Creswell and Creswell

[2013] FCCA 2388

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CRESWELL & CRESWELL [2013] FCCA 2388

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Interim arrangements for care of children (twins) aged five years – high level of tension and mistrust between parties – nature of interim hearing – presumption of equal shared parental responsibilities – allegations of family violence – meaningful parental relationships – best interests.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975, ss.60CC, 61DA, 65DAA

MRR v GR [2010] HCA 4

Applicant: MR CRESWELL

Respondent: MR CRESWELL

File Number: ADC 1702 of 2013

Judgment of: Judge Brown

Hearing date: 31 October 2013

Date of Last Submission: 31 October 2013

Delivered at: Adelaide

Delivered on: 31 October 2013

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Bowler

Solicitors for the Applicant: Douglas Hoskins Legal

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Black

Solicitors for the Respondent: Lamont Black

ORDERS

1. The matter be fixed for final hearing before Judge Brown on 28, 29 & 30 April 2014 at 10.00 am.

2. The applicant father file and serve an updated Statement of Financial Circumstances within twenty eight (28) days of this order.

3. Pursuant to Section 62G(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 the parties and the children of the relationship [X] and [Y] both born [in] 2008 attend upon a Regulation 7 practitioner nominated by the Dispute Resolution Co-ordinator, Federal Circuit Court of Australia, on a date and at time/s to be advised for the purposes of the preparation of a family report, such report to be released on or before 5 February 2014.

4. The Family Report to deal with the following matters:

   (a)any views expressed by the said children and any factors (such as the said children’s maturity or level of understanding) that would affect the weight that the court should place on those wishes;

   (b)the matters set out in ss.60CC, 61DA and 65DAA of the Family Law Act 1975;   and

   (c)any other matters that the Family Consultant/assessor considers important to the welfare or best interests of the said children.

5. The solicitors for the parties forward copies of all documents filed with the Court to the nominated report writer in accordance with the directions of the Child Dispute Co-ordinator.

DURING THE PERIOD OF ADJOURNMENT THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The father sepnd time with the children [X] and [Y] both born [in] 2008 as follows:

   (a)From after school on Friday 1 November 2013 until 3.30 pm the following Sunday 3 November 3012;

   (b)From 9.00 am 7 December 2013 until 3.30 pm on 9 December 2013;

   (c)From 9.00 am 12 December 2013 until 3.30 pm on 14 December 2013;

   (d)From 9.00 am 7 December 2013 until 3.30 pm on 9 December 2013;

   (e)From 9.00 am 17 December 2013 until 3.30 pm on 20 December 2013;

   (f)From 4.00 pm 24 December 2013 until 2.00 pm on 25 December 2013;and

   (g)From 9.00 am 28 December 2013 until 3.30 pm on 30 December 2013.

2. The children be exchanged wherever possible at their school and when school is not in session in the foyer of the [omitted] Police Station.

3. Until further of other order the Interim Intervention Order of 26 July 2013 made by the [omitted] Magistrates Court is varied so that the father may communicate with the mother in writing in electronic means in the form of emails and SMS messages to discuss arrangements directly relating to the welfare of the children.

4. The parties be restrained and injunctions are hereby granted restraining them from:

   (a)Leaving the children at or near a swimming pool, spa or beach in the absence of direct supervision by an adult;

   (b)Consuming alcohol to excess for a period 24 hours prior to their time with the children and during any time that the children are spending time with them;

   (c)Travelling by motor vehicle with the children in the absence of appropriate restraints.

5. Without admission, the parties be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining the parties from:

   (a)Discussing these proceedings with the children or allowing any other person to do so;

   (b)Abusing or denigrating the other party in the presence of the children or allowing any other person to do so.

6. The parties utilise a communication book for the purposes of the parties communicating in relation to the children’s health, welfare and education.

7. Further consideration of this matter be adjourned to 14 February 2014 at 9.30 am.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Creswell & Creswell is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA

AT ADELAIDE

ADC 1702 of 2013

MR CRESWELL

Applicant

And

MR CRESWELL

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and Background

1. These reasons for judgement were orally delivered immediately following the interim hearing concerned.  They have been corrected from the transcript, in the sense that punctuation has been inserted; paragraphs inserted as intended; errors in expression corrected; footnotes, headings and case references inserted; and corrections made necessary to make the orally delivered reasons amenable to being read.

