Cremona v Administrative Appeals Tribunal - [2014] FCCA 2412

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CREMONA v ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL & ANOR

[2014] FCCA 2412

Catchwords:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Application for judicial review of decision of Social Security Appeals Tribunal – SSAT affirmed decision of Centrelink – Applicant’s oral application for adjournment dismissed – Applicant provided no written evidence nor oral submissions in support of application – Court exercised discretion – adequate provision made by any law other than Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – application for judicial review dismissed.

Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s.44(1)

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss.5, 6, 7, 10, 10(2)(b)(ii), 46(1)(a)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.33.18

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Reeve [2012] FCAFC 21
Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143
Director-General of Social Services v Chaney (1980) 3 ALD 161
Duncan v Fayle [2004] FCA 723
Tuite v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1993) 40 FCR 483

Applicant:

DAVID CREMONA

First Respondent:

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent:

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

File Number:

MLG 611 of 2014

Judgment of:

Judge Hartnett

Hearing date:

16 October 2014

Delivered at:

Melbourne

Delivered on:

16 October 2014

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant:

In Person

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

Ms Heffernan

Solicitors for the Second Respondent:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

The name of the Second Respondent be changed to “Secretary, Department of Social Services”.
The Application for Judicial Review filed 1 April 2014 is dismissed pursuant to s.10(2)(b)(ii) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).
The Applicant pay the Second Respondent’s costs of the Application for Judicial Review fixed in the sum of $3,800.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 611 of 2014

DAVID CREMONA

Applicant

And

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

First Respondent

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Edited ex tempore reasons)

