Crocker v Commr for Consumer Affairs - [2004] SADC 189

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(District Court Administrative and Disciplinary Division)
In the Matter of SECOND-HAND VEHICLE DEALERS ACT 1995
CROCKER v COMMR FOR CONSUMER AFFAIRS
Judgment of His Honour Judge Muecke, Assessor Sewell and Assessor Hutchinson
21 December 2004
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Whether the appellant applicant for Second-Hand Vehicle Dealers Licence a fit and proper person.
Appeal dismissed. Appellant found to be dealing in motor vehicles when he knew he should have a licence and when he knew that he did not have a licence. Appellant found to be conducting a second-hand vehicle business under someone else's licence when he knew he could not properly do so.
District Court Act 1991 s42E, referred to.
Pav v Commercial and Private Agents Board (1988) 143 LSJS 1, considered.

CROCKER v COMMR FOR CONSUMER AFFAIRS
[2004] SADC 189

By Appeal to the Administrative and Disciplinary Division of the District Court of South Australia filed 21 January 2004 the appellant appealed against a decision of the Commissioner for Consumer Affairs whereby the Commissioner refused the appellant’s application for a Second-Hand Vehicle Dealers Licence on the stated determination that the appellant was not a fit and proper person to hold such a licence as he failed to comply properly with his obligations under the Second-Hand Vehicle Dealers Act 1995. The appellant set out grounds of appeal.
The court heard the appeal on 29 September 2004. An affidavit sworn by Graham Close on 11 May 2004 (with a number of exhibits) was tendered at the appeal hearing by counsel for the Commissioner for Consumer Affairs (Exhibit R1). The affidavit and exhibits indicate that on or about 1 October 2003 the appellant applied, by application dated 30 September 2003, for a licence under the Second-Hand Vehicle Dealers Act 1995. In considering the application Mr Close had regard to information in the possession of the Commissioner contained in two consumer complaint files, and in an interview conducted with the appellant by the Compliance Branch of the Office of Consumer and Business Affairs. That material was exhibited to the affidavit. Mr Close referred in his affidavit to the information referred to as indicating that:
(a)Mr Crocker had not complied with his licensing obligations in that he had traded without a licence, and had attempted to conduct a second hand vehicle dealing business under the guise of another person’s licence and business name.
(b)As a result of such conduct, Mr Crocker had avoided licence fees, compensation fund contributions, and business name registration fees.
(c)Mr Crocker had failed to honour warranty obligations in relation to a Ford Falcon EA wagon sold to a Mr Roger Peake.
(d)Mr Crocker had failed to honour his obligations in relation to providing clear title in relation to a Toyota Tarago van sold to a Mr Mahommed Tahir.
(e)Mr Crocker had displayed Section 16 Notices on vehicles that he had offered for sale which did not comply with section 16 of the Act in that the last owner’s names were not listed and he did not have written instructions from those owners instructing him not to disclose their names and addresses on the notices.
(f)Mr Crocker had failed to display Section 16 Notices on all vehicles that he had offered or exposed for sale.
By letter dated 17 October 2003 Mr Close wrote to the appellant giving the appellant the opportunity to provide a submission on the issues listed in that letter and on any other matter that he believed may assist with the deliberations as to whether the appellant should be considered to be a fit and proper person to be the holder of a licence under the said Act.
By an undated letter received by Mr Close’s office on 21 November 2003 the appellant responded to Mr Close’s earlier correspondence.
By 2 December 2003 Mr Close had examined the Consumer Complaint files relating to the two complaints previously mentioned and he had also read a record of the interview conducted with the appellant by the Compliance Branch on 23 September 2003. He had considered the appellant’s submissions in his undated letter. After considering those matters Mr Close was not convinced that the appellant had complied with his obligations under the Second-Hand Vehicle Dealers Act 1995 and therefore concluded that he was not a fit and proper person to be granted a licence.
On 9 December 2003 Mr Close wrote to the appellant advising him that he did not meet all the requirements in order for his application to be granted and attached reasons for that decision. The reason was that the appellant was not a “fit and proper” person to hold a dealer’s licence as he has failed to properly comply with his obligations under the Second-Hand Vehicle Dealers Act 1995.
The appellant appealed against that decision.
We have examined the decision of Mr Close on the evidence and material before him. We allowed further evidence and material to be presented to us and we have considered that evidence and material. On this appeal we must give due weight to the decision being appealed against and the reasons for it and not depart from the decision except for cogent reasons (see District Court Act, 1991 s42E).
