IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Hobart No H10 of 2015
B e t w e e n -
WARRICK COVERDALE VALUER‑GENERAL OF THE STATE OF TASMANIA
Appellant
and
WEST COAST COUNCIL
Respondent
FRENCH CJ
KIEFEL J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT HOBART ON TUESDAY, 1 MARCH 2016, AT 1.59 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR M.E. O’FARRELL, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Tasmania: If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS S.K. KAY, for the appellant. (instructed by Acting Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas))
MR S.B. McELWAINE, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS R.L.A. MUNNINGS, for the Attorney‑General as contradictor. (instructed by Crown Law (Tas))
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Solicitor.
MR O’FARRELL: Your Honours, the controversy in this case centres on section 11(1) of the Valuation of Land Act 2001 (Tas). Our central contention is that “land” bears its ordinary legal meaning which does not include the sea. The troublesome part, perhaps – although we say it is not so troublesome – of section 11 of the Act is that it includes, within the class of lands to be valued, Crown lands that are liable to be valued under the Local Government Act 1993, Part 9, which deals with local government rating. We pose the question, must “Crown lands” in the second part of section 11(1) nevertheless answer the description of land and we submit that that question should be answered in the affirmative.
We start, your Honours, with Alcan, and we say that the surest guide to the interpretation of section 11 is the text itself. Your Honours, if I can just take you to section 11, which is in the combined bundle of statutes at page 39 – primarily, your Honours, section 11 imposes on the Valuer‑General a duty. That duty is to make valuations of various different types of land values:
of all lands within each valuation district, including –
and we emphasise “including” –
any Crown lands that are liable to be rated in accordance with Part 9 of the Local Government Act 1993.
We submit, your Honours, that firstly, when one looks at the words “values of all lands”, “lands” means those things which are effectively a saver of realty, and do not include the sea. As to the second part of the section, which is the inclusive part, we submit that the focus of the section, as I have submitted, is the duty of the Valuer‑General to value land. It does not permit, in our submission, the Valuer‑General to value anything else.
FRENCH CJ: What is the scope of the duty on the Valuer‑General, given the provisions of subsection (1A)? That seems to be a fairly wide discretion to exempt land from valuation.
MR O’FARRELL: It is, your Honour. It is a strange provision. It found its way into the…
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- Case
- [2016] HCATrans 43
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the Council had erred in its interpretation and application of the West Coast Planning Scheme 2007, specifically concerning the assessment of the development's impact on the environment and its compliance with density and amenity requirements. The Court also had to determine whether the Council had properly considered all relevant factors and had acted reasonably in refusing the application.
The High Court, in its joint judgment, found that the Council had made an error of law in its interpretation of the planning scheme. The Court reasoned that the Council had adopted an overly restrictive approach to the environmental impact assessment, failing to give adequate weight to the mitigation measures proposed by the developer. Furthermore, the Court held that the Council had misconstrued the density and amenity provisions, leading to an unreasonable refusal of the development application. The principles of statutory interpretation and administrative law, particularly concerning the proper exercise of discretionary powers by local councils, were central to the Court's reasoning.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the primary court and remitting the matter to the West Coast Council with a direction to reconsider the development application in accordance with the Court's reasons.
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