Council of The Law Society of The Australian Capital Territory v Legal Practitioner 201822 (Alveer Singh) - [2019] ACAT 27

ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

COUNCIL OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY v LEGAL PRACTITIONER 201822 (Alveer Singh) (Occupational Discipline) [2019] ACAT 27

OR 22/2018
Catchwords: OCCUPATIONAL DISCIPLINE – legal practitioner – consent orders – breaches of undertaking – finding of professional misconduct – practising without insurance – finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct – penalty and costs – education – public reprimand
Legislation cited: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 s 55
Legal Profession Act 2006 ss 8, 16, 34, 311, 312A, 386, 387, 419, 425, 433, 435, 585

Subordinate

legislation cited: Legal Profession (Solicitors) Conduct Rules 2015 (ACT) rr 2, 4, 5, 6
List of
Texts/Papers Cited: G Dal Pont, Riley Solicitors Manual (Lexis Nexis, 2005)
Cases cited:Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 QB 750
Council of the Law Society of the ACT & A Legal Practitioner [2010] ACAT 26
Council of the Law Society of the ACT & Legal Practitioner 2 [2016] ACAT 120
Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner W [2013] ACAT 1
Council of the Law Society of NSW v Kim [2012] NSWADT 45
Council of the Law Society of NSW v Morgan [2015] NSWCATOD 71
Law Society of New South Wales v Panopoulos [2010] NSWADT 208
Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Detata [2012] WASCA 214
Legal Services Commissioner v Smith [2014] QCAT 518
Legal Services Commissioner v Zaghini [2005] LPT 4
New South Wales Bar Association v Sahade (No 3) [2006] NSWADT 39
Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Izzard [2016] ACAT 68

Tribunal:Presidential Member E Symons
Date of Orders: 26 February 2019
Date of Reasons for Decision: 26 February 2019

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )

CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ) OR 22/2018

BETWEEN:
COUNCIL OF THE LAW SOCIETY
OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Applicant

AND
LP 201822
Respondent

TRIBUNAL:Presidential Member E Symons
DATE:26 February 2019

ORDER

Upon finding that the respondent has engaged in professional misconduct as particularised in the application it is ordered that:

Pursuant to section 425(1) of the Legal Profession Act 2006 (the Act), the respondent is guilty of professional misconduct in respect of charges 1 and 3.
Pursuant to section 425(1) of the Act, the respondent is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct in respect of charge 4.
Pursuant to section 425(3)(e), the respondent be publicly reprimanded.
The respondent pay a fine in the sum of $12,000.
The respondent undertake a course in ethics approved by the applicant within 12 months.
Pursuant to section 435(1) of the Act, the respondent pay the applicant’s costs calculated on a solicitor own-client basis in accordance with the ACT Supreme Court scale in a sum to be agreed and, if not agreed between the applicant and the respondent, the costs are to be assessed by a cost expert, namely LegalCost, and the respondent is to pay 90% of the costs so assessed plus disbursements in full.
………………………………..
Presidential Member E Symons

REASONS FOR DECISION

Background

On 19 October 2018 the Council of the Law Society of the ACT (Council) filed an application for disciplinary action (application) in relation to the respondent (practitioner or respondent) under section 419 of the Legal Profession Act 2006 (the Act). A Canberra legal practitioner at the respondent’s former employer had made a complaint to the Council in regard to the respondent’s conduct. After investigation, the Council determined to bring these proceedings.[1]
[1] This decision was previously anonymised and cited as Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Legal Practitioner 201822 [2019] ACAT 27 pursuant to section 423A of the Legal Profession Act 2006. As the appeal period has ended, the practitioner has now been identified in the citation of this decision. The reasons for decision otherwise remain unchanged from the date of publication.
The practitioner indicated his intention to plead to three of the charges in the application, charges 1, 3 and 4. Charge 2 was pleaded in the alternative to charge 1.
Section 55 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACAT Act) provides that if the parties to an application reach agreement about the terms of a tribunal decision and the tribunal is satisfied that an order consistent with the agreed terms is within the powers of the tribunal and would be appropriate to make, it may make a decision in accordance with the agreement.
The parties filed a joint submission on 14 November 2018 which set out the parties’ agreed position in respect to the facts and contentions in support of the charges, the characterisation of the conduct and sanction. The joint submission is to be read in conjunction with the facts and contentions in the application which is supported by the affidavit dated 30 November 2018 of Robert Reis, the Professional Standards Manager of the Law Society.
The joint submission did not include submissions in relation to a public or private reprimand. The Tribunal is satisfied that this was an oversight. The parties each subsequently filed separate submissions in relation to the nature of the reprimand. The Council’s submissions, in which it sought a public reprimand, were filed on 15 January 2019. The practitioner’s submissions, in which he sought a private reprimand, were filed on 25 January 2019.
Although the parties in the joint submission seek orders by consent pursuant to section 55 of the ACAT Act, the parties acknowledged that the tribunal does not simply issue consent orders. As the tribunal stated in another occupational discipline decision, Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Izzard:[2]
As identified in Medical Board of Australia v Martins [2013] QCAT 376 there is a public interest in parties to an occupational discipline matter being able to identify areas of agreement, and seeking to resolve the matter by way of consent orders. However the role of the Tribunal is not to simply issue orders as requested by the parties. In making an order for occupational discipline, even where by consent, the Tribunal must actively consider the facts that are agreed, the characterisation of those facts and the orders proposed as an appropriate response to the matter.
[2] [2016] ACAT 68 [10]
At the hearing Mr Buxton appeared for the Council and the practitioner represented himself. Both parties relied on the documentation which had been filed, which included their written submissions in relation to the reprimand, and made oral submissions at the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing the Tribunal reserved the decision. This is the decision.

