DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Coy v Herrmann [2013] QDC 316
PARTIES:
LISA JANE COY
(applicant)v
VANESSA LEIGH HERRMANN
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
1377/2013
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court
DELIVERED ON:
31 October 2013
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
31 October 2013
JUDGE:
Samios DCJ
ORDER:
- Order as per draft
- In relation to the respondent’s application, the applicant’s solicitors to pay the respondent’s costs of the application by the respondent.
CATCHWORDS:
PRACTICE- Originating application- step in the proceedings - want of prosecution - where the applicant seeks leave to take a step in the proceedings pursuant to rule 389 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules - where the respondent to the originating application seeks an order for the originating application be dismissed for want of prosecution - where the respondent in the alternative seeks the originating application be dismissed on the basis of no reasonable cause of action
Legislation:
Rule 171, 389 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules
Cases:
Tyler v Custom Credit Corp Limited & Ors [2000] QCA 178
Stanford v Stanford (2012) HCA 52
COUNSEL:
Mr Bunning for the applicant
Mr Linklater-Steele for the respondent
SOLICITORS:
Family Law Care Solicitors for the applicant
Carroll Fairon Solicitors for the respondent
There are two applications before me today. In one of those applications, the applicant, who was the applicant in the originating application, seeks leave to take a step in the proceedings pursuant to rule 389 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. The respondent to the originating application also brings an application by which she seeks an order that the originating application filed 7 May 2010 be dismissed for want of prosecution. In the alternative, she seeks an order pursuant to rule 171 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules that the originating application filed 7 May 2010 be dismissed on the basis of no reasonable cause of action. In both applications before me today, other orders are sought which are unnecessary at this stage to mention.
I will call the applicant in the originating applicant “the applicant” for these reasons, and consequently, the respondent in the originating application as “the respondent” for the purpose of these reasons. The applicant and the respondent, it is accepted, were in a property relationship. There is a dispute as to the dates between which they were in that de facto relationship. The applicant says the relevant dates were between December 2005 and 24 October 2008, when they separated under the one roof and lived together, but not as a couple, until November 2008. As far as the respondent is concerned, the relationship commenced on 13 December 2005, but they did not live together until about March 2006. The respondent says they separated in late March or early April 2008.
For the purposes of the applications before me today, the date of cohabitation and separation does not assume significance, because both parties agree that the relationship was of at least two years. There is no challenge by the respondent to the jurisdiction of the…
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- Case
- [2013] QDC 316
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court noted that under Rule 171 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, a party must diligently prosecute their case and refrain from any act or omission that causes delay or waste of court time. The court further referred to Rule 389, which provides that an originating application seeking leave to take a step in the proceedings must be filed within a reasonable time. The court also considered the relevant case law, including Tyler v Custom Credit Corp Limited & Ors and Stanford v Stanford. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated sufficient diligence in prosecuting their originating application and that the application had been pending for an unreasonable length of time. The court also found that the applicant had not established a reasonable cause of action in their originating application.
In light of the above, the court dismissed the applicant's originating application for want of prosecution and ordered the applicant's solicitors to pay the respondent's costs of the application. The court did not need to consider the alternative ground of dismissal based on no reasonable cause of action. The court's orders were as follows: (1) the applicant's originating application was dismissed for want of prosecution, and (2) the applicant's solicitors were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Order as per draft
2. In relation to the respondent’s application, the applicant’s solicitors to pay the respondent’s costs of the application by the respondent.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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