COWAN & RICH - [2010] FMCAfam 837

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

COWAN & RICH

[2010] FMCAfam 837

FAMILY LAW – Costs – mother seeking costs against father – costs awarded.

Family Law Act 1975, s.117
Federal Magistrates Act 1999, s.86
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001, r.21.02

Brown & Brown [1998] FamCA 115
In the marriage of Kohan (1992) 16 FAM LR 245
In the marriage of Munday & Bowman (1997) 22 FAM LR 231
Penfold & Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311

Applicant:

MR COWAN

Respondent:

MS RICH

File Number:

SYM6284 of 2006

Judgment of:

Kemp FM

Hearing date:

In chambers following written submissions

Date of Last Submission:

21 June 2010 (and 3 August 2010)

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

12 August 2010

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Gayle Meredith & Associates

Respondent:

Self-represented

ORDERS

The father pay the costs of the mother in the sum $2,115.00, within 60 days of today’s date.
The matter is removed from the active pending cases list in this Court.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Cowan & Rich is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYM6284 of 2006

MR COWAN

Applicant

And

MS RICH

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

On 25 June 2008, the father and his brother filed an Application seeking a variation of certain parenting orders with respect to [X] (born [in] 1996) (also known as [X]) (“the child”), made in this Court, by consent, on 6 September 2006 (“the 2006 orders”).
On 11 September 2008, the mother filed her Response to that Application, seeking her own parenting orders, but also relevantly seeking that the 2006 orders be discharged.
The father discontinued his parenting Application on 28 April 2009 and his brother also did so on 12 June 2009.
Notwithstanding the father’s discontinuance of the proceedings referred to in paragraph 3 above, the mother filed an Amended Response on 30 September 2009, which sought to prosecute her proposed revised parenting orders.
On 4 December 2009, the mother also filed an Amended Application in a Case and affidavit in support, in which she sought various orders in relation to child support, which included an order that the father be liable for the mother’s costs as follows:
“(4) That the father, be liable for all costs related to matters in relation to the Application to vary the 2006 orders made by Mr Cowan and Mr E between 25 June 2008 and 11 June 2009 and reimburse the mother, as per the affidavit attached”.
In an affidavit filed by the mother on 4 December 2009, she indicated
“…that the proceedings significantly impeded on valuable parenting time with the child and further restricted her valuable financial resources and therefore, sought all costs related to these maters on an indemnity basis in accordance with Annexure “A””.
On 22 December 2009, the father filed a Reply to the mother’s Amended Application in a Case and sought in paragraph 5 of that document that the mother’s costs application be dismissed. The father filed an affidavit sworn by him on 21 December 2009 and filed 22 December 2009, an affidavit sworn 8 January 2010 and filed in Court on 11 January 2010.
The father submits the mother has filed affidavits since 4 December 2009, but they do not relate to the application for costs.
The mother’s Amended Application in a Case filed 4 December 2009 was listed for hearing on 11 January 2010 and was opposed by the father. A decision was delivered on that date by Federal Magistrate Demack and orders were made. Her Honour’s decision is currently under appeal by the mother. However, order 2 made by Federal Magistrate Demack provided for the following:
“2. The Court will adjourn the mother’s interim order 4 (in relation to costs) in her Amended Application in a Case filed 4 December 2009 to be joined with the mother’s response in regard to parenting orders for the child.”
The costs issue was then listed for mention on 19 April 2010, when the following orders were made:
“(1) The mother to file and serve any written submissions as to costs within 21 days of today’s date.
(2) The father file and serve any written submission as to costs in reply within 21 days of that date.
(3) The costs issue referable to the father’s withdrawal of the parenting application will be reserved.
(4) The matter be adjourned to 19 May 2010 at 9.30am as to whether the mother is proceeding with the parenting orders as sought in her response.
(5) Leave is granted to the parties to advise the Court whether if the mother does not seek to proceed with either the costs or the parenting orders then the above orders may be vacated within 14 days. In which case the Court’s order will be that the father’s application will be dismissed with no order as to costs”.
On 19 May 2010, the following further orders were made in relation to the costs issue:
“(1) The time for the mother to file and serve any written submission for costs be extended to Monday, 24 May 2010.
(2) The applicant father to file and serve any written submissions in reply by 21 June 2010.
(3) The mother file and serve an updating affidavit providing the current position as to the father spending time with the child on or before 11 June 2010.
(4) The mother file and serve an updated financial statement on or before 11 June 2010”.
The mother continued to prosecute the parenting orders sought in her Amended Response and that matter was then listed for final hearing on 15 June 2010.
On 15 June 2010, the parenting matter proceeded on an undefended basis as against the father and the following orders were made:
“(1) The orders made 6 September 2006, Sydney, be discharged.
(2) The mother and the father have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.
(3) The child live with the mother.
(4) That the father spend time with the child at all such times as the parties agree in writing and in this regard each of the parents will have respect for the child’s views.
(5) The father have liberal communication with the child subject to the child’s acquiesce by letter, telephone, email or Skype.
(6) Pursuant to section 65DA(2) of the Family Law Act 1975, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are included in these orders”.
The mother’s written submissions were filed on 25 May 2010, one day late.
The father’s submissions in response were lodged on 21 June 2010 and filed in the Registry on 22 June 2010.
The Court forwarded a letter to both parties on 22 June 2010, requesting confirmation from both the mother and the father’s solicitor that their submissions were served on the other party.
The father’s solicitor confirmed by letter on 23 June 2010 that the father’s submissions had been served on the mother.
The mother’s letter to the Court dated 29 June 2010, confirmed that she had personally served the submission documents by hand on 25 May 2010 at the father’s solicitors’ office.
The Court notes that no submissions were received from the father’s brother in relation to the costs issue.
The mother in her written submissions does not seek costs orders against the father’s brother, but only the father.
On 3 August 2010, the mother sought to place before the Court two additional documents by way of further submission. These two documents consisted of a letter from the father to the child dated

