Cowie & Neylan
[2023] FedCFamC2F 686
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Cowie & Neylan [2023] FedCFamC2F 686
File number(s): HBC 130 of 2022 Judgment of: JUDGE TAGLIERI Date of judgment: 6 June 2023 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – valuation of property – discrete issue hearing regarding value of former matrimonial home – competing valuations from qualified valuers – where valuers gave evidence concurrently at discrete issues hearing – declaration as to value of the former matrimonial home Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79
Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 7.1, 7.1.4, 7.1.6, 7.16, 7.32,
Cases cited: Bollen & Bollen [2020] FamCA 605
Elsey v Elsey (1997) FLC 92-727
Gamer and Gamer (1988) FLC 91-932
Georgeson and Georgeson (1995) FLC 92-618
Lenehan & Lenehan (1987) FLC 91-815
Little and Little (1990) FLC 92-147
Mallet v Mallet (1984) FLC 91-507
Phillips & Phillips [2002] FamCA 350
Smith and Smith (1991) FLC 92-26
The Commonwealth v Milledge (1953) 90 CLR 157
Division: Division 2 Family Law Number of paragraphs: 74 Date of hearing: 15 and 16 May 2023 Place: Hobart Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Mooney SC Solicitor for the Applicant: Ogilvie Jennings Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Trezise Solicitor for the Respondent: PWB Lawyers ORDERS
HBC 130 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MS COWIE
Applicant
AND: MR NEYLAN
Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE TAGLIERI
DATE OF ORDER:
6 June 2023
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
A.The market value of the property situate at 1 B Street, Suburb C in Tasmania, is $1,900,000.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.This matter is listed to 14 June 2024 at 9:30am for the making of final property orders.
2.Within 7 days of the date of the Orders, the parties file a draft minute of orders sought to be made by consent.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Cowie & Neylan has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judge Taglieri
These proceedings relate to parenting and property matters between Ms Cowie (“the Wife”) and Mr Neylan (“the Husband”). On the first day of the defended hearing, the parties invited the Court to make orders by consent in relation to the parenting issues. After being satisfied the orders were in the best interests of the two children, X born 2007 and Y born 2009, final parenting orders were made by consent on 15 May 2023.
The parties also advised the Court that they agree orders should be made pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) to adjust the net non-superannuation assets of the relationship on a 50/50 basis between the parties.
Further, I was informed that the parties agree:
(a)That there should be an equalisation of the parties’ superannuation interests;
(b)That there is an agreed distribution of chattels and other household items, to be divided according to an agreed schedule and which sits outside of the 50/50 adjustments;
(c)About the treatment and use of a bank account to pay school fees; and
(d)About the treatment of the Husband’s accrued employment entitlements.
Noting all the agreements referred to above, I was told that the singular dispute between the parties relates to a difference of $500,000,000 in respect of the current value of the former matrimonial home at 1 B Street, Suburb C in Tasmania (“the FMH”), which the Husband seeks to retain. This difference being represented by one valuer,[1] opining the value of the FMH at $1,750,000 and the other at $2,250,000.[2]
[1] Mr D.
[2] Mr E.
Accordingly, at the outset of the defended hearing it was determined that I would conduct a hearing in respect of a discrete issue, being the current market value of the FMH (“the discrete issue”), with the parties expectation being that a consent minute would be produced to the Court containing the orders sought.
The only evidence adduced by the parties in respect of the discrete issue was from two qualified valuers as expert witnesses (“the Valuers”). The first Valuer is Mr D, who had been jointly engaged by the parties to conduct an initial valuation in May 2022 and who subsequently, on instruction from the Husband solely, undertook an updated valuation in May 2023. The other Valuer is Mr E, who had been engaged by the Wife to undertake an assessment and prepare a report after I made orders on 15 May 2023 that she be permitted to obtain Mr E’s opinion for the reasons I gave orally.
On 15 May 2023, I also ordered that the Valuers would give evidence concurrently,[3] if the Wife sought to rely on the opinion of Mr E. At the commencement of the hearing, I gave directions for the order of and manner of cross-examination and re-examination of the Valuers
[3] Pursuant to powers under r 7.32 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
THE EXPERT EVIDENCE
On 16 May 2023, the hearing of the discrete question proceeded. The Husband read into evidence the affidavit of Mr D filed 12 May 2023, which relevantly annexed his initial valuation report dated 9 May 2022[4] and his updated valuation report dated 3 May 2023.[5] The affidavit included a summary of Mr D’s professional experience and qualifications.[6]
[4] At Annexure B.
