Cox v Nelson

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

COX v NELSON & ORS

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Perry

7 February 2006

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GROUNDS OF REVIEW - RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS

Application by plaintiff for judicial review of Parole Board decision made pursuant to s 67 of the Correctional Services Act 1962 refusing his application for release on parole - the plaintiff's behaviour while in prison constitutes a mandatory consideration under the statute - whether Parole Board failed to consider specific matters complained of - held that there was no evidence that the Parole Board failed to consider all relevant matters - whether failure to consider such matters would in any event constitute reviewable error - held that consideration of specific matters referred to in application not mandated by the statute - application dismissed.

Correctional Services Act 1982 s 60(7), s 63(3), s 67, referred to.
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Application S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59; Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163; Minister for Immigration v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; Kianfar v Minister for Immigration (Unreported) BC2001 08536 [2001] FCA 1754; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; Sean Investments Pty Ltd v Mackellar (1981) 38 ALR 363; affirmed on appeal (1982) 42 ALR 676; Turner v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 35 ALR 388, considered.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GROUNDS OF REVIEW - GENERALLY

Whether evidence existed for inference by Parole Board that the plaintiff had abused prescription medication - held that incorrect inference identified by plaintiff - Parole Board drew inference that a reservation existed regarding the plaintiff's drug use - that inference drawn in part on incorrect reading of psychologist's report - nevertheless inference open on the basis of a correct reading of the report - no reviewable error demonstrated - application dismissed.

R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 100; Control of Government Action Creyke, McMillan and Reynolds, LexisNexis Butterworths (Australia) 2005; Halsbury's Laws of England 4th ed, 2001 Reissue Vol 1(1) Administrative Law 270 [122], considered.

COX v NELSON & ORS
[2006] SASC 30

Civil

  1. PERRY J. On 27 May 2003, the plaintiff was sentenced in the District Court following his plea of guilty to two counts of armed robbery, and a further count of breach of a good behaviour bond. The total sentence which was imposed was a sentence of imprisonment for 5 years 10 months and 4 days, with a non-parole period of 1 year 10 months and 4 days.[1]

    [1]  In his affidavit filed in support of the application, the plaintiff states that the sentence was 9 years 5 months and 9 days with a non-parole period of 6 years. In fact, the actual sentence is as I have indicated. The difference is explained by reference to the fact that in fixing the sentence,…

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Details
Case
[2006] SASC 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Cox v Nelson, the applicant sought judicial review of a decision made by the Parole Board under section 67 of the Correctional Services Act 1962, which refused his application for release on parole. The plaintiff argued that the Board had failed to consider his behaviour in prison, which is a mandatory consideration under the statute. The defendants opposed the application, arguing that there was no evidence of such failure and that the consideration of specific matters was not mandated by the statute. The court was required to decide whether the Parole Board failed to consider all relevant matters and, if so, whether such failure would constitute a reviewable error.

The court held that there was no evidence that the Parole Board failed to consider all relevant matters. The Board had drawn together a considerable body of material, including a report from the manager of the Prisoner Assessment Unit, which detailed the plaintiff's attitudes and activities while in custody. The Board had also interviewed the plaintiff and made observations about his behaviour in prison. The court further held that the consideration of specific matters referred to in the application was not mandated by the statute. The statute provided that the Board was to have regard to the matters prescribed in the regulations and to such other matters as the Board considers relevant, which gave the Board a wide discretion as to the matters it considered.

The court dismissed the application and made no orders as to costs. The plaintiff's argument that the Parole Board had failed to consider his behaviour in prison was not supported by the evidence. The Board had considered the plaintiff's behaviour and had made observations about it in their reasons. The plaintiff's argument that the consideration of specific matters was mandated by the statute was also rejected by the court. The statute provided that the Board was to have regard to the matters prescribed in the regulations and to such other matters as the Board considers relevant, which gave the Board a wide discretion as to the matters it considered.