The Council’s application

The Council’s application seeks disciplinary orders in relation to four charges preferred against the practitioner which relate to his breaches of an undertaking (Undertaking) given to his former employer, a Canberra legal firm, when he was concluding his employment with them and commencing practice as the principal of his own law firm, and action taken by him following the conclusion of his employment. The Undertaking is set out at paragraph 30 below.
The Council contends (charge 1) that the practitioner breached the Undertaking by, firstly, retaining and removing physical documents from his former employer without their authority and without their clients’ authority. Secondly, the Council contends that by retaining electronic records which belonged to his former employer, the practitioner breached the Undertaking. Thirdly, the Council contends that the practitioner breached the Undertaking by inserting his own law firm’s legal email address on a contract prepared at his former employer’s; by acting for a client of the former employer; and by emailing a client of his former employer. The Council contends that the practitioner used personal information about his former employer’s clients which had been obtained by him during the course of his employment with his former employer for the collateral purpose of acting for these clients under the auspices of his new firm.
While the Undertaking related primarily to the terms of severance of the practitioner’s employment with his former employer and not to any specific client matter or matters, the Council contends the Undertaking was given “in the course of legal practice”[3] as it was intended to affect the underlying conduct of various client matters previously undertaken by the practitioner but, following his departure, to be undertaken by the former employer. The Council contends that the practitioner breached rule 6 of the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Conduct Rules 2015 (Rules).
[3] Legal Profession (Solicitors) Conduct Rules 2015 rule 6.1
As the practitioner pleaded to charge 1 it is not necessary to consider charge 2.
The Council contends, in charge 3, that by issuing bills under the auspices of the practitioner’s own law firm for work performed substantially at the former employer’s law firm, the practitioner failed to act in the best interests of his clients and, to the contrary, placed them at risk of being billed for the same work by both his former employer and his own law firm and, further, he compromised the orderly and effective management and completion of the clients’ respective matters. The Council contends that the practitioner breached rule 4.1.1 of the Rules.
The fourth charge relates to the practitioner practising without insurance. The Council contends that the practitioner did not satisfy the pre-condition to the approval of his practising certificate, namely that he confirm that he had professional indemnity insurance, and, as a result, the practitioner was not an “Australian legal practitioner”[4] between 2 December 2017 and 9 January 2018. In that period the practitioner ordered searches and arranged settlement. The Council contends that he engaged in legal practice during that period when he was not entitled to do so and breached section 16 of the Act.
[4] Legal Profession Act 2006 sections 8 and 311
The practitioner admits the facts set out in paragraphs 1 to 21, and the contentions set out in paragraphs 32 to 38, of the application. The practitioner agrees with the restatement of the law particularised in paragraphs 22 to 31 of the application.

The legal framework

The Tribunal adopts and sets out below the legal framework in the application.[5]
[5] See Application for Occupational Discipline 19 October 2018 paragraphs [22]-[27] and [28]-[31]
Section 16 of the Act provides that a person commits an offence if the person engages in legal practice in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the person is not an Australian legal practitioner.
“Australian legal practitioner” means an Australian lawyer who holds a local practising certificate or interstate practising certificate.
Section 34 of the Act provides that an Australian legal practitioner (being an Australian lawyer who holds a local practising certificate or interstate practising certificate) is, subject to the Act, entitled to engage in legal practice in the ACT.
Section 311(1) of the Act provides that no certificate may be granted without an approved indemnity insurance policy being current.
Section 312A(1)(a) of the Act states that a practitioner who is issued with a practising certificate on the basis that the practitioner is, or will be, the holder of an approved indemnity insurance policy for the period of the practising certificate must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the policy continues in force during the period.
Section 312A(2) of the Act provides that a failure to hold an approved indemnity insurance policy can constitute either professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional misconduct.
Sections 386 and 387 of the Act state:
386 What is unsatisfactory professional conduct?
In this Act:
unsatisfactory professional conduct includes conduct of an Australian legal practitioner happening in connection with the practice of law that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian legal practitioner.
Note See also s 389 (Conduct capable of being unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct).
387 What is professional misconduct?
(1)In this Act:
professional misconduct includes—
(a)unsatisfactory professional conduct of an Australian legal practitioner, if the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and
(b)conduct of an Australian legal practitioner whether happening in connection with the practice of law or happening otherwise than in connection with the practice of law that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.
(2)For finding that an Australian legal practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice as mentioned in subsection (1), regard may be had to the suitability matters that would be considered if the practitioner were an applicant for admission to the legal profession under this Act or for the grant or renewal of a local practising certificate.
Note See also s 389.
If the tribunal is satisfied that a practitioner is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct it may make the orders mentioned in subsections 425(3) to (5). Subsections 425(3) and (5) state:
(3) The ACAT may make the following orders in relation to the Australian legal practitioner:
(a)an order recommending that the name of the practitioner be removed from the local roll;
(b)an order that the practitioner's local practising certificate be suspended for a stated period or cancelled;
(c)an order that a local practising certificate not be granted to the practitioner before the end of a stated period;
(d)an order that—
(i)stated conditions be imposed on the practitioner's practising certificate granted or to be granted under this Act; and
(ii)the conditions be imposed for a stated period; and
(iii)states the time (if any) after which the practitioner may apply to the ACAT for the conditions to be amended or removed;
(e)an order publicly reprimanding the practitioner or, if there are special circumstances, privately reprimanding the practitioner.
…
(5) The ACAT may make the following orders in relation to the Australian legal practitioner:
(a)an order that the practitioner pay a fine of a stated amount of not more than the amount mentioned in section 427;
(b)an order that the practitioner undertake and complete a stated course of further legal education;
(c)an order that the practitioner undertake a stated period of practice under stated supervision;
(d)an order that the practitioner do or not do something in relation to the practice of law;
(e)an order that the practitioner cease to accept instructions as a public notary in relation to notarial services;
(f)an order that the practitioner's practice be managed for a stated period in a stated way or subject to stated conditions;
(g)an order that the practitioner's practice be subject to periodic inspection by a stated person for a stated period;
(h)an order that the practitioner seek advice in relation to the management of the practitioner's practice from a stated person;
(i)an order that the practitioner not apply for a local practising certificate before the end of a stated period.
The Rules impose binding obligations on practitioners pursuant to section 585 of the Act. Further, section 585 of the Act provides that a failure to comply with the Rules can constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
The purpose and effect of the Rules is set out in rule 2:
The purpose of these Rules is to assist solicitors to act ethically and in accordance with the principles of professional conduct established by the common law and these Rules.
In considering whether a solicitor has engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, the Rules apply in addition to the common law.
A breach of these Rules is capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, and may give rise to disciplinary action by the relevant regulatory authority, but cannot be enforced by a third party.
Relevantly, for this matter, rule 4 provides that:
A solicitor must also:
4.1.1act in the best interests of a client in any matter in which the solicitor represents the client;
4.1.2be honest and courteous in all dealings in the course of legal practice;
4.1.3deliver legal services competently, diligently and as promptly as reasonably possible;
4.1.4avoid any compromise to their integrity and professional independence; and
4.1.5comply with these Rules and the law.

