FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CQI18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 1427
Appeal from: CQI18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2020] FCCA 3104 File number: VID 185 of 2021 Judgment of: MORTIMER J Date of judgment: 15 November 2021 Date of publication of reasons: 18 November 2021 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to set aside order allegedly made in error – where impugned order set aside decision made by independent merits reviewer – impugned order made intentionally – application granted – impugned order replaced by declaratory and injunctive relief – application for interlocutory relief to restrain the removal of the appellant – application refused – directions made in relation to Court’s registry accepting future applications to restrain appellant’s removal
COSTS – successful appeal – ground on which the appellant succeeded clearly raised at trial, but not developed – order that parties bear their own costs at trial – order that the respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, except for the costs of the interlocutory application
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 46A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05(e)
Cases cited: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1404; 209 FCR 123
CQI18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 1168
McHugh vMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 223; 385 ALR 405
Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 41; 243 CLR 319
Smethurst v Commissioner of Police [2020] HCA 14; 376 ALR 575
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 29 Date of hearing: 15 November 2021 Counsel for the Appellant: D Kelsey-Sugg Solicitor for the Appellant: Asylum Seeker Resource Centre Counsel for the Respondents: J A Barrington Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
VID 185 of 2021 BETWEEN: CQI18
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
MARA MOUSTAPHINE (IN HER CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER)
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MORTIMER J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 NOVEMBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The relief sought by the First Respondent in the interlocutory application filed on 19 October 2021 be refused.
2.The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal, including the hearing on 15 November 2021, but excluding costs arising from the Appellant responding to the First Respondent’s interlocutory application filed on 19 October 2021.
3.Order 5 of the orders of the Court made on 28 September 2021 be vacated.
4.Orders 3 and 4 of the orders of the Federal Circuit Court made on 19 November 2020 be set aside and in their place the following be made:
(a)An order that the time in which a judicial review application may be brought in the Federal Circuit Court be extended to 8 February 2019.
(b)An order that the First Respondent, whether through her employees, officers and agents…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Cqi18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2021] FCA 1427
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court determined that the impugned order, which set aside a decision made by an independent merits reviewer, was made intentionally. As such, the application to set it aside was granted. The court replaced the impugned order with declaratory and injunctive relief, restraining the Minister from giving effect to the recommendation and conclusions of the reviewer in any future decision-making concerning the appellant. The court refused the Minister's application for interlocutory relief to restrain the appellant's removal, finding that there was some purpose in the application, but the relief sought should be refused. Furthermore, the court directed that future applications to restrain the appellant's removal could be accepted for filing, provided they comprised an originating application and a concise statement, and no other supporting documents were required.
In summary, the Federal Court granted the appellant's application to set aside the impugned order and replaced it with declaratory and injunctive relief. The court refused the Minister's application for interlocutory relief to restrain the appellant's removal. Additionally, the court directed that future applications to restrain the appellant's removal could be accepted for filing under certain conditions. The orders included the refusal of the relief sought by the Minister in the interlocutory application, the payment of the appellant's costs of the appeal, the vacating of certain orders made on 28 September 2021, and the setting aside of specific orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 19 November 2020.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The relief sought by the First Respondent in the interlocutory application filed on 19 October 2021 be refused.
2. The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal, including the hearing on 15 November 2021, but excluding costs arising from the Appellant responding to the First Respondent’s interlocutory application filed on 19 October 2021.
3. Order 5 of the orders of the Court made on 28 September 2021 be vacated.
4. Orders 3 and 4 of the orders of the Federal Circuit Court made on 19 November 2020 be set aside and in their place the following be made:
(a) An order that the time in which a judicial review application may be brought in the Federal Circuit Court be extended to 8 February 2019.
(b) An order that the First Respondent, whether through her employees, officers and agents or howsoever otherwise be restrained from giving any effect to the recommendation and conclusions of the Second Respondent in any future decision making or conduct concerning the Appellant for the purposes of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
(c) A declaration that in deciding, on 27 September 2012, to recommend to the First Respondent that the Appellant was not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations, the Second Respondent failed to observe the requirements of procedural fairness.
(d) An order that each party bears its own costs of the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court.
THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:
1. If the Appellant applies for interlocutory or final relief restraining his removal from Australia, that application may be accepted for filing provided it comprises an originating application and a concise statement, and no other supporting documents are required.
2. Any such application is to be expedited and treated as urgent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
However, the Court was informed at the hearing that on 26 October 2021 the appellant’s request for an exercise of the power under s 46A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) had been “internally remitted” and will be reassessed by someone within the Department with the appropriate delegation. The Court was also informed that no removal of the appellant will be considered while that process is underway. The process was explained to the Court as an internal non-statutory process for which there are some administrative guidelines. As I noted during the hearing, there is no need for the Court to engage in detailed and perhaps contested legal analysis about whether the set aside order was available and appropriate where the ultimate objective might be secured in a less contested way. In his notice of appeal to this Court, one of the orders sought by the appellant was that the Minister be restrained from relying on the second respondent’s recommendation. Counsel for the Minister appeared to accept relief of that kind could be granted, although he submitted it was not necessary. In my opinion, relief of that kind is available: see Smethurst v Commissioner of Police [2020] HCA 14; 376 ALR 575 at [170]-[183] in the reasons of Gordon J. On balance, I have concluded that injunctive relief is the preferable kind of order. There will be a variation to the Court’s orders of 28 September 2021 to that effect. While I accept that the Minister will respect a declaration made by the Court, I am not confident the subject matter of the declaration is sufficiently clear, especially to a delegate or person charged with conducting a reassessment, that no further or other order should be made. I emphasise, therefore, that the injunction is granted for the sake of clarity, to make it clear that, as the Court explained in its reasons of 28 September 2021, the denial of procedural fairness was critical and material to the way the second respondent assessed the credibility of the appellant, and so in that sense the whole task of the second respondent miscarried. That is why it is appropriate to restrain the Minister, and her employees, officers and agents, from giving any effect to the second respondent’s recommendation. That does not preclude a fresh reviewer having regard to the material that was before the second respondent in the conduct of a fresh review. For these reasons, I accept that there was some purpose in the Minister’s interlocutory application, and it would not be appropriate for that interlocutory application to be dismissed. However, the relief sought in the interlocutory application should be refused. As to the costs of the hearing today, it is somewhat difficult to understand that the appellant’s legal representatives have not been informed about the 26 October 2021 internal remitter, and at least a significant part of today’s hearing has been taken up with refinements made to the parties’ arguments and positions and an adjournment all because of this new development, of which apparently only the Minister, her department and her legal representatives seem to be aware. Accordingly, in my view, the appellant should have his costs of the hearing today, but not the costs associated with responding to the interlocutory application.Declaratory relief