COUNCIL OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE ACT & THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER X (Chanaka Bandarage) (Occupational Discipline)
[2012] ACAT 34
•16 May 2012
ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
COUNCIL OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE ACT & THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER X (Chanaka Bandarage) (Occupational Discipline) [2012] ACAT 34
LP 8 of 2009
Catchwords: OCCUPATIONAL DISCIPLINE – legal profession - property transaction - delay in registering transfer - failing to properly and promptly discharge retainer-unsatisfactory professional conduct-misrepresentations-conduct intended to intimidate clients to dissuade them from lodging a complaint-professional misconduct
Legislation: Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) ss 419, 420, 421, 386, 387, 389
Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007 r. 1.1, 1.2, 36.1
Cases: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
NSW Bar Association v Livesey [1982] 2 NSWLR 231
Texts: Riley Solicitors Manual, Dal Pont, G.E. 5th ed. [33,040.10], [35,040.5]
Tribunal: Ms L. Crebbin, General President
Mr G. Lunney, SC Senior Member
Ms J. Westaway, Member
Date of Orders: 16 May 2012
Date of Reasons for Decision: 16 May 2012AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ) LP 8 of 2009
BETWEEN:
COUNCIL OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE ACT
Applicant
AND:
THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER X
Respondent
TRIBUNAL: Ms L. Crebbin, General President
Mr G. Lunney SC, Senior Member
Ms J. Westaway, Member
DATE: 16 May 2012
The Tribunal is satisfied that:
(i) The respondent is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct in respect of ground 1 of the Grounds of Complaint; and,
(ii) The respondent is guilty of professional misconduct in respect of ground 2 and ground 3 of the Grounds of Complaint.
order
The Tribunal orders that:
(i) The applicant file and serve written submissions as to the orders that it says should be made under section 425 and section 433 of the Legal Profession Act 2006 as a consequence of the Tribunal’s findings on or before the close of business on 6 June 2012.
(ii) The respondent file and serve written submissions in response on or before the close of business on 27 June 2012.
(iii) The application is to be listed for hearing on a date to be advised.
.
………………………………..
L. Crebbin
General President on behalf of theMembers of the Tribunal
REASONS FOR DECISION
1. The Council of the Law Society of the ACT (the applicant), filed an Application for Disciplinary Action dated 23 November 2009 against the named legal practitioner (the respondent) pursuant to Section 419 of the Legal Profession Act 2006 (the LP Act). Although it was dated 23 November 2009, the application was filed in the Tribunal’s registry on 19 November 2009. The orders it sought were: ‘Findings of professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct’. It alleged that the respondent had breached Rules 1.1, 1.2, and 36.1 of the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007(the Rules).
2. The basis for the application was set out in an attachment which was amended during the course of the hearing. The amended grounds are set out in detail below.
3. The factual background of the complaint was set out in various affidavits filed in the proceedings and in evidence given before the Tribunal. The hearing of the application was spread over 5 days between April and July 2010 with written submissions being filed by the parties. The applicant filed submissions of approximately 20 pages on 6 August 2010. The respondent filed a submission of approximately 60 pages in response on 3 September 2010. He filed what he referred to as an addendum of a further 5 pages on 14 September 2010. The respondent’s submissions included material that was properly characterised as evidence. The applicant filed submissions in reply on 30 September 2010. The respondent then filed further submissions in early October 2010 that were not ordered by the Tribunal. These submissions have not been considered although we note that the document added nothing to the voluminous material already provided. Despite the length of the hearing and the amount of material filed, the facts giving rise to the application were straightforward and for the most part, uncontroversial.
Factual background
4. The respondent holds an unrestricted practising certificate, and is the principal of a law firm practicing in the ACT. He acted for two clients who are referred to as RC and LF, on the joint purchase of a residential property. He also acted for LF on the sale of a property in her name. Settlement of the joint purchase occurred on 9 November 2007. The clients later complained to the applicant.
5. The complaint was made to the Law Society by letter of 10 December 2008. The complaint was about the actions of the respondent in relation to the resolution of a problem that prevented registration of the transfer of the title to the new property to RC and LF.
6. RF’s middle name was included in his description on the mortgage document relating to the purchased property, but was not included in the transfer handed to the complainants’ mortgagee at settlement. As a result, the transfer and security documents could not be registered by the mortgagee.
7. The mortgagee’s solicitors wrote to the respondent’s firm on 21 February 2008 saying:
Our office is still unable to register security documents as we still require original Contract for sale so we are then able to have the Transfer amended and stamped.
Currently Transfer has it as R-C- and L- F- , we need it amended to note R’s middle name.
Your urgent assistance on this matter would be appreciated.
There is a controversy as to whether that letter was received by the respondent, and that will be referred to later in these Reasons.
8. In any event no contract was forwarded by the respondent prior to another letter being despatched by the mortgagee’s solicitors on 21 April 2008. The letter had a heading that set out the names of the complainants and the address of the property they had purchased. It said:
I refer to previous correspondence sent to your office on 21 February 2008.
Our office is still unable to register security documents, as we are still waiting for you to send us the original Contract of sale.
This matter needs to be resolved as a matter of urgency,(sic) If it is not finalised in the near future your client as well as ours is exposed and at risk.
Your client is currently in breach of the terms of its loan contract and your failure to attend to our request may entitle our client to take action under the loan contract.
Please rectify this matter within 7 days.
Again, there was some controversy about this letter.
9. The respondent sent a contract to the mortgagee’s solicitors on 28 April 2008. There was controversy about how that occurred. Unfortunately it was the incorrect contract, and related to the earlier transaction involving the sale of the LF’s property.
