CPB19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

[2024] FedCFamC2G 1016

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

CPB19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1016

File number:

SYG 1628 of 2019

Judgment of:

JUDGE SKAROS

Date of judgment:

10 October 2024 

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Judicial Review – Protection Visa - Procedural fairness – Impermissible merits review – Where applicant self-represented – claim of threat to life by father-in-law – application is dismissed

Legislation:

 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424A, 424AA, 438, 476(1)

Cases cited:

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496; [2016] FCAFC 146

DZADW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1338

FRA18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 2287

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2016) 244 FCR 305; (2016) 343 ALR 97

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; (2019) 363 ALR 599

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 136 ALR 481

MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 1; [2016] FCA 1081

Plaintiff S157/2002v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476; [2003] HCA 2

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437; (1994) 124 ALR 265

Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347; [1994] FCA 1105

Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 889

SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26

SZLXE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1312

Division:

Division 2 General Federal Law

Number of paragraphs:

55

Date of hearing:

25 September 2024

Place:

Parramatta

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Self-represented Litigant

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Ms Shultz, Mills Oakley

Solicitor for the Second Respondent:

Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

SYG 1628 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

CPB19

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE SKAROS
DATE OF ORDER:	10 OCTOBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent is amended to “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”.

2.The application filed on 1 July 2019 (as amended) is dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE SKAROS:

1. By application filed on 1 July 2019, the applicant sought judicial review under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 22 June 2019. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister (the delegate) to refuse the applicant a Protection (subclass 866) visa (the protection visa) under s 65 of the Act.

   BACKGROUND

2. The applicant is a 40-year-old male citizen of India who arrived in Australia on 1 May 2008, as the holder of a Subclass 573 student visa, which was valid until 12 June 2008. On 25 August 2010, he was granted a further student visa. On 31 July 2014, the applicant applied for a Medical Treatment Visa. That application was refused on 6 August 2014, a decision affirmed by the then Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) on 19 November 2014. The applicant applied to the then Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of that decision. That application was dismissed on 21 May 2015.

3. On 7 July 2015, the applicant lodged the protection visa application. On 8 July 2016, the applicant attended an interview with the delegate. On 27 July 2016, the delegate refused to grant the protection visa.

4. On 18 August 2016, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision. He provided a copy of the delegate’s decision record with the application for review.

5. On 24 April 2019, the applicant appeared in person at a hearing before the Tribunal. 

6. On 22 June 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa. On 24 June 2019, the applicant was notified of the Tribunal’s decision.

   THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION

7. The Tribunal outlined the assessment criteria for the protection visa under both the primary ‘refugee’ criteria and the complementary assessment criteria, in ss 362(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Act, respectively.

8. The Tribunal set out a summary of the applicant’s migration history.

9. The Tribunal then set out the applicant’s claims for protection, without alteration, as follows:

   The applicant met his wife when she was a fellow overseas student in Australia. They fell in love and decided to get married. When they told their respective parents about their plans they were infuriated. His parents were upset because she is a divorcee. Due to this, the applicant’s family did not want him to marry her, as they believed it would give their family a bad name. The applicant’s in-laws also opposed the marriage. They were angry that their daughter divorced the groom of their choice, and was now marrying someone else. She belongs to a very conservative family, where women are not allowed to choose their life partners. Her parents considered the marriage to be a blot on their family honour. But they were madly in love, they belong to the modern generation; living in Australian society allowed their outlook to change. When they got married their parents became very hostile. The in-laws threatened the applicant, stating that they would kill him if he returns to India.

   Honour killings are common in his part of India. The police cannot protect him, since they are corrupt and incompetent, and are known for abusing human rights. Even if there are laws protecting couples, they still get killed in broad daylight; while the law would protect him in name, the law is not enforced in India. Furthermore, the applicant’s father-in-law had served in the police, and has connections with them. The police are notorious for violating human rights and staging killings and for corruption. The father has made this into a prestige issue and he will take any step to eliminate the applicant. Therefore he would not be protected and would be killed upon return to India.

   He cannot relocate within India, as he has not lived there for seven years. The applicant would need a support network to relocate successfully, a network that he now lacks.