2. This afternoon, I have to deal with the matter of Creswell. The applicant in the proceeding is Mr Creswell and the respondent is

   
   

   Ms Creswell. The proceedings are concerned with interim arrangements for the parties’ children, twins [Y] and [X], who were born [in] 2008. 

3. By way of background, as I understand things, the parties met one another sometime in late 2004. At the time, they were both [occupation omitted]. 

4. They began to live together in the following year and married on [date omitted] 2006.  Mr Creswell was born in 1968 and Ms Creswell was born in 1982.  During the parties’ marriage, they lived in Cairns, Perth and Brisbane, but the family has lived in Adelaide since September 2011. 

5. By way of occupation, Mr Creswell is a [occupation omitted].  He is involved with [omitted]’s project in Papua New Guinea.  He has been employed by [omitted] since November of 2011. 

6. Due to the onerous nature of his employment and its responsibility, he is well paid.  He is required and has been required to work on a roster, which necessitates him being in Papua New Guinea for 28 days at a stretch. He then returns to Australia, for rest and recuperation, for a further 28 days before returning to Papua New Guinea.

7. Mr Creswell began these proceedings on 16 May 2013.  His application was made shortly after the parties separated on 24 April 2013.  The parties agree that the circumstances surrounding their separation were difficult.  It also seems to be the case that, for each of them, the emotional consequences of their separation continue to reverberate powerfully.

8. From Mr Creswell’s point of view, he was presented with a letter, at the airport, when he had returned to Australia from Papua New Guinea, informing him that the relationship between the parties was over.  He was shocked.  He is critical of a number of aspects of Ms Creswell’s behaviour in the period since, including in respect of financial matters. 

9. At any event, within weeks of the parties separating, he commenced proceedings in the court.  It is his position, on both a final and interim basis, that the parties should have equal shared parental responsibility for the children.

10. Thereafter he seeks a regime whereby the children would live with each of their parents for relatively equal periods of time, in what is commonly called an equal time arrangement.  If he continues to work in PNG, he wishes those periods to coincide with the time he is in Australia, which is currently every second month or so.

11. Ms Creswell responded to the application on 3 July of this year.  It is her position that the court needs to take a cautious approach to the father spending time with the two children concerned.  In her application, she did not specify, with any detail, what that time should be.  She is currently working as an administrative assistant and she is not as well remunerated as Mr Creswell. 

12. In the period prior to the case coming on for directions on 8 July,
    Mr Creswell spent time with the children concerned.  This occurred subject to the supervision of two individuals, Mr F and Ms F. 

13. They are respectively the uncle and a cousin of Ms Creswell, and they each submitted affidavits in support of Mr Creswell’s position, indicating that from their perspective, the time they observed with the children went well.  They each also have positive things to say about the children’s relationship with their father.

14. It is Mr Creswell’s position that although he frequently was away from Adelaide, in the periods when he was in Adelaide, he was fully involved in the children’s lives, preparing their meals, bathing them, interacting with them and generally being a loving and caring father. 

15. He would categorise himself, I think, as a closely involved father.  He has also provided testimonials from people, who have been involved with him in the past as to his good character. He has gone to great pains to file a great deal of affidavit material, in a relatively short period of time.

16. The mother’s position is diametrically opposed to Mr Creswell’s view.  She essentially says that Mr Creswell was not closely involved with the children, at all.  Rather, she categorises him a person who has a short temper, who has difficulties with drinking to excess, which on her evidence exacerbates Mr Creswell’s irritability.

17. She also asserts that he has longstanding issues to do with his mental health.  She asserts that he suffers from a bipolar condition.  Essentially it is her position that Mr Creswell lacks insight into the needs of the children concerned.  In addition, as a consequence of the end of the parties’ marriage, which she instigated, is very angry with her. 

18. This has caused him to be intent on harassing of her, using the children as one avenue of such harassment.  It is her case that she is the children’s primary carer and has always been so, something which
    Mr Creswell is either unable to accept or is ignoring to suit his campaign against her.