27. Rule 5 provides that:

5.1A solicitor must not engage in conduct, in the course of practice or otherwise, which demonstrates that the solicitor is not a fit and proper person to practise law, or which is likely to a material degree to:
5.1.1be prejudicial to, or diminish the public confidence in, the administration of justice; or
5.1.2bring the profession into disrepute.

28. Rule 6 refers to undertakings and provides that:

6.1A solicitor who has given an undertaking in the course of legal practice must honour that undertaking and ensure the timely and effective performance of the undertaking, unless released by the recipient or by a court of competent jurisdiction.

The practitioner’s response

The practitioner accepts that he:
(a)breached rule 6 of the Rules (charge 1);
(b)breached rule 4.1.1 of the Rules (charge 3); and
(c)engaged in legal practice when he was not entitled to do so, in breach of section 16 of the Act.

The agreed facts

The parties agree[6] with the following facts:[7]
[6] Joint submission filed 14 November 2018 [5]
[7] Application for Occupational Discipline 19 October 2018 [1]-[21]
1.       The respondent
(a)was admitted as a Barrister & Solicitor of the Supreme Court of the ACT on 20 August 2010;
(b)held a restricted practising certificate issued by the applicant continuously between 26 August 2010 and 8 January 2018; and
(c)held an unrestricted practising certificate issued by the applicant since 9 January 2018.
2.       At all material times the Respondent was concluding his employment with [the Respondent’s former employer] and commencing practice as the principal of the firm carrying on practice under the name and style of [the Respondent’s present firm].
Facts
3.       The Respondent commenced employment with [the Respondent’s former employer] on 29 June 2015. Following an initial two-month contract to work in the conveyancing team, the Respondent was appointed as a senior associate on 1 September 2015 and was tasked primarily with managing the conveyancing team.
4.       On or about 1 May 2016 the Respondent signed a further employment Contract with [his former employer].
5.       The Respondent’s 1 May 2016 Employment Contract provided as follows:
13Return of Employer Material
Upon termination of this Agreement the Employee must forthwith deliver to Employer (or its authorised representative) all Documents (including by not limited to plans, statistics, position papers and records), and Employer Material including keys, business cards, credit cards, disks, tapes and other materials (and copies thereof) in their possession or control which relate in any way to the business or affairs of the employer.
…
16.2After Employment
16.2.1. The Employee warrants and undertakes to the Employer jointly and severally that he will not for the following periods after termination of this agreement as it applies to him:
(a)2 years; and
(b)1 year
A canvass, solicit or endeavour to entice away from the Employer of the Firm, any person who at any time in the period of 5 years preceding the date of termination of this agreement was or is a client of, or referrer of clients to the Firm;
…
C counsel, procure or otherwise assist any person to do any of the acts referred to in paragraphs A or B of this clause 16.2.1.
6.       On 9 November 2017 the Respondent resigned from [the Respondent’s former employer] and advised [the Managing Partner] that he was establishing his own law firm. The Respondent gave six weeks’ notice but asked to serve out his notice period.
7.       [The Managing Partner] considered it would be in the best interests of the firm for the Respondent to leave the firm immediately to preserve security of confidential information. The Respondent responded in terms that he was aware of his obligations and stated that he would not take any of the firm’s confidential information, intellectual property or existing clients. [The Managing Partner] accepted the Respondent’s assurance and permitted him to work out his notice period. [The Managing Partner] had similar conversations with the Respondent on several occasions during the following 6 weeks.
8.       On 6 December 2017 the Law Society approved the Respondent’s Unrestricted Practising Certificate. By letter dated 12 December 2017 the Society advised that the certificate was ‘approved … subject to confirmation of professional indemnity insurance’. The Society informed the Respondent that LawCover would be in contact to arrange insurance.
9.       On 21 December 2017, being the Respondent’s final day of employment with [his former employer], the Respondent provided a signed ‘Undertaking in favour of [the former employer]’ that he had returned all physical firm documentation, destroyed all electronic records in his possession and would not use any confidential and/or personal information obtained during the course of his employment relating to, inter alia, clients for a collateral purpose (the Undertaking).
10.     The Undertaking is expressed in terms that the Respondent undertakes that:
1.I have returned to [the former employer] all physical objects in my possession belonging to [the former employer];
2.I have returned or destroyed all electronic records in my possession belonging to [the former employer]; and
3.I will not use for any collateral purpose any confidential and/or personal information obtained by me during the course of my employment by or about [the former employer], its clients, principals and/or employees.
11.            Following 21 December 2017, the Respondent:
(a)retained three [of the former employer’s] physical files, being:
i.file number 151356 titled [LP 201822] – Miscellaneous Matters 2015;
ii.file 160007 titled [LP 201822] – Miscellaneous Matters 2016; and
iii.file number 170004 titled [LP 201822] – Miscellaneous Matters 2017;
(b)retained electronic records belonging to [the former employer], including email addresses for clients of [the former employer], including the following clients of [the former employer] or referrers to [the former employer]:
i.[Client/Referrer A];
ii.[Client/Referrer B];
iii.[Client/Referrer C];
iv.[Client/Referrer D]
v.[Client/Referrer E];
vi.[Client/Referrer F];
vii.[Client/Referrer G];
(c)removed and retained hard copy documents from the following physical files at [the former employer]:
i.[File 1];
ii.[File 2];
iii.[File 3];
iv.[File 4];
v.[File 5];
vi.[File 6];
vii.[File 7];
viii.[File 8];
12.     Prior to 21 December 2017, the Respondent had marked the files in subparagraph 11(c) as “not proceeding” at [the former employer] to enable the files to be closed.
13.     The Respondent did not have authority from the clients or authority from [the former employer] to remove the physical files electronic records or documents.
14.     In removing files when he was not so entitled the Respondent deprived the clients of procuring a release from their liability for any fees payable in respect to work in progress recorded by [the former employer].
15.     In respect to [Client/Referrer A and File 6], on 14 November 2017 the Respondent forwarded to [the Respondent’s email address] an email received from [Client/Referrer A] addressed to [the Respondent’s] email account with [the Respondent’s former employer] on 19 October 2017.
16.     Prior to 21 December 2017, the Respondent had also prepared a contract for the sale of a property for [a further client] from the offices of [the former employer] in which he recorded the seller’s solicitor as [the Respondent’s new firm].
17.     In respect to [File 7], the majority of the work was completed by [the Respondent’s former employer] (save for final searches and settlement). Nevertheless, on 22 December 2017 the Respondent opened a file in his system and ordered searches. On 23 December 2017 the Respondent rendered an account for the whole of the conveyance which included professional fees in anticipation of settlement taking place on 12 January 2018. The invoice reflected that the disbursements for searches were incurred on 22 December 2017 and the professional fees were incurred on 23 December 2017.
18.     On 3 January 2018 the Respondent wrote to the seller’s solicitor (in relation to [File 7] enclosing the rates certificates and requesting settlement figures for 12 January 2018. On 4 January the Respondent scheduled settlement with the bank. On 5 January 2018 the Respondent informed the client that settlement had been booked with the bank and enclosed the settlement adjustment sheet, cheque directions and invoice. The matter was settled on 12 January 2018.
19.     On 3 January 2018 the Respondent emailed a client of [the Respondent’s former employer] (who was a client prior to the respondent’s employment with [the former employer]) to advise that he had commenced practice under his own firm and looked forward to providing her with assistance in the future.
20.     The Respondent contacted LawCover to arrange professional indemnity insurance on 3 and 4 January 2018.
21.     On 9 January 2018 the Law Society contacted the Respondent to ascertain whether he had obtained insurance. On 9 January 2018 LawCover contacted the Respondent and issued him with professional indemnity insurance.