The appellant gave sworn evidence. Five exhibits were tendered on his behalf. On 5 November 2004 we received from the appellant’s solicitor the Remarks on Penalty of a Magistrate who dealt with the appellant on 23 September 2004 upon his plea of guilty in the Adelaide Magistrates Court to one count of carrying on business as a second-hand motor vehicle dealer without being authorised by a licence under the said Second-Hand Vehicle Dealers Act 1995, and two counts of carrying on business under a business name not registered under the Business Names Act 1996. All three offences were alleged to have occurred between 16 January 2003 and 17 or 24 September 2003. The first count involved the appellant selling, or offering for sale, thirty-four motor vehicles and offering a further fourteen motor vehicles for sale from 123 Richmond Road, Richmond when not licensed under the said Act. The second and third counts involved the appellant carrying on business under the name of Jolly Car Company and Adelaide’s Cheapest Cars respectively, business names not registered under the Business Names Act. We have marked these Remarks on Penalty of 23 September 2004, Exhibit A7.
We have earlier set out what matters Mr Close alleged were indicated in the two consumer complaint files and in an interview conducted with the appellant by the compliance branch of the Office of Consumer and Business Affairs. The first two related to the fact that Mr Crocker had not complied with his licensing obligations in that he had traded without a licence, and had attempted to conduct a second-hand vehicle dealing business under the guise of another person’s licence and business name. As a result, the appellant had avoided licence fees, compensation fund contributions, and business name registration fees. In his affidavit Mr Close set out these allegations in more detail. He stated that:
“The Tahir and Peake files both revealed that purchasers had bought vehicles from ‘Dave’ of ‘Jolly Car Company’. Further investigation showed ‘Dave’ to be Mr David Percival Crocker. At the time of these transactions, Mr Crocker held no licence under the Act. Records held by our office revealed that he was likely to be aware of his obligation to be licensed as he had been licensed in the past. The Jolly Car Company was no longer a registered business name at the time of these transactions, and although a stamp upon the Peake contract containing a reference to ‘Ted Whyte T/A Jolly Car Company MVD 103919’, our office records revealed that licence MVD 103919, formerly held by Edward Whyte, had been suspended since 8 September 2002.”
“… by trading without a licence, Mr Crocker was able to avoid payment fees that are statutorily required of licence holders. Perhaps more importantly he was able to avoid payment to the compensation fund which exists for the protection of the vehicle purchasing public.”
It was submitted by the appellant’s counsel that these matters constitute the primary basis for the conclusion by Mr Close that the appellant is not a fit and proper person to be the holder of a licence under the said Act. We agree that they were, and should have been, significant matters.
The appellant is 56 years of age. He has had a long history of work in the automotive industry including association for some time with a Formula 1 team and later with what became the Holden Dealers team. Although he couldn’t remember the exact dates his recollection was that between 1990 and 1995 he operated as a dealer in motor vehicles from a car yard on North East Road. He worked there on his own account and for that purpose held a second-hand vehicle dealer’s licence. He said that during the time he held such a licence he was familiar with the obligations imposed legislatively on dealers in second-hand motor vehicles and he complied with those obligations.
The appellant said that due to pressure of work and a family break-up he scaled down this business and “got involved with Mr Whyte”. He was employed by Mr Whyte at his car yard for a couple of years. It was the Jolly Car Company. The appellant said that later on Mr Whyte offered him the business to purchase. As to the arrangements for him to purchase Mr Whyte’s business the appellant said:
AWe’d agreed on a purchase price whereby we would pay this off over a period of 12 months or whatever period was necessary. We had goods –
HIS HONOUR
QWhat do you mean by that.
AI had agreed on paying him $1,000 a month, however, when it was financially viable I would pay him and he would sort of say ‘What about another repayment?’, and I would say ‘I didn’t go that well this month, could we delay it?’, and that was the whole idea, that I paid this amount of money off and when that was paid off, I would then get the name the Jolly Car Company and I would then apply for the licence in my own name.
XN
QHow much was the price for the business.
A$12,000.
QYou would operate the business while you were paying for it.
ACorrect.
QAnd trade under –
AMr Whyte’s licence.
QTrading as the Jolly Car Company.
ACorrect.
QWho’s responsibility was it to maintain the licence during this period.
AWell, Mr Whyte.
