2849-05
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: 28 July 2005
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: 8 March 2006
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: Shearer: ‘Disease’ and sections 15 and 16 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987; adequacy of evidence.
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: Acting Deputy President Deborah Moore
HEARING:On the papers
REPRESENTATION: Appellant: McCabe Partners
First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Second Respondent A O Ellison & Co
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL: 1. The decision of the Arbitrator dated 28
July 2005 is confirmed.
2No order as to costs of the appeal.
BACKGROUND TO THE APPEAL
Kevin Francis Croker (‘the Appellant’) was employed by John Wallace McLeod t/as Sunnybrae Pastoral Company (‘the First Respondent’) as a shearer. He claimed that on either 26 or 28 April 1999 whilst shearing, he suffered an injury to his right knee. He also claimed that as a result of the injury to his right knee, he suffered impairment to his sexual organs.
The Appellant was subsequently employed by Nils Taube Limited and Endowa Pty Limited t/as Mylora Pastoral (‘the Second Respondent’) also as a shearer. He alleged that in April 2003 whilst shearing he “started to suffer pain in his left shoulder” and further, on 10 October 2003, he tripped at work and again injured his left shoulder. He also claimed the nature and conditions of his employment with the Second Respondent between 10 October 2003 and 28 October 2003 caused and/or materially aggravated injuries to his left shoulder, right knee, back, left leg, left hip, sexual organs and hearing loss. He further claimed that for a number of years prior to 28 October 2003 he was employed in the shearing industry and that this type of employment was a substantial contributing factor to the aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation and/or deterioration of degeneration of his right knee, left shoulder, neck, back and left leg, hip, impairment to his sexual organs and “degeneration and strain of the hearing loss [sic].”
The Second Respondent, he alleged, was the last employer in employment to the nature of which the disease condition was due.
On 24 February 2005, the Appellant lodged an Application to Resolve a Dispute in the Commission seeking, as against the First Respondent, weekly benefits compensation from 1 July 1999 to date and continuing, together with some specified medical expenses. He also sought lump sum compensation pursuant to sections 66 and 67 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (‘the 1987 Act’) in respect of 40% loss of use of the right leg at or above the knee, and 30% loss of sexual organs.
As against the Second Respondent, the Appellant sought weekly benefits compensation from 28 October 2003, some specified medical expenses, and 53% Whole Person Impairment in respect of injuries to the left shoulder, right knee, neck, back, left leg and left hip. A claim was also made for benefits pursuant to section 67 of the 1987 Act.
In its Reply filed on 3 May 2003, the First Respondent disputed all aspects of the Appellant’s claim including ‘worker’, ‘injury’ and ‘incapacity’. The Second Respondent filed a Reply date stamped by the Commission 17 March 2006. I assume it should read 17 March 2005. The Second Respondent also placed most aspects of the Appellant’s claim in dispute, but in particular, noted that “the Applicant has been paid and continues to be paid weekly compensation by Allianz as insurer of the Second Respondent … ”
The matter was listed for conciliation/arbitration hearing on 15 June 2005. At that hearing, the Appellant conceded that there was no dispute with the Second Respondent with respect to weekly compensation payments and section 60 expenses.
The remaining issues in dispute were identified by the Arbitrator as, with respect to the claim for weekly benefits as against the First Respondent, whether the Appellant received an injury, whether employment was a substantial contributing factor to the injury, and for what period the Appellant was partially incapacitated. In relation to the claim for certain specified medical expenses, the issue was whether or not those expenses were “reasonably necessary for the compensable injury” pursuant to section 60 of the 1987 Act.
The Appellant had initially sought an order that the First Respondent pay for a right knee replacement operation however, this aspect of the claim was not pressed.
As against both Respondents, the Arbitrator then noted:
“Lump sum compensation pursuant to section 66 and section 67 of the 1987 Act has also been claimed. There remains on foot a dispute as to whether or not an injury has been suffered in the course of employment, or whether there has been an aggravation of a disease pursuant to section 16, and this determination will either result in the necessity for referral of section 66 assessments to an Approved Medical Specialist or the extinguishment of those components of the application”.