15 July 2010 and an article from a magazine featuring, it was asserted, the father’s home in New York. The documents were both attached to an affidavit affirmed by the mother on 3 August 2009. No evidence has been provided that this affidavit or the documents contained within it, have been served on the father’s legal representatives and the document itself was filed outside the timetable provided for written submissions. The magazine article was asserted to be from the March 2010 edition, which was published prior to the filing of the mother’s submissions on 25 May 2010 and would have been available to her at that time. The Court has had regard to those documents, but declines to receive them on this application. The Court has not, in those circumstances, sought any submissions from the father, given the need to ensure applications of this nature are dealt with as expeditiously and cost-efficiently as possible. The documents, even if admitted, would be given no weight, given their untested contents. On their face, they would appear to bear little relevance to a determination of the financial position of the father or of any other factor relevant to the Court’s consideration of the competing cost submissions.

The Law

The Court’s general power to award costs is found in s.86 of the Federal Magistrates Act1999 (Cth) and in particular pursuant to r.21.02 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001.
In relation to costs, s.117 of the Act states:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), subsection 70NFB(1) and ss. 117AA, 117AB, 117AC and 118, each party to proceedings under this Act shall bear his or her own costs.
(2) If, in proceedings under this Act, the court is of the opinion that there are circumstances that justify it in doing so, the court may, subject to subsections (2A), (4) and (5) and the applicable Rules of Court, make such order as to costs and security for costs, whether by way of interlocutory order or otherwise, as the court considers just.
(2A) In considering what order (if any) should be made under subsection (2), the court shall have regard to:
(a) the financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings;
(b) whether any party to the proceedings is in receipt of assistance by way of legal aid and, if so, the terms of the grant of that assistance to that party;
(c) the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the proceedings including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the conduct of the parties in relation to pleadings, particulars, discovery, inspection, directions to answer questions, admissions of facts, production of documents and similar matters;
(d) whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous orders of the court;
(e) whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings;
(f) whether either party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer; and
(g) such other matters as the court considers relevant.
(3) To avoid doubt, in proceedings in which an independent children's lawyer for a child has been appointed, the court may make an order under subsection (2) as to costs or security for costs, whether by way of interlocutory order or otherwise, to the effect that each party to the proceedings bears, in such proportion as the court considers just, the costs of the independent children's lawyer in respect of the proceedings.
(4) However, in proceedings in which an independent children's lawyer for a child has been appointed, if:
(a) a party to the proceedings has received legal aid in respect of the proceedings; or
(b) the court considers that a party to the proceedings would suffer financial hardship if the party had to bear a proportion of the costs of the independent children's lawyer;
The court must not make an order under subsection (2) against that party in relation to the costs of the independent children's lawyer.
(5) In considering what order (if any) should be made under subsection (2) in proceedings in which an independent children's lawyer has been appointed, the court must disregard the fact that the independent children's lawyer is funded under a legal aid scheme or service established under a Commonwealth, State or Territory law or approved by the Attorney‑General.
The above section was considered by the High Court in Penfold & Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311, where it was said:
“Sub-section (2) requires a finding of justifying circumstances as an essential preliminary to the making of an order. Beyond this there is nothing in the subject matter or in the interrelationship of the two provisions, which imposes any additional or special onus on an applicant for an order for costs”.
A costs order can be made on the basis of one or a combination of factors Brown & Brown [1998] FamCA 115.
Section 117 is a discretionary power of the Court, the Court will examine each of the factors in turn in relation to justifying a costs order.