10. There was controversy about what contact, if any, the mortgagee’s solicitors had with the respondent from that date to early September 2008. The mortgagee’s solicitor said that phone calls had been made to the respondent’s office about the wrong contract being sent. The respondent said that no phone calls were received. The mortgagee’s solicitors wrote to the respondent on 5 September 2008 advising that the incorrect contract had been sent and asking for the correct contract. The respondent did not respond to that letter until 30 October 2008 when he caused the correct contract to be delivered to the mortgagee’s solicitor.
11. The complainants became aware that there was a problem on about 7 July 2008 when a rates notice in the name of the previous owners was sent to the property. They took this up directly with the mortgagee, but because no action was apparently taken, followed up with an email to the mortgagee on 16 August 2008.
12. The complainants then sent a fax to the respondent’s firm on 19 August 2008. The fax said that the complainants had recently received an overdue rates notice and water bill addressed to the previous owners; that the “rates and land titles people” had no notice of change of ownership and asked that the respondent fax documentation about the change of ownership to the Titles Office immediately. The fax said that interest had accrued on the overdue bills and that the complainants were worried that their water was going to be cut off. The practitioner was away and didn’t receive the fax. There was follow up correspondence on 25 August 2008. That document refers to a phone call made to the respondent’s office earlier that day.
13. The respondent and the complainants continued to correspond by email and letter, between August and approximately mid-December 2008. It is useful to refer to those exchanges that assist an understanding of the basis for the application. The documents are annexed to an affidavit of Robert Anthony Reis sworn on 7 December 2009 and to affidavits made by the respondent on 10 March and 11 June 2010.
14. On 30 September 2008 the complainants sent an email to the respondent’s firm referring to a telephone conversation between LF and the respondent on 27 August 2008 in which the respondent was alleged to have said that he had sent the relevant information to the ACT Titles Office. The email said that the Titles Office said they had not received any fax. The respondent was asked to send a copy of the fax he had sent to the Titles Office in August to RC so that RC could discuss it with the Titles Office. The respondent replied to LF’s email by simply saying that he would ‘attend to your enquiry asap’.
15. During October 2008, the complainants continued to pursue resolution of the problem. This included an exchange of emails between the respondent and the complainants on 20 October 2008 in which the respondent said that he would personally ‘go to our archives and retrieve your file‘. He said that he would only be able to do that ‘next Sunday (26 Oct). Could you please wait until then?’ RC replied:
Another 6 days till Sunday 26/10 may not seen very long to wait but it is already quite a long time since we raised this with the respondent’s firm. L first contacted the respondent’s firm on 19 August about this issue (and was subsequently told that the matter had been sorted), and I spoke to you in late September...
16. A number of other emails were exchanged between that day and 28 October 2008. On 27 October RC emailed the respondent’s firm asking if the file had been found on the previous day. The respondent replied on 28 October 2012 simply saying:
[The mortgagee’s solicitors] are attending to this matter. They have lodged the Transfer last Friday. The new title will be issued in your names very soon.
17. On 29 October 2008 the respondent sent an email to the complainants saying inter alia, ‘We sent the Contract to [the mortgagee’s solicitors]’, however a subsequent email of 31 October 2008 confirmed that the contract had been delivered to the mortgagee’s solicitors on 30 October 2012.
18. Further emails followed as the complainants pursued the registration of the title documents. On 11 November 2008, the respondent sent an email to RC saying in relevant parts:
If there is a bank, the post-settlement work is done by the Bank. In your case you had a bank. The bank should have attended to applying for a new certificate of title. The bank’s solicitors contacted us and requested the contract for sale. They did not do this immediately after the settlement, but only recently. We do not know why they wanted the Contract for Sale as it is not required to register the title in your names...
After their request we provided them with the original Contract for Sale. I know it took some time. We had difficulty in retrieving the file from our archives. However, we should reiterate that the Contract for Sale is not required to register the title in your name. The bank should have done this...
19. The respondent wrote to the complainants on 20 November 2008 and said:
As far as we can remember the sequence of events are (sic) as follows:
• The matter was settled on 2 November 2007.
• Nearly 7 months after the settlement, on or about 28 April 2008, we were asked by (the mortgagee's solicitors) to provide them with the original contract for sale. They did not give us a reason for the request.
• Immediately afterwards, we provided the contract for sale to them (we do not know the precise date).
• Unfortunately, we had provided the wrong contract for sale - contract for the sale of [incorrect address].
• More than 5 months afterwards, on or about 5 September 2008, we were told by (the mortgagee's solicitors) that we provided the wrong contract for sale.
• We admit it took us some time to locate the contract for sale for [correct address]. This is because the file, which had been sent to our archives, was unable to be located. We had to go to the archives several times to locate the file. We finally managed to locate the file.
• We sent the contract for sale for [correct address] to (the mortgagee's solicitors) sometime in October 2008 (we cannot at the moment state the precise date).
• Had (the mortgagee's solicitors) asked us to send the correct contract for sale much earlier (rather than waiting for 5 months), we would have provided so.
• You will agree most of the delays in relation to registration of the title has been due to the inaction of (the mortgagee’s solicitors).
20. The respondent wrote again to the complainants on the following day, 21 November 2008. He made the following statements in the letter:
We do not have any record in the file of receiving letters from the (mortgagee’s solicitors) dated 21 April 2008, or on 21 February 2008. This does not mean we are saying the (mortgagee’s solicitors) never sent these letters to us, what we are saying is that those letters are not in the file.