[5] At Annexure C; tendered as Exhibit R-1.
[6] At Annexure A.
The Wife read into evidence the affidavit of Mr E filed 16 May 2023, annexing his valuation report dated 15 May 2023[7] and an outline of his qualifications.[8] Counsel for the Wife also produced a document outlining the points of contention dated 16 May 2023 (“points of contention document”) in accordance with Order 6 of the Orders made by me on 15 May 2023.
[7] At Annexure B; tendered as Exhibit A-1.
[8] At Annexure A.
Having received the affidavit evidence, Mr D and Mr E gave oral evidence concurrently in relation to the points of contention document.
Variances of information relied upon[9]
[9] Points of contention document at points 3, 4 and 5.
The Valuers recorded a different size of allotment for the FMH, being over 1,300 m² in Mr D’s report and 5m² larger in Mr E’s report. However, both experts said that this “small” difference did not have any significance or material relevance to their opinions. I so find.
They also recorded a difference in the size of the residence, but the two Valuers could not explain how or why the difference existed. Both said that they had measured the residence themselves using a laser measuring device. Ultimately, the Valuers indicated that the differential in measurements was not of material relevance, as it was not the critical difference between them concerning the value each attributed to the property. I find accordingly.
The Valuers were referred to the different description of the configuration of the residence in their respective May 2023 reports. Each Valuer stated that this was of no relevance to the opinion they had given and I so find.
Qualifications, expertise and compliance with expert witness rules[10]
[10] Points of contention document at point 6.
Comparing the respective qualifications and experience set out in the Valuers’ affidavits, the evidence establishes that Mr E became a certified practising valuer in early 2001 and Mr D achieved that qualification in 2020. They have equivalent qualification, although Mr E has held it for longer and I accept he has greater experience in a general sense by virtue of longevity of his career.
However, based on the evidence given by Mr D about the quantity of valuations for properties in excess of $2,000,000 he has undertaken since becoming a certified practising Valuer,[11] his shorter experience does not, in my view, cause his opinion to have less weight. Mr D was very specific in answering questions about the volume of the valuations both residential and other that he had undertaken for different purposes. He has undertaken valuations for finance applications and for family law disputes.
[11] Being over 100.
Mr E gave more generalised evidence about the number of valuations without specifics, but I accept that he has considerable experience, given the length of time he has worked in industry.
Although not stated in his report, Mr D stated that he was familiar with the expert Rules of evidence and part 7.1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“the Rules”). He said that when he prepared his May 2022 valuation report, he took it that the parties’ solicitors had jointly instructed him as a Single Expert witness pursuant to the Rules, but acknowledged that he had not stated this in the report. He stated that he had, in fact, complied in most respects with the Rules for the purpose of preparing both his 2022 and 2023 reports, but acknowledged he had been instructed to complete the updated 2023 report by only the Husband’s solicitors.
Mr D was not particularly challenged about specific non-compliance with the duties and responsibilities of an expert, and it was not explained how the failure to state in his report that he was aware of them and would comply with rr 7.1.4 to 7.1.6 of the Rules has impacted on the reliability of his opinion.
I find that Mr E was fully aware of the Rules applicable for expert witnesses and, as he stated, abided by them. Indeed, there is no evidence to the contrary and he was not challenged about the statement in his report at section 6 in this regard.
Nature of the property, comparative sales considered, methodology, detail underlying opinion and reasoning[12]
[12] Points of contention document at points 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.
The evidence given concurrently by the Valuers demonstrated that they had adopted the same established and commonly accepted methodology and approach to express their opinions about the value of the FMH. First, they assessed comparative sales and then adopted a summation approach as a check. Accordingly, in my view, there is no material distinction between the two Valuers in terms of their qualifications and expertise.
Mr D made frank concessions that his reports did not contain as much detail as Mr E’s concerning the underlying information utilised to arrive at his conclusion. He also conceded that his reports did not contain the level of detail set out in Mr E’s report at section 17 and 18.