Background

Background to the litigation

The proceedings came on for hearing before me on 20 January 2006. Dr Christopher Bleby appeared for the plaintiff. Mr Michael Wait appeared for the defendants, who opposed the application.Background The applicant was born on 23 August 1968. He was aged 36 years at the time his application was considered by the Board. The plaintiff’s parents separated when he was 4 years of age, and at the age of 10 he was made a ward of the State and placed in a Boys’ Home. The plaintiff has a lengthy criminal record, commencing at the age of about 11 years. His record of criminal offending extends into his adult years, and was described by the Board as a “significant record”. Between the age of 18 years and May 2005 when the Board’s reasons were published, a period of approximately 19 years, he had spent about 15 years in prison. The offences giving rise to his present sentence were committed in breach of conditions of parole upon which he had been released. As for the plaintiff’s behaviour while in prison serving the present sentence, during the course of their reasons, the Board made the following observations:“Regrettably, Cox has an unfortunate record of behaviour whilst in prison. He has been involved in some 30 incidents during his period of 5+ years in prison. These incidents have included threats to other prisoners, threats to staff including a social worker, intimidation of an intellectually disabled fellow prisoner, abuse of staff including nurses, stealing and other dishonesty, and unauthorised possession of medication.Clearly, Cox has adopted an unfortunate and antagonistic attitude towards staff and others in the prison environment. When things have not gone his own way, he has retaliated with negative and inappropriate behaviour.…The prisoner’s institutional behaviour is regrettable, and a little surprising given the submissions made to the sentencing judge on his behalf, to the effect that he was determined to rehabilitate himself. The sentencing judge noted that his rehabilitation would require extraordinary determination on your part. The judge advised Cox that you are well aware that if you fail to rehabilitate yourself then your future is very bleak. In the course of considering his application, the Board interviewed the plaintiff on 22 March 2005. In their reasons they observe:He readily conceded that he had a long history of inappropriate behaviour and misconduct whilst in prison. He asserted, however, that his behaviour had improved markedly from 2000. To assist in considering the plaintiff’s application, the Board drew together a considerable body of material. The manager of the Prisoner Assessment Unit furnished the Board with a report in the form of a minute dated 26 August 2004. This detailed the plaintiff’s attitudes and activities while in custody, including aspects of his attempts at education and employment, medication and his general conduct. It appears that the plaintiff was transferred from Yatala Labour Prison to Port Augusta prison in January 2004, and from there to Mount Gambier Prison in May 2004.

Decision

Reasons for decision

PERRY J
The concern expressed by Dr Bleby as to the significance of even a relatively short period of further incarceration was evidently not shared by those responsible for instituting the proceedings. They were commenced on the very last day but one, of the six month period referred to in SCR r 98.06, which provides:Subject to any enactment, or order of the court granting an extension of time, a summons for judicial review must be issued within six months from the date when grounds for the review first arose, and shall in all cases be made as promptly as possible.Conclusion I would dismiss the application. I so order.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PERRY J

I do not think it necessary to resolve that difficult question in this case. I say that because it is the inference drawn by the Board which, on the face of it, was an element in their decision. That inference was that, having regard to the terms of the psychological report, there was a “reservation about cessation of substance abuse”. As I have said, that was a fair inference to draw from the terms of the relevant part of the report, and if that is so, I do not see that it is fatal to the soundness of the decision if the inference was drawn on a broader base than was justified on the evidence.Discretionary considerations On the hearing of any application for judicial review, even if grounds justifying the making of an order were to be made out, the court has a wide discretion whether to grant relief.[12] For the reasons which I have given, in my view, none of the grounds asserted by the plaintiff are made out.[12] See Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Ed, 2001 Reissue Vol 1(1) Administrative Law 270 [122]. Even if, contrary to the conclusion which I have reached, the plaintiff had made out all or any of the grounds which he advanced, a serious question arises as to whether, in its discretion, the relief should be granted. As to this aspect of the matter, I raised with counsel the question as to what considerations would, in the circumstances of the case, be relevant to the exercise of the discretion, should it be necessary to address that question. In particular, I pointed out that the fact that the plaintiff may renew his application to the Board after 25 April 2006 may well be a relevant consideration. When I raised the matter in arguendo with Dr Bleby, he submitted:When you are talking about somebody who is incarcerated, every week is important … parole is highly valued. Whether a week, two weeks, a month, it is highly significant to the plaintiff. I accept that in matters concerning the liberty of the subject, the court should not devalue the importance of even a short confinement in custody. But the plaintiff is being held in lawful custody, unless and until he succeeds in securing an order for his release on parole. I have already referred to the fact that, for one reason or another, he has not yet been given the benefit of a full pre-release program. His ability to resume normal life in the community must be regarded as questionable at this stage, absent adequate preparation, and given the negative effects flowing from the institutionalised existence which he has led for many years. The Board clearly considered his suitability for release very carefully, and are in the best position to re-assess the matter if he cares to apply again. The concern expressed by Dr Bleby as to the significance of even a relatively short period of further incarceration was evidently not shared by those responsible for instituting the proceedings. They were commenced on the very last day but one, of the six month period referred to in SCR r 98.06, which provides:Subject to any enactment, or order of the court granting an extension of time, a summons for judicial review must be issued within six months from the date when grounds for the review first arose, and shall in all cases be made as promptly as possible.Conclusion