Section 117(2A)(a) – The financial circumstances of the party

The mother says that while she is an [occupation omitted], she is receiving nominal income from that line of work after relocating to Sydney for the child’s secondary schooling. The mother says she is currently receiving the Newstart Allowance (although in her Financial Statement she indicates that this was suspended on 17 May 2010), child support and rental from her property in New South Wales. The mother submits that the rental received pays some of the mortgage on the property, but does not cover the entire monthly mortgage payment.
The mother says that she had nominal superannuation which she has now withdrawn on the ground of financial hardship.
The mother says that she now rents in Sydney to be near the child, who attends high school, which she submits is the type of private school that the father attended himself and encouraged the mother to enrol the child in, for his schooling. The mother says that the father has, to date, not paid any contribution towards the child’s school fees or education. The mother says that these costs have been paid by herself with the help of her parents.
The mother says the father is and has been residing in the United States of America (“USA”) since 1995 and has made his home there.
The mother says that the father also owns substantial property in the USA and while he has not filed any evidence of his financial position, she submits he was employed by Company A in a senior executive position and that he now holds the position of managing director with Company B, after Company A was taken over during the financial crisis.
The mother asserts that in the child support assessment proceedings lodged on 11 February 2010 (presumably with the Child Support Agency), the father disclosed his income as $374,706.00 and she further submits that she does not believe this to be, in any event, indicative of the father’s full salary package and bonuses. The Court was unable to find evidence of this disclosure. As this judgment is decided on the papers alone, this assertion cannot be tested.
The mother filed a Financial Statement on 11 June 2010 and that was to the following effect:
a)she received a weekly income of $1,665.00 broken down as to $850.00 rent, $75.00 from her [occupation omitted], $251.50 Newstart Allowance (suspended as of 17 May 2010), $61.50 family tax benefit and $428.00 child support. Therefore, taking into account the suspension as at the date of the Financial Statement, the mother’s weekly income was approximately $1,414.50;
b)she had a total personal weekly expenditure of $2,362.00 broken down as to $135.00 income tax; $900.00 rent (although she states in Part F that her mother pays a share of the rent for her), $708.69 mortgage payment for Property A, $21.00 for other rates/unit levies, $26.00 home insurance, $149.00 loan repayments to Bank A, $200.00 Bank B Mastercard, $150.00 Bank A Visa card and $222.00 for all other unspecified expenditure. Taking into account the contribution to rent received, the mother’s current total personal weekly expenditure is approximately $1,912.00;
c)the mother has provided in Part N of her financial statement, a weekly breakdown of her expenses, which totals $1,830.00 per week. Within that figure, is some $611.00 for education expenses for the child. The mother also discloses that her own mother pays some $826.00 per week towards school fees and other schooling related expenses, which would, on that scenario, bring her actual expenditure down to $1,004.00 per week;
d)the value of property owned by her totals $762,284.00, broken down as follows; $700,000.00 being a 70% share in Property A, $180.00 at Bank A, $104.00 at Bank B, $6,000.00 in relation to her business interests, and $20,000.00 household contents.
e)superannuation worth $400.00;
f)her liabilities of $720,786.00 are broken down as to $533,856.00 being 100% of her mortgage debt, $123,043.78 personal loan from Bank A, $28,854.00 owed to Bank B on her Mastercard, $14,033.00 owed to Bank A bank on her Visa card, $7,000.00 owed to Mr R and $14,000.00 owed to Citibank on her visa card.
The mother also provided evidence in the form of a settlement statement from her own mother’s sale of a property in relation to the fees that she has paid for the child’s school fees.
The father has filed no document relevant to his financial circumstances and made no submission contrary to the mother’s assertions that he is substantially better off financially than she is. The Court accepts the position that the mother, given her debt exposure, expenses and minimal cash resources, is in an inferior financial position to that of the father. The Court gives this factor weight.