Mr D’s frankness and ability to produce spreadsheets with relevant workings he had prepared when undertaking the updated valuation, in my view, shows that he undertook an approach using a level of detail and methodical approach effectively analogous to the approach that Mr E used. However, he did not set this out in his report whereas Mr E did.
While it is preferable that the relevant information, detail and reasoning be included in a report of an expert nature, the totality of Mr D’s evidence clearly demonstrates the information, detail and reasoning upon which he relied for the opinion expressed.
Much criticism was made of the lack of detail in Mr D’s report, but I note that no such complaint was apparently made by the parties in relation to the May 2022 report. This report was obtained and used by the parties jointly, at least for negotiations, and now has been received in evidence without contest.[13]
[13] Points of contention document at points 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.
It is self-evident from the contents of each Valuer’s report that they both considered some of the same properties for comparison purposes, but not all properties considered were the same. Each said that they considered both settled and unsettled sales.
Their choice of properties for comparison was different in the following respects:
·Mr D considered 11 properties situated in Suburb C, Suburb G, Suburb H, Town J, Suburb K, and Suburb L. Mr E, on the other hand, considered nine properties situated either in Suburb G, Suburb M, Suburb L, Suburb O, Suburb K and Suburb N; and
·Mr E said he included two properties with sale dates in late 2022 and one in mid-2022 because they ought to be considered, despite agreeing that the market was slowing due to a number of factors, including interest rate rises and matters referred to in section 15 of his report. Mr D was unwilling to include sales earlier than late 2022 for comparison, and had not done so because of the slowing of and changes in the market as referred to in his updated report.[14]
[14] Affidavit of Mr D filed 12 May 2023 at Annexure B on page 73.
Each Valuer gave oral evidence about why they had chosen the properties they had for comparison purposes. The tenor and effect of Mr E’s evidence was that, for the purposes of identifying his comparative property sales, he took a number of considerations into account. However, that market appeal, views, quality and size of residential amenity and size of land were important.
Mr D’s evidence was that all of those considerations were relevant, but that he considered the location was very important because proximity to the city in the inner suburbs and differences in geographical character of different locations impacted on the nature of demand in a location. For that reason he excluded some of the properties considered by Mr E, namely those in Suburb M and Suburb N.
The task of the Valuer was described by Mr D to be one of analysing data and Mr E agreed, but each said that there was a degree of subjectivity in identifying comparative sales. On my enquiry as to whether there were recognised criteria within the industry for selecting sales for the purposes of the comparative sales method of valuation, I was told that no such recognised criteria existed.
It is particularly relevant in my view that Mr E did not include any sales in Suburb C for comparison purposes. I consider this is a weakness in Mr E’s choice of comparative sales. I accept the evidence of Mr D that persons looking to purchase property in Suburb C would not necessarily be looking for properties with the same or similar characteristics as persons interested in property at Suburb M or Suburb N. According to Mr D’s evidence, while there are likely to be properties within all these suburbs with similar residential amenity, what the suburbs offer is different in location, transport, distance of travel, outdoor character, and lifestyle amenity. I accept what Mr D says in that respect.
Mr D’s opinion was criticised because he did not include five properties considered by Mr E. The five properties Mr D did not consider were said by Mr E to be of similar to the FMH’s standard/quality in amenity, market appeal, views and quality. However, their location and suburb qualities are considerably different to Suburb C, accepting Mr D’s evidence referred to at [30] of these reasons. Mr D explained why he did not include those properties for comparison purposes.
Mr E said it was relevant to assess and state if a property was characterised as “top end” in order to complete research in respect of what were comparable sales. However, Mr D did not agree and stated that it adds unwarranted subjectivity into the analysis.
When Mr D was questioned about his approach to five particular properties said to be “top end” and comparable to the FMH and why he did not consider them, he stated as follows:
·The property at P Street in Suburb M because, although it was comparable in age and nature to the FMH, it was not comparable as to location;
·The property at Q Street in Suburb O sold almost 12 months ago and the market had changed since that time;
·R Street was an “outlier” and he agreed its exclusion would “skew” his figures. However, he added that, on his analysis of rate per square metre, the property did not correspond to the FMH;
·The property at S Street in City GG was overall a superior property. He agreed that he attributed an approximate land value of $1,200,000 for this property in his summation approach; and
·The property at T Street in Suburb N was not considered because it was distinguishable in respect of location and the nature of the suburb.