The appellant said that at about 17 September 2003 he received a letter from the Office of Consumer and Business Affairs directed to Mr Richard George Whyte of the Jolly Car Company (Exhibit R1, approx middle of “GC2”). The appellant said the letter should have been addressed to Mr Edward George Whyte. He said that upon reading the last paragraph of that letter he became concerned about the status of the business and it’s licensing. His concern was whether the business was registered and whether the licence was current. Because of his concern he contacted the local Consumer Affairs and expressed his concern. They said “unfortunately we cannot give you that information, due to the Privacy Act”. He said he had asked them if the licence was current. He had said “I am running a business”. He “didn’t actually get a reply”. The appellant said that he then rang the Whyalla branch (of Consumer Affairs) and pretended that he was a local resident of Whyalla, he was a potential buyer of a car in Adelaide, and he wanted to check up on the people he was dealing with, namely the Jolly Car Company. He enquired if they were fair and reputable people. They said “yes, we have no problem”. He had said “are there any complaints against these people?”. They had answered “no there is not”. He had said “so I can feel quite safe, I can go down there and purchase a motor vehicle and they will be – were to comply under the conditions of the Second-Hand Vehicles Act, so they’re currently licensed and conducting business”. They had answered “yes, currently conducting business with no problems. I’ll double-check the licence”. The appellant said that she had come back to him and said “it appears the licence has expired”.
The appellant said that that was when he became aware there was no licence. He said he had made the necessary phone calls, got documents sent to him, and completed a document applying for a second-hand motor vehicle dealers licence. That was the application for a licence that has been refused and is the subject of this appeal.
The appellant said that he tried to find Mr Whyte at a range of various motor vehicle dealers in Canberra, because Mr Whyte had moved to Canberra. He could not locate Mr Whyte.
The appellant said that before speaking to the Whyalla Consumer Affairs people he did not have any knowledge that the business wasn’t licensed. He said that he was receiving documentation from Consumer Affairs and on a couple of occasion had representatives come to the premises. He was asked if he had received correspondence to him at the Jolly Car Company and he said that he had.
In cross-examination the appellant said that he had not, by September 2003, paid the full $12,000 to Mr Whyte for the purchase of the business. He still has not done so. He owes Mr Whyte $2,000.
The appellant said that the agreement for him to purchase Mr Whyte’s business was not in writing. There are no documents which evidence the agreement. He said that the hand-over of the business of selling cars was to occur on the completion of him paying the monies in full to Mr Whyte. He said that there “was obviously no stock” to the business. “It was good-will. There was next to no plant and equipment. It was just a good-will deal: “Here you are. You give me the $12,000. You can begin trading straight away”. The appellant said “that’s exactly how it worked”. As far as the licence was concerned the appellant said Mr Whyte would renew the licence, keep the licence current, until he had paid him in full. He said that was part of the $12,000.
The appellant was cross-examined about what he had said in his interview with Consumer and Business Affairs. He was directed to an answer he had given, being: “On payment of the purchase price, which was in November 2002, Mr Whyte was to arrange the transfer of the business licence to myself. Due to timing, it was Mr Whyte’s obligation to file the appropriate return and to pay the licence fee and then transfer the business”. The appellant was asked to comment upon a number of aspects of that answer. He was asked whether he had meant to infer that Mr Whyte was going to transfer the licence over to him once he had paid the purchase price. The appellant answered: “he was going to notify Consumer Affairs that he had ceased business and I would apply for the licence, but he was going to keep it – keep the licence current until – ”. He said that he had not been suggesting that the licence was something that he could buy. He was asked:
QDoes it follow from that that it was clearly your responsibility, once you got the business –
AI never got the business.
Q– let me finish the question.
AWhy I didn’t –
QLet me finish the question. Was it your understanding that, once you got the business, it was your responsibility to apply for a new licence.
AWhen he notified me, yes. When he notified me, he was going to notify the Consumer Affairs.
QSo he was –
ASo that he had – that the licence would not be renewed and the new purchaser was me.
QThe responsibility was yours to go and apply for a new licence, correct.
AOnly when I had total control of the business. He agreed – he knew we were still short of money, but he agreed to re – to renew the licence because he knew business was a bit hard.
The appellant said that Mr Whyte has vanished. He has vanished without getting the last $2,000 of the purchase price. He said he was not concerned about Mr Whyte vanishing because he “used to come back at Christmas time”. He said he imagined that he would have called in then and would have got the balance of his monies.
The appellant agreed that for at least eight months he was running the Jolly Car Company business alone. At no time during that period did he speak with Consumer Affairs about the situation of the licence.
The appellant agreed that the correspondence he said he received from Consumer Affairs were either addressed to the Jolly Car Company, or to Richard George Whyte of the Jolly Car Company. He knew Richard George Whyte was in Canberra.