If we received the 21 February 2008 letter we would have promptly acted on it.
If I have read the 2 letters, I would have known the full particulars of the story, and I would have acted fast. I cannot recall reading them.
Until recently (until you told us), we did not know the gravity of the problem. After you contacted us, we have acted fast, despite our other work. I hope you will agree with this.
Again, had I known the gravity of the situation, there would have been no reason for me not to act promptly. Normally, we act on post-settlement matters very quickly.
The letter continues as follows:
We take responsibility for the delay in finding the ACT purchase contract. We had to go to our archives several times to find same. I think we may have delayed the process by few weeks in October.
We are happy to compensate your loss to the extent of our lapse.
21. Further correspondence occurred including a letter of 23 November 2008 to the complainants. It contained the following statements.
I can now say that (the mortgagee’s solicitors) have sent two letters to us, on 21 February 2008 and 21 April 2008.
We agree that we have not acted promptly in attending to the requests made by (the mortgagee’s solicitors) in their two letters.
We agree that the issuance of your title deed was delayed owing to our lapse of attending to the matter.
We agree that you have suffered economic loss as a result, especially in regards to the rates payments, as interest has accrued for the non-payment of rates. We agree to compensate you for the said economic loss, and any other loss, suffered by you.
We apologise to you for our lapse, which was un-intentional. We request you to provide particulars of your said economic and other loss. We will pay you when you have provided the particulars.
22. This letter brought forth a very detailed reply from the complainants. They made a claim for refund of the fee paid to the practitioner’s firm for acting on the conveyance, together with interest incurred on rates and water and sewerage charges, fee for a title search, and a costing in respect of time spent in all the ancillary work they did in trying to expedite registration of the transfer. The claim for their work included a detailed chronology of the time they had spent and what they had done. They included a photocopy of a payslip from the employer of RC.
23. The claim totalled $2,892.31, of which approximately $264.00 was interest, $947.73 the practitioner’s fees, $20.00 title search, and the balance, the hours spent claim.
24. The respondent replied on 9 December 2008. It was a long letter, but it contained an offer to settle the claim for 75% of the interest paid, the search fee, and an ex gratia payment of $100.00. This would approximate a payment of $298.00, just over one tenth of the complainants’ claim.
25. It also sought to qualify the statement made in the letter of 23 November 2008: ‘I can now say that (the mortgagee’s solicitors) have sent two letters to us, on 21 February 2008 and 21 April 2008’. He said that he was taking moral responsibility for them in order not to prolong the matter despite the letters not being on his file.
26. He also made a number of comments about his view of the role of the mortgagee’s solicitors in causing delay in rectification of the transfer.
27. The complainants then wrote their letter of complaint to the Law Society. They attached to it much of the correspondence between themselves and the practitioner. The last such attachment was a copy of the practitioner’s letter of 9 December 2008.
28. The applicant wrote to the practitioner on 12 December 2008 advising him of the complaint and attaching a copy of the letter of complaint. The respondent did not receive that letter until 16 December 2008.
29. On 12 December 2008, the practitioner wrote a further letter to the complainants. It repeated the offer that had previously been made, but imposed a time limit of 5 days for acceptance. He concluded the letter as follows.
We note that you are claiming $53.0154 per hour from me for times allegedly spent by you attending to this matter. We note you have attached a copy of your wages statement from (RC’s employer). We note that you have not given the same information for (LF).
Please note we are considering writing to (RC’s employer), enquiring whether you have also been paid wages by them for the times you were allegedly doing work on this matter. You will agree you cannot claim monies from two parties for the same times.
30. The complainants added this statement to their previous complaint by letter to the Law Society of 14 December 2008.
31. In his evidence given to the Tribunal on 29 April 2010, the respondent denied sending a letter to the mortgagee’s solicitors on 28 April 2008. His evidence was that the contract was sent with a ‘With Compliments” slip. He said “it was sent to [the mortgagee’s solicitors] on 28 April with a compliments slip but as I said there was no cover letter that was prepared to my knowledge because I could not find a letter created in my complete system (T214 l. 43).
32. On 4 May 2010 the respondent filed an affidavit in the proceedings. The affidavit was subsequently amended and re-filed on the direction of the Tribunal on 11 June 2010. At annexure ‘A’ to the affidavit was a letter written by the respondent to the mortgagee’s solicitors dated 28 April 2008. It refers to the mortgagee’s solicitors’ letter of 21 February 2008, (not the more recent letter of 21 April 2008). It says that the contract requested is being sent. It is headed with a reference to the incorrect property transaction. The respondent affirmed (Para 16) that he had found the electronic copy of the letter on 1 May 2010. It was saved in the file relating to the sale of LF’s property rather than in the electronic file relating to the purchase of the property by RC and LF. This discovery caused him to go through the papers that he kept in temporary storage in his garage. He found the original hard copy of the letter in the wrong file in his garage. In the affidavit he acknowledged that he had given evidence that there he had not prepared any letter of 28 April 2008 and said that that statement had been incorrect. He said that he regretted his error.
33. On the same occasion he found a copy of the fax sent by LF to him on 19 August 2008 in which she first alerted him to the problems with registration of the title.