10. The Tribunal had several concerns about the applicant’s evidence and his delay in claiming protection in Australia.

11. The Minister’s summary of the Tribunal’s concerns in respect of the applicant’s evidence, as contained in the submissions, provided a summary which the Court adopts as follows:

    (a) The applicant’s evidence that his wife’s parents had continued to pay for her studies and supported her in Australia from 2014-2016 was inconsistent with his claim that her actions were contrary to the wishes of her strict and conservative family. The Tribunal noted that, as discussed at the delegate’s interview, the applicant’s wife had lodged a further student visa application in September 2013 (after her parents knew she had married the applicant) and the support from the applicant’s father-in-law indicated he did not disapprove of her life in Australia but rather sought to help her stay longer in Australia. The Tribunal was not satisfied with the applicant’s explanation that “he had never thought about this but the tension was there when his father-in-law came to Australia” and found if his claims were true, he would have thought about the continuing support received from the applicant’s father-in-law (CB 154, [22]). The Tribunal found the applicant’s father-in-law’s support undermined the applicant’s claim that he did not accept his daughter’s marriage (CB 155, [23]).

    (b) The Tribunal found the applicant gave inconsistent evidence about other details of his claims, including: when his wife’s parents found out about their relationship; why the applicant’s father-in-law did not like the applicant; and whether or not he moved out of the marital home when the applicant’s parents-in-law came to visit Australia (CB 155-156, [24]).

    (c) The applicant’s evidence was that he had lived in the same home as his father-in-law in mid-2013 when he visited Australia and the Tribunal noted that if he did wish to harm the applicant, he had the opportunity to do so. The Tribunal was not satisfied with the applicant’s explanation that “he was behaving in an unnatural way”, given the applicant’s claim that the father-in-law was a strict, powerful and hostile man who was prepared to kill (CB 156, [25]).

    (d) The Tribunal noted the applicant’s agreement with the proposition that he spoke three languages, was educated and work experience which suggested he would not experience any problems adjusting or returning to India. The Tribunal found this evidence undermined the applicant’s written claim that he could not return to India and could not relocate (because he had not lived there for seven years and did not have a support network). The Tribunal found these changes in his claims undermined his credibility and claims (CB 157, [26]).

    11. The Tribunal was also concerned about the applicant’s delay in applying for protection and his changing evidence about whether or not he had obtained advice about his options (CB 157, [28]-[29]). The Tribunal considered the applicant’s explanations and found the applicant had not provided a satisfactory reason for not lodging a protection visa application in 2013, given his assertion that this was when he received the most serious threats from his father-in-law (CB 157-158, [30]).

    12. The Tribunal also expressed concern that the applicant lodged a Medical Treatment visa in 2014, instead of a Protection visa, particularly given his evidence that he received serious threats from his father-in-law in 2013. The Tribunal found that if he had protection needs as a result of his marriage, he would have lodged a Protection visa instead of a Medical Treatment visa that the applicant essentially claimed was not based on a genuine medical needs case. The Tribunal found this undermined his protection claims and credibility (CB 158, [32]).

    13. The Tribunal considered the applicant’s response to information put to him in accordance with the procedure in s 424AA, in compliance with s 424A ([33]-[35]) but was not prepared to accept his explanations. The Tribunal found that if his protection claims were true, he would have told the delegate at his interview in connection with his medical treatment visa application that he could not return because of his fears. The Tribunal found the applicant’s willingness to lodge a Medical Treatment visa application whilst in good health suggested he was prepared to lodge an application which was not based on truthful representations (CB 159, [35]).

    14. In light of all these matters, the Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant was a witness of truth (CB 159, [36]). Considered cumulatively, the Tribunal found the applicant had fabricated accounts of events and his claims for protection (CB 159, [38]).

    15. The Tribunal had some doubts about the applicant’s marriage but was prepared to accept for the purpose of the application that there was a genuine marriage (CB 159,[39]). On the basis of its adverse credibility findings, the Tribunal did not accept the applicant had a subjective fear of harm from his father-in-law, or that he had received any threats from him at all (CB 159-160, [40]). The Tribunal noted the applicant’s evidence that he and his wife are from the same caste and faith and found there was no reason he should not be accepted as her husband. The Tribunal did not accept there was any reason for finding that the applicant faced a real chance or real risk of adverse interest or harm from anyone on the basis of his marriage (CB 160, [41]).

    16. The Tribunal considered country information contained in the DFAT report but found it did not indicate that the applicant or a person of his profile faced a real chance or risk of serious or significant harm in India for any reason (CB 160, [44]).

