| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S ECI 2020 01975
| IN THE MATTER of an application under s 85B of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) | |
| MELANIE CRESPO | Applicant |
| v | |
| THOMAS KELSON | Respondent |
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JUDGE: | Tinney J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 4 December 2020 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 14 May 2021 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Crespo v Kelson |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2021] VSC 264 |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Application for crimes compensation order – Mother of murdered 17-year-old child – Application for extension of time – Pain and suffering – Whether financial circumstances of respondent should be taken into account – Costs of application - Sentencing Act 1991 s 85B, 85D, 85H, 85K.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Ms A Hancock | Rightside Legal |
| For the Respondent | Mr T Danos | Acting pro bono under the Victorian Bar Pro Bono Scheme |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
This is an application for compensation pursuant to s 85B of the Sentencing Act 1991 (‘the Act’). Melanie Crespo (‘the applicant’) is the mother of Cayleb Hough (‘Cayleb’) who was murdered by the respondent on 20 December 2015.
The applicant seeks a compensation order comprising amounts for pain and suffering and for past and future counselling.
The application was launched out of time and hence proceeded as an application for extension of time pursuant to s 85D of the Act. I reached a determination during the running of the application that it would be in the interests of justice to extend the time for the commencement of the application for compensation to 29 April 2020. Having granted that extension of time, I indicated I would publish my reasons for that decision, along with my decision on the application for a compensation order itself at a future time.
What follows are my reasons for granting an extension of time, and my decision on the substantive application for compensation.
Circumstances of the offence
Cayleb was 17 years old at the time he met his tragic and violent death at the hands of the respondent. The circumstances of that death are set out in detail in the sentence I passed upon the respondent on 10 August 2018.[1] I will summarise those circumstances only briefly here.
[1]R v Kelson [2018] VSC 442 (‘Sentence’).
In sentencing the respondent, I noted that the murder to which he had pleaded guilty occurred in exceedingly strange circumstances. That, I believe, was no exaggeration.
Cayleb and the respondent, who was some nine years his senior, were friends who, for some time leading up to the events, had been frequent users of drugs together. In the days preceding the murder, they were in each other’s company, not sleeping, using ice and other drugs, and observed to be substantially affected by drugs and behaving strangely.
On the morning of 20 December 2015, Cayleb and the respondent attended at a residential address in Dight Street, Collingwood. There they spent time in the company of a friend of the respondent named…
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- AGLC
- Crespo v Kelson [2021] VSC 264
- Case
- [2021] VSC 264
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the financial circumstances of Kelson were not relevant to the decision. The court noted that the purpose of the crimes compensation scheme was to provide relief to victims of crime, and that the scheme was not intended to be a means of punishing the offender. The court also held that the costs of the application should not be awarded against Kelson, as the application was made in good faith and there were reasonable grounds for making it. The court found that the applicant had not acted unreasonably or without proper consideration in making the application, and that there were no grounds for imposing costs against the respondent.
The court's reasoning was based on the provisions of the Sentencing Act 1991, which provide that an extension of time for making an application for compensation may be granted if the applicant satisfies the court that there were reasonable grounds for the delay. The court found that the applicant had satisfied this requirement, and that there were no other factors that should be taken into account when deciding whether to grant an extension of time. The court also noted that the imposition of costs against the respondent would not serve the interests of justice, as the application was made in good faith and there were reasonable grounds for making it.
The court dismissed the application for an extension of time and ordered that the costs of the application be paid by the applicant. The court held that the imposition of costs against the respondent would not be appropriate in the circumstances, and that the applicant should bear the costs of the application. The court's decision provides guidance on the factors that should be taken into account when deciding whether to grant an extension of time for an application for crimes compensation, and the circumstances in which costs may be awarded against a respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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