Craven v Ready Flowers Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 40 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Craven v Ready Flowers Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1308

Citation: Craven v Ready Flowers Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1308
Parties: GORDON CRAVEN v READY FLOWERS PTY LTD ACN 115 489 480 and GARY ERYL ROY OWEN
File number(s): QUD 773 of 2012
Judge(s): GREENWOOD J
Date of judgment: 5 December 2013
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – consideration of an application for an extension of time for seeking leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia
Cases cited: Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387
Foran v White (1989) 168 CLR 385 - cited
Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 - cited
Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 169 CLR 101 - cited
Wykes v Samalk Pty Ltd (1990) Aust Contract Rep 90‑097 - cited
Date of hearing: 9 April 2013
Date of last submissions: 9 April 2013
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 117
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms Catherine Muir
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr L Venville, Archibald & Brown Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 773 of 2012
BETWEEN:

GORDON CRAVEN
Applicant
AND:

READY FLOWERS PTY LTD ACN 115 489 480
First Respondent

GARY ERYL ROY OWEN
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GREENWOOD J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 DECEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application filed by the applicant on 11 December 2012 is dismissed. 

2.The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent of and incidental to the application.   

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 773 of 2012
BETWEEN:

GORDON CRAVEN
Applicant
AND:

READY FLOWERS PTY LTD ACN 115 489 480
First Respondent

GARY ERYL ROY OWEN
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GREENWOOD J

DATE:

5 DECEMBER 2013

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background and introduction

  1. These proceedings are concerned with an application by Mr Gordon Craven, the applicant in the principal proceeding before the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of that Court on a separate question determined at the outset of the trial. 

  2. Although the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia is now the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, I will continue to describe the judgment, the subject of this application, as a judgment of the former Court (as it is) and, more particularly, as I make references to the primary judge, I will continue to make references to Federal Magistrate Jarrett. 

  3. The trial proceeded to a concluded hearing (with judgment reserved) having regard to the matters remaining in issue confined as they were by the interlocutory determination of the separate question. 

  4. Mr Craven is a self‑represented applicant and I propose therefore to address in more detail than usual the procedural background and the foundation contentions Mr Craven made in the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Craven v Ready Flowers Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1308
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the case of Craven v Ready Flowers Pty Ltd involves a dispute between Mr. Craven and Ready Flowers Pty Ltd (RFPL). Mr. Craven asserts that RFPL made false representations to consumers, alleging that the company falsely represented its business model and made misleading statements about the conformity of goods, the location of florists, and delivery services. He claims that these representations led to his detriment. The case raises questions about the applicability of estoppel principles, the disclosure of material facts, and whether there was an abuse of process by RFPL in not disclosing the change in ownership of the business.

The legal issues the court was required to decide include whether the Federal Magistrate, Jarrett FM, erred in applying the principles of estoppel to the facts presented by Mr. Craven. Specifically, Mr. Craven argues that Jarrett FM failed to apply the doctrines of estoppel by representation, estoppel by acquiescence, estoppel by silence, and estoppel by convention. He further contends that RFPL abused the process by not disclosing the change in ownership of the business until late in the proceedings. Another issue is whether there was a duty on RFPL to disclose the sale of the business to consumers and the material facts of the transaction.

The court found that there was no probative evidence of conduct by RFPL that would support an estoppel claim. The Federal Magistrate correctly determined that there was no evidence of a habitual course of dealing with RFPL on the assumption contended by Mr. Craven. Furthermore, the court held that there was no duty on RFPL to disclose the change in ownership to consumers, especially since the new owner's name appeared on the website. The lateness of the disclosure of the transfer of ownership did not amount to an abuse of process, as it was responsive to the fresh re-pleading of the claims by Mr. Craven. The court concluded that there was no arguable error in the findings of the Federal Magistrate.