    17. The Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm or real risk of significant harm for any reason, including being targeted or threatened by his wife’s family (CB 160, [45]). The Tribunal found the applicant would be able to support himself and live in India and did not accept he faced harm for any financial or economic reason or inability to adjust (CB 160, [46]).

    18. The Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant faced a real chance of risk of requiring access to state protection (CB 160, [47]).

    19. The Tribunal considered the applicant’s claims individually and cumulatively but having regard to its adverse credit findings and country information, the Tribunal rejected the entirety of the applicant’s claims for protection and found he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution as a refugee for any reason claimed (CB 160, [48]).

    20. The Tribunal found the applicant had survived in a foreign country for a number of years and as such would be able to support himself and live in India upon return. The Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant faced a real risk of significant harm for any reason (CB 161, [51]-[52]).

    [sic]

    APPLICATION TO THIS COURT

12. The application before this Court contains three grounds of judicial review, which have been considered further below.

13. The applicant did not file any amended application.

14. In compliance with orders made by a Registrar of the Court, the applicant filed written submissions on 10 April 2024. The Minister also filed written submissions on 17 April 2024, as provided for in the Orders.

15. On 25 September 2024, the applicant appeared before the Court in person at the final hearing. A solicitor appeared on behalf of the Minister.

16. The Minister sought to rely on material in the Court Book. Accordingly, the Court Book, filed on 1 August 2019, was tendered into evidence and marked as Exhibit CB. As the Tribunal’s decision record was contained in the Court Book, it was not necessary for the Court to take into evidence the applicant’s Affidavit, sworn/affirmed on 27 June 2019, which merely annexed a copy of that decision.

17. Being mindful that the applicant was unrepresented, the Court explained to him how the hearing would proceed and the role and powers of the Court in judicial review proceedings.

18. The application for judicial review filed by the applicant only sought orders to quash the Tribunal’s decision and did not seek a writ of mandamus requesting the matter be remitted to the Tribunal. An application that fails to seek a writ of mandamus or prohibition, or an injunction, has the result of the application not properly invoking the Court’s Jurisdiction in the matter pursuant to s 476(1) of the Act: FRA18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 2287 [15] & [21]. Noting that the applicant was unrepresented, the Court proposed that the application, filed on 1 July 2019, be amended to seek a writ of mandamus. The Court has the power to do this, even on its own motion: Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 889 [44]–[51]. There being no objection by the Minister, the Court so ordered.

19. The applicant was guided through his written submissions and was invited to make oral submissions in support of the grounds of review set out in his originating application. The Minister also made oral submissions at the hearing which largely reflected the written submissions filed on 17 April 2024.

    CONSIDERATION

20. The Court can only grant relief if it can be established that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by a jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476.

21. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421 (SZMTA) at [81], the High Court, per Nettle and Gordon JJ explained that:

    The categories of jurisdictional error are not closed. Jurisdictional error by a statutory decision-maker includes identifying a wrong issue; asking the wrong question; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; and failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness.

22. To constitute jurisdictional error, the error must be material, in the sense that it could have realistically deprived the applicant of the opportunity of a successful outcome: SZMTA at [2].

23. Further, as explained to the applicant at the hearing, it is not for the Court to review the merits of the Tribunal decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272.

    Grounds of Review

24. The application for judicial review set out the following grounds, without alteration:

    1.        Jurisdictional error and lacked jurisdiction

    2.        Error in interpretation of legislation

    3.        Natural Justice

25. In his written submissions, the applicant stated that parts of the Tribunal’s decision needed to be ‘reinterpreted’ per his belief and also outlined the following particulars:

    (a)That when he filed for the protection visa, there was a significant risk to his life as his father-in-law, who had served in the Punjab Police, could still use his links to harm him if he returned to Punjab.

    (b)That he had not been to India for the last 14 years and ‘there is an increase in local killings in Punjab and surroundings’. He also expressed that he would face difficulties living outside Punjab, that he was financially dependent on his wife, and that they now have a child together.

    (c)That the inconsistencies in his evidence, as found by the Tribunal, were due to his nervousness and stress.

    (d)That his father-in law did not hurt him when he visited Australia because, ‘he was not a fool to publicly hurt him in Australia, where there are laws’. He stated, however, that there was a risk his father-in-law would hurt him if he returned to India.