On 28 July 2005, a ‘Certificate of Determination’ issued with an accompanying ‘Statement of Reasons’. The determination of the Arbitrator was as follows:
“1.That the First Respondent pay the Applicant weekly compensation at the rate of $165.91 from 1 July 1999 to 26 July 1999 under s40 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. An award for the First Respondent thereafter.
2.That the First Respondent pay the Applicant’s expenses under s60 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 with respect to the injury on 26 or 28 April 1999 on production of the accounts or receipts.
3.That the Second Respondent pay the Applicant’s expenses under s60 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 with respect to the injuries to the left shoulder and right knee between April and October 2003 on production of accounts or receipts.
4.An award for the Second Respondent with respect to the Applicant’s claim for injuries to the neck, back and left leg.
5.That this matter be set down for further teleconference to arrange a referral of the lump sum components of the Application to an Approved Medical Specialist.
6.That the Respondents pay the Applicant’s costs as agreed or assessed”
On 12 August 2005, the Appellant lodged an Appeal against Decision of Arbitrator. The grounds of appeal are not readily apparent, however, it seems that the Appellant complains that as against the First Respondent, the Arbitrator, having found the injury to the right knee on 26 or 28 April 1999 was an injury “in the nature of an aggravation of a degenerative knee” then
“… had to find that any further incapacity was due to that disease. By effectively stating that the Applicant was entitled to a closed period, how can the Arbitrator distinguish between that aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation and/or deterioration of a disease caused by employment and constitutional degeneration? By stating that the Application is entitled to a closed period due to the aggravation is a classic case of not understanding the disease provisions of the Workers Compensation Act 1987”.
The Appellant then concludes:
“The disease which causes the incapacity is cumulative aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation and/or deterioration … caused by many years of shearing employment with many different employers and the last employer prior to the operation is responsible for compensation and for the incapacity caused by the many years of previous employment as a shearer.”
As against the Second Respondent, the Appellant appears to be submitting that the Arbitrator made a “mistake” when, in relation to the claim for injuries to the neck, back and left leg, the Arbitrator stated “I am unable to find any compelling evidence to suggest that there has been any aggravation to those body parts and I find for the Second Respondent in respect to those aspects of the claim”. The Appellant says that:
“The Appellant’s claim is brought pursuant to section 15 and section 16 and it has long been established that it is not necessary for a worker on an application for compensation based on section 15 and section 16 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, for the worker to establish that the disease was actually brought about or contributed to by the employment undertaken for the employer, it is enough that the disease is incidental to that class of employment so that it can be attributed to service therein”.
The Appellant concludes its submissions by setting out the findings and award the Arbitrator “should have” made.
On 8 September 2005, the First Respondent filed a Notice of Opposition to Appeal. To begin with, the First Respondent says that because the appeal was not served on the First Respondent within the time prescribed by Rule 77(4) of the Workers Compensation Commission Rules 2003 (‘the Rules’) the appeal must fail. The First Respondent however does proceed to make submissions in reply to the Appellant’s submissions, and in essence says that firstly, the Appellant’s “recounting of selected passages” of evidence does not establish a basis for appeal, and secondly, that the Appellant’s initial claim did not plead a ‘nature and conditions’ count or make any reliance upon the disease provisions referred to in sections 15 and 16 of the 1987 Act. The First Respondent submits that the Arbitrator’s findings were supported by adequate evidence and there has been “… no error in fact or law.”
The Second Respondent filed a Notice of Opposition to Appeal also on 8 September 2005. The Second Respondent also submits that “… the appeal demonstrates no error of law and is easily sustained on the factual basis upon which it is predicated,” and refers to the evidence that was before the Arbitrator in support of this submission.
ON THE PAPERS REVIEW
Both the Appellant and the First Respondent submit that the Appeal can be decided ‘on the papers’. The Second Respondent submits that an oral hearing is required however, no submissions as to why the appeal should not be determined on the papers have been made.
