FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Crawford v Geocore Pty Ltd [2024] FedCFamC2G 176
File number: MLG 1412 of 2023 Judgment of: JUDGE FORBES Date of judgment: 1 February 2024 Catchwords: FAIR WORK – application for default judgment against respondents – where applicant unlawfully stood down from full-time employment – where applicant filed application in Fair Work Commission – where FWC ordered reinstatement – where respondents did not comply with FWC order – where respondents altered applicant’s employment to casual – repudiation – claims for unpaid wages, payment in lieu of notice and accrued annual and long service leave – alleged contravention of general protections provisions of Fair Work Act – respondents failed to engage in proceedings – default judgment ordered Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 44, 90, 117, 340,527, 545, 547, 550
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 44, 211
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 17 Date of hearing: 1 February 2024 Place: Melbourne Solicitor for the Applicant: Sparke Helmore Respondents: No appearance ORDERS
MLG 1412 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: ELIZABETH CRAWFORD
Applicant
AND: GEOCORE PTY LTD
First Respondent
AMANDA BROWN
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE FORBES
DATE OF ORDER:
1 FEBRUARY 2024
UPON the admissions the First Respondent is taken to have made, consequent upon default by the First Respondent pursuant to rule 13.04(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (FCFCA Rules) and
UPON the admissions the Second Respondent is taken to have made, consequent upon default by the Second Respondent pursuant to rule 13.04(2) of the FCFCA Rules, and the Second Respondent being taken to have admitted to being involved in the contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act), of the First Respondent pursuant to section 550 of the FW Act
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Judgment
1.Default judgment is entered for the Applicant against the Respondents pursuant to sub-rule 13.05(2)(c) of the FCFCA Rules.
Compensation
2.Pursuant to section 545(2)(b) of the FW Act, the First Respondent and Second Respondent, jointly and severally pay to the Applicant the following amounts within 14 days, less applicable taxation:
(a)$10,414.10 in respect of her entitlement to be paid out her accrued but untaken annual leave and annual leave loading upon the end of her employment as required by section 90 of the FW Act; and
(b)$6,249.10 in respect of her entitlement to payment in lieu of notice as required by section 117 of the FW Act. Any payment by the Respondents in respect of the amount ordered to be paid in order (b), is to also be offset against the amount ordered to be paid at Order 6 below.
3.Pursuant to section 44(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFCA Act), the First Respondent pay to the Applicant, in respect of entitlements…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 176
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the respondents had entirely failed to participate in the litigation, having not filed notices of address for service, responses or defences, and not attended any directions hearings. This complete non-engagement by the respondents triggered the application for default judgment under rule 13.04 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021. The court held that the application was made appropriately and in accordance with the rules, and the relief sought by Ms Crawford appeared to be within the court's jurisdiction and power to grant. The court further noted that while the respondents had not filed any defence or evidence, there was no apparent defence that would prevent the granting of default judgment. Regarding the claim against Ms Brown for accessorial liability under section 550(1) of the FW Act, the court was satisfied that the statement of claim properly pleaded a case that, if proven, would result in such liability.
The court granted the application for default judgment with certain amendments to the proposed orders. The court required the second proposed order to separately identify each of the sums sought pursuant to section 545 of the FW Act and reduced the amount for non-economic loss arising from the alleged contravention of section 340 of the FW Act to $10,000, exercising caution appropriate for a default judgment order. The court's final orders provided for the relief sought by Ms Crawford, including payment of unpaid wages, payment in lieu of notice, accrued annual and long service leave, and damages for contravention of the general protections provisions of the FW Act and for adverse action, with the specified amendments.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There has been a complete failure on the part of the two respondents to engage in the litigation. Despite the applications having been served, the respondents have not filed notices of address for service and have not filed responses or defences. The respondents have failed to attend the various directions hearings which have been listed.CONSIDERATION I am satisfied that the respondents are in default within the terms of rule 13.04 of the Rules. As a consequence of that default, my discretion is enlivened to make orders pursuant to rule 13.05, including giving judgment for the applicant for the relief sought in the application. For default judgment to be granted pursuant to rule 13.05 where a proceeding was commenced by an application supported by a statement of claim, the Court must be satisfied that Ms Crawford appears to be entitled to the remedies that she seeks or the relief that she seeks as pleaded in that statement of claim. I also need to be satisfied that the relief sought by Ms Crawford is within the power of the Court to grant. The power afforded to me is discretionary, and I must exercise the discretion to grant default judgment with caution. In my view, the application has been made appropriately and in accordance with the rules. Ms Crawford is not required to prove by way of evidence the claim which is sought to be advanced, but the Court does have to be satisfied on the face of the statement of claim that the applicant appears entitled to the relief claimed. I am satisfied that I have power to grant the relief sought by the statement of claim. This Court plainly has statutory power to make orders relating to contraventions of the FW Act and an associated jurisdiction to make orders for breaches of contract. I need to be satisfied that each element of the various causes of action have been properly pleaded in the statement of claim, and I am so satisfied. I am satisfied that the statement of claim filed on behalf of Ms Crawford complies with the rules of pleading and properly pleads the various causes of action, including those under the FW Act and at common law. Of course, in this case, the respondents have not filed any defence or any evidence, so it is unnecessary for me to speculate about what the respondents might say if they had engaged in this proceeding. However, having read the outline of submissions filed in this application and the affidavit in support, I am satisfied that there is no obvious defence which would prevent me from making the orders for default judgment. As to the liability of the second respondent, Ms Brown, I accept the submissions that the statement of claim pleads a case, which, if it was proven at trial, would give rise to a finding of accessorial liability against her pursuant to section 550(1) of the FW Act. Having said all those things, I am satisfied that the orders proposed by the applicant’s solicitor Mr Sherr should be made subject only to the following amendments:(1)that proposed order 2 be amended to separately identify each of the sums sought pursuant to section 545 of the FW Act; (2)that order 7(b) relating to non-economic loss arising from the alleged contravention of section 340 of the FW Act should be amended to $10,000. In relation to that last point, my view is that, having regard to the evidence before me and exercising appropriate caution in relation to a default judgment order, the amount of $10,000 falls comfortably within the assessment I would make at final trial. If the matter went to final trial, I am less confident about the amount of $20,000 in that respect.