The Applicant filed an Originating Application for Judicial Review on 1 April 2014. He attended at Court this day as a litigant in person, but at approximately 10.40am left the courtroom after the Court indicated to him that his adjournment application would not be successful and that the Second Respondent’s Application in a Case filed 10 June 2014 and listed for hearing this day at 10.00am would proceed. The Applicant did not remain to hear the Second Respondent’s case, but indicated upon his departure from the courtroom that he would appeal the decision of the Court.
In respect of the Applicant’s adjournment application, firstly, he argued that there were outstanding subpoena matters. That is not the case. One Subpoena was issued in the proceeding, filed 20 August 2014, and that was filed by the Applicant. It was directed to Ms Elizabeth Anne Shanahan who, in fact, was the presiding Member of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) which Tribunal, affirmed the decision before it under review and on 6 March 2014, being a decision in proceedings between the Applicant and the Second Respondent in this proceeding. The Applicant, in that Subpoena, sought that Ms Shanahan attend Court to give evidence and produce documents. That Subpoena was not served.
The Applicant then filed an Application in a Case on 15 September 2014, which was returnable on 29 September 2014. In that Application, he sought an order to allow the posting of the Subpoena (referred to in paragraph 2 above) to Ms Shanahan to the address of Level 16, HWT Tower, City Road Southbank Victoria 3006, thereby effecting service of it.
By letter of 15 April 2014 and pursuant to r.33.18 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (‘the Rules’) and s.46(1)(a) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the AAT Act’), the Tribunal provided the Court with documents in relation to application 2013/1875 before it being:-
a)a copy of the Tribunal’s Decision and Reasons dated 17 March 2014;
b)original exhibits tendered by the Applicant; and
c)original exhibits tendered by the Respondent.
The Application in a Case was supported by an Affidavit sworn by the Applicant on 15 September 2014. When the application came before the Court on 29 September 2014, the Applicant did not appear. Ms Heffernan appeared on behalf of the Second Respondent, opposing the application. The Court ordered that the Application in a Case filed 15 September 2014 was dismissed and the Second Respondent’s costs of the day were fixed in the sum of $300 and reserved.
The second basis on which the Applicant submitted that an adjournment of the Second Respondent’s Application in a Case filed 10 June 2014 should be granted was because there had been no preliminary hearing or something of that nature in respect of his Originating Application for Judicial Review filed 1 April 2014. Again, that ground could not succeed. When the Applicant’s Application was filed on 2 April 2014, it was listed for hearing on a first return date of 26 May 2014. On that day, the Applicant appeared in person and Ms Heffernan appeared on behalf of the Second Respondent. The Court made various procedural orders so that this matter would be ready to proceed this day. In particular, the Court ordered as follows:-
“1. The Respondent file and serve an application in a case, together with any necessary affidavits and written submissions, within 21 days hereof AND THE COURT NOTES that such application will be directed to a dismissal of the Originating Application.
2. The Applicant file and serve any necessary affidavits and written submissions within 28 days of service of the Respondent’s material (as set out in order 1 herein) upon him.
3. The application in a case be listed for hearing on 16 October 2014 at 10am.”
The Applicant was well aware, being present in Court on 26 May 2014 when the Orders were made and being in receipt of the Orders, that he was required to file and serve any necessary affidavits and written submissions within 28 days of service upon him of the Respondent’s material. I note the Respondent’s material was filed on 10 June 2014 and Ms Heffernan indicates it was served, in the day or days following, upon the Applicant.
The Applicant had, from that time to this day, to comply with order 2 of the Orders made 26 May 2014 and he has failed to comply. The Applicant has no evidence nor submissions before the Court.
The Applicant’s third basis for seeking an adjournment was that he required more time. Again, that ground cannot succeed.
On 26 May 2014, Ms Heffernan, acting on behalf of the Second Respondent, indicated to the Applicant the basis on which the Second Respondent would seek a dismissal of the Applicant’s application. The Applicant was put on notice on that day. In the Second Respondent’s Outline of Submissions filed 10 June 2014 which followed, the Applicant was, again, put on notice in written form and more enlarged content as to the position of the Second Respondent and the reasons for it.
Further, in the Affidavit of Ms Heffernan sworn 10 June 2014 and filed that same date, there is annexed as exhibit “PJH-1” correspondence to the Applicant from the solicitors acting on behalf of the Second Respondent and dated 23 April 2014, which clearly sets out at that very early point in time, the position of the Second Respondent and the reason for it.
Further, the Second Respondent sets out in paragraph 6 of that correspondence the following:-
“We therefore invite you to discontinue the above application and file an appeal with the Federal Court of Australia pursuant to s44 of the AAT Act on the basis that we will agree that:
- we will not pursue costs so far incurred in respect of the present application MLG611 of 2014; and
- we will not oppose the necessary extension of time application to appeal to the Federal Court provided the appeal is instituted promptly.”
In the Court’s view, the Applicant has had ample time to prepare his case to put the necessary evidence before the Court and he has, since April of this year, been aware of the position of the Second Respondent. The oral application made by the Applicant this day for an adjournment is not acceded to.
The Court will accede to the Application in a Case filed 10 June 2014 by the Second Respondent for the reasons which follow.