All parties have filed lengthy submissions on appeal. Having carefully read that material, the Arbitrator’s Reasons, the transcript and all the evidence before him, I am satisfied that I have sufficient information within the meaning of section 354 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (‘the 1998 Act’) and in accordance with Practice Directions 1 and 6 to proceed ‘on the papers’, and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.
LEAVE TO APPEAL
The amount at issue on the appeal satisfies the criteria set out in section 352(2) of the 1998 Act. The appeal was filed in time. On 17 August 2005 the Commission issued a direction that the Appellant serve on the Respondents a sealed copy of the Appeal by 25 August 2005. The Appellant was directed to lodge a Certificate of Service by 1 September 2005, and the Respondents to file and serve on the Appellant any Notice of Opposition in Reply by 8 September 2005.
The First Respondent appears to have received the direction but it claims the appeal was not served until 29 August 2005. The Notice of Opposition was filed in time, but no certificate of service is included in the appeal file. That file contains a certificate of service by the Second Respondent only. There does not appear to be a certificate of service from the Appellant.
Correspondence in the file suggests that there may have been some administrative errors by the Commission in that the matter was initially wrongly identified as an AMS Appeal, and documents may have been placed in another file. That may well account for the lateness in the appeal documents being returned to the Appellant for service on the Respondent. In the circumstances, and in the absence of any other information on this point, and whilst I am prepared to accept the First Respondent’s claim as to service, I do not consider that I can enforce the apparently mandatory requirements of Rule 77(4) and as a consequence refuse leave to appeal because of some possible administrative error by the Commission. Accordingly, leave to appeal is granted.
SUBMISSIONS, EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS
The Claim Against The First Respondent
The Arbitrator found at paragraph 38 of his ‘Statement of Reasons’ that:
“With respect to the right knee injury on 26 April or 28 April 1999, I find that there has been an injury in the nature of an aggravation of a degenerative knee. The Applicant’s employment with the First Respondent was the substantial contributing factor to that aggravating injury. My finding that there has been an aggravation at work is not seriously challenged by any of the medical evidence”.
He went on further in paragraph 39 to state:
“Where there is variance of opinion, or an absence of opinion, is [sic] as to what period that aggravation may have persisted, my finding that there was a degenerative condition, principally in the nature of an osteoarthritic condition, is a finding supported by Dr Smith in his report of 19 May 2005. Dr Smith opines that that aggravation would have ceased after three months. Having regard to all of the evidence I consider that to be a fair and supportable estimate… I therefore find that the First Respondent is liable to pay the Applicant weekly payments for the period 26 April 1999 to 26 July 1999. I find for the First Respondent thereafter”.
Doctor Sevier, the Applicant’s treating doctor, in a report dated 15 November 2004, noted that the Appellant presented on 12 July 1999 with a history of injuring his right knee on 26 April 1999 whilst shearing. He referred the Appellant to Dr Paul Miniter. The Appellant did not provide a report from Dr Miniter to the Commission, however, Dr Sevier recorded that “Dr Miniter … felt that he had a degenerative medial meniscal tear.” Dr Sevier then reports on findings at arthroscopy on 23 February 2000, which in summary showed “significant degenerative change”. Dr Sevier then noted that the Appellant was not seen again “… in relation to his right knee until 5 August 2004”.
In a report to the First Respondent’s insurer dated 19 October 2000, Dr Sevier confirmed that the Appellant had been certified fit to resume normal work both in March 2000 and again in June 2000.
Dr Stubbs, who treated the Appellant for his left shoulder injury, first made reference to the Appellant’s right knee injury in a report dated 18 November 2004. He stated “I can happily agree there was an exacerbation of his arthritis in 1999 …”
Dr Mahony who saw the Appellant at the request of his solicitors on 23 September 2004, recorded that “he also has symptoms referable to degenerative changes in the right knee…”
Dr Miniter wrote to the First Respondent’s insurer on 13 October 2004 that “… the arthroscopic findings were those of osteoarthritic disease and it is not likely that the minor injury in April 1999 was the main cause of the symptoms…” He concluded “The condition diagnosed is consistent with the history given but the very minor injury in the workplace has not been a substantial precipitating factor.”