The Law
34. The LP Act gives the Tribunal power to make orders for the discipline of legal practitioners where the Tribunal is satisfied that a practitioner is guilty of either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. Section 420 of the LP Act provides that the Tribunal is bound by the rules of evidence in hearing an application. The applicant bears the onus of proving its case on the balance of probabilities. A line of authorities establish that the standard of proof as described in Briginshaw v Briginshaw is appropriate for disciplinary proceedings because of the potential serious consequences for a practitioner who is found guilty of misconduct
35. In this application, the applicant submits that the respondent has engaged in conduct that amounts to unsatisfactory professional conduct and conduct that amounts to professional misconduct. This is said to have arisen from conduct involving elements of delay, misleading conduct and threatening and intimidating conduct in contravention of the Rules.
36. The terms unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct are defined in sections 386 and 387 of the LP Act respectively.
37. The statutory definition of unsatisfactory professional conduct set out in section 386 of the LP Act, includes conduct that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent practitioner. It comprehends behaviour that is not so significant that it can be described as disgraceful, but is, nevertheless, of a standard less than the standard that a member of the public is entitled to expect from a professional person.
38. It is described in Riley Solicitors Manual in this way:
These standards are not to be determined by reference to lawyers who are without fault, but of the reasonably competent lawyer. As such, the standard of reasonableness invoked by the definition aims to distinguish between conduct that falls within a tolerable range of human error and bad professional work which falls below reasonable standards of competence and diligence.
39. Professional misconduct is defined in section 387 as including unsatisfactory professional conduct that involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or to maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence. It also includes conduct that justifies a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.
40. Section 389 of the LP Act lists specific behaviours that can constitute either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. Paragraph (a) is relevant here. It provides that conduct which is a contravention of the LP Act can be either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
41. Section 104 of the Legislation Act 2001 provides that a reference to an Act includes a reference to any statutory instruments made, or in force, under the Act. For the purposes of the LP Act, this includes the Rules. It is alleged that the respondent’s behaviour contravenes rules 1.1, 1.2 and 36.1. The rules provide:
Rule 1.1
A practitioner should treat his or her client fairly and in good faith, given due regard to the client’s position of dependence upon the practitioner, his or her special training and experience and the high degree of trust which a client is entitled to place in a practitioner.
Rule 1.2
A practitioner must act honestly, fairly and with competence and diligence in the service of a client, and should accept instructions and a retainer to act for a client, only when the practitioner can reasonably expect to serve the client in that manner and attend to the work required with reasonable promptness.
Rule 36.1
A practitioner should ensure that his or her practice is efficiently and properly administered and should take all reasonable and practicable steps to ensure that professional engagements are fulfilled or that early notice is given if they cannot be fulfilled.
The GROUNDS alleged
42. There were three grounds of complaint alleged by the applicant. An oral application was made to amend the grounds on the morning that the hearing commenced. Section 421 of the LP Act allows the Tribunal to amend an application at any time to omit or include an allegation if satisfied that it is reasonable to do so having regard to all the circumstances. Such a power is appropriate for proceedings that are regulatory and protective, rather than adversarial in nature. Section 421(2) specifies that the Tribunal must have regard to whether an amendment will affect the fairness of the proceedings before it.
43. The respondent agreed with the proposed amendment to ground 1.1, but objected to proposed amendments to grounds 2.2 and 3.1 saying that it was unfair of the applicant to seek amendments on the day of the hearing when the respondent had prepared his case on the basis of the original application. He said that the proposed amendments changed the substance of the application, that he had come prepared to argue on the grounds of which he had had notice, that the applicant had had plenty of time and resources to make any changes to its application well before the day of the hearing and that the changes proposed, particularly to ground 3.1 were very significant.
44. The Tribunal accepted the proposed amendments to grounds 1.1 and 2.2. The proposed amendment to ground 3.1 was refused. The Tribunal accepted that it did expand the material before the Tribunal and that it would be unfair to allow that amendment at such a late stage.
GROUND 1
45. This alleged a failure to properly and promptly discharge the retainer from the clients. The particulars of this were that the respondent negligently:
1.1 failed to respond to the letter of 21 February 2008 from the mortgagee’s solicitors in circumstances where the matter required urgent attention.
1.2 forwarded to the mortgagee’ solicitors the incorrect contract.
1.3 failed to produce the correct contract for a period of eight weeks from 5 September 2008 to 31 October 2008 in circumstances where the matter required urgent attention.
GROUND 2
46. This alleged that the respondent engaged in misleading conduct. Particulars of this were:
2.1 In a letter dated 20 November 2008 from the respondent to the complainants, the respondent deliberately or recklessly misrepresented to his client that:
2.1.1 he had not received a letter from the mortgagee‘s solicitors dated 21 February 2008 in circumstances where a subsequent letter of 28 April 2008 refers to it;
2.1.2 the mortgagee’s solicitors did not provide a reason for the request which was made when the letter of 21 April 2008 clearly did;
2.1.3 most of the delays in the matter were attributable to the solicitors for the mortgagee in circumstances where the respondent knew that this was not the case; and
2.2 The respondent, by letters dated 21 November 2008 and 9 December 2008 to the complainants and his letter of 9 February 2009 to the applicant, deliberately or recklessly repeated the misrepresentation that most of the delays in the matter were attributable to the solicitors for the mortgagee.
GROUND 3
47. This alleged that the respondent had engaged in threatening and intimidating conduct. Particulars of this were:
By his letter dated 12 December 2008 to the complainants, the respondent engaged in conduct which was intended to intimidate his clients to dissuade them from lodging a complaint with the applicant by threatening to contact the employer of one of the complaints.
The submissions
48. In its submissions, the applicant submitted that the Tribunal should find each ground proven, and make findings of unsatisfactory professional conduct in the case of Ground 1, and professional misconduct in respect of Grounds 2 and 3.
