Croker v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CROKER v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA [2007] FMCA 1374
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Application for dismissal of proceedings pursuant to r.13.10 and/or r.13.11 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) – application for security of costs pursuant to s.80 of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) and/or r.21.01 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) – application for the matter to be stayed pending an application to the High Court of Australia.
Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001 (NSW), s.67
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss.24(1A), 33(4)
Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth), ss.17A, 80
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.13.10, 13.11, 21.01
High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), r.6.07
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss.52, 75AO
Attorney General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 at 490-491
CATE v International Flavours & Fragrances (Aust) Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 36
Croker v the Commonwealth of Australia [2005] NSWSC 994
Croker v Sydney Institute of TAFE (State of New South Wales) (2003) FCA 942
MG Distribution Pty Ltd & Others v Khan & Anor [2006] FMCA 666
MZKCN v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2007) FMCA 573
Peterson v Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd [2003] FMCA 172
Vivid Entertainment LLC v Digital Cinema Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 157
Applicant: CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
Respondent: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
File number: SYG 548 of 2007
Judgment of: Lloyd-Jones FM
Hearing date: 7 June 2007
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 14 August 2007

REPRESENTATION

Advocate for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms R Pepper
Solicitors for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The application filed by Mr Croker in these proceedings on 29 May 2007 seeking this matter to be stayed until the outcome of an application to the High Court of Australia is dismissed.

  2. Mr Croker provide security for costs to the Commonwealth of Australia pursuant to s.80 of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) and/or r.21.01 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) in the sum of $30,000 by 4.00pm on 11 September 2007.

  3. Mr Croker has leave to file and serve an amended application, statement of claim and supporting affidavit clearly stating the nature and details of his claim by 4.00pm on 11 September 2007.

  4. The proceedings are adjourned for further directions to 21 September 2007 at 9.30am.

  5. Costs are reserved.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 548 of 2007

CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER

Applicant

And

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The Proceedings

  1. The matter before the Court is from an application by the respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia ("the Commonwealth"), seeking the following orders:

    a)Summary judgment;

    b)That the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to r.13.10 of the Federal Magistrate Court Rules 2001 (Cth) ("the Rules");  or

    c)Security costs in the sum of $30,000; or

    d)An order under r.13.11 of the Rules that Mr Croker not be permitted to continue the present proceedings or any further proceedings without leave of the Court.

  2. In support of…

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Details
Case
[2007] FMCA 1374
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Croker v Commonwealth of Australia case involves an application for summary judgment or summary dismissal by the Commonwealth against Mr Croker, who is the plaintiff in this proceeding. The application is based on the provisions of s.17A(2) of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) and r.13.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001. The Commonwealth argues that Mr Croker has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings and that the proceedings should be summarily dismissed or judgment should be given in favor of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth raises several grounds for its application, including the lack of a valid cause of action, the novelty of the cause of action, and the absence of a basis for administrative damages. Additionally, the Commonwealth asserts that the proceedings are an abuse of process due to the prior litigation of the same subject matter in another jurisdiction.

The court was required to determine whether Mr Croker's statement of claim sufficiently disclosed an arguable cause of action and whether the proceedings should be summarily dismissed or judgment should be given in favor of the Commonwealth. The court considered the arguments presented by the Commonwealth and the principles set out in relevant authorities, such as DEY v Victorian Railway Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62, which emphasise the importance of allowing a case to proceed to trial if there is a real question to be determined. The court also examined the provisions of s.17A of the Federal Magistrates Act and r.13.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules to assess whether the proceedings met the criteria for summary dismissal or judgment.

After considering the arguments and authorities, the court found that the statement of claim did not sufficiently disclose an arguable cause of action and that the proceedings were an abuse of process due to the prior litigation of the same subject matter. The court noted that the new statutory provisions, while lowering the threshold for summary dismissal, still required the court to be satisfied that Mr Croker had no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings. The court concluded that there was a real question to be determined, which meant that it was not competent for the court to dismiss the action as frivolous or vexatious and an abuse of process. Therefore, the court dismissed the application for summary judgment or summary dismissal.

The court ordered that the application filed by Mr Croker seeking to stay the matter until the outcome of an application to the High Court of Australia be dismissed. Additionally, Mr Croker was required to provide security for costs to the Commonwealth of Australia pursuant to s.80 of the Federal Magistrates Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application filed by Mr Croker in these proceedings on 29 May 2007 seeking this matter to be stayed until the outcome of an application to the High Court of Australia is dismissed.

2.