Section 117(2A)(b) – If any party in receipt of legal aid

The mother has to some extent represented herself in these proceedings, but has from time to time retained legal representation and has incurred legal costs in the order of some $7,556.40.
The father has had legal representation in the proceedings.
The mother and father submit, and the Court accepts, that this factor is not applicable.

Section 117(2A)(c) – The conduct of the parties in relation to the proceedings

The mother submits that the father’s parenting application lodged by him was unnecessary. She says that she has always encouraged the father and his brother to spend regular time with the child. The mother says that the main problem that she has encountered was the insufficient effort on the part of the father to establish and maintain regular and routine time with the child. She submitted that this would be of benefit to the child and by the father lodging his application, this exacerbated the situation in that it created uncertainty as to when the child would next see the father. The mother says that the father then withdrew his application without any apparent reason and without bringing any fruitful conclusion to the matter. The mother submits that this conduct was unreasonable.
Further, the mother submits that the father’s conduct in filing his parenting application, raising issues and then unilaterally withdrawing them, was an abuse of process. The mother submits that family law strongly encourages parties, especially when dealing with children’s matters, to try and resolve the matter through negotiation. The mother says that the father did not attempt to do this prior to filing his application. The Court accepts that the father filed his application without obtaining a s.60I certificate relevant to any effort to mediate or resolve the parenting matter prior to the commencement of proceedings. Nevertheless, the father sought and was granted an exemption by a Registrar from so filing such a certificate. While the grounds for that exemption cannot now be examined, the Court can consider, given the circumstances which have occurred, whether the failure to carry out those steps should be a matter to be considered in determining costs.
The Court is of the view that the father’s failure to take steps to resolve parenting issues prior to the commencement of the proceedings, is a matter which weighs against him.
The father submits that following the commencement of the proceedings, there can be no criticism of how he conducted himself in the prosecution of those proceedings. He submits, and the Court accepts, that there is no contention that he failed to comply with any directions, or has failed to file documents or provide particulars or the like.

The father submits that the mother caused or contributed to her own costs and his costs, by her failure to accept an offer made on

13 January 2009 to accept his discontinuance of the proceedings on the basis that each party pay his or her own costs. The father says that there was no response by the mother or her solicitors to this offer up until 28 April 2009, when he then filed his Notice of Discontinuance.
The Court is of the view that the father’s offer of 13 January 2009, was one capable of acceptance by the mother within a reasonable period after it was made. The Court accepts that at least by 30 January 2009, this offer could have been accepted. This is a matter which will be considered further below.

Section 117(2A)(d) – Proceedings necessitated by the failure of a party to comply with previous orders

The mother submits that the father’s parenting application was filed in circumstances where he had failed to comply with the 2006 orders and that he had not made or attempted to make any visits to spend time with the child in over 2 years. The father refutes this. As this is a hearing on the papers alone, this dispute cannot be determined.
The mother submits the father’s application was unnecessary as there was no failure on her behalf to comply with the 2006 orders. Nevertheless, the mother did in fact proceed to prosecute her own parenting orders by way of response.
The mother submits that the father’s application was vexatious and that the father should have approached her directly to attempt to resolve any issue perceived to exist concerning him spending time with the child.
The father says that he experienced a number of difficulties in spending time with the child, even after parenting orders were first made on

4 June 2003. He said he was then forced to seek further orders in August 2006, to vary orders made in 2003, which culminated in the 2006 orders.
Notwithstanding the complaints that the father said that he had with the 2006 orders and the mother’s alleged non-compliance with them (including incurring financial loss as a result of cancelled travel plans when the father says that the mother informed him shortly prior to travel that the child would not be available to spend time and his alleged thwarted attempts to spend telephone time with the child), no contravention proceedings were commenced.
In light of the contested evidence, the Court can make no findings relevant to this factor.