Mr E simply stated that the quality and character of the properties were similar and that is why he regarded them as comparable.
Asked why he had only used Suburb C properties as comparators in May 2022 and this time included properties in other inner suburbs, Mr D explained that it was because there were fewer sales and less data in Suburb C since he last provided an opinion. He also added that when he excluded properties as outliers he was referring to rates and not the final sale price.
The choice of properties for comparison adopted by Mr D by admission were mostly smaller in land area as well as residential living area. However, in his report he acknowledged that they were inferior in quality for comparative purposes or superior by location. As such, for the purpose of comparative analysis he appears to have allowed for the inferior size to some degree, which is not fully set out or explained in his report. I find that because the properties considered by Mr D were mostly significantly smaller in land size, it likely has impacted adversely on the analysis he undertook.
I find that there are weaknesses in the choice of comparators by Mr E due to not accurately assessing location. However, I find that there are weaknesses in assessing size of property in Mr D’s assessment.
I find that each Valuer, for the most part, fairly reliably assessed other factors such as amenity, views, quality and character of the residence for the purpose of choosing comparative properties in undertaking the comparative sales method of assessment. However, in the case of Mr D, because a number of the properties he chose were plainly inferior in size and amenity, upward adjustment will be required.
Summation approach to valuation and land value
Mr D’s evidence ultimately demonstrated that he had adopted the same summation method as Mr E to check the opinion at which he arrived using the comparative sales method of valuation.
He produced the relevant schedule to demonstrate this.[15]
[15] Exhibit R-2 and Exhibit R-3.
Counsel for the Wife did not challenge the calculations made by him in the schedule or test them in any way, except to obtain confirmation from Mr D that the land value he used for S Street in City GG on the summation method was similar to the $1,100,000 Mr E used for the FMH for the same method.
Mr E’s summation approach appears in his report at [18]. In evidence, he explained how he made his calculations, saying that for this purpose he attributed a land value of $1,100,000 for the land upon which the FMH is situated.
Mr D said that he attributed $550,000 as the land value for the FMH, which is also apparent from page 6 of Exhibit R-3. He did not state how he arrived at that sum, but Exhibit R-3 demonstrates that he undertook a summation method for all other properties that he used as comparisons when adopting the comparative sales method of valuation.
Mr E did not produce a summation method for any other comparison property used by him, so it is impossible to critically analyse the reliability of the $1,100,000 attributed to the land for the FMH. I enquired about the source of that figure of $1,100,000 and he simply stated that he adopted the figure based on examination of all vacant land sales in comparable areas.
I observe that difference in the land values attributed to the FMH for the summation method is $550,000 and represents closely to the difference in the current market value for the FMH.
Comparison of the calculations at section 18 of Mr E’s report with the table in the summation schedule made by Mr D for the FMH demonstrates that they arrived at about $10,000 apart only under the summation method for the dwelling value of the FMH. This reinforces that the material dispute lies in the different value attributed to the land value for the FMH.
Counsel for the Wife put the Valuer-General of Tasmania’s valuation at 1 September 2022 to the Valuers. It was received into evidence as Exhibit A-2, but each Valuer stated that they did not have regard to it at the time of preparing their reports in May 2023. They were asked if any weight should be given Valuer-General’s valuation, which identified land value of $1,050,000 and capital value of $1,750,000.
Mr E stated it should be considered as the officers of the Valuer-General had at the time undertaken an exercise of reviewing land sales in the area. However, later in his evidence Mr E stated that the Valuer-General valuation is for rating purposes and he does not rely on it.
Mr D did not appear to agree in respect of the use or consideration of the Valuer-General’s report. He explained that the valuation figure is a conclusion not demonstrated or supported by the evidence considered to arrive at the conclusion.
In attributing $550,000 more to the land value of the FMH than Mr D, Mr E agreed he had placed significance on views and elevation, but added it was also based on his experience with sales and the size of the allotment. He conceded that the view from the FMH was a “flat view” overlooking the city and that the top side of B Street afforded more panoramic views. He also agreed that he had taken into account the use to which the land would be put if it were vacant, such as after a fire when development potential was a consideration.