    (e)That his delay in lodging his protection visa application was because ‘being away from [his] place of birth and people [he has] known throughout is perhaps the most extreme step’.

    (f)That the spirit of the law had not been applied, as the Tribunal’s decision was founded upon the basis of situational evidence, not upon the basis of risk involved if he had to go to Punjab. He submitted that the Tribunal could have asked him for more submissions if they found inconsistencies in his evidence and he could have been given a chance to provide a clearer picture, especially since he did not have any legal or other advice before appearing at the Tribunal hearing, and had no knowledge of how the proceedings would go.

    Ground one

26. By ground one, the applicant alleged there was jurisdictional error, and that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction. At the hearing, the applicant could not articulate what the jurisdictional error was or why he thought the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction, stating only that his life was at risk if he returned to his home country, and that the Tribunal thought this was simply an assumption that he was making.

27. As submitted by the Minister, there is nothing in ground one, or in the submissions made by the applicant, that specifies the nature of the jurisdictional error allegedly committed by the Tribunal.

1. To the extent that ground one alleges that the Tribunal did not properly consider the applicant’s claim to fear harm if he returned to his home country, this ground is not made out. The Tribunal’s decision record indicates that it had regard to the applicant’s claim to fear harm from his father-in-law if he returned to India. The Tribunal engaged with the applicant’s claim to fear harm, and its findings, that he did not face a real chance or real risk of serious or significant harm in India, was open on the evidence before it and for the reasons it gave.

2. As to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the Court notes that the delegate’s decision was reviewable under Part 7 of the Act. The application for review of the delegate’s decision was lodged with the Tribunal within the prescribed period of 28 days from the date the applicant was taken to have been notified of that decision. The applicant did not withdraw his application for review. In these circumstances, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to conduct a review of the delegate’s decision.

3. Ground one does not establish jurisdictional error.

   Ground two

4. By ground two, the applicant alleged that the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the legislation. The applicant was unable to expand on this ground in his oral submissions.

5. In his written submissions, however, the applicant’s compliant appears to have been directed at how the Tribunal interpreted the evidence he gave about his father-in-law being in the Punjab Police, his reasons for remaining in the family home when his in-laws visited Australia, and his reasons for the delay in seeking protection.

6. The Court accepts, as submitted by the Minister, the Tribunal was not required to accept uncritically any of the applicant’s claims: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451. As to the Tribunal’s credibility findings, the Court accepts that those findings were not lacking a logical or probative basis. Nor could it be said that there was a misunderstanding by the Tribunal of the relevant material before it: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496.

7. As to the Tribunal’s consideration of the applicant’s delay in applying for protection, there was nothing illogical or unreasonable in the way the Tribunal had regard to this circumstance. The Court accepts the Minister’s submission that it was a legitimate and obvious factor to consider when assessing the genuineness of the applicant’s claim to fear harm. The Court accepts that the Tribunal’s findings on credibility were open to it on the material and evidence before it, and for the reasons it gave: Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at [11]; DZADW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1338 at [19]).

8. Ground two does not establish jurisdictional error.

   Ground three

9. By ground three, the applicant alleged that he had been denied natural justice.  

10. At the hearing, the applicant said he had nothing further to add regarding ground three.

11. A review of the Tribunal’s decision indicates that it complied with its procedural fairness obligations in Part 7 Division 4 of the Act. The applicant was invited by the Tribunal to a hearing as mandated by ss 425 and 425A of the Act. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments. The applicant was on notice, based on the Tribunal’s questions and the concerns discussed with him at the hearing, that his credibility was in issue. The Court is also satisfied, for reasons set out further below, that the Tribunal complied with its obligations under ss 424A and 424AA of the Act in relation to the information contained in the departmental case note.

12. In considering the applicant’s written submissions, ground three could be construed as a failure on the part of the Tribunal to give the applicant the opportunity to respond to the ‘inconsistencies’ as he did not have knowledge of how the proceedings ‘will go’ and because he was ‘nervous’.

13. Firstly, the Court notes that there is no evidence before it which suggests that the applicant’s nervousness deprived him of an opportunity to meaningfully participate in the hearing.

14. Secondly, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s procedural fairness obligations did not extend to doubts, inconsistencies, and absence of evidence: SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship  [2007] HCA 26 at [18]. The Court agrees with this submission, however, in this case, the Tribunal’s decision record indicates that it discussed with the applicant the concerns it had with his claims and evidence, including inconsistencies, and that the applicant was given an opportunity to respond to those concerns.