49. In relation to Ground 1, the applicant suggested that the three particulars of the ground were to be viewed in combination. When that was done they indicated sustained, related and cumulative acts of negligence in breach of the Rules.
50. In relation to Ground 2, they suggested that particulars 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 should be considered together, and particulars 2.1.3 and 2.2 considered together. It suggested that when considered together, whether the respondent’s conduct was found to have been reckless or deliberate, the conduct was very serious and should be treated as professional misconduct.
51. In relation to Ground 3, the applicant submits that at the time that he wrote the letter of 12 December 2012, the respondent had no intention of writing to RC’s employer and that he told an untruth in order to convince or coerce the complainants to avoid a complaint to the Law Society.
52. At paragraph 82 of the submissions, the applicant submits as follows:
To make such a threat to complainants in order to deter them from making a complaint to the Law Society is very serious. It threatens the integrity of the complaints process, brings the profession into disrepute, and is certainly professional misconduct.
53. The applicant also made in the course of its submissions, a lengthy attack on the credit and veracity of the respondent.
54. The respondent provided detailed and lengthy submissions. Those submissions will be dealt with as each of the particulars of the Grounds is dealt with below.
Ground 1
Failure to properly and promptly discharge the retainer from his clients.
Particular 1.1
1.1 The respondent negligently failed to respond to the letter of 21 February 2008 from the mortgagee’s solicitors in circumstances where the matter required urgent attention.
55. This allegation relates to a letter which was sent by the mortgagee’s solicitor to the respondent dated 21 February 2008 requesting him to send them the original contract for the purchase. The respondent does not acknowledge that he received this letter, but does not deny that he did so. His approach, in so far as it is possible to isolate one, is that he cannot remember seeing the letter and it is not on his file; therefore he did not read it and as a result, did not respond to it.
56. He relied on an affidavit affirmed on 11 June 2010, which dealt with this topic. It reads as follows.
I cannot remember reading the 21 February 2008 letter, this does not mean I deny (the mortgagee’s solicitors) ever sent it to us. Because I cannot remember reading this letter I was unable to act on it. Had I read the letter I would have gone and acted on it, as there was no reason for me not to do so.
57. Consideration of whether he received and read this letter also involves whether he received and read a similar letter relating to the same topic sent to the respondent by the mortgagee’s solicitors dated 21 April 2008. The respondent’s response to whether he received it and read it is the same as his response about the 21 February 2008 letter.
58. In his submissions to the Tribunal, at paragraph 23 he said:
I stand by that I cannot remember reading or seeing the 21 April 2008 letter. (the mortgagee’s solicitor) were unable to prove that they have sent this letter….
59. Both letters were sent by (the mortgagee’s solicitor) in the normal course of business. It is unlikely that the first letter was not received in the office of the respondent and read by him. It is extremely unlikely that both letters were not received and were not read by the respondent.
60. The respondent wrote a letter to the mortgagee’s solicitors enclosing a contract on 28 April 2008. This is the letter referred to in paragraph 32 above. It is extremely unlikely that he spontaneously wrote that letter and attached a contract without having seen either or both of the letters of the mortgagee’s solicitor.
61. The respondent’s letter of 28 April 2008 specifically refers to a letter of the mortgage’s solicitor dated 21 February 2008. It is extremely unlikely that the respondent referred to that letter without receiving or reading it. It is almost inconceivable that he would have written the letter of 28 April 2008 had his doing so not been triggered by either or both of the mortgagee’s solicitor’s letters.
62. In a letter the respondent wrote to the complainants on 23 November 2008, the opening paragraphs are as follows.
I can now say that (the mortgagee’s solicitor) have sent two letters to us, on 21 February 2008 and 21 April 2008.
We agree that we have not acted promptly in attending to the requests made by (the mortgagee’s solicitor) in their two letters.
63. The respondent makes further reference to receipt of the letter of 21 February 2008 in a letter he wrote to the complainants of 9 December 2008. He says in the letter of 9 December 2008 the following.
Again I took the responsibility, but you will agree that (the mortgagee’s solicitor) only contacted us on 21 February 2008.
64. The respondent returned to the same theme in a letter to the applicant of 9 February 2009. He said the following.
When (the mortgagee's solicitor) wrote to us on or about 21 February 2008 I fully agree we should have responded promptly to (the mortgagee’s solicitor) letter and provided them with the Contract that they sought. Not providing the Contract as requested was an office administrative error; this is inexcusable.
65. Having regard to the evidence referred to above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the evidence establishes that the respondent received the letter from the mortgagee’s solicitor dated 21 February 2008.
66. This finding is not only relevant to this particular, but also to later allegations.
67. The Tribunal is satisfied that the respondent’s failure to respond to the letter of 21 February 2008 for over two months, until 28 April 2008 was more than a mere administrative error. The letter requested urgent assistance. It indicated what assistance was sought and the purpose of the request. It should have caused the respondent to be concerned about the position of his clients. The Tribunal is satisfied that his failure to do anything in response was negligent. The necessary result is that the Tribunal finds that particular 1 is made out.
68. The respondent seems to have regarded the need to ensure that his clients were registered as the proprietors of the property purchased in the transaction in which he acted for them, as the responsibility of the mortgagee’s solicitor. In any event, having received the communication from them requesting provision of the contract, his duty to his clients was to cooperate in achieving that result. The Tribunal is of the view that the respondent’s retainer was still alive at that time, the clients’ interest not having been registered then. The Tribunal will return to this issue later.