When it was put to Mr E that the land value is inherently speculative because there were no vacant land sales in Suburb C with which comparison could be made, he agreed it was “difficult”.
Mr E maintained that it was appropriate to compare the Suburb M and Suburb N properties with the FMH, because they are elevated and very popular, in close proximity to Suburb C and have market appeal.
Mr D gave evidence that for the purpose of arriving at $550,000 for the land value of the FMH in the summation method, he looked at the comparative sales more closely. He did an evaluation of proximity to the city and of views, but also looked at land size and sale of similar sized parcels in adjoining suburbs.
All the evidence about the summation method reveals that the value attributed to the land is not derived by actual sales of land only in Suburb C or sales of land in inner suburbs of comparable size. Instead each Valuer made an assessment of what part of the overall sale price was to be attributed to the land alone and divided that figure by the area of land to arrive at a square metre rate.
My impression is that Mr E has overstated the land value of the FMH and Mr D has understated it given the foregoing reasons, but the evidence does not permit a reliable assessment on the balance of probabilities of where the true figure lies.
For all the above reasons, I consider the summation method adopted by both Valuers involve subjectivity, guesswork or unreliable comparison. I find the summation approach taken by each expert should be ignored as unhelpful.
Consistency and evidence about the market since May 2022[16]
[16] Points of contention document at point 6.
It was put to Mr D that his opinion as to the value of the FMH was entirely devoid of detail as to the description of the property and explanations of how he came to the figure, but he disagreed and referred to the description given in the Executive Summary of his reports.[17]
[17] Affidavit of Mr D filed 12 May 2023 at Annexure B on pages 10 and 47.
Mr E stated that, given the purpose of the valuation, it was very relevant to give a full description of the property.
Counsel for the Wife observed to Mr D that his valuation of $1,750,000 represented a 12.5 per cent drop in the previous valuation for the FMH. It was suggested that this was a large difference in a relatively short time, and he was asked if this was market-wide or specific only to “top end” properties like the FMH. Mr D said that it varies from property to property and that there is no “hard and fast rule” on how much the market has declined. He also repeated sentiments that he included in his May 2023 report as follows:[18]
Sales activity during 2023 had demonstrated a softening of the market with more days on market and less sales achieving an excess of asking prices. Recent interest rate rises and a negative outlook regarding future rises, combined with inflationary pressure may act to increase this softening.
It is prudent to note the economy is currently effected [sic] by the increased inflationary pressure, recent and perceived future interest rate rises, global uncertainty regarding the conflict in Ukraine and the pandemic. The outlook is generally considered to be one of uncertainty which may affect market sentiment and economic conditions in a negative manner.
[18] Affidavit of Mr D filed 12 May 2023 at Annexure B on page 73.
It was put to him that the opinion was contradictory to that stated earlier in his report that recent market direction was “stable to improving”.[19] Mr D clarified that he had failed to edit this part of his May 2022 report when he had used it as a template for the updated 2023 report. He had not intended to convey that the direction of the market was stable to improving as it did not reflect the situation in May 2023 or his opinion.
[19] Affidavit of Mr D filed 12 May 2023 at Annexure B on page 72.
Mr E was asked about the market in May 2022 and if he could comment on whether it had changed since then. He declined to comment, specifically stating that the only way to know would be to examine both markets[20] independently, which he had not done.
[20] Meaning May 2022 and May 2023.
However, he generally agreed that there had been change in the market for similar reasons to those to which Mr D referred.