Characterisation of the conduct

The Council submits,[8] and the Tribunal agrees, that:
[8] Applicant’s submission on appropriate penalty 14 January 2019 [7]-[10]
7. The statutory definition of unsatisfactory professional conduct set out in section 386 of the Act includes conduct that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent practitioner. It comprehends behaviour that is not so significant that it can be described as disgraceful, but is, nevertheless, of a standard less than the standard that a member of the public is entitled to expect from a professional person. It was described in Legal Practitioner RH v Council of the Law Society of the ACT [2016] ACAT 94 at [119] (quoting from Riley Solicitors Manual) as:
These standards are not to be determined by reference to lawyers who are without fault, but of the reasonably competent lawyer. As such, the standard of reasonableness invoked by the definition aims to distinguish between conduct that falls within a tolerable range of human error and bad professional work which falls below reasonable standards of competence and diligence.
8.       Professional misconduct is defined as including unsatisfactory professional conduct that involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence and conduct of an Australian legal practitioner whether happening in connection with the practice of law or happening otherwise than in connection with the practice of law that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.
9.       Professional misconduct at common law is defined by conduct which would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by professional colleagues of good repute and competency (see Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1QB 750).
10.     A global finding may be made where there is a continuing course of conduct arising from a single source (see Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner P4 (No. 2) [2015] ACAT 35 at [5-7]. In Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner RN (occupational discipline) [2016] ACAT 122 at [40] and [44] the Tribunal agreed that where there are several instances of poor conduct they may, if they have a single theme, be combined so that a single finding of professional misconduct may be made.

Charge 1 – failure to honour undertaking in breach of rule 6

The Tribunal agrees that by retaining and removing physical documents from his former employer without its authority and without the clients’ authority, the practitioner breached the Undertaking, in particular point 1:
I have returned to [the former employer] all physical objects in my possession belonging to [the former employer].
The Tribunal also agrees that by keeping electronic records belonging to his former employer the practitioner breached the Undertaking, in particular point 2:
I have returned or destroyed all electronic records in my possession belonging to [the former employer].
Further, the Tribunal agrees that by inserting his own law firm’s legal email address in a contract prepared at his former employer’s, by acting for a client of his former employer and by emailing a client of his former employer, the practitioner used personal information about clients of his former employer which he had obtained during his employment with them for a collateral purpose, namely the ability to act for the clients under the auspices of his new firm, and breached point 3 of the Undertaking:
I will not use for any collateral purpose any confidential and/or personal information obtained by me during the course of my employment by or about [the former employer], its clients, principals and/or employees.
The Tribunal also agrees that the Undertaking was given “in the course of legal practice”[9] as it was intended to affect the underlying conduct of various client matters previously undertaken by the practitioner but, following his departure, to be undertaken by the former employer. In doing so the practitioner breached the terms of the Undertaking and rule 6.

Charge 3 – Failing to act in the best interests of his clients

[9] Legal Profession (Solicitors) Conduct Rules 2015 rule 6.1

In issuing bills under the auspices of his new firm for work substantially performed at his former employer, the Tribunal agrees that the practitioner failed to act in the best interests of his clients and, to the contrary, placed them at risk of being billed for the same work by the former employer and his own firm. The practitioner breached rule 4.1.1, as his conduct compromised the orderly and effective management and completion of the clients’ respective matters.