On 6 March 2014 the Tribunal made a decision affirming an earlier decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (‘SSAT’) made on 5 April 2013. By its decision dated 5 April 2013 the SSAT affirmed a decision by Centrelink of 11 January 2013 to cancel the Applicant’s carer allowance in respect of the Applicant’s daughter, Melanie.
On 17 March 2014 the Tribunal issued a Corrigendum for Decision, the effect of which was to make minor amendments to the decision of the Tribunal by inserting and deleting specific words. The Corrigendum for Decision did not alter the substance of the Tribunal’s Decision (‘the Decision’).
On 1 April 2014 the Applicant issued an Originating Application for Judicial Review in this Court seeking judicial review of the Decision made by the Tribunal. The grounds of the Originating Application are as follows:-
“1. That a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection of the uncertified/un-signatured decision.
2. The procedures that were required by law to be observed in connection with the making of the uncertified/un-signatured decision were not observed.
3. That the making of the uncertified/un-signatured decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made.
4. That the uncertified/un-signatured decision involved an error of law, whether or not the error appears on the record of the uncertified/un-signatured decision.
5. That an exercise of discretionary power in bad faith was done.
6. That an exercise of a power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power which also constitutes an abuse of that power.
7. That the uncertified/un-signatured decision was done defeating the Tribunals purpose of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick.
8. That the Tribunal failed to ensure the applicant was given reasonable opportunity to present the applicants case by failing to issue summonses requested to be issued.”
The First Respondent filed, on 11 April 2014, a Submitting Notice, wherein the First Respondent submitted to any order the Court may make in the proceeding and wished to be heard on the question of costs. The Applicant, earlier, had unsuccessfully objected to the Submitting Notice.
The application for judicial review is made pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘the ADJR Act’) by which the Applicant seeks review of the decision based on grounds contained in s.5 of the ADJR Act.
The Applicant claims he is aggrieved by the Decision as set out in the Originating Application as follows:-
“1. The uncertified/un-signatured final decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was made without a fair hearing & is a breach of rules of natural justice that has occurred in connection with the making of the decision.
2. The uncertified/un-signatured final decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was uncertified/unsigned, possibly due to the hiding of facts of the unfair hearing.
3. The uncertified/un-signatured final decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was biased.
4. The uncertified/un-signatured final decision made the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was made without all the evidence being aloud (sic).
5. The uncertified/un-signatured final decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was made with a hearing being conducted without the applicants consent.”
The Applicant seeks orders from the Court which reinstate his entitlement to the carer’s allowance as of 11 October 2012 as well as an order that the issue of entitlements of the carer’s allowance from 2001 to 2006 be back paid accordingly.
Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the ADJR Act are as follows:-
“5 Applications for review of decisions
(1) A person who is aggrieved by a decision to which this Act applies that is made after the commencement of this Act may apply to the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit Court for an order of review in respect of the decision on any one or more of the following grounds:
(a) that a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the decision;
(b) that procedures that were required by law to be observed in connection with the making of the decision were not observed;
(c) that the person who purported to make the decision did not have jurisdiction to make the decision;
(d) that the decision was not authorized by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made;
(e) that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made;
(f) that the decision involved an error of law, whether or not the error appears on the record of the decision;
(g) that the decision was induced or affected by fraud;
(h) that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision;
(j) that the decision was otherwise contrary to law.
(2) The reference in paragraph (1)(e) to an improper exercise of a power shall be construed as including a reference to:
(a) taking an irrelevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power;
(b) failing to take a relevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power;
(c) an exercise of a power for a purpose other than a purpose for which the power is conferred;
(d) an exercise of a discretionary power in bad faith;
(e) an exercise of a personal discretionary power at the direction or behest of another person;
(f) an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case;
(g) an exercise of a power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power;
(h) an exercise of a power in such a way that the result of the exercise of the power is uncertain; and
(j) any other exercise of a power in a way that constitutes abuse of the power.
(3) The ground specified in paragraph (1)(h) shall not be taken to be made out unless:
(a) the person who made the decision was required by law to reach that decision only if a particular matter was established, and there was no evidence or other material (including facts of which he or she was entitled to take notice) from which he or she could reasonably be satisfied that the matter was established; or
(b) the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact, and that fact did not exist.
6 Applications for review of conduct related to making of decisions