19. When the matter first came before the court, the parties were able to agree on a regime of time for the children to interact with their father.  They spent time with him, during the day, in July on a number of occasions.  

20. In addition, at an early stage a communication book was inaugurated, in order to minimise interactions between the parties and injunctions were also made restraining each of the parties from discussing the case with the children or abusing or denigrating the other parent in the presence of the children.  This latter order was introduced with a view to reducing the high levels of tensions between the parties.

21. Other orders were made, no doubt with the intent of assuaging some of the mother’s concerns, that the children were not to be left near open water without supervision;  and that both parties were not to consume alcohol in the period when the children were with each of them and the immediate period preceding.

22. Orders were also made ensuring that the children were restrained in cars, it being, I think, one of Ms Creswell’s criticisms of Mr Creswell that he is not mindful of road safety issues to do with the children. 

23. The property aspects of the case, and, if I have not done so already, I should point out that there are property aspects to the case, were referred to a conciliation conference, which was scheduled to take place in . 

24. It was, I think, the hope, at this earlier stage, that the parties would adjust to the circumstances surrounding their separation smoothly and on the next occasion, there might be some advance in the matter, particularly in terms of Mr Creswell spending more time, particularly overnight time with the children.  That sometimes happens, sometimes it does not.  

25. I acknowledge that the separation between the parties was difficult and raw, particularly, it would seem, from Mr Creswell’s point of view.  At any event, when the matter returned to court on 22 August, it was agreed that the parties would meet with one of the family consultants to discuss on-going arrangements for the care of their children.   On that basis, the matter was adjourned until October, to coincide with
    Mr Creswell’s return to Australia.

26. In August, I advanced Mr Creswell’s time with the children to include some overnight periods.  The injunctions, which had been earlier agreed, were extended and regrettably, it was necessary for me to make an order that, if the children could not be exchanged at their respective schools, then they should be exchanged at the [omitted] Police Station foyer.  I should say that, although the children are twins, they attend different schools.  As I recall, [Y] is at [omitted] and [X] is at [omitted].

27. The conciliation conference was not successful and it is the case that Ms Creswell has changed solicitors and now it seems necessary for the case to be fixed for final hearing.

28. The report from the court counsellor, Ms B, was released to the parties on or around 16 October 2013.  It is entitled Memorandum to Court.  It did not involve any detailed examination, observation or assessment of the two children concerned, rather it focused on the parties themselves and their respective perspectives on the case. 

29. As the parties will appreciate, at this interim stage, I have not seen either of them giving evidence in their own voices or being placed under pressure through cross-examination.  At this stage, I have only heard submissions from their respective counsels.

30. Accordingly, it is difficult, if not impossible, for me to assess what type of people they are and particularly who of them is likely to be more truthful or more insightful about their circumstances, particularly in terms of issues to do with the twins.  As I say, the parties are polarised in the extreme in respect of the nature of their relationship in the past and how they have parented [Y] and [X] up to this stage. 

31. The parties reiterated their respective positions to the family consultant, as they have been detailed in these reasons to date.  The mother alleged that Mr Creswell continued to verbally abuse and intimidate her; that he was a person who had poor control of his impulses; and was affected by alcohol abuse and fluctuating mental health.

32. From his perspective, the father denied the gravamen of all the allegations against him. In particular, he maintained to the family consultant that he had successfully refuted all 76 allegations raised by the mother in court. 

33. It should be pointed out, I think, that since the proceedings were instituted, Mr Creswell has filed many affidavits and has done his best to file material refuting the mother’s allegations against him. 

34. In particular, he has filed an affidavit from his solicitor, Mr Douglas, to which is attached a report from a psychiatrist whom he has been consulting.  She is Dr H.  She deposes that she has no concerns about Mr Creswell’s psychiatric capacity to maintain a proper level of relationship with the two children concerned and further she assesses him to be a reliable and protective parent.

35. To return to the report of the family consultant, she assessed
    Mr Creswell as being determined and intense, motivated by a desire not to be regarded by his children, when they were older, as an absent parent.  Ms B assessed Ms Creswell as being calm and measured.   