15. Thirdly, the Tribunal, appropriately, considered the information contained in the departmental case note (CB 97-98) as ‘information’ for the purposes of s 424A of the Act because it contained a rejection, denial, or undermining of the applicant’s claims to be a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations: SZBYR V Minister and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship  [2007] HCA 26 at [18]. The case note appears to be a record of an interview conducted by a departmental compliance officer with the applicant in relation to his application for the Medical Treatment Visa.

16. The Tribunal put to the applicant that the information contained in the case note indicated that he could return to India and that the only reason he gave for not wanting to return to India was that he wanted to be with his wife in Australia. The Tribunal informed the applicant that his failure to mention his fear of harm in India during this interview undermined his claims.

17. The Tribunal’s decision record indicates that the applicant responded to this information at the hearing, and that the Tribunal had regard to those responses as part of its consideration of the applicant’s claims and evidence.

18. In relation to the obligation in ss 424A and 424AA of the Act, the Tribunal indicated in its decision record that the information in the case note (to the extent it was relevant) was put to the applicant pursuant to s 424AA of the Act (CB 152, [9]). There is no reason to doubt that the Tribunal complied with the obligations in s 424AA of the Act as it stated: SZLXE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1312 at [19].

19. Having considered the evidence before it, the Court is satisfied that there was no denial of natural justice on the part of the Tribunal. Accordingly, ground three does not establish jurisdictional error.

    Other matters raised by the Minister

20. As a model litigant, the Minister’s solicitor brought to the Court’s attention that the Tribunal did not disclose to the applicant the notification or existence of the non-disclosure certificate, dated 23 August 2016, issued pursuant to s 438(1) of the Act (the certificate).

21. The certificate was issued in respect of two documents on the Department’s file (CB 95). The first was the completed Disclosure Decision Checklist (CB 96), the second was the internal departmental case note in respect of the interview conducted with the applicant in relation to his application for the Medical Treatment Visa (CB 97-98).

22. In its decision, the Tribunal found that the fact the folios ‘contained information relating to an internal working document and business affairs’ was not a necessary or sufficient basis for public interest immunity. The Tribunal considered that the certificate was not valid and did not trigger the operation of ss 438(3)(a) and 438(3)(b) of the Act, in relation to how the documents or information could be dealt with. The Tribunal proceeded to treat the documents in ‘the usual way as if there was no certificate’. The Tribunal found the disclosure decision checklist was irrelevant and, as considered above, the information in the departmental case note was put to the applicant pursuant to s 424AA of the Act to the extent it was relevant (CB 152, [9]).

23. The Court considers that the Tribunal was correct in finding that the reasons stated in the certificate (that the documents contained information relating to internal working documents and business affairs) was not a basis upon which a claim for public interest immunity could be made. It was also correct to find that the certificate purportedly issued under s 438(1) of the Act was not valid.

24. Notwithstanding that the certificate was not valid, the fact of the notification under s 438 of the Act triggered an obligation of procedural fairness on the part of the Tribunal to disclose the fact of the notification to the applicant: SZMTA at [2],[27].

25. The is no evidence before the Court to indicate that the Tribunal informed the applicant of the existence of the certificate or its notification under s 438. The Minister concedes that this did not occur, but nevertheless submitted that this case is distinguishable from MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 1 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2016) 244 FCR 305, in that the breach was not material, in the sense that it did not deprive the applicant of the possibility of a successful outcome: SZMTA at [2]-[3], [38].

26. The Court accepts the Minister’s submissions and considers that there has been no “practical injustice” to the applicant in this case: SZMTA at [38]. The Disclosure Decision Checklist, which appears to be an administrative document, contained no information of any material relevance to the applicant’s claims for protection. As to the internal departmental case note, to the extent it was relevant, the Tribunal put to the applicant the particulars of the information contained in that document in accordance with the procedure in s 424AA of the Act.

27. Neither the invalid certificate, nor the Tribunal’s failure to inform the applicant of the notification, nor the existence of the certificate realistically deprived the applicant of the possibility of a successful outcome. Accordingly, no jurisdictional error arises on this basis.

    CONCLUSION

28. As none of the grounds raised establish jurisdictional error, the application for judicial review must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Skaros.

Associate: T.A.J

Dated:       10 October 2024