Section 117(2A)(e) – Whether any party wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings

The mother submits that as the father was not prepared to pursue these proceedings to a resolution, the father has been totally unsuccessful.
The mother submits the filing of the father’s application has put unnecessary stress on her, which was exacerbated by the fact that, she says, she is in a dire financial situation. The mother submits that the father has created unnecessary conflict, when attempting to create harmony, she says, would have been more beneficial to all parties and that his conduct was unreasonable in all the circumstances.
The father submits that he was not wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings, but that he discontinued the proceedings.
The father says that, in any event, as and from 11 September 2008, when the mother filed a Response to the father’s Application, she also sought that the 2006 orders be discharged.
The father says that the mother has proceeded with her application [by way of her amended response] on an undefended basis, even after he had discontinued his application.
The Court is of the opinion that given the father discontinued his application and the mother proceeded successfully with her responsive orders, and while the mother was wholly successful in that regard, the father was not wholly unsuccessful.

Section 117(2A)(f) – Any offers in writing

The mother submits that this factor is not applicable.
The father submits that he attempted to settle these proceedings when his solicitors wrote on 13 January 2009 to the mother’s then solicitors, Solicitor A (Annexure “A” to the father’s submissions), offering to discontinue the proceedings on the basis that each party pay their own costs.
The father says that on 14 January 2009, a letter was forwarded to Solicitor A attaching draft consent orders (Annexure “D” to his submissions), which provided a mechanism for his offer of 13 January 2009 to be accepted. The father says that no response was received to that offer.
The father submits that the parties were required to attend Court on 1 April 2009 and on that date, the following orders were made:
(1)The matter be adjourned to 30 July 2009 at 10am for mention.
(2)Pursuant to section 62G(2) of the Family Law Act 1975, the parties and the child/ren of the relationship attend upon a Family Consultant nominated by the Dispute Resolution Co-ordinator of this Court on a date and at times to be advised for the purposes of the preparation of a Family Report addressing the issues identified in s.60CC of the Act
(3)The parties send copies of all of their court documents to the Family Consultant within 3 days of being requested to do so by the Family Consultant.
(4)For the purpose of completing a Family Report, the Family Consultant is granted leave to inspect the court file and all documents produced on subpoena (once leave to inspect has been granted to at least one other party in the matter).
(5)I DIRECT the legal representatives for the parties confirm with the Family Consultant no later than 10 days prior to the scheduled interviews that the interviews will proceed on the dates allocated.
THE COURT NOTES
(6)The father resides in New York and subject to his travel commitments, the Family Report writer may need to conduct interviews by phone.
(7)The applicant father has put a proposal to the respondent mother and the Court would expect some detailed response be provided to the applicant father’s solicitors.
The father says that as at 28 April 2009, he and his solicitors had not received any response to his offer and that therefore he had no course other than to file and serve a Notice of Discontinuance on that date.
The father submits that the proceedings therefore continued for the period from 14 January 2009 to 28 April 2009, due to the conduct of the mother alone.
The Court is of the opinion that the mother was in a position to accept the father’s offer on or about 30 January 2009 and, as and from that date, save for the mention on 5 February 2009, the mother should, otherwise, be at risk as to her own costs.