36. Significantly, Ms B reported that Ms Creswell was supportive of the children having ongoing time with their father.  However, she (Ms Creswell) continued to hold concerns about their safety.  Again significantly, Ms Creswell acknowledged the children looked forward to seeing their father. 

37. However, she asserted they were reluctant to spend overnight periods with their father and returned from spending time with him unsettled and exhausted.  The mother agreed with Ms B’s recommendation that it was appropriate that there be an incremental increase in the father’s time with the children.  

38. It is the father’s position, which he maintained to the court consultant, that there should be a week about arrangement to commence immediately.  He apparently expressed concern that the court was biased in favour of women.  Ms B reported that there is considerable acrimony between the parties.  I think this is, if anything, an understatement.

39. Today, I am told by counsel that the mother has sought an interim intervention order against Mr Creswell, which relates to the sending of emails or SMS messages to her by him.  Those messages are asserted by Mr Creswell to only relate to the children concerned and to be analogous to the communication book communications which have been exchanged between the parties pursuant to the earlier order. 

40. But notwithstanding this alleged state of affairs, it is his case that he has been arrested by police and charged with some species of offence. No doubt this has added to the acrimony between the parties.  The mother asserts that the father continues to harass her at handovers and abuse her, matters which the father strenuously denies.

41. So the respective positions of the parties are polarised in the extreme.  The father being of the view that the children’s care ought to be shared strictly on an equal basis between him and the mother.  The mother, ostensibly at least, is open to the children spending more time with their father, including overnight time, but only cautiously and incrementally.

42. From the father’s perspective, any advance in the matter, so far as he spending more time with the children concerned, is perceived to be glacially slow.  It is his case that the mother is motivated by factors related to the parties’ issues, particularly about financial matters, not to what is likely to be best for the children.

43. I have to decide this case on the basis of the evidence available to me.  As I have already pointed out, in many ways that evidence is unsatisfactory.  It is unsatisfactory because, at this point, I cannot determine who of the parties is the more reliable witness of the two. 

44. Indeed, it’s not unknown for people to be completely honest but still have diametrically opposing views because of their personality or their view of things.  At any event, at this stage, I can’t make findings about the nature of the parties’ relationship with one another.

45. In addition, at this stage, I do not have any independent assessment of [Y] and [X]’s needs.  No expert has seen the two children interacting with each of their parents.  Such interactions are usually instructive because it is possible for an expert to see how warmly and confidently children interact with a parent, and very often, to adopt a cliché, a picture is worth a thousand words. 

46. I will never meet or see [Y] and [X] and yet I am cast in the position where I have to make significant decisions about their care. For obvious reasons, a report from an independent expert, who sees the two children with each of their parents, is likely to be a very useful piece of evidence for me. However, at this interim stage, I do not have such a report.

47. In conjunction with the final hearing I am going to allocate, which will take place on the 28, 29 and 30 of April of next year, I will order that such a report be prepared, by one of the court-appointed psychologists.

48. Such a report is likely to take about 12 weeks to complete.  There may be issues about Mr Creswell and his work in the meantime, but ideally it will be released on or before 5 February of 2014.

49. As I say, notwithstanding deficits in the evidence, I must still make a significant decision about the two children concerned.  In this decision, as in all decisions to do with children, the best interests of the children concerned are the paramount or most important consideration. 

50. Pursuant to the applicable legislation, the Family Law Act, I must look to a long list of matters, which are contained in section 60CC of the Act to determine how any individual child’s best interests will be best served.

1. There are two categories of consideration outlined in the section – primary considerations and there are two of those, and which are firstly the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents, and secondly, the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to or exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence. 

2. Prior to some recent legislative amendments, those considerations were not formally ranked in regards to one another.  They have been referred to in a number of decisions of the Family Court as being twin pillars on which the considerations relating to children stand. 

3. However, as a result of the insertion of section 60CC(2)(a) into the Act, the court is now directed, in applying those primary considerations, to give greater weight to the need to protect children from the physical or psychological consequence of being subjected to or exposed to family violence, neglect or abuse.

4. The additional considerations are more numerous.  They deal with such things as the wishes of the children concerned, the nature of the child’s relationship with individuals, the level of parental insight and so on and so forth. 