The appellant was cross-examined about another part of his record of interview. By an answer he had given it could be inferred that he said that he had made the final payment of what he owed Mr Whyte for the business twelve months before the interview on 23 September 2003. The appellant said that he may have been mistaken in that answer. He was asked about another answer where he said that the figure of $10,000 included “the licence, the fixtures and fittings that were there and probably a little bit of good-will, I suppose”. He was asked why he was paying for Mr Whyte to pay his licence. He answered:
Mr Whyte wanted to keep his licence because he said to me “This might not work out in Canberra for me. I may wish to come back”.
The appellant was asked:
QWhich brings me, I suppose, to the next question. Under the agreement, as you have told it to us, it was your responsibility to go and apply for your own licence if you were going to deal in your own name; is that right.
AYes, that’s correct.
QAnd you have already told us that you didn’t do that.
AI didn’t do that, no, that’s correct, because I understood the licence was still – was current, and quite shocked by the fact that I found that it hadn’t been, that it wasn’t current, had expired, but I received no notification to say The Jolly Car Company is trading without a licence’
HIS HONOUR
QBut licences aren’t issued to the Jolly Car Company.
ANo, they’re issued to Mr Whyte.
QAnd they are not issued to Adelaide Best Cars.
AThat’s correct.
QOr any other business.
ANo, it was issued to Mr Whyte, but there was no –
QAll licences are issued to natural people, did you understand that.
AYes. There was no notification that came to me as about that licence or the licence to Mr Whyte, right, and I understood that Mr Whyte’s – all Mr Whyte’s communication as regards to licensing was actually sent to his private address which is 1 Trevor Avenue, Rostrevor.
QSo why did you think that.
ABecause he had a couple of speeding fines that ended up at that address.
QI’m sorry I thought you meant document from the consumer affairs, because you were getting correspondence from the commissioner addressed to Mr Whyte at the Jolly Car Company.
ACorrect, but we didn’t get any communication, certainly there was no communication came there. He was the one who notified me and said ‘I have information the licence has got to be renewed, I will take it out of this money’.
QDid you believe during 2003 before September that you could deal in motor vehicles at the premises of the Jolly Car Company using a licence of a person who lived interstate and was not in the business.
AHe decided to move up there temporarily, that’s why he wanted to keep his licence current, because he said ‘I’m going up there to satisfy my wife for a while, I will be returning to Adelaide’.
QI’ll ask you the question again.
AAll right.
QDid you believe in the first nine months – let’s make it eight months of 2003 that you could deal in secondhand motor vehicles at the premises of the Jolly Car Company using a licence of a person who lived interstate and was not operating in any way or associated with in any way the business.
AYes, I did.

We refer here to the evidence of a contract by which Mr Peake purchased a car from the Jolly Car Company. That contract contained a stamp that reads “Ted Whyte trading as Jolly Car Company, 123 Richmond Road, Richmond SA”. It contains the notation “MVD 103919”. This was a transaction conducted by the appellant. He was asked whether he had any concerns about the concept of contracting in Mr Whyte’s name. He said he understood the licence was current with Mr Whyte “and everything was fair and above board, there was not intention or intent here to try and defraud anybody …”. The appellant agreed that he had no trading account in the name of the Jolly Car Company and he agreed that he had told investigators that he had one trading account and it was operated by a cheque book in the name “David Crocker trading as Adelaide’s Cheapest Cars”. He was asked:
QWhat I’m getting at is whether you have any comment to make to the court about the discrepancy between making contracts in the name of Ted Whyte trading as Jolly Car Company and putting the money into the account of David Crocker trading as Adelaide’s Cheapest Cars.
AThat was the way I did the business.
QDid you think that was an appropriate way to do business.
AI didn’t feel I was breaking any laws.
QIf, for instance, a purchaser was for some reason aggrieved with the sale at the time, they obviously couldn’t pursue Mr Ted Whyte, could they, because you didn’t know where he was.
AWell, if there was a problem we would try and solve it. We’ve only had one complaint in six years.
QBut just in answer to my question, they couldn’t sue Ted Whyte, could they.
ANo, they would come back and see me.
QAnd the Jolly Car Company, that’s just a name, isn’t it.
ACorrect.
QAnd your name, David Crocker, doesn’t appear there.
ACorrect.
QNeither does Adelaide’s Cheapest Cars, does it.
ACorrect.
