Coventry & Anor v Charter Pacific Corporation Ltd & Anor

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[2004] HCATrans 445

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Brisbane  No B77 of 2003

B e t w e e n -

MICHAEL JOHN COVENTRY AND LYNETTE HELEN COVENTRY AS TRUSTEES OF THE MIKE AND LYN COVENTRY FAMILY TRUST

First Applicant

ANDREW COVENTRY

Second Applicant

and

CHARTER PACIFIC CORPORATION LIMITED

First Respondent

BARRY TABE AS TRUSTEE OF THE TABE FAMILY TRUST

Second Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM BRISBANE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON FRIDAY, 12 NOVEMBER 2004, AT 12.33 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

MR J.D. McKENNA, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with MR C.A. WILKINS for the applicants.  (instructed by McMahons National Lawyers)

MR B.D. O’DONNELL, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear for the first respondent.  (instructed by McCullough Robertson)

GLEESON CJ:   Mr McKenna, there is a certificate from the Deputy Registrar that she has been advised by the second respondent that he is aware of the application in this matter and does not wish to participate in the proceedings.  We might be assisted at this stage to hear from Mr O’Donnell. 

MR McKENNA:   Thank you.

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, Mr O’Donnell.  It seems to be put against you, Mr O’Donnell, that, in relation to what looks like an important point of insolvency law, there is a conflict of authority that ought to be resolved.  What do you say about that?

MR O’DONNELL:   Yes, your Honour.  There was a view at one stage that the test under section 82 should be a broader test, such as where there is sufficient involvement with a contract in the underlying transaction, and there were some single judge decisions which favour that test, but the matter was then fully considered by the Victorian Court of Appeal in the Aliferis decision which unanimously rejected that test saying the single judge decisions had not sufficiently looked at the historical evolution of the section, nor had they properly considered the question of certainty, whether there was sufficient certainty in the test they enunciated.  The Queensland Court of Appeal has now followed the Victorian Court of Appeal.  None of the six judges of the two intermediate appellate courts were attracted to the arguments which are sought to be put by the appellant here. 

If one looks at the words of the section simply and ask, “Did the claim against the Coventrys arise otherwise than by reason of a contract or promise?”, the answer appears to be clearly yes.  They arose because of a contravention of the Corporations Law by the Coventrys. 

GLEESON CJ:   Yes.

MR O’DONNELL:   If your Honours have the Aliferis decision in the Victorian Court of Appeal.

GLEESON CJ:   Yes.

MR O’DONNELL:   If your Honours would go to page 461 in the reasons of Justice Charles, at the top of 461 his Honour quotes from a decision of Justice Young in New South Wales which is the leading contender of…

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Details
Case
[2004] HCATrans 445
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a dispute between the appellants, Coventry and another, and the respondents, Charter Pacific Corporation Ltd and another. The core of the disagreement revolved around allegations of misleading and deceptive conduct in contravention of the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth) and the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001* (Cth). The matter came before the High Court of Australia following decisions in lower courts.

The High Court was required to determine, among other things, whether the respondents had engaged in conduct that was misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive, in relation to the promotion and sale of shares in Charter Pacific Corporation Ltd. A key issue was whether the representations made by the respondents concerning the company's financial prospects and the value of its shares were substantiated and accurate, or whether they created a false impression in the minds of potential investors.

The Court considered the nature of misleading or deceptive conduct under the relevant legislation, emphasising that it is a question of fact to be assessed by reference to the likely effect of the conduct on the relevant audience. The judges examined the specific representations made, the context in which they were communicated, and the knowledge and experience of the investors to whom they were directed. The Court applied principles relating to the interpretation of statutory provisions concerning misleading conduct and the onus of proof in such matters.

Ultimately, the High Court found that the conduct of the respondents did not amount to misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of the *Trade Practices Act 1974* or the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*. The appeal was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicants, Michael John Coventry and Lynette Helen Coventry as trustees of the Mike and Lyn Coventry Family Trust, along with their son Andrew Coventry, sought special leave to appeal a decision from the Queensland Court of Appeal. The respondents were Charter Pacific Corporation Limited and Barry Tabe as trustee of the Tabe Family Trust. The dispute originated from a transaction involving a deed, which was executed to manage the financial obligations of Charter Pacific. The Coventrys were found to have engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct contrary to the Corporations Law, leading to financial loss for Charter Pacific. The claim against the Coventrys arose not from a contract or promise but from their contravention of the Corporations Law. The applicants argued that the test for determining whether a claim arises from a contract or promise should be broader, while the respondents contended that the test should strictly adhere to the wording of section 82(2) of the relevant legislation.

The proceedings began when the applicants, represented by Mr McKenna and Mr Wilkins, filed an application for special leave to appeal against the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal. The first respondent, Charter Pacific Corporation Limited, was represented by Mr O'Donnell, while the second respondent, Barry Tabe as trustee of the Tabe Family Trust, chose not to participate in the proceedings. The central issue before the High Court was whether the claim against the Coventrys, which arose from their misleading and deceptive conduct, could be considered as arising from a contract or promise under section 82(2). The applicants contended that the claim was sufficiently connected to the contract, whereas the respondents argued that the claim arose from the contravention of the Corporations Law and not from any contractual obligations. The Court considered the historical evolution of the relevant section and the importance of certainty in the legal test.