The court further noted that Mr. Craven knew the assumption he made was untrue, and there was no abuse of process by RFPL in not disclosing the change in ownership earlier. The court emphasized that the websites systematically introduced the name Ready Flowers Limited, putting consumers on notice of the new entity. As such, the grounds of appeal proposed by Mr. Craven were dismissed, and no extension of time was granted for leave to appeal from the interlocutory judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Put simply, there is no probative evidence of conduct by the entity against which the estoppel is asserted. Mr Craven says that by convention consumers (including him) assumed that the company they dealt with when engaging with the Ready Flowers website prior to 1 February 2009 was an Australian company, RFPL, and also generally assumed, wrongly, that they were continuing to deal with that company when engaging after 1 February 2009 with the Ready Flowers website. The difficulty with this notion is the uncontested evidence before Jarrett FM that Ready Flowers Limited was published on the website. Federal Magistrate Jarrett found at [29] and [20] that there was no evidence of a habitual course of dealing with RFPL on the footing of the assumption contended for by Mr Craven. There is no demonstrated error in that finding. Mr Craven says there was a duty in RFPL to disclose the sale to consumers and, in the circumstances of his proceeding, a duty to disclose to him the transfer of ownership well prior to 24 May 2012. I am not satisfied that any duty arose in RFPL to tell consumers or the world of the change in ownership of the business from RFPL to RFL especially once it is accepted, as Mr Craven pleads, that the name of the new owner and operator of the website business appeared on the website and especially all of the Australian websites on and after February 2009. Nor was there any general duty to tell Mr Craven of the sale or the elements of the commercial transaction between those parties or provide Mr Craven with a copy of the transaction instruments. In the context of the action, however, RFPL was required to plead any material facts upon which it would wish to rely in answering the pleaded claims against it and to the extent that RFPL intended to rely upon the transfer of ownership to RFL on 1 February 2009 as an answer to those claims in respect of conduct after that date, an obligation arose in RFPL to plead the material facts of the sale. No duty arose otherwise. Importantly however, the lateness of the disclosure of the transfer of ownership by the pleading of the defence on 24 May 2012 is entirely explained by the strikeout orders of the earlier Amended Statement of Claim (to which it would be inappropriate to plead) and the fresh re‑pleading of the claims by Mr Craven on 20 April 2012. The pleading of the material fact concerning the transfer of ownership occurred on 24 May 2012 about one month after the filing and serving of the Fresh Amended Statement of Claim. There is no material delay in terms of the disclosure of the material fact by the pleading which was responsive to the pleading filed on 20 April 2012. There is no abuse of process. For all these reasons, I am not satisfied that any arguable error has been demonstrated on the part of Federal Magistrate Jarrett as to Grounds 1, 2 and 3 of the proposed grounds of appeal. At [29] and [42], Jarrett FM found that Mr Craven knew to be untrue the assumption he says was fostered by the conduct of RFPL either for a “considerable part of this action” or “from the very beginning”. Mr Craven says that he did not know the assumption he asserts “to be untrue” until the pleading on 24 May 2012. Nevertheless, the pleading makes clear that the websites systematically introduced the name Ready Flowers Limited putting consumers on notice of that entity.