Consideration of charges 1 and 3

In considering the practitioner’s conduct, the Tribunal is satisfied that it has arisen from a single source, his decision to leave his former employer and set up his own legal practice and take clients he believed to be ‘his clients’ with him. While there are several instances of poor conduct, they have a single theme. The Tribunal is satisfied that these instances should be combined when making findings about the conduct.
The Council submits that the practitioner’s breaches of the Undertaking constitute professional misconduct as they are both a substantial and consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence and also conduct that would otherwise be considered disgraceful or dishonourable by colleagues of good repute and competency.
The practitioner accepts that charges 1 and 3 in each case and considered together constitute professional misconduct within the meaning of section 387(1) of the Act and professional misconduct at common law being conduct that would reasonably by regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by professional colleagues of good repute and competency and is otherwise capable of bringing the legal profession into disrepute.
The authorities provide that a lawyer’s failure to fulfil an Undertaking given to another lawyer may form the basis for disciplinary proceedings and may, depending on the circumstances, amount to either professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct.
The Council referred the Tribunal to Riley Solicitors Manual[10] and numerous authorities to assist in determining the appropriate form of disciplinary response in this matter. The principal factor is the nature of the misconduct. Other relevant factors include:[11]
(a)the frequency of the misconduct and any prior findings of misconduct;
(b)the lawyer’s age and professional experience;
(c)the lawyer’s attitude;
(d)the lawyer’s (lack of) appreciation of wrongdoing;
(e)testimonials and opinions by third parties;
(f)illness or stressors suffered by the lawyer;
(g)the loss suffered by third parties as a result of the lawyer’s misconduct; and
(h)the loss already suffered by the lawyer personally as a result of the misconduct.
[10] G E Dal Pont, Riley Solicitors Manual (LexisNexis 2005) [33,045]
[11] G E Dal Pont, Riley Solicitors Manual (LexisNexis 2005) [33,065]
In Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Detata[12] (Detata) Mr Detata was found to have breached an undertaking which he gave to hold funds in the trust account of the firm he was employed by as security for a prospective claim for damages by another party. Martin CJ (Pullin and Murphy JJA agreeing) of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia expounded at length on the importance of legal practitioners performing their undertakings. They said:
48     The importance of legal practitioners performing their undertakings cannot be overstated. The practice of giving, and relying upon, undertakings given by legal practitioners is widespread and serves an important public purpose. The circumstances in which undertakings are given and relied upon are many and varied. In some cases an undertaking will be proffered and received as a substitute for strict or timely performance of an obligation, perhaps arising under a contract or under a statutory provision. In other cases, the undertaking might be given in order to provide a form of security to the person to whom it is proffered - for example, an undertaking that an executed document will be held in escrow until certain conditions are met, or that legal proceedings will not be instituted if certain conditions are met, or that funds or other property will be retained by the practitioner until certain conditions are met. In all of these circumstances, the usual effect of the proffer and acceptance of the undertaking will be to obviate the need to commence or to continue legal proceedings. This serves the public interest by preserving the limited resources of the parties and the courts.
49     Undertakings will often be proffered and received in the course of legal proceedings - for example, in relation to interlocutory procedures. The provision of undertakings in those circumstances serves the public interest by reducing or averting interlocutory disputes.
50     Undertakings by legal practitioners are a common feature of commercial and property transactions in which legal practitioners are engaged. In some cases, a party might complete a transaction before all relevant conditions are satisfied in reliance upon an undertaking by a practitioner to the effect that he or she will cause a particular condition to be satisfied. In this context, the proffer and acceptance of undertakings by legal practitioners improves the efficiency and expedition of commercial and property transactions and thereby serves to lubricate the wheels of commerce, trade and finance: see Rubik Financial Ltd v Herskope[2010] WASC 343; In the Matter of a Solicitor 'L' (Unreported, VSC, LPA 3 of 1989, 17‑ 21 June 1989).
51     Undertakings can only serve these purposes and thereby further the public interest if they are accepted and relied upon. In some circumstances, a practitioner may proffer an undertaking in terms which makes it clear that the undertaking is only that of the client and not the practitioner. In such a case, the obligation of performance will fall upon the client, not the practitioner. However, this is not such a case. In this case, the undertaking was expressly and unequivocally given in terms which bound both Mr Detata's client, Mr Detata and the firm by which he was employed.
52     The proffer of an undertaking binding upon a legal practitioner and his or her firm can be expected to enhance the reliability of the undertaking, and thereby the prospect that it will be accepted and relied upon by the party to whom it is proffered. In this way, the proffer of an undertaking binding upon a legal practitioner enhances the achievement of the various purposes to which I have referred, and thereby enhances the public interest. It is therefore vital that legal practitioners perform their undertakings, regardless of whether the undertaking was proffered in error or oversight, irrespective of any change in circumstances, no matter how radical, and irrespective of any hardship to the legal practitioner concerned (see Bhanabhai v Auckland District Law Society[2009] NZHC 415 [59]-[64] (Priestley, Heath and Winkelmann JJ).
53     Further, it is vital for the maintenance of public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession and its practitioners, and for the maintenance of the confidence which practitioners have in dealing with each other, that performance of their undertakings be enforced: see (Rubik Financial Ltd).
54     For these reasons, the obligation of a legal practitioner to perform his or her undertaking is a solemn obligation of the utmost importance. Failure to perform that obligation will generally be regarded as professional misconduct, and depending on the circumstances, will often be regarded as serious professional misconduct.
[12] [2012] WASCA 214
In Legal Services Commissioner v Zaghini[13] (Zaghini) the respondent legal practitioner gave:
[a] personal undertaking that the unpaid invoice as presented by Thomson Redhead solicitors and our (Canning Craymer’s) unpaid outlaid disbursements in this matter in the sum of $1,019.87 are paid within 21 days of the date of this letter, our Debra Canning is prepared to provide assistance by way of preparation of affidavit.
The practitioner breached the undertaking and did not pay the amount due for about 11 months. The complaint also considered failures to respond to the Law Society. Chief Justice de Jersey held:
As to the characterization of the misconduct, to which I should say the respondent has, in his terms, pleaded guilty, the breach of the undertaking should, in my view, warrant a finding of professional misconduct. It was not an unintended breach. There was no reasonable explanation offered for failure to honour the undertaking for an extended period, as I have said, approximately 11 months. It is right, in my view, to characterise the breach of the undertaking as deliberate and it warrants a finding of professional misconduct which is made.
[13] [2005] LPT 4 page 2
In the present matter the Council submits[14] where the failure was deliberate and not attended by reasonable explanation, a court or tribunal can legitimately conclude that the lawyer suffers “a lack of real appreciation of the significance of an undertaking and the importance of compliance with undertakings given between practitioners in order to ensure the proper service of clients.”[15]
[14] Applicant’s submission on appropriate penalty 14 January 2019 [16]
[15] See Zaghini page 6
While the practitioner admitted, at the earliest opportunity, that he had breached the Undertaking, he sought to diminish his responsibility by variously indicating that:
(a)“his intention was to ensure a seamless transition for the clients”;[16]
(b)“I was anxious for my practice to commence as I had always dreamed of beginning my own practice”;[17]
(c)“those few clients that were clients of mine, that were referred to the firm by myself, I informed those clients that I would be leaving to set up my own practice. Those clients informed me that they wanted to remain with me, and so in the course of tidying up my office and files, I separated those files that belonged to those clients by closing them in the Leap system and retaining the physical documents that were in the file separately. I then left the physical file cover in a pile of files that were required to be archived.”[18]; and
(d)“I do wish to submit that my actions stemmed from my extreme displeasure in relation to my working conditions at my previous firm, and from the stress and humiliation I felt which caused me to decide to resign and begin my own practice … those actions were undertaken during a period of time where I was extremely dissatisfied with my working conditions and the progression of my career within the firm and was not thinking clearly about the ramifications of my actions.”[19]