5. In addition, the court is empowered to consider any other fact or circumstance it considers relevant.  The aim of that long list is so that the court is able to tailor an idiosyncratic response which is appropriate for the best interests of the child concerned. 

6. In the legislation there is the presumption that it is in the child’s best interests for his or her parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child concerned. That presumption arises as a consequence of the provisions of section 61DA of the Act.

7. If the presumption is applied, the court is directed to consider children spending either equal periods of time or substantial and significant periods of time, with each parent, subject to overall considerations of the children’s overall best interests and what is reasonably practical in the familial circumstances concerned.

8. In this day and age, cases involving parents sharing equally the responsibility for making decisions about their children and for that responsibility resulting in an equal time arrangement are somewhat controversial. 

9. However, it should be noted that the presumption relates to the allocation of parental responsibility, not strictly to the allocation of time which a child spends with his or her parents. 

10. The presumption is rebutted on a number of bases.  Firstly, it is rebutted if the court has reasonable grounds to believe that a parent has engaged in abuse of the child or family violence has occurred.  It is also rebutted if the court is of the view that it would not be in the best interests of the child for it apply.

11. At this interim stage, where evidence is untested, the court also has a discretion not to apply the presumption, if it is inappropriate for it to be applied, in all the circumstances of the case concerned. 

12. As I say, if the presumption does apply, the court is required to actively consider the child or children concerned living with both parents on an equal time basis subject to two considerations.  Firstly, such an outcome must be in the best interests of the child concerned, and secondly, it must be reasonable practicable to put into place. 

13. If the court rejects equal time, it is then required to consider substantial and significant time.  That is a concept defined in the Act.  It includes time during the week and during the weekend, time that allows a parent to be involved in a child’s routine, and also time which enables a child and parent to spend time on special occasions.

14. The definition of substantial and significant time is, I think, closely tied in with the concept of meaningful relationship contained in the legislation.  A meaningful relationship depends, in my view, not only on the extent of time, in a quantitative sense, which a parent spends with a child, but also on its qualitative aspects. 

15. It being the case, I think, that parental relationships have more meaning or have the potential to be more meaningful, if the parent and child are able to interact in a variety of contexts and settings, both the weekday, weekends and during school holidays. 

16. Again, substantial and significant time is subject to it being in the child’s best interests and for it to be reasonably practicable to implement. 

17. What is reasonably practicable is defined by a number of criteria set out in section 65DAA(5). The considerations relate to the geographic proximity of the parents’ homes, but more significantly I think also how well the parents concerned communicate with one another, their capacity to solve problems and what is the impact that such an arrangement would have on the child concerned.

18. In a case called MRR[1], the High Court has said that both criteria have to be satisfied, before an order for either equal time or substantial and significant time is made.  More importantly, the High Court indicated that what is reasonably practicable, in any case, depends on the reality of the familial situation surrounding the child and parents concerned.

    [1] MRR v GR [2010] HCA 4

19. In this case, quite clearly, there is a high degree of rancour and acrimony between the parents concerned.   As such, it would appear to be the case that the parties are still adjusting to the difficult circumstances relating to the end of their relationship.

20. In this case, I do not think that it is appropriate for me to apply the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility, at this interim stage, because of the polarised positions of the parties.

21. However, notwithstanding the rejection of the presumption, I am still required to put in place the regime which I think will best serve the interests of the children concerned. 

22. The parties have been separated for a period approaching six months.  There can be no doubt, I think, that Mr Creswell is fervently desirous of maintaining his relationship with [Y] and [X] and spending as much time as possible with the two children. 

23. It is, I think, the flavour of the mother’s case that, to a certain extent, Mr Creswell’s is fixated on what he perceives to be his rights rather than what are the entitlements of the children concerned.   But, notwithstanding this criticism, I am still required to consider the benefits of the children having a meaningful level of relationship with both their parents. 

24. The mother’s view is that I should approach the case from the perspective of protecting the children from being exposed to what she would characterise as family violence.

25. She says that that family violence has occurred at handovers, when she has been abused by Mr Creswell. In terms of the definition of family violence in the Act, it would cover behaviour that is intended to coerce or intimidate a person. 