In a subsequent report dated 13 January 2005, Dr Miniter wrote “I believe in fact that there is little association between the injury in 1999 and the current condition. In other words, he has a disease of natural onset …”
Dr W Coyle, Orthopaedic Surgeon, saw the Appellant at the request of the First Respondent’s insurer on 20 December 2004. He concluded in his report dated 23 December 2004 that “the injury that occurred on 28 April 1999 was an aggravation of the pre-existing condition. That aggravation was temporary … it may have accelerated the condition at the time, but this acceleration has now ceased.”
Dr ALG Smith saw the Appellant on 19 May 2005 and reported to the First Respondent’s solicitors the same day that:
“The aggravation sustained in April 1999, settled of its own accord but some symptoms continued due to underlying arthritic processes and the knee has deteriorated further … In the absence of a traumatic lesion I think the episode of 25 April 1999 would have settled after three months and left no real damage of itself.”
Dr Meachin who saw the Appellant on behalf of the Second Respondent has a different view. In his report dated 15 February 2005, he concluded that “as a result of this surgery, [arthroscopic surgery] he had developed arthritic changes which are getting worse. The need for this surgery … does relate to the work caused injury sustained whilst working for the [First Respondent] …”
The Arbitrator’s finding in respect of injury to the right knee, was clearly open on the evidence before him and was not, as he put it, “seriously challenged by any of the medical evidence …”
It is not clear from the Appellant’s submissions what error it is alleged the Arbitrator made in this finding. The Appellant submits:
“… The Arbitrator has found that the Applicant suffers a disease within section 15 and/or section 16 of [the 1987 Act] and therefore, the Arbitrator had to find that any further incapacity was due to that disease. By effectively stating that the Applicant was entitled to a closed period, how can the Arbitrator distinguish between that aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation and/or deterioration of a disease caused by employment and constitutional degeneration?”
The Appellant further submits:
“The disease which causes the incapacity is cumulative aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation and/or deterioration caused by many years of shearing employment with many different employers and the last employer prior to the operation is responsible for compensation and for the incapacity caused by the many years of previous employment as a shearer.”
The Appellant seems to have confused the Arbitrator’s finding as to injury pursuant to section 4 of the 1987 Act with the operation of sections 15 and 16 of the same Act. ‘Injury’ is defined in section 4(b) of the 1987 Act as including:
“(i)a disease which is contracted by a worker in the course of employment and to which the employment was a contributing factor; and
(ii)the aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation or deterioration of any disease, where the employment was a contributing factor to the aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation or deterioration …”
The Arbitrator’s finding, in this case of ‘injury’ within the meaning of section 4(b)(ii) was, as I have said, open on the evidence. Section 16 merely makes provision for determining the ‘deemed date of the injury’ and for determining liability of the particular employer. The duration of any incapacity is a separate matter.
It should also be noted that, as the First Respondent points out in its submissions, no reliance was placed by the Appellant in his application on any ‘nature and conditions of employment’ count or on the ‘disease’ provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the 1987 Act. The First Respondent says that “… The Appellant’s counsel … confirmed that as against the First Respondent he relied upon a frank injury only …” and quotes from the transcript. Indeed, counsel for the Appellant said to the Arbitrator (page 3 transcript):
“… The following is necessary on your part as far as, firstly, findings are concerned, that is, the applicant suffered injury to his right knee in the course of his employment with the first respondent on or about 26 April 1999… and that as a result thereof … was partially incapacitated from … April 1999 to …. October 2003. The factual situation is that the Applicant has been in receipt of weekly compensation from the second respondent since that date.”
The Arbitrator’s task, in the present case, having found that the Appellant had suffered an ‘injury’ with the First Respondent was, as he identified it (paragraph 6 of the ‘Statement of Reasons’) “for what period was the Applicant partially incapacitated?”