In response to a question from me, he stated the market “has had a decline over the past 12 months”. For these reasons, I find that it was unreliable to use the May 2022 sales included by Mr E for comparison purposes.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES – VALUATION DISPUTES
The Full Court in Phillips & Phillips [2002] FamCA 350, as cited in Bollen & Bollen [2020] FamCA 605 at [34], outlined the factors the Court is to consider where the valuation of property is in dispute. In summary, the Full Court said:
·The correct approach to be applied is a common sense one after considering all material, to fix a value satisfactory to the mind of the Court;[21]
·As to ‘appropriate principles’, there is no fixed rule as to the proper method of valuation and the preferred methodology depends upon the facts of the case.[22] However, a fundamentally flawed method should not be used, being one that is not applicable to the facts of the case;[23]
·If the Court prefers one expert to another, then reasons for the preference should be stated;[24]
·Where there is a discrepancy between two or more values it is not open to the Court merely to adopt a mean or average figure between the rival opinions.[25] However, this does not mean that, when faced with two competing valuations, the Court is bound to accept one or the other and the Court is able to form its own separate view applying established principles of valuation;[26]
·A midpoint between two valuations will not necessarily involve error on the part of a primary judge if there are findings and a reasoned basis for decision taken. Faced with a gap between two or more valuations, where the judge considers that on the probabilities the higher or lower valuation should be lowered or increased to arrive at the true value, he or she is at liberty to so adjust as seen fit;[27]
·If there is a disparity in the evidence, such that it is too difficult, complex or hazardous because of market volatility or unique character of a property, for the Court to accept a valuation or come to a separate conclusion, then a more proper solution may be to order sale of the property.[28]
[21] The Commonwealth v Milledge (1953) 90 CLR 157 at pp 161-162.
[22] Mallet v Mallet (1984) FLC 91-507 at p 79,121 per Mason J; Georgeson and Georgeson (1995) FLC 92-618 at p 82,218.
[23] Elsey v Elsey (1997) FLC 92-727.
[24] Gamer and Gamer (1988) FLC 91-932 at pp 76,746-76,747.
[25] Lenehan & Lenehan (1987) FLC 91-815 at 76,142.
[26] Borriello and Borriello (1989) FLC 92-04; The Commonwealth v The Commonwealth v Milledge (1953) 90 CLR 157 at p77,558.
[27] Borriello and Borriello (1989) FLC 92-04 at p 77,559.
[28] Little and Little (1990) FLC 92-147 at p78,020; Smith and Smith (1991) FLC 92-261 at 78,759.
CONCLUSION – CURRENT MARKET VALUE
Noting the above findings, I consider that the most reliable measure of the current value of the FMH is to utilise the views of the Valuers based on the comparative sales method as a starting point. The summation method is inappropriate for the reasons referred to at [39] to [56] above.
In addition, in applying and preferring the comparative sales method, there should be exclusion of some properties chosen by Mr E based on their location and older data given market changes.
Consequently, the properties chosen by both Valuers in common should be considered in the comparative sales method. However, the properties in Suburb N and Suburb M should be excluded because I have preferred Mr D’s choice as to location of inner city suburbs being more accurate. In addition, the older sales data should be excluded,[29] because of the common evidence given by both Valuers as to the adverse change in the market since May 2022.[30]
[29] Q Street.
[30] See [60] to [62] of these reasons.
The effect of my findings and reasoning is that the following properties ought to be included for the purpose of the “starting point” comparative sales method:
Property Value U Street in Suburb G $1,350,000 F Street in Suburb L $1,950,000 S Street in Suburb K $2,200,000 V Street in City GG $3,075,000 2 B Street in Suburb C $905,000 W Street in Suburb C $1,050,000 Z Street in Suburb C $1,270,000 BB Street in Suburb C $1,300,000 CC Street in Suburb H $1,450,000 EE Street in Town J $1,510,000 FF Street in Suburb K $1,650,000 R Street $2,150,000 $19,860,000.00
The total value of these 12 properties is $19,860,000.00, giving a median sum value of approximately $1,655,000.
Despite the above reasoning, it is also necessary to acknowledge that Mr D has used some significantly smaller and inferior properties to the FMH, and so an upward adjustment which is not amenable to a precise measure or assessment is required. However the upward adjustment required is guided, on the balance of probabilities, by a review of exhibit R-3, in which Mr D has demonstrated land values assessed by him for all properties he considered using the Comparison method.
Further, as the unchallenged evidence is that the FMH was valued at $2,000,000 in May 2022, the current value of the FMH logically must be below this sum.
I expressly reject the contention that I should prefer Mr E’s valuation to that of Mr D or that I should prefer Mr D’s valuation, because each involved some weakness in my view which distorted their reliability.
I conclude for all the above reasons that the current market value of the FMH is $1,900,000.
I will list the property proceedings for the purpose of pronouncing final orders. To enable this, noting the agreements’ referred to at [2] and [3] of these reasons, I direct that the parties file a draft minute of consent orders within seven days.
I certify that the preceding seventy-four (74) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Taglieri. Associate:
Dated: 6 June 2023
0
4
0