Conclusion – charges 1 and 3
[16] Exhibit RR1 to Affidavit of Robert Reis 30 November 2018 page 17 (Letter to the Respondent’s former employer dated 15 January 2018)
[17] Exhibit RR1 to Affidavit of Robert Reis 30 November 2018 page 52 (Letter from the Respondent to the Law Society of the ACT dated 27 March 2018)
[18] Exhibit RR1 to Affidavit of Robert Reis 30 November 2018 page 49 (Letter from the Respondent to the Law Society of the ACT dated 27 March 2018)
[19] Exhibit RR1 to Affidavit of Robert Reis 30 November 2018 page 205 (Letter from the Respondent to the Applicant’s Legal Representative dated 6 September 2018)

It is critical to the administration of justice that practitioners can be relied upon to do what they say they are going to do. As stated in Detata, “the obligation of a legal practitioner to perform his or her undertaking is a solemn obligation of the utmost importance.”[20]
[20] Detata [54]
None of the explanations given by the practitioner as set out in paragraph 45 above, or in his affidavit affirmed on 21 December 2018, were reasonable. In that affidavit the practitioner focused on his actions in retaining a number of client files from his former employer and mitigating factors. He did not refer to or acknowledge his failure to honour the Undertaking given to his former employer. For the Tribunal, this showed a lack of appreciation of the significance of an undertaking and his obligation to perform it.
The Tribunal agrees with Council’s submission as set out in paragraph 44 above. The failure here was deliberate and was not attended by reasonable explanation. The Tribunal concludes that the practitioner suffers “a lack of appreciation of the significance of an undertaking and the importance of compliance with undertakings given between practitioners in order to ensure the proper service of clients.”[21]
[21] Zaghini page 6
The Tribunal agrees that the conduct set out in paragraphs 32 to 36 above, in each case and considered together, constitutes professional misconduct within the meaning of section 387(1) of the Act and professional misconduct at common law as it is conduct that would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by professional colleagues of good repute and competency[22] and is otherwise capable of bringing the legal profession into disrepute.

Charge 4 – Practising without insurance

[22] Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 QB 750 per Lopes J

The practitioner’s application for an unrestricted practising certificate was approved on 6 December 2017 subject to the confirmation of professional indemnity insurance. The practitioner conceded that in ordering searches and arranging settlement during the period 22 December 2017 and 9 January 2018 he completed legal work during this period without appropriate insurance.

Consideration of charge 4

The Tribunal agrees that the practitioner did not satisfy the pre-condition to the approval of his practising certificate as he did not confirm that he had professional indemnity insurance and, therefore, he was not an ‘Australian legal practitioner’ between 22 December 2017 and 9 January 2018. The Tribunal is satisfied that the practitioner was engaged in legal practice when he was not entitled to do so, in breach of section 16 of the Act.
The Council submits that the practitioner’s conduct constitutes unsatisfactory professional conduct only due to the short period of time involved and the fact that the practitioner acted prematurely rather than dishonestly.[23]
[23] Applicant’s Submissions on appropriate penalty 14 January 2019 [39]
The practitioner accepts that charge 4 constitutes unsatisfactory professional conduct within the meaning of section 386 of the Act.[24]

Conclusion – charge 4

[24] Joint Submission filed 14 November 2018 [9]

The Tribunal agrees that the conduct described in paragraph 50 above amounts to unsatisfactory professional conduct within the meaning of section 386 of the Act: it is conduct that “falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian legal practitioner.” It comprehends behaviour that is not so significant that it can be described as disgraceful, but that is, nevertheless, of a standard less than the standard that a member of the public is entitled to expect from a professional person.

Sanction

Are the orders proposed an appropriate response to the matter?

The parties submit that, apart from determining whether a public or private reprimand is to be included in the sanction, the following orders are appropriate and able to be made by the Tribunal:
(a)a finding pursuant to section 425(1) of the Act that the practitioner is guilty of unsatisfactory conduct in respect of charge 4;
(b)a finding pursuant to section 425(1) of the Act that the practitioner is guilty of professional misconduct in respect to charges 1 and 3;
(c)a fine in the sum of $12,000;
(d)an order that the practitioner undertake a course in ethics approved by the Council within 12 months; and
(e)an order pursuant to section 433(1) of the Act that the practitioner pay the Council’s costs calculated on a solicitor own-client basis in accordance with the ACT Supreme Court scale in a sum to be agreed and, if not agreed between the practitioner and the Council, the costs are to be assessed by a cost specialist, namely LegalCost, and the practitioner is to pay 90% of the costs to be assessed plus disbursements in full.