QAnd indeed I think we’ve already ascertained whether you knew it or not, the business name of Adelaide’s Cheapest Cars –
AHad expired.
We are satisfied on all the evidence before us that at least between 16 January 2003 and 23 September 2003 the appellant sold or offered for sale forty-eight motor vehicles when he was not licensed under the said Act to carry on business as a second-hand motor vehicle dealer. Furthermore, we are satisfied, and find, that the appellant did so knowing that he was not licensed under the Act and knowing that he could not sell or offer for sale any motor vehicles unless he personally held a current second-hand motor vehicle dealers licence in his name.
The appellant had for some years held a motor vehicle dealers licence when he operated a business on his own account. We find that at all times he knew that a second-hand motor vehicle licence is issued to natural people and not to businesses. We reject the appellant’s evidence that he considered that he could operate as a second-hand motor vehicle dealer on a licence of or in the name of another person. We do not believe his evidence that he thought he could operate as a motor vehicle dealer on Mr Whyte’s licence.
We reject the appellant’s evidence about the arrangement or agreement that he said he had with Mr Whyte in about late 2002 for him to purchase Mr Whyte’s business of the Jolly Car Company. We acknowledge the possibility that there was some business arrangement between the appellant and Mr Whyte in regard to the appellant operating the business at the premises of the Jolly Car Company. We are unable to find what those arrangements may have been. However, we reject the appellant’s evidence that there was an arrangement or an agreement between the two men that the appellant would purchase the business and Mr Whyte’s licence to operate it. We are satisfied that the appellant made up that story to justify the fact that he was operating a car yard on his own without having a licence to do so, when he knew that he needed a licence to do so and did not have one.
It may be that there was some arrangement between the appellant and Mr Whyte that the appellant would operate the business of the Jolly Car Company whilst Mr Whyte was in Canberra. The appellant’s evidence was that Mr Whyte did not wish to give up his licence because he may want to return from Canberra if his business prospects there did not eventuate. We note that Mr Whyte’s dealer’s licence was suspended from 1 August 2002 due to non-payment of compensation fund contributions. That does not seem to be consistent with Mr Whyte wishing to maintain his licence. We are unable to make findings as to what arrangements, if any, there were between the appellant and Mr Whyte. Mr Whyte did not give evidence before us and the appellant said he has gone missing. We are not prepared to find that the appellant does not know Mr Whyte’s current whereabouts.
We do not believe the appellant’s evidence as to the arrangement or agreement that he had with Mr Whyte. We also do not believe the appellant’s evidence about his telephone call to the Whyalla branch of Consumer Affairs. We thought his evidence on these matters was contrived and bizarre.
We are satisfied and find that at least between January and September 2003 inclusive the appellant was knowingly trading as a second-hand motor vehicle dealer and that he was doing so knowing that he should have been, and was not, licensed to do so.
Another matter referred to by the decision-maker concerned s16 notices on vehicles offered for sale by the appellant at the Jolly Car Company. Mr Close’s affidavit refers to that matter in this way:
eMr Crocker had displayed Section 16 Notices on vehicles that he had offered for sale which did not comply with section 16 of the Act in that the last owner’s names were not listed and he did not have written instructions from those owners instructing him not to disclose their names and addresses on the notices: Exhibited to this affidavit and marked GC5 is an internal memo dated 2 October 2003 reporting that all such section 16 Notices seized by OCBA investigator Steve Wall indicated the last owner details as “available on request”. When challenged, Mr Crocker could not produce requests from the previous owners addressing their privacy concerns – indeed he could not produce any information to indicate the names and addresses of previous owners.
fMr Crocker had failed to display Section 16 Notices on all vehicles that he had offered or exposed for sale: Exhibit GC5 also revealed that one vehicle being offered or exposed for sale at the time of OCBA investigator’s visit to the premises did not display a schedule, in contravention of the Act.
All but one of the number of vehicles investigators saw in the appellant’s car yard indicated that the last owner details were “available on request”. Exhibit A3, tendered on behalf of the appellant, was a standard form letter apparently emanating from the Office of Consumer and Business Affairs referring to s16 of the said Act. That section was said to impose on dealers a requirement to display, on any second-hand motor vehicle that is offered or exposed for sale, a notice containing certain information. The appellant gave evidence that he had not been kept up to date with such correspondence relating to s16 of the said Act. He said that he did not receive a letter in the terms of Exhibit A3. He wrote to the Commissioner that he “only recently … became aware of the Section 16 amendments”. He wrote “although still registered as a dealer, I had not received any advice updates in relation to legislative changes, which I am informed were sent to other dealers.”