Section 117(2A)(g) – Such matters as the Court considers relevant

The Court is of the opinion that there are no other relevant matters.
The father submits the mother’s costs application should be dismissed as there are no circumstances which would justify the Court in departing from the usual position that the parties pay their own costs.
The father submits that the mother should only be able to claim costs until either 13 January 2009 (the date of his offer) or 28 April 2009 (the date he filed his Notice of Discontinuance). The Court notes that the father’s brother did not file his discontinuance until 11 June 2009.
The father submits that if an order for costs was made in the mother’s favour, it should only be on the basis of party-party costs and not indemnity costs. The father refers to the decisions of In the marriage of Kohan (1992) 16 FAM LR 245 and In the marriage of Munday & Bowman (1997) 22 FAM LR 231, as supporting the proposition that the Court should not lightly depart from the ordinary rule relating to costs which provide for party-party costs and that the circumstances justifying a departure from that rule should be exceptional. The Court accepts the father’s submission that indemnity costs are “still an exception in this and other jurisdictions” and the Court accepts that there are no exceptional circumstances here justifying such a departure.
The mother sought costs on an indemnity basis as set out in Annexure “A” to her affidavit of 4 December 2009. Annexure “A” totalled $10,128.05.
Annexure “A” sets out the following claimed costs and expenses:
a)Mr F and Co Solicitors, legal costs of $400.40 (item 1);
b)an estimate of $60.00 for petrol return to the airport (item 2);
c)flights (for which there is no invoice and the amounts have been estimated by the mother as $180.00 each way) (items 3 and 5);
d)accommodation in the sum of $444.65 (the statement includes $30.70 in relation to wine and chocolate, $61.95 on internet and phone charges and $352.00 on accommodation fees) (item 4);
e)meals and transport (estimated at $150.00 per day, but totalling $325.00) (item 6);
f)child minding ($350.00) (item 7);
g)parking at the airport of $32.00 (item 8);
h)fees of Ms B of 20 May 2008 for excess of 4 hour professional consultation at $1,000.00 (item 9);
i)Mr H, Solicitors of $1,397.00 (legal costs) (item 10);
j)Mr C Lawyers of $5,759.00 (legal costs) (item 11).
The father submits that any quantum for costs as sought by the mother, could only possibly claim items numbered 1, 10 and 11 as referred to above.
The Court notes that the expenses claimed in items numbered 2-8 as referred to above, were largely for the mother to attend in Sydney between 18-20 November 2008, at a child dispute conference with [omitted] scheduled on 19 November 2008 at 9.15am, when the father appeared by telephone from New York. These costs are not in the nature of legal costs, but personal expenses of the mother. In relation to the consultation with Ms B referred to in item numbered 9, there is no identification of who Ms B is and what these fees relate to in relation to any “professional consultation”. The Court accepts the father’s submission that this expense would also appear to be a personal expense of the mother.
In relation to the legal costs claimed by the mother for Mr C lawyers, the Court accepts the father’s submission that all of the work claimed was done after the filing of his Notice of Discontinuance on 28 April 2009. It was not until 20 May 2009 that Mr C commenced acting on behalf of the mother, as evidenced by the filing of his Notice of Address for Service.
Further, an examination of Mr C’s memorandum of legal fees shows that some of his fees relate to matters outside the parenting application and, accordingly, outside the terms of the costs sought in this application. Further, there would appear to be some duplication of costs in relation to perusing correspondence and files from their Solicitors. Further, as the father submits, the previous bill of $4,000.70 rendered by Mr C is not attached and may relate to work done prior to his filing of a notice of address for service on 20 May 2009. The Court is not in a position on the material provided, to further analyse that position.
Similarly, the Court accepts the father’s submission in relation to the fees claimed for Solicitor A, as itemised in their invoice of 27 May 2009, which are not specified as to date, so as to determine what work was undertaken prior to 30 January 2009. The inclusion in that invoice of an agency fee for Mr F of 1 April 2009 of $187.00 (inclusive of GST), relates to an event, on its face, occurring after 30 January 2009.
The Court is of the view that given the matters referred to above, there are sufficient justifying circumstances for there to be an order made in the mother’s favour, but applying the costs referred to in Schedule 1 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules up until 30 January 2009, the date upon which the father’s offer could reasonably have been accepted, but including the mention on 5 February 2009. Those costs are assessed as follows:

DATE

EVENT

AMOUNT

25 June 2008

Opposing application up to completion of first date

1,500.00

22 August 2008

First return date (short mention)

205.00

2 October 2008

Mention

205.00

19 November 2008

CDC

N/A

5 February 2009

Mention

205.00

TOTAL

$2,115.00

Conclusion

In all the circumstances of this matter and having considered the parties submissions and the matters referred to above, the Court is of the view that it is appropriate that there be an order as to costs in the mother’s favour, in the sum of $2,115.00.
The father has made no application for any time in which to pay costs or for any instalment sums to be considered. The Court will allow the father some time to pay the sum of $2,115.00 and will order such payment to be made to the mother within 60 days of today’s date.

I certify that the preceding seventy-seven (77) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Kemp FM

Associate:

Date: 12 August 2010

DATE	EVENT	AMOUNT
25 June 2008	Opposing application up to completion of first date	1,500.00
22 August 2008	First return date (short mention)	205.00
2 October 2008	Mention	205.00
19 November 2008	CDC	N/A
5 February 2009	Mention	205.00
TOTAL		$2,115.00