The Council submits[25] that the conduct in this case is similar to that in Zaghini but is more egregious and hence the orders sought in the preceding paragraph are appropriate to make. In Zaghini, de Jersey CJ took into consideration:
(a)that there had been no previous appearance before a disciplinary body;
(b)that there were no allegations of dishonesty;
(c)that the sum required to be paid pursuant to the Undertaking was eventually paid;
(d)the legal practitioner had been unwell and depressed for an extended period, including the period covered by the misconduct and he did express an apology for his breaches;
(e)that the legal practitioner had not been co-operative with the Tribunal; and
(f)that the legal practitioner sought to diminish the significance of his breach of the undertaking by saying that, effectively, it was no more than a personal spat between two competitors between whom there was some bad blood.
[25] Applicant’s submission on appropriate penalty 14 January 2019 [23]
In Zaghini, which was decided in 2005, de Jersey CJ ordered a public reprimand and a fine of $6,000 and, relevantly for the present case, said:
In setting the amount of the fine, we have regard to the importance of ensuring a fine of an amount that sends a proper signal, both to the practitioner and to the profession generally, of the significance attached to undertakings and the importance of proper compliance with them. [26]
[26] [2005] LPT 4 page 7
In Detata, which was decided in 2012, the Court of Appeal imposed what Martin CJ described as “a significant fine … in the amount of $10,000”. Pullen JA said “[i]n enforcing undertakings the court is not guided by considerations of contract, but aims instead at securing honesty of conduct in its officers.”[27]
[27] Detata [78]
The Council noted the following points of difference, set out below, in the present case and Zaghini:
(a)the practitioner deliberately breached the Undertaking;
(b)the practitioner took steps to conceal that he had removed the files from his former employer by marking files as “not proceeding” and closing them on the former employer’s system;
(c)the practitioner knew, when he signed the Undertaking on 21 December 2017, that he had taken steps to remove client information from the former employer, such as emailing himself client details and entering his new law practice’s details on a contract for sale;
(d)the Undertaking was breached for financial gain, namely to transfer and attract work to his new law practice;
(e)the breach of the Undertaking negatively affected clients by depriving them of a release from the former employer’s fees; and
(f)the practitioner sought to diminish his responsibility for the breach of the Undertaking by saying that his breach was brought about by personal and financial stress and dissatisfaction with the management practices of the former employer.
The Council also noted that the present case involves a further charge of not acting in the best interests of the clients and practising without insurance, charges that were not present in Zaghini.
In the practitioner’s favour, the Council brought to the Tribunal’s attention that the practitioner has been co-operative with the Council and the Tribunal; co‑operated with his former employer to pay a fee for the files removed, and has displayed remorse for his actions.
The Council also referred the Tribunal to the helpful summary of the case law involving a breach of an undertaking, in relation to appropriate penalty by Chesterman M in Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Panopoulos.[28] The Tribunal has considered this summary as well as the further cases summarised by the Council at paragraphs 30 to 33 of the applicant’s submissions on penalty dated 14 January 2019. In Council of the Law Society of NSW v Kim[29] the legal practitioner breached a condition of his practising certificate, failed to honour an undertaking he had given to the Law Society to attend the next applicable practice management course, and failed to respond to correspondence from the Law Society. In that case, the Administrative Decisions Tribunal of New South Wales (NSW ADT) determined that the failure to honour the Undertaking warranted a finding of professional misconduct and a fine of $5,000 and the legal practitioner was ordered to pay costs of $3,000.
[28] [2010] NSWADT 208 [25]-[33]
[29] [2012] NSWADT 45
In the later case of Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Morgan[30] the legal practitioner failed to comply with an undertaking to the Law Society that she would meet her tax obligations, retain an independent expert to supervise her financial affairs and provide quarterly reports to the Law Society. The Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales, Occupational Division, publicly remanded the legal practitioner and made an order for her to pay costs of approximately $9,000.
[30] [2015] NSWCATOD 71
The practitioner in this case agrees with the proposed sanctions in paragraph 55 above. The Tribunal has read the three character references he attached to his affidavit. The referees attest to the practitioner’s deep regret over his actions and his taking responsibility for them as well as the fact that the conduct was completely out of character.
Having considered the authorities, the practitioner’s affidavit and attached references and the parties’ oral and written submissions, the Tribunal finds that, subject to the determination of the reprimand below, the orders agreed by the parties are within permissible range and appropriate for the Tribunal to make.