Decision

Reasons for decision

There is no dispute between the parties as to Federal Magistrate Jarrett’s description of the nature of the claims made by Mr Craven by his Fresh Amended Statement of Claim filed on 20 April 2012. The controversy, said to give rise to appellable errors on the part of Federal Magistrate Jarrett about which an extension of time is sought for leave to appeal from the interlocutory judgment, concerns the question of the transfer of ownership of the internet business to RFL and whether appellable error arises in relation to the determination of the estoppel question on the evidence. The elements of the interlocutory decision At [4], the primary judge observed that Mr Craven’s claim against RFPL is one based upon “representations” said to have been made to “an average consumer”. The primary judge notes that by para 1 and its sub‑paragraphs of the Amended Statement of Claim, Mr Craven alleges that RFPL made misrepresentations or false representations to consumers in respect of contracts arising between RFPL and consumers in the period from “2006 to current”. At [5], the primary judge notes that the foundation allegation made by Mr Craven at para 1.1(e) is that by reason of RFPL’s substantial number of false representations, an inference arises that RFPL’s false representations form an integral part of its “business model” and each contract entered into between RFPL and a consumer is “tainted with a false representation” [original emphasis]. At [7], the primary judge notes that paras 2 to 5 of the Amended Statement of Claim essentially deal with misrepresentations said to have been made to consumers. The allegations in para 2 are said to frame misrepresentations arising out of the description of goods on certain websites. The contention is that the goods delivered to people who order from the website do not conform with the description of those goods on the website. The contention is that in a substantial number of cases the goods delivered to buyers do not conform with the description on the website thus giving rise to a contravention. At [8], the primary judge addresses para 3 of Mr Craven’s Amended Statement of Claim and notes that para 3 deals with representations as to the location of florists. The contention is that RFPL by using possessive phrases such as “our florists” and “our local florist” represents to people dealing with RFPL through its website that the location of the business is “local” in the sense of necessarily being an Australian undertaking. Mr Craven contends that these “representations” about location are false, misleading and deceptive thus giving rise to contraventions of the provisions of the relevant Acts. At [9], the primary judge addresses the contention in para 4 of Mr Craven’s Amended Statement of Claim. By para 4, Mr Craven asserts representations by RFPL about delivery and same day delivery. Mr Craven contends that these representations as to delivery are false thus giving rise to the contraventions in suit.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Craven contends by Grounds 1 and 2 that Jarrett FM erred by failing to apply to the facts the rules of estoppel by representation, estoppel by acquiescence (or laches), estoppel by silence “amounting to a representation” (particularised by failing to tell Mr Craven for over three years of the change in ownership on 31 January 2009 or 1 February 2009) and estoppel by convention. Mr Craven also contends that RFPL engaged in an abuse of process by failing to tell him until 24 May 2012 of the change in ownership. Further considerations Mr Craven recognises in his written submissions at para 46, by citing authority, that there is now “but one doctrine of estoppel” rationalised in a reductionist way by seeking out the common unifying foundation for all earlier categories of estoppel. The unifying doctrinal foundation for estoppel is simply that Courts exercising jurisdiction at common law or in equity will do what is necessary, but no more, to prevent a person from suffering detriment in reliance upon an assumption as to a present, past or future state of affairs which the party estopped has induced that person to hold. Thus, the Court focuses upon the conduct of a party and frames remedial protection against the detriment a person would suffer from a change in position should the assumption that led to that change be abandoned. There is thus one overarching doctrine of estoppel rather than a series of independent fractured rules of the kind that Mr Craven says Jarrett FM failed to apply to the facts in evidence before him: Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 447‑453 per Mason CJ; Foran v White (1989) 168 CLR 385 at 411‑413; Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 410 per Mason CJ; but see, Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 169 CLR 101 at 112‑113; Wykes v Samalk Pty Ltd (1990) Aust Contract Rep 90‑097 at 91,008 – 91,013. So, it follows that if RFPL is shown to have made a statement or representation or otherwise to have engaged in conduct fostering an assumption about a certain state of affairs; and a person relies upon the statement or representation made, or the assumption fostered or engendered, to that person’s detriment; and RFPL proposes to act inconsistently with the statement or representation or the assumption so fostered about that state of affairs, in circumstances where it would be unconscionable to do so, the Court will seek to frame remedial relief that addresses and removes the identified detriment arising from the change in position in reliance upon the statement, representation or assumptions. Applying these propositions of law, Mr Craven contends, in effect, that RFPL cannot now rely on the fact of the sale of the Ready Flowers internet business to RFL as at 1 February 2009 as an answer to the factual proposition that whatever representations or statements were made on the Ready Flowers website on or after 1 February 2009 (then operated by RFL), they were not statements or representations of RFPL. This estoppel by conduct operating against RFPL is said to arise fundamentally on three footings.