The Appellant claimed weekly benefits pursuant to section 40 of the 1987 Act from 1 July 1999 onwards. The Arbitrator found that as a result of the injury to his right knee in April 1999, the Appellant was partially incapacitated for a period of three months as a consequence of that injury (my emphasis).
At paragraph 40 of the Statement of Reasons, the Arbitrator notes:
“The Schedule of Earnings as tendered by the Applicant … has not been seriously challenged, although I do agree with the Respondents that some further financial information would have been of assistance for some of the interim periods. For example, it may have been that the earnings that the Applicant was able to obtain as a result of increased application to his cherry orchard while not shearing may have resulted in a higher income from that occupation however, there is simply no information to assist me on this aspect. On that basis, the best evidence that I have, … is the Applicant’s Schedule of Earnings”.
The Arbitrator then concluded that that document should be the reference document with respect to any calculation of weekly payments.
The Appellant does not appear to challenge the amount of the award, merely its duration. However, there was clearly ample evidence, particularly from Dr Miniter and Dr Sevier, the Appellant’s treating doctors, that the injury in April 1999 had a limited effect upon the Appellant. As the First Respondent points out in its submissions:
“The Arbitrator found on the basis ‘of all the evidence’ that the likely estimate of the period that the Applicant would have been so affected by that injury was that expressed by Dr Smith viz 3 months. The fact that the frank injury as found aggravated a degenerative condition for a limited period was available to the Arbitrator on the evidence referred to in his reasons … this approach is consistent with the unanimous decision of the NSW Court of Appeal in Rail Services Australia v Dimovski & Anor [2004] NSWCA 267.”
I agree with this submission, and I can see no error in the Arbitrator’s determination in this respect.
The Claim Against The Second Respondent
Despite lengthy submissions by the Appellant in respect to the Arbitrator’s findings as against the Second Respondent, as the Second Respondent succinctly points out “the only issues relating to the second respondent in this appeal are the findings that the applicant did not suffer injury, by way of frank injury or aggravation of a disease, in the employ of the second respondent affecting his neck, back or left leg.”
As the Arbitrator pointed out at paragraph 42 of his ‘Statement of Reasons’, “At this point I should note that it is generally agreed that the hearing loss and sexual dysfunction aspects of the claim should be referred to an Approved Medical Specialist for determination …”
The Appellant seems to be suggesting that the Arbitrator ought to have found that injuries to the neck, back and left leg were by way of a ‘disease’ and that:
“It has long been established that it is not necessary for a worker on an application for compensation based on section 15 and 16 of the [1987 Act], for the worker to establish that the disease was actually brought about or contributed to by the employment undertaken for the employer, it is enough that the disease is incidental to that class of employment so that it can be attributed to service therein”.
The Appellant has cited a number of authorities in its submissions in support of this proposition, but what the Appellant has overlooked is “that there must be a finding of ‘injury’ within the meaning of section 4 of the 1987 Act for sections 15 and 16 to come into operation. Section 15(1) of the 1987 Act provides that “if an injury is a disease which is of such a nature as to be contracted by a gradual process - …” In other words, section 15 assumes that injury has occurred and simply provides a mechanism for determining when injury is deemed to have happened, by whom compensation is to be paid and other ancillary matters. It does not obviate the need for a worker to establish ‘injury’ within the meaning of section 4. So to with the operation of section 16. A worker seeking to rely on section 15 must establish that the relevant disease is a disease incidental to the class of employment, and that the class of employment contributed to contracting the disease. A reference merely to a ‘degenerative spine’ or ‘spinal disease’ in a man of nearly 60, as in the Appellant’s case, is not sufficient; much of the population in that age category could be said to suffer the same process. In other words, there must be some evidence to connect the employment with the claimed ‘disease’.
In most of the authorities cited by the Appellant in its submissions, the workers had complained of symptoms in, for example, the back such that the task of the court was to determine whether ‘injury’ within the meaning of section 4 of the 1987 Act had been established.