Public or private reprimand

The Council submits that it is appropriate to order a public reprimand.
The practitioner submits that there are special circumstances as provided in section 425(3)(e) of the Act warranting the order of a private reprimand. He submits that the Tribunal should make a subjective determination taking into account that:
(a)He has not been the subject of any previous disciplinary proceedings in the entirety of his career since August 2010.
(b)He has admitted the breaches at the outset of the proceedings and has shown contrition for his actions.
(c)He has arranged for the compensation that his former employer required to be paid for the files he had taken.
(d)There is no continuing risk towards the subject matter with respect to the issue of deterrence. He has moved from firm to firm throughout his legal career and has not been involved in the kind of actions which are the subject of these proceedings.
(e)The legal matters of those clients whose files were taken have not been compromised by his actions.
(f)As noted by the tribunal in Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Legal Practitioner W[31](Legal Practitioner W) the proceedings in themselves can act as a deterrent to the respondent and that publication of the tribunal’s reasons “will act as an important conduit of information and a deterrent to ACT practitioners.”[32] The practitioner submits that he does not wish in any way to minimise or detract from the seriousness of the subject matter, but fervently urges the Tribunal to take into consideration the effect that the current proceedings have already had on him, in terms of deterrence.
(g)By the imposition of the $12,000 fine and payment of the Law Society’s costs for the proceedings the practitioner will be sufficiently deterred from engaging in any further conduct of any type whatsoever that may result in disciplinary proceedings being brought against him in the future.
(h)The tribunal has previously, in Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner 2,[33] considered factors not dissimilar to the ones submitted by the respondent above in finding that the pre-condition for the making of a private reprimand was satisfied. In that case the tribunal took into account the length of practice (18 years as a highly successful partner of a major law firm), lack of prior disciplinary proceedings and that the practitioner’s actions ultimately did not adversely affect the client. [34]
(i)The practitioner’s business and reputation will be severely impacted negatively by the issuance of a public reprimand. In this regard the practitioner submits that most of his work derives from potential clients looking for him through internet searches by name, and for a relatively new business, the publication of his name on the disciplinary register will cause potential clients to reconsider engaging him for legal work.
(j)The practitioner is soon to become sole breadwinner of the family. Due to the arrival of a baby in April 2019, his wife will be on maternity leave for a period of at least 12 months, further compounding the argument that he cannot afford to be losing business at this point in time.
[31] [2013] ACAT 1
[32] [2013] ACAT 1 [85]
[33] [2016] ACAT 120
[34] [2016] ACAT 120 [25]
The Council referred the Tribunal to Legal Services Commissioner v Smith[35] in which the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal considered that:
The primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public. The purpose is furthered, and the public interest is served, if the effect of an order made is to deter other practitioners from engaging in professional misconduct. Whilst the primary aim is not to punish the legal practitioner, a significant consideration in relation to penalty is the deterrent element. Practitioners must appreciate that conduct which is unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct carries with it a serious risk, and so should be deterred from such conduct.
[35] [2014] QCAT 518 [35]
The Council also referred the Tribunal to Riley Solicitors Manual[36]:
A reprimand as a disciplinary response is usually confined to findings of professional misconduct or, more likely, unsatisfactory professional conduct, that are insufficiently serious to merit suspension or striking off. It is not unusual to combine a reprimand with a fine and/or with conditions requiring the completion of an educational program or some other restrictions on the manner and scope of practice. A reprimand it is said, “has the effect of identifying standards the establishment and maintenance of which protects the public”. Being reprimanded, though it does not oust any practise rights (except where combined with practise restrictions or conditions), remains a serious matter; it “marks the disgrace of a member of an honourable profession inherent in [the] misconduct”. A previous disciplinary order of this kind is potentially relevant to the disciplinary response to any future misconduct.
A court or tribunal is more inclined to reprimand a lawyer where not only is his or her misconduct not marked by any tinge of dishonesty, but is isolated in nature and entirely out of character, as supported by evidence as to the lawyer’s good character. Examples in the case law of lawyers who have been reprimanded include … breaching a single undertaking. [references omitted]
[36] G E Dal Pont, Riley Solicitors Manual (LexisNexis 2005) [33,060]
The practitioner referred the Tribunal to Legal Practitioner W. In that decision the difference between a public and private reprimand was discussed by the tribunal.[37] That tribunal found that special circumstances for making a private reprimand were established because the practitioner had a 20-year unblemished record in practising law, the breaches were at the lower end of the scale in terms of their seriousness, and it was not established that any clients suffered prejudice as a result of the errors and delays admitted by the practitioner.
[37] [2013] ACAT 1 [76]-[85]
The practitioner claims that a public reprimand would negatively impact on his reputation and business. In Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v A Legal Practitioner[38] the tribunal was not persuaded by that practitioner’s claim of the possible loss of reputation and business in his practice that it should issue a private reprimand. It stressed that a “public reprimand should function as a warning to other practitioners not to offend in a similar way”.[39]
[38] [2010] ACAT 26
[39] [2010] ACAT 26 [60]
The Legal Services Division of the NSW ADT discussed the use of public and private reprimands in New South Wales Bar Association v Sahade (No 3)[40] (Sahade):
A difference between a ‘public reprimand’ and a ‘private reprimand’ is that the former, being published, can act as a warning to others not to offend in a similar way. A reprimand that remains private can really act only as a personal deterrent. Therefore, in the case of a legal practitioner who himself requires no deterrence, one factor that might determine whether a reprimand should be made public would be whether there is any reasonable possibility that one or more other legal practitioners might act in the same way as the legal practitioner under consideration. If there is no such a likelihood, one reason for imposing a public reprimand would be absent.
[40] [2006] NSWADT 39 [128]
The conduct of the barrister in Sahade involved deceptive representations made by him in order to ensure that he would acquire more shares in the second Telstra share issue than he might have been able to acquire without deception. He was found guilty of professional misconduct on two of the grounds. The NSW ADT had regard to a number of factors, including:
(a)opinions from supporting witnesses;
(b)the practitioner’s current character and the support he has received from colleagues, friends and family meant it was unlikely he would offend again;
(c)the six years of legal practice since the actions giving rise to the proceedings without any allegation of fault coming to notice; and
(d)the prolonged and painfully anxious period of some years in his life when, as a man in his twenties, the barrister should have been able to enjoy his life.
The NSW ADT said:
133. … This was a self-inflicted punishment, but must act as a real deterrent.
…
135. In all of these circumstances we are of the opinion that the Barrister no longer presents any risk to the public. Indeed, we think that the signs are, and it is very likely, that from now on his services will benefit them.
…
137. It remains that what the Barrister did in 1999 was seriously wrong. Most fully informed ordinary people with knowledge of all the material facts would expect the Tribunal to reflect that in its orders. We would agree.
138. Therefore, we order that the Barrister pay a fine of $10,000 and we publicly reprimand him.

Conclusion

In the absence of any guidance in the Act on ‘special circumstances’, the Tribunal has taken into consideration all of the above submissions and case law. This jurisdiction is governed by how to protect the interests of the public. It is true that the publication of these reasons will go some way to protect the interests of the public, at least the legal community.
However, in this case the practitioner’s own period of unblemished record was relatively short — seven years. While the practitioner has raised the effect of a public reprimand on his business and his reputation, there is no escaping that this is self-inflicted. His breaches of the Undertaking and the luring or enticing of clients away from his former employer were seriously wrong. Even though he asserted that he had introduced the clients to his former employer in the beginning, they were not his clients but the clients of the firm who employed him at that time.
The Tribunal has made a finding of professional misconduct. Therefore, the basis for a private reprimand disappears.
The Tribunal will order a public reprimand. Together with the orders in paragraph 55 above, the Tribunal is satisfied that this sanction marks both the seriousness of the practitioner’s conduct and it serves the public interest by deterring other practitioners from engaging in such conduct.

………………………………..
Presidential Member E Symons

HEARING DETAILS

FILE NUMBER:	OR 22/2018
PARTIES, APPELLANT:	Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory
PARTIES, RESPONDENT:	Legal Practitioner 201822
COUNSEL APPEARING, APPLICANT	N/A
COUNSEL APPEARING, RESPONDENT	N/A
SOLICITORS FOR APPLICANT	McInnes Wilson Lawyers
SOLICITORS FOR RESPONDENT	N/A
TRIBUNAL MEMBERS:	Presidential Member E Symons
DATES OF HEARING:	7 February 2019