Particular 1.2
69. The incorrect contract was sent. The question is whether that was done negligently.
70. The respondent had acted for one of the complainants in the sale of a residential property at about the same time, so that both matters were settled within a short period of each other. The contract that was sent was the contract that related to the other property which was a sale, rather than the purchase by both complainants. On one view, the respondent, knowing that there had been two transactions involving two contracts at about the same time should have used extra care when retrieving a contract, to ensure that it was the correct contract that he sent. The letters of 21 February 2008 and 21 April 2008 clearly showed the details of the contract requested.
71. The respondent in his submissions says that providing the wrong contract was a ‘genuine administrative error’. He speculates as to how it may have come about that the incorrect contract was provided, but does not provide a positive explanation.
72. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, provision of the incorrect contract can only be regarded as having been done negligently. It was certainly not a case in which the covering letter correctly described the contract which the respondent intended to send, and the incorrect contract was mistakenly put in the envelope.
73. The Tribunal cannot regard this as a simple error. Having received two letters correctly identifying the purchase transaction, the respondent did not take sufficient care to ensure that he was complying with the mortgagee’s solicitor’s request, and provides no satisfactory explanation for failing to do so. Reference to the incorrect transaction in the covering letter of 28 April 2008, excludes the possibility of a ‘simple’ administrative error. Both letters from the mortgagee’s solicitor give the reason for requiring the contract, and stress the urgency of the situation as it affected the respondent’s clients. There was a magnitude of risk for his clients and particular attention was required.
Particular 1.3
74. This particular relates to the period between the mortgagee’s solicitor telling the respondent that the incorrect contract had been provided, and the actual provision by the respondent of the correct contract. The period alleged is between 5 September 2008, and 30 October 2008. This period does not include a previous period during which the applicant alleges there were phone calls from the mortgagee's solicitor to the respondent’s office to chase up the correct contract. Those calls are the subject of dispute.
75. The respondent throughout the case has been critical of what he alleges to have been delays caused by the mortgagee's solicitor. Any issue of delay on the part of the mortgagee's solicitor does not arise for the period in question. It was the respondent’s task and duty to provide the correct contract. The antecedent delay, whatever its cause, only underscored the need for the respondent to take timely and effective action once he received the letter of 5 September 2008.
76. It is difficult to distil from the respondent’s written submission what precisely the evidence he says that the Tribunal should have regard to in relation to this issue. He admits the delay. He opens his submissions relating to this particular as follows.
I admitted in my evidence that it was unfortunate that it took us nearly 8 weeks to find the correct Contract for Sale. It is true that so much time was spent on finding the correct Contract for Sale, after making several visits to the archives, and having gone through so many archive boxes, so many times, the Contract for Sale was finally found.
77. Later in the submissions (Para 16) he suggests that after settlement he was entitled to close his file. “This is because the mortgagee/mortgagee’s solicitor attends to post-settlement work. If there is no mortgagee’s solicitor (example, where the buyer is a cash purchaser, without a bank), then the solicitor will continue to act for the client until the title is registered.”
78. This is a misconception of the duty of a solicitor acting for the purchaser of a property post settlement, and cannot be regarded as a satisfactory explanation for the delay alleged.
79. The evidence of the respondent indicates that after he was advised by the mortgagee's solicitor of his having sent the incorrect contract, he made many visits to his archives and went through many boxes of archived files in order to locate the relevant contract, but in spite of these concerted efforts, it was not until late October that he was able to locate and provide the contract.
80. The Tribunal rejects that evidence.
81. In his affidavit of 27 April 2010, RC deposes to a conversation that he had with the respondent on approximately 29 September 2008. In that conversation RC says that he told the respondent that there was an ongoing problem getting the property transferred. In response, the respondent said: “This is the first time I have heard that there is a problem. I would need to look at the file to know anything about it. The file will be in archives and it will be some effort to get it out.” There was no challenge to this evidence in cross examination. The clear inference is that the respondent had done nothing in response to the letter of 5 September 2008 at that stage.
82. It became apparent in cross examination that the respondent used an outbuilding at his residence as a storage facility. His affidavit affirmed 11 June 2010, Para. 21 indicates that both sale and purchase files were closed on the same day, 21 November 2007. They were numbered consecutively 3405 and 3406 for archival purposes, and placed in the same box, numbered 154, and then placed in storage. He says the sale file was just below the purchase file. In those circumstances, the Tribunal cannot give any credibility to the claim that the purchase contract was difficult to find.
83. The complainants prepared what they describe as a timeline which appears in Annexure ‘A’ to Mr Reis’ affidavit of 7 December 2009, commencing at page 24. This sets out the actions taken by the complainants during September and October 2008, attempting to expedite registration of their transfer. This includes brief description of their communications with the respondent and his responses.
84. This evidence indicates that the respondent took no action to locate the contract referred to in the letter from the mortgagee's solicitors of 5 September 2008 at least until 29 September 2008. The Tribunal is satisfied that thereafter his attempts to locate the contract were either non-existent or ineffective for another 4 weeks.
85. References in the emails that passed between the respondent and the complainants in this period do not support his assertions that he had to go to the archives several times to locate the file. His correspondence makes it clear that an attitude that it was the responsibility of the mortgagee's solicitors to protect his client’s interests by attending to rectification drove his inactivity. Even as late as 29 October 2008, he wrongly asserted that the correct contract had been delivered to the mortgagee’s solicitor.
86. It was not until the clamour from his clients had reached what apparently was an unbearable level that the contract was produced. He appears to have been untroubled by the assertion of the mortgagee's solicitor that his own clients were in default throughout this period.
87. The Tribunal is satisfied that the respondent’s conduct in this regard was negligent and that this particular is made out.