26. I am not in a position, as I say, to make findings of fact about this issue.  Although I am required to give greater weight to issues of family violence, in my view that does not mean that I am directed to ignore the benefits of the children having a meaningful level of relationship with their father.

27. Since the matter was before the court in August, there has been, I think, little scope for the matter to be advanced.  Mr Creswell has been overseas for a significant portion of the time.  He complains that
    Ms Creswell rebuffed his overture to spend time with the children on Father’s Day, which from his perspective, was an important occasion for both him and the children.

28. Through his counsel, Mr Bowler, he would assert that this is demonstrative of the mother’s disregard for his significant role in the children’s lives.  He is concerned that the mother seeks every pretext to circumvent his relationship with the children and will allow him only to spend the bare bones of what is sufficient to maintain his relationship with the children.

29. Essentially, he asserts that she is not proactive in extending their time with the children and therefore the court must intervene to secure the children’s best interests.  Again, that is an issue I am not able to resolve, but I think it is instructive that Ms B indicated that, in general terms, the mother was in favour of a graduated and gradual increase. 

30. It would seem to be the position that she wishes that time to remain at the most two overnights at a time.  The position is that Mr Creswell is currently within Australia.  He has to return next Monday to PNG.  He will be here in Australia for all of January, apart from a few days. 

31. At this stage, the parties’ relationship continues to be difficult.  Mr Creswell has recently filed an affidavit.  I have been provided with some pages of the communication book.  They are, I think, anodyne in their nature.  Mr Creswell has also sought out the children’s teachers and asked them to comment on how the children have presented at school following spending overnight time with him.  Again, there is nothing untoward in that. 

32. It would seem to me that the most significant danger to the children at the present time is the nature of the parties’ relationship with one another.  If the parties are relatively isolated from one another and are capable of being cordial, or at least not inflammatory to one another, it seems likely to me, on balance, that the children will not be exposed to family violence. 

33. In this case I have to, I think, bear in mind the ages of the children.  They are still of tender years.  I am not as sanguine as Mr Creswell that they will easily transfer to an equal time arrangement at this stage, certainly not in the absence of any independent assessment to that effect. 

34. Certainly at this stage, the parties’ ability to cooperate with one another seems to be a factor completely lacking.  But, on the other hand, it would seem to me that some consideration has to be given to advancing the children’s relationship with their father, vis-à-vis the time he is currently spending with them. 

35. I think that it would be in the children’s best interests to spend blocks of time with their father in the December holiday and also prior to Mr Creswell’s departure to New Guinea on Monday. 

36. However, in terms of the children’s significant relationships, there can be no doubt that, certainly since the parties separated, the mother has been the children’s primary carer.  In these circumstances, I think the difficult emotional topography between the parties, at present, behoves that no dramatic experiment is taken with the children’s care at the moment. 

37. Whether that is gender bias, I am not sure, but as I say, it appears to be uncontroversial that Ms Creswell has provided more care for the children, certainly since the parties separated.  In my view, this is a significant factor.

38. What I have in mind, during December, is that there be two blocks of two nights and then two blocks of three nights, with one overnight period to coincide with Christmas, so over the 26 or 27 days that Mr Creswell is in Australia in December, he will have the children for 11 nights of that. 

39. That will, in my view, ensure that the children have the benefit of having a meaningful level of relationship with him.  I am also satisfied that this approach is consistent, in general terms, with what Ms B recommended.

40. Namely that the current regime, which I inaugurated on an ad hoc basis, should be supported, which is relatively short periods of time which is fairly regularly spaced. So for those reasons, I will fix the matter for final hearing for three days on 28, 29 and 30 of April 2014 and order that a family report be prepared.

41. I will also make other orders specifically delineating the time the father is to spend with the children.

42. Two matters remain outstanding, I think.  One is the adjournment date, which should coincide with when Mr Creswell will be back in this country, and secondly whether the two children, notwithstanding their infancy, should be independently represented.

43. I will hear submissions from counsel regarding these two matters, but otherwise will make the orders as outlined above, which are now as set out at the commencement of these reasons for judgement. 

I certify that the preceding ninety-three (93) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Brown

Associate: 

Date:  31 October 2013