Mr Croker provide security for costs to the Commonwealth of Australia pursuant to s.80 of the

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The application for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary dismissal, is covered by s.17A(2) of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth):Section 17A Summary Judgment Material17A (2) The Federal Magistrates Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a) The first party is defending the proceedings or that part of the proceedings;(b) The Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings or that part of the proceedings. Ms Pepper submits that Mr Croker has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings and there ought to be summary judgment in favour of the Commonwealth pursuant to s.17A of the Federal Magistrates Act or summary dismissal pursuant to r.13.10 of the Rules. This is especially in relation to the cause of action pleaded at paragraph 13 of Mr Croker’s statement of claim:13. The respondent is liable for wrongfully defending a claim for breach of warranty pursuant to a law of tort and contravention of the Commonwealth Consumer Protection Law and in particular The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).Ms Pepper also referred to the relief sought in paragraph 15 of the statement of claim:15. By reason of the matters set out able the applicant has suffered a loss and damage:(i) The respondent has caused administrative costs to be incurred; and(ii) The respondent has caused other financial and non-financial damage. Ms Pepper argues that Mr Croker has no reasonable prospects of success because:a)The Trade Practices and Breach of Warranty claim is pleaded as a threshold matter against the Commonwealth and that the High Court is an agency of the Commonwealth. Ms Pepper submits that it is not. Accordingly, as the pleadings currently stand, there is no basis for the Commonwealth liability as set out.b)The cause of action pleaded in paragraph 13 of the statement of claim is a novel cause of action unknown at law.c)No basis for administrative damages has been pleaded permitting the claim for damages in paragraph 15(i) of the statement of claim.d)Mr Croker cannot get by way of damages in excess of that which has been offered by the Commonwealth in its offer of compromise.e)The proceedings are otherwise an abuse of process given that the subject matter (the defective cufflinks) has been previously litigated in another jurisdiction: Croker v the Commonwealth of Australia [2005] NSWSC 994. It is submitted that whether one applies the lower threshold in s.17A(2) or the higher threshold in r.13.10, the statement of claim does not sufficiently disclose an arguable cause of action or is an abuse of process and ought to be summarily dismissed. In support of this contention, Ms Pepper refers to MG Distribution Pty Ltd & Others v Khan & Anor [2006] FMCA 666 at [37]-[44] per McInnis FM:[37] It will be noted that the new provision appears to lower the threshold whereby the Court may be satisfied that it is appropriate to summarily dismiss a claim. Section 17A(3) specifically removes the Court's consideration the concept of a proceeding otherwise needing to be "hopeless" or "bound to fail" for it to have "no reasonable prospects of success". To that extent, it seeks to modify the principles set out in a well known authority including DEY v Victorian Railway Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62; 23 ALJR 48; [1949] ALR 333 (DEY).[38] The new provision clearly provides in s.17A(2) that this Court may give judgment for the respondents against the first applicant for the whole or part of the proceedings if a Court were to be satisfied that the respondents are defending the proceedings or part of the proceedings and the Court is further satisfied that the first application in this case has "no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings or that part of the proceedings".[39] However, the new statutory, in my view, does not necessarily distract entirely from the principles in relation to the summary dismissal which were described by Dixon J in DEY as being "well settled". It is relevant, in my view, to have regard to the following passage from the decision of Dixon J in DEY as follows:The principle upon which the jurisdiction is exercisable are well settled. A case must be very clear indeed to justify the summary intervention of the Court to prevent a plaintiff submitting his case for determination in the appointed manner by the Court with or without a jury. The fact that a transaction is intricate may not entitle the Court to examine a cause of action allegedly to grow out of it from the purpose of seeing whether the proceeding amount to an abuse of process or is vexatious. But once it appears that there is a real question to be determined whether the fact or law and that the right of the parties depending upon it, then it is not competent for the Court to dismiss the action as frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process.[40] The present application seeking to summarily dismiss the proceedings by the first applicant, while subject to the new s.17A of the FM Act, otherwise still relies upon the factors identified in r.13.10 of the Federal Magistrate Court Rules 2001 which provides as follows: (Not copied).[41] It will be noted that the factors set out in that rule are similar, though not identical to the factors relied upon by the respondents in the notion of motion. A factor in common is the concept of "an abuse of process of the Court" and there being "no reasonable cause of action disclosed". The rule provides for the summary dismissal if the proceedings or claim for relief is "frivolous or vexatious", which in the present case I take to be relied upon by the respondents, ambient the respondents in their notice of motion refer to the proceedings having a "tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings."[42] In any event, the concept of an abuse of process for there being no reasonable cause of action disclosed on the pleadings, when considered in the light of s.17A, still require the Court to be satisfied that the first applicant in this case has "no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings". Hence the principles set out by Dixon J may still have application to the extent that when considering whether the Court is satisfied that the party has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings, the Court is entitled to consider whether there is a real question to be determined, whether of fact and law, and that the right of the parties depending upon it.[43] If the Court were to find that there is a real question to be determined, whether it be of fact and law, and the rights of the party depend upon the real question, then it seems to me that it would not be competent for the Court to dismiss an action as frivolous or vexatious and an abuse of process, nor would it be competent of the Court to make a finding that it is satisfied that the party has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings. [44] If there is a real question to be determined, whether it be of fact and law, and if the rights of the parties depend upon that, then it is difficult to see how the Court on summary dismissal application could be satisfied that a party had not reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings. To make a finding, in a sense, "begs the question" to be determined at trial.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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