Ground 1 Generally – Failure to properly and promptly discharge the retainer
88. The Tribunal finds that each particular of this ground is made out. What was a relatively simple error involving the mis-description of RC, capable of relatively easy rectification, through mistake and subsequent inactivity became an unnecessary debacle. This was more than human error of a busy practitioner that it would be reasonable to excuse. It was conduct that fell short of the standard of competence and diligence that RC and LF were entitled to expect. The Tribunal accepts that the respondent’s acts amounted to a contravention of each of the rules relied on and should be characterised as unsatisfactory professional conduct.
Ground 2 – Engaged in misleading conduct
Particulars 2.1.1 and 2.1.2
89. It is convenient to deal with Particulars 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 together.
90. These rely on statements made by the respondent in a letter dated 20 November 2008 to the complainants. The letter is produced in full at paragraph 19 of these decisions. The letter opens with a statement that the sequence of events was set out ‘as far as we can remember’. It then incorrectly refers to settlement having occurred on 2 November 2007, rather than 9 November. The subject statement is in the second paragraph:
Nearly 7 months after the settlement, on or about 28 April 2008, we were asked by (the mortgagee's solicitors) to provide them with the original contract for sale. They did not give us a reason for the request.
91. In his submissions, the respondent makes the point that the 20 November 2008 letter does not precisely refer to a letter from the mortgagee's solicitor of 21 April 2008, nor does it refer to a letter from the same source of 21 February 2008. He submits that accordingly, the letter cannot be said to include any deliberate or reckless misrepresentations as alleged by the applicant. He submits that on that basis the Tribunal (Para. 22) should dismiss grounds 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 straight away. This is a simplistic analysis.
92. The paragraph contains a number of representations: first, that it was nearly seven months after settlement that the respondent was asked to provide the original contract for sale; secondly, that the request was made on or about 28 April 2008 (and by inference, this was the first request) and thirdly, no reason was given for the request. Each assertion is incorrect.
93. There were two requests for the contract from the mortgagee’s solicitors, made in letters dated 21 February 2008 and 21 April 2008. The first request was made approximately 3 and a half months after settlement. The second request was made approximately 5 and a half months after settlement. The reference to ‘nearly 7 months’ is incorrect, even if the time frame referred to is accepted as relating to the second request only.
94. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to the letter of 21 February 2008 are set out in paragraph 65. Against the background of those findings, the first and second representations must be regarded as incorrect and as involving, by necessary inference, misrepresentations concerning the letter of 21 February 2008. Given the Tribunal’s findings, they must be taken to be deliberate misrepresentations.
95. It is clear that it is the letter of 21 April 2008 that the respondent is referring to in his letter of 20 November 2008. The letter of 21 April 2008 contains, on its face, a reason for requesting the contract. It is alleged by the applicant that the respondent’s incorrect assertion that he was given no reason for the request, was either deliberate or reckless. It is a very obvious error for the respondent to have made. The content of the letter of 20 November 2008 and what is known of surrounding events supports the inference that the mis-description was not just careless, but was made with an absence of any care as to the accuracy of the statement.
96. Indeed, in his letter to the complainants of 21 November 2008, the respondent indicated that he had no record of receiving, or recollection of seeing, the letter of 21 April 2012. There was no basis then for him to make any assertion on 20 November about whether he had been given a reason for the request for the contract. On his own case, he had not read the latter and could not recall it. It is open to infer that his assertion was something that was simply made up at the time. At the very least, it was a reckless misrepresentation.
97. The Tribunal finds that particulars 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 are made out.
Particular 2.1.3
98. This particular relates to the following statement in the letter of 20 November 2008:
You will agree that most of the delays in relation to registration of the title has been due to the inaction of [the mortgagee’s solicitor].
99. The applicant alleges that when he made the representation, the respondent knew that the representation was incorrect and that he made it deliberately, or that he was reckless about it.
100. The representation has been made repeatedly by the respondent. Indeed as late as 3 September 2010 the respondent, in his written submissions to the Tribunal at Para. 45, says as follows.
I standby my statement in (the letter of 20 November 2008) final dot point - “You will agree that most of the delays in relation to registration of the title has (sic) been due to the inaction of (the mortgagee’s solicitors)”. I am defending a serious Complaint against me, the consequences of which will have a drastic/severe effect on me. I am entitled to say my true belief, and I have proved this by evidence. I am not making an unfair accusation.
101. Whatever other problems there may be with that statement, it does indicate a firm belief in the truth of his criticism that most of the delay in registration was attributable to the mortgagee’s solicitor. At all relevant times the respondent was of that view. It was not a deliberate misrepresentation, nor are we satisfied that it was made recklessly. The Tribunal has other concerns about the statement that are set out in greater detail below.
102. Particular 2.1.3 is not established.
Particular 2.2
103. This particular alleges that the respondent continued the misrepresentation referred to in particular 2.1.3. For the reasons set out above, this particular is also not established.
104. Having said that, the respondent’s attitude to the responsibility of and actions of the mortgagee’s solicitor compared to his own is very concerning because it suggests that the respondent misunderstands the duty that a solicitor owes to his or her clients.
105. The respondent in justifying the statements that he made regarding delay, takes a quantitative approach based on periods of inactivity and attributes fault to others and sometimes to himself, for each period isolated. This approach ignores two fundamental and related principles.
106. The first is that the respondent’s retainer and his duty to his client did not end at the settlement table. The Tribunal takes the view that the respondent’s retainer to his clients was to act on the conveyance of the particular property to them. In general terms, this retainer would have ceased only when the title to the property was successfully transferred to them, subject to any mortgage or other agreed third party interest.