We are satisfied that the appellant did not receive any notification from the Office of Consumer and Business Affairs addressed to him personally because he was not licensed as a dealer during the year 2003. There were no legislative changes to s16 during that year. The only way the appellant could have become aware of any letter sent by the Office of Consumer and Business Affairs in the form of Exhibit A3 was if such a letter was sent to Mr Whyte at the Jolly Car Company and the appellant opened it. We are unable to find whether that occurred or not. We are not able to find that the appellant did not receive such a letter addressed to Mr Whyte at the Jolly Car Company.
What we consider important in respect to s16 of the said Act is that that section provides that if a notice is attached to a vehicle in which it is stated that the name and address of the last owner of the vehicle is available on request from the dealer, the dealer must, on request of a potential purchaser, disclose the name and address to the potential purchaser before a contract is made for the purchase of the vehicle. In this case the investigators asked the appellant for the names and addresses of the last owner of all of the vehicles on which a notice was displayed to the effect that those details were available on request from the dealer. The appellant was unable to provide those details in respect to any of the vehicles in the yard which displayed such a notice. He explained that those details had been stolen from his briefcase from his car at his home address. We do not believe that evidence. We find that the appellant made up that story to the investigators, and that he did so because he was not able or prepared to supply any of those details to the investigators.
The other two matters that Mr Close considered and which were the subject of evidence before us concerned two vehicles sold by the appellant to a Mr Peake and a Mr Tahir. We find it unnecessary to deal in detail with these two matters. The appellant said that Mr Whyte had brought the vehicle eventually sold to Mr Tahir to the yard and asked that the appellant sell it. We find that the engine number of the vehicle had been partly obliterated and most of the chassis number had been ground off. The vehicle was seized by police when it was found to be a stolen vehicle. We find that the vehicle was in that state when sold by the appellant and that he should have become aware of the state of the vehicle. We are satisfied that he did not make proper enquiries as to the vehicle.
We indicated earlier that the District Court Act provides that we are not to depart from the decision of the decision-maker except for cogent reasons. On the findings we have made we are satisfied that there are no cogent reasons to depart from Mr Close’s decision in this matter. We have found that the appellant was dealing in motor vehicles when he knew he should have a licence and when he knew that he did not have a licence. We have found that he was conducting a business under someone else’s licence when he knew that he could not properly do so. We have found that he made up an excuse for that when confronted by investigators from Consumer Affairs. We have found that he made up a story about having had documents stolen from himself when confronted by those investigators. We have found that he sold a motor vehicle whose engine number and chassis number were respectively partly and totally obliterated and that he made no proper enquiries to ascertain that fact before sale.
We have also found that the appellant was not truthful in the evidence he gave before us.
We have noted the Magistrate’s Remarks on Penalty of 23 September 2004. They were of little assistance to our considerations and conclusions as we have had the benefit of all the material that was before us (including the evidence of the appellant) which the learned Deputy Chief Magistrate did not have.
In Pav v Commercial and Private Agents Board (1988) 143 LSJS 1 Perry J said at pages 12-13:
The considerations which it will be proper to take into account in determining whether a person is a fit and proper person to hold a particular licence will vary according to the nature of the licence and the nature of the work done pursuant to the licence.
It would be wrong to attempt any exhaustive catalogue of relevant considerations. It is obvious though that they will bear largely upon the character of the person concerned and in particular whether or not his character and reputation is such that members of the public with whom the person is dealing can deal with the person with a reasonable degree of confidence that he would act honestly and carry out his duties in a trustworthy way and with a due and proper sense of responsibility.
We are not satisfied, on the findings we have made, that the appellant’s character or reputation would be such that members of the public with whom he deals could deal with him with a reasonable degree of confidence that he would act honestly and carry out his duties in a trustworthy way and with a due and proper sense of responsibility. It was submitted to us on behalf of the appellant that no member of the public had been financially disadvantaged by the appellant’s dealing in motor vehicles without a licence. We are not convinced that the fact (if it be a fact) that no member of the public has suffered by the conduct of the appellant is such as to alter those conclusions. If it be a fact it is due more to good luck than anything else.
We consider that Mr Close’s decision was well justified on the material before him. One of the key purposes of the Second-Hand Vehicle Dealers Act is to protect the public from persons who do not comply with the requirements of the Act. On the material before us and the findings we have made we would come to the same conclusion.
In these circumstances we affirm the decision appealed against.
We make no order for costs as we do not consider such an order to be necessary in the interests of justice.