In the present case, whilst the Appellant gave some oral evidence of symptoms in various parts of his body, his testimony was unsupported by most of the medical evidence. For example, Dr Sevier, the Appellant’s treating GP, saw the Appellant over a number of years. The Appellant consulted him in October 2003 with complaints of left shoulder problems. He was seen regularly over the next 12 months. At no stage was there a complaint of neck, back or left leg pain. Dr Stubbs, who treated the Appellant for his left shoulder injury, made no record of any complaints of neck, back or left leg pain. Dr Mahony, qualified by the Appellant, who saw the Appellant almost 12 months after this left shoulder injury in October 2003, recorded that “he thinks he may have hurt his neck at the time [October 2003] as he has had persisting neck symptoms”. This is not supported by Dr Sevier.
Later in his report of 24 September 2004, Dr Mahony opines:
“He has added symptoms referable to a cervical strain in association with degenerate changes … a thoracic strain almost certainly in association with degenerate changes as well as a low lumbar back strain in association with degenerate changes with nerve root irritation affecting the lower limbs, particularly the left lower limb.”
He concludes “… it is consistent that the nature of his work has produced such lesions aggravating a potentially irritable spine.”
Dr Mahony’s diagnosis is of ‘strains’, not a disease as such. His opinion does not throw any light on when and what circumstances those ‘strains’ or ‘lesions’ occurred or became symptomatic.
The Appellant’s own evidence in relation to this neck was (page 32 transcript) “… I have always had trouble at different stages in the cold months of sort [sic] of turning around to back a car or a truck, you know.” Nothing in that statement suggests that his work as a shearer was implicated in the development of symptoms.
Dr Coyle, qualified for the First Respondent, asked the Appellant about his past history. He recorded in his report of 23 December 2004 “Apart from the fracture of [the] left ankle 30 years ago, Mr Croker says that he has had no other work related illnesses or injuries”. When ask about his present complaints, no reference was made to either the neck, back or left leg.
Dr Meachin, qualified by the Second Respondent reported on 15 February 2005:
“He mentioned intermittent aching in the lower back. He also mentioned neck ache in the 1980’s when he saw a chiropractor … He has not seen a doctor as regards his back … He had x-rays done prior to a medico-legal appointment with Dr Mahony … He said that he has intermittent back ache and intermittent left sided neck ache.”
Dr Meachin concluded “This man’s neck and back problems are not related to any incident at work. I feel that they relate to constitutional degenerative changes. I also note that he did not mention these problems to me when I first reviewed him on 08/09/04 nor did he mention them to … Dr Sevier or Dr Stubbs. It would appear that the only person who mentioned them in a medico-legal report was Dr Mahony … From the history obtained I could not find any specific injury sustained to either area.”
The Arbitrator’s statement that “I am unable to find any compelling evidence to suggest that there has been any aggravation to these body parts” was amply supported by the evidence before him. He was entitled to find on that evidence that the Appellant had failed to satisfy the onus of establishing ‘injury’ to either his neck, back or left leg, and made no error of law or fact in so doing.
CONCLUSION
The powers of a Presidential Member to revoke a decision of an Arbitrator pursuant to section 352(7) of the 1998 Act are exercisable only where it is demonstrated that the decision of the Arbitrator is affected by some legal, factual or discretionary error [see Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172].
Nothing in the Appellant’s submissions demonstrates that the Arbitrator erred in his determination. The appeal focused on what the Arbitrator should or ought to have found, but provided no evidence as to why the Arbitrator’s decision was flawed. The Arbitrator has made valid findings of fact based on both written and oral evidence before him, and his reasons adequately reflect those findings.
The Appellant has failed to demonstrate any error which would justify revocation of the Arbitrator’s decision.
DECISION
The decision of the Arbitrator dated 28 July 2005 is confirmed.
COSTS
No order as to costs of the appeal.
Deborah Moore
Acting Deputy President
8 March 2006
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE REASONS FOR DECISION OF DEBORAH MOORE, ACTING DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
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