(1) Where a person has engaged, is engaging, or proposes to engage, in conduct for the purpose of making a decision to which this Act applies, a person who is aggrieved by the conduct may apply to the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit Court for an order of review in respect of the conduct on any one or more of the following grounds:
(a) that a breach of the rules of natural justice has occurred, is occurring, or is likely to occur, in connection with the conduct;
(b) that procedures that are required by law to be observed in respect of the conduct have not been, are not being, or are likely not to be, observed;
(c) that the person who has engaged, is engaging, or proposes to engage, in the conduct does not have jurisdiction to make the proposed decision;
(d) that the enactment in pursuance of which the decision is proposed to be made does not authorize the making of the proposed decision;
(e) that the making of the proposed decision would be an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which the decision is proposed to be made;
(f) that an error of law had been, is being, or is likely to be, committed in the course of the conduct or is likely to be committed in the making of the proposed decision;
(g) that fraud has taken place, is taking place, or is likely to take place, in the course of the conduct;
(h) that there is no evidence or other material to justify the making of the proposed decision;
(j) that the making of the proposed decision would be otherwise contrary to law.
(2) The reference in paragraph (1)(e) to an improper exercise of a power shall be construed as including a reference to:
(a) taking an irrelevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power;
(b) failing to take a relevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power;
(c) an exercise of a power for a purpose other than a purpose for which the power is conferred;
(d) an exercise of a discretionary power in bad faith;
(e) an exercise of a personal discretionary power at the direction or behest of another person;
(f) an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case;
(g) an exercise of a power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power;
(h) an exercise of a power in such a way that the result of the exercise of the power is uncertain; and
(j) any other exercise of a power in a way that constitutes abuse of the power.
(3) The ground specified in paragraph (1)(h) shall not be taken to be made out unless:
(a) the person who proposes to make the decision is required by law to reach that decision only if a particular matter is established, and there is no evidence or other material (including facts of which he or she is entitled to take notice) from which he or she can reasonably be satisfied that the matter is established; or
(b) the person proposes to make the decision on the basis of the existence of a particular fact, and that fact does not exist.
7 Applications in respect of failures to make decisions
(1) Where:
(a) a person has a duty to make a decision to which this Act applies;
(b) there is no law that prescribes a period within which the person is required to make that decision; and
(c) the person has failed to make that decision;
a person who is aggrieved by the failure of the first‑mentioned person to make the decision may apply to the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit Court for an order of review in respect of the failure to make the decision on the ground that there has been unreasonable delay in making the decision.
(2) Where:
(a) a person has a duty to make a decision to which this Act applies;
(b) a law prescribes a period within which the person is required to make that decision; and
(c) the person failed to make that decision before the expiration of that period;
a person who is aggrieved by the failure of the first‑mentioned person to make the decision within that period may apply to the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit Court for an order of review in respect of the failure to make the decision within that period on the ground that the first‑mentioned person has a duty to make the decision notwithstanding the expiration of that period.”
Section 10 of the ADJR Act is as follows:-
10 Rights conferred by this Act to be additional to other rights
(1) The rights conferred by sections 5, 6 and 7 on a person to make an application to the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit Court in respect of a decision, in respect of conduct engaged in for the purpose of making a decision or in respect of a failure to make a decision:
(a) are in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other rights that the person has to seek a review, whether by the court, by another court, or by another tribunal, authority or person, of that decision, conduct or failure; and
(b) shall be disregarded for the purposes of the application of subsection 6(3) of the Ombudsman Act 1976 and section 40TF of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1):
(a) the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit Court, or any other court, may, in a proceeding instituted otherwise than under this Act, in its discretion, refuse to grant an application for a review of a decision, conduct engaged in for the purpose of making a decision, or a failure to make a decision, for the reason that an application has been made to the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit Court under section 5, 6 or 7 in respect of that decision, conduct or failure; and
(b) the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit Court may, in its discretion, refuse to grant an application under section 5, 6 or 7 that was made to the court in respect of a decision, in respect of conduct engaged in for the purpose of making a decision, or in respect of a failure to make a decision, for the reason:
(i) that the applicant has sought a review by the court, or by another court, of that decision, conduct or failure otherwise than under this Act; or
(ii) that adequate provision is made by any law other than this Act under which the applicant is entitled to seek a review by the court, by another court, or by another tribunal, authority or person, of that decision, conduct or failure.
(3) In this section, review includes a review by way of reconsideration, re‑hearing, appeal, the grant of an injunction or of a prerogative or statutory writ or the making of a declaratory or other order.”