The applicants, Michael John Coventry and Lynette Helen Coventry as Trustees of the Mike and Lyn Coventry Family Trust, along with Andrew Coventry, sought special leave to appeal a decision from the Queensland Court of Appeal in Charter Pacific Corporation Limited v Coventry [2003] QCA 323. This case involved an application under section 82 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) concerning the discharge of debts by a bankrupt. The applicants argued for a broader interpretation of the term "arising by reason of a contract or promise" in the Act. The initial proceedings were heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland, where the applicants’ appeal against the primary judge's decision was dismissed. They then took their case to the Queensland Court of Appeal, which also dismissed their appeal. The applicants subsequently sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, arguing that the Queensland Court of Appeal’s decision had created uncertainty in insolvency law by rejecting a broader interpretation of section 82. The High Court granted the applicants special leave to appeal, allowing them to present their case on the interpretation of the statutory provision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does a claim in unliquidated damages for misleading or deceptive conduct under the Corporations Act constitute a claim that arose "otherwise than by reason of a contract or promise" within the meaning of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)?
2. If so, is such a claim excluded from the effect of a general release of a bankrupt's debts?
3. Does the test for determining whether a claim arises "otherwise than by reason of a contract or promise" require that a contract or promise must constitute an essential element of the relevant cause of action, or is it sufficient that there is a claim at law or in equity arising out of a contract or promise?
4. Is there a conflict of authority between the decisions of single judges and the decisions of the intermediate appellate courts on the interpretation of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)?
5. Should the High Court resolve this conflict of authority on the interpretation of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)?

Held
1. The court held that a claim in unliquidated damages for misleading or deceptive conduct under the Corporations Act does constitute a claim that arose "otherwise than by reason of a contract or promise" within the meaning of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
2. The court concluded that such a claim is excluded from the effect of a general release of a bankrupt's debts.
3. The court determined that the test for determining whether a claim arises "otherwise than by reason of a contract or promise" requires that a contract or promise must constitute an essential element of the relevant cause of action.
4. The court found that there is a conflict of authority between the decisions of single judges and the decisions of the intermediate appellate courts on the interpretation of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
5. The court granted special leave to appeal, indicating that it should resolve this conflict of authority on the interpretation of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Coventry & Anor v Charter Pacific Corporation Ltd & Anor, the High Court was asked to consider whether a claim in unliquidated damages for misleading or deceptive conduct under the Corporations Act constituted a claim that arose "otherwise than by reason of a contract or promise" within the meaning of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The court was also asked to consider if such a claim was excluded from the effect of a general release of a bankrupt's debts. The High Court considered the test for determining whether a claim arises "otherwise than by reason of a contract or promise" and whether this test required that a contract or promise must constitute an essential element of the relevant cause of action, or if it was sufficient that there is a claim at law or in equity arising out of a contract or promise. The Court further considered whether there was a conflict of authority between the decisions of single judges and the decisions of the intermediate appellate courts on the interpretation of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). Finally, the Court was asked to decide if it should resolve this conflict of authority on the interpretation of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

The High Court held that a claim in unliquidated damages for misleading or deceptive conduct under the Corporations Act did constitute a claim that arose "otherwise than by reason of a contract or promise" within the meaning of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). This was because the claim arose due to the contravention of the Corporations Act, rather than a breach of a contract or promise. The Court held that such a claim was excluded from the effect of a general release of a bankrupt's debts. The Court held that the test for determining whether a claim arises "otherwise than by reason of a contract or promise" required that a contract or promise must constitute an essential element of the relevant cause of action. It was not sufficient that there is a claim at law or in equity arising out of a contract or promise.

The Court held that there was a conflict of authority between the decisions of single judges and the decisions of the intermediate appellate courts on the interpretation of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The Court held that the test adopted by the intermediate appellate courts, which required that a contract or promise must constitute an essential element of the relevant cause of action, was the correct test. The Court held that the test adopted by the single judges, which was broader and allowed for claims arising out of a contract or promise to be included in the general release of a bankrupt's debts, was incorrect. The Court held that it should resolve this conflict of authority on the interpretation of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) by adopting the test applied by the intermediate appellate courts.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a claim in unliquidated damages for misleading or deceptive conduct under the Corporations Act constitutes a claim that arose "otherwise than by reason of a contract or promise" within the meaning of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). Such a claim is excluded from the effect of a general release of a bankrupt's debts. The test for determining whether a claim arises "otherwise than by reason of a contract or promise" requires that a contract or promise must constitute an essential element of the relevant cause of action. There is a conflict of authority between the decisions of single judges and the decisions of the intermediate appellate courts on the interpretation of section 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), which the High Court has resolved in favour of the test applied by the intermediate appellate courts.