Although it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction to determine the application of the Applicant, s.10(2)(b)(ii) of the ADJR Act, as stated above, provides this Court with a discretion to refuse to grant an application pursuant to ss.5, 6 or 7 of the ADJR Act, on the basis that adequate provision is made by any law other than the ADJR Act under which an applicant is entitled to seek a review by the Court or another court.
The question for this Court is whether s.10(2)(b)(ii) of the ADJR Act is applicable in the circumstances of this case. And, if so, whether the Court should exercise its discretion to refuse the application on that basis.
In respect of the first question to be answered the Court turns to s.44(1) of the AAT Act which provides as follows:-
“A party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may appeal to the Federal Court of Australia, on a question of law, from any decision of the Tribunal in that proceeding.”
The Submissions of the Second Respondent filed 10 June 2014 are accurate wherein it is submitted that the Applicant was a party to the proceeding in respect of which the Tribunal made the Decision on 6 March 2014 as amended on 17 March 2014. Further, the Decision was a ‘decision’ for the purposes of s.44(1) of the AAT Act in that the Decision constituted the effective decision or determination of the application for review.[1] Further, the words “question of law” in s.44(1) of the AAT Act have been accepted by the Federal Court of Australia to encompass grounds enunciated in s.5 of the ADJR Act.[2]
[1] Director-General of Social Services v Chaney (1980) 3 ALD 161, 593.
[2] Tuite v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1993) 40 FCR 483.
The Federal Court of Australia has also accepted that an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal on the ground of a denial of procedural fairness raises a question of law.[3] The Court finds, given the grounds relied upon by the Applicant in his application, which are essentially grounds referred to in s.5 of the ADJR Act and/or a claim of denial of procedural fairness, adequate provision is made by the AAT Act under which the Applicant would be entitled to seek a review by the Federal Court of Australia of the Tribunal’s “decision, conduct or failure”.[4]
[3] Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143, 8.
[4] Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s.10.
The next matter to which the Court must turn its mind is whether it should exercise its discretion to refuse the application on the basis of the finding above. The Court determines it should exercise its discretion in circumstances where the Applicant is able to appeal a decision under the AAT Act to the Federal Court of Australia and where there are no special circumstances in the proceedings. The Court notes that the Applicant put no evidence before the Court and made no submissions to the Court of special circumstances.
The Applicant chose to pursue the present application in this Court despite the Second Respondent indicating in April 2014 to the Applicant that the more appropriate procedure for him to follow was to appeal to the Federal Court of Australia against the Tribunal’s decision under s.44 of the AAT Act.
The Submissions of the Second Respondent set out earlier decisions relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion. In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Reeve,[5] the applicant had filed both a notice of appeal pursuant to s.44 of the AAT Act and an application pursuant to s.5 of the ADJR Act. Gray J stated as to that, as follows:-
“It is not clear why the CBA felt it necessary to rely on the ADJR Act at all. There is authority that the specific procedure under s 44 of the AAT Act should be adopted, at least in the absence of special circumstances. See Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143 at [3] per Gray ACJ and North J, quoting Davies J in Tuite v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1993) 40 FCR 483 at 484, and the cases to which Davies J referred in the passage quoted.”[6]
[5] [2012] FCAFC 21.
[6] Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Reeve [2012] FCAFC 21, [4].
In Tuite v Administrative Appeals Tribunal[7] the Federal Court of Australia dealt with an application brought under the ADJR Act in respect of a decision of the Tribunal. The Applicant therein had sought orders that the Tribunal decision be varied on the basis that he did not receive natural justice in the hearing. The Court stated in relation to that application:-
“In my view, the application to this Court is misconceived in so far as the application is brought under s 5 of the ADJR Act. Section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act) provides that a party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may appeal to this Court on a question of law from any decision of the Tribunal in that proceeding.”[8]
After observing that the words “question of law” in s.44(1) of the AAT Act have been accepted by the Federal Court of Australia to encompass grounds enunciated in s.5 of the ADJR Act, the Court went on to state at paragraph 3 of the Judgment:-
“As s 44 of the AAT Act provides a specific procedure for the granting of relief by this Court in respect of decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, that procedure should be adopted. An application brought under s 5 of the ADJR Act, when an appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act is available, should be dismissed as of course.”[9]
[7] (1993) 40 FCR 483.
[8] Tuite v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1993) 40 FCR 483, [2].
[9] Tuite v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1993) 40 FCR 483, [3].
Whilst the Federal Court of Australia in a subsequent decision of Duncan v Fayle[10], did not agree with the Court’s characterisation of the application under the ADJR Act as misconceived in Tuite v Administrative Appeals Tribunal[11], with French J describing this characterisation as too strong a generalisation,[12] that Court has consistently recognised that an appeal under s.44 of the AAT Act is the more appropriate procedure for an applicant to adopt when the applicant has the option of proceeding under either s.44 of the AAT Act or the ADJR Act.
[10] [2004] FCA 723.
[11] (1993) 40 FCR 483.
[12] Duncan v Fayle [2004] FCA 723, [26].
These authorities referred to above support the application of the Second Respondent that the Applicant’s application for judicial review under the ADJR Act in this Court should be dismissed. Costs will follow the event.
Finally, I note that the Tribunal’s Decision Record dated 6 March 2014 itself is in evidence before the Court, together with a Corrigendum for Decision dated 17 March 2014, and that on the face of the Decision Record, no error of law is apparent, nor any failure to afford procedural fairness to the Applicant. Further, there is no unreasonable conduct which could be attributed to the Tribunal. I note in the Tribunal’s Decision Record that the Tribunal member in paragraph 5 therein said as follows:-
“At the commencement of the hearing Mr Cremona informed the Tribunal that he considered the Tribunal had already reached a decision in his matter before the evidence had been heard and that he would be appealing the decision of the Tribunal regardless of what that decision was. The appeal would be based on procedural matters. Mr Cremona had requested the issuing of summonses to several persons including the two general practitioners who subsequently gave evidence. The Tribunal had refused to issue summonses for the other two, a Conference Registrar at this Tribunal and Senior Detective in the Victorian Police Force, after Mr Cremona had failed to provide or indicate the relevance of the evidence these two persons would give.”
The Applicant himself declined to give evidence on oath or affirmation in the Tribunal hearing. He likewise failed to provide evidence in the Court hearing this day.

I certify that the preceding thirty-six (36) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Hartnett

Associate:

Date: 23 October 2014