107. The second principle is that the duty that he owed to his clients was not transferred to the solicitors for the mortgagee, in spite of a conveyancing practice of convenience that after settlement involving registration of a mortgage; lodgement of documents and registration is done by the mortgagee’s lawyers.
108. There were long periods during which the respondent’s duty was clear, but he was inactive, or he was inactive and relying on the mortgagee’s solicitor to take action. There was no evidence that he, at any time, followed up, pursued or took any real interest in, the resolution of the serious problem that his clients faced. The evidence was to the contrary.
109. The Tribunal makes no comment on the actions of the mortgagee’s solicitor, because what they did or did not do, was essentially irrelevant to the continuing obligation the respondent had to his clients to ensure that registration of their interest had been attended to at the earliest reasonable opportunity.
110. The Tribunal does not agree with the submission of the respondent that he had no responsibility for any delay from the date of settlement to 28 April 2008. That approach is built on his misconception that the mortgagee’s solicitor bore the sole responsibility for registration of his clients’ title.
111. After 28 April his duty to effect registration of his clients’ title remained, and the mistaken provision of the incorrect contract did not relieve him of that burden. Having regard to the findings made about the respondent’s knowledge of the letters of 21 February and 21 April 2008, the Tribunal is satisfied that he was on notice of a serious problem that affected his clients’ interests. He should have, at the very least, made his own enquiries to check with the mortgagee’s solicitor after 28 April 2008, that the problem was fixed and the transfer of title and security documents satisfactorily finalised.
112. In this regard, his denial of any communication between his firm and the mortgagee’s solicitors between 28 April and 5 September 2008 does not reflect particularly well on him – it begs the question of why he wasn’t chasing them to confirm that the problem had been fixed. It was not good enough for him to say that the mortgagee’s solicitor bore the sole responsibility.
113. He should also, in our view, have alerted his clients to the fact that there was a problem, rather than leaving it for them to discover it some months later when they received a bill for overdue rates.
114. The application in this matter does not include any general allegation of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. There is no allegation that the respondent’s conduct generally was such that he failed to act in a way that accords with a reasonable standard of competence or diligence. The application is narrowly focussed on particulars that relate to specific matters. It is not open to the Tribunal to go beyond the grounds and particulars relied on by the applicant to make findings against the respondent in respect of matters that were not raised in the application. While section 421 of the LP Act does allow the Tribunal the power to amend an application on its own motion, that is not a power that is easy to exercise before the evidence is heard and submissions made.
Ground 2 Generally – Engaging in Misleading Conduct
115. Particulars 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 are established and Ground 2 supported, notwithstanding that the applicant has not discharged its onus in relation to particulars 2.1.3 or 2.2.
116. The conduct of the respondent contravenes rules 1.1 and 1.2. Findings that the respondent has made both deliberate and reckless misrepresentations to his clients have been made. The applicant submits that this should lead the Tribunal to characterise the conduct as professional misconduct. This is not conduct that is about the standard of the practitioner’s work, his diligence or his competence, but about his candour when dealing with his clients. The Tribunal accepts, following the authorities referred to in Riley Solicitors Manual [35,040.5] that this is appropriately characterised as professional misconduct.
Ground 3
117. This ground alleges that the respondent engaged in threatening and intimidating conduct. There is one particular as follows:
Particular 3.1
By his letter dated 12 December 2008 to the complainants, the respondent engaged in conduct which was intended to intimidate his clients to dissuade them from lodging a complaint with the Law Society by threatening to contact the employer of one of the complainants.
The allegation relates to the final sentences of a letter written by the respondent to the complainants on 12 December 2008. They read as follows.
Please note we are considering writing to University of Wollongong, enquiring whether you have also been paid wages by them for the times you were allegedly doing work on this matter. You will agree you cannot claim monies from two parties for the same times.
118. There were a number of preceding communications between the respondent and the complainants which are relevant to understanding the above quotation.
119. The requested contract, or part of it, needed to achieve rectification, was supplied to the mortgagee’s solicitor at the end of October 2008. RC sent an email to the respondent on 9 November 2008 pointing out that the title had not been transferred at that time. He said in that email; ‘we have spoken to the Law Society as we are frustrated by the lack of progress’.
120. The respondent wrote to the complainants on 20 November 2008. This is the letter set out at paragraph 19 that has been referred to previously.
121. RC responded by email of 20 November 2008. He concluded it as follows:
We have suffered considerable stress and lost time due to your persistent neglect and delay in handling our matter. We were at significant risk of much more substantial damage. We are drafting a letter to the Law Society and will forward you a copy.
122. The response from the respondent was a letter of 21 November 2008 to the complainants. The respondent referred to errors he had made and said that he was happy to compensate the claimants for their loss arising out of his lapse. This offer to compensate was repeated in a further letter of 23 November 2008 in the following terms.
We apologise to you for our lapse, which was un-intentional. We request you to provide particulars of your said economic and other loss. We will pay you when you have provided the particulars.
123. It is interesting to note the timing of the mention of a complaint to the Law Society and the making of the offer to compensate by the respondent. This is particularly so having regard to the robust wording of the respondent’s letter of 20 November 2008.
124. The complainants wrote to the respondent on 30 November in response to his offer to compensate. They had kept detailed records and particularised a claim which consisted of the respondent’s fees for acting on the purchase, interest paid on statutory charges, a title search, and a costing of the time spent by the complainants in dealing with the problem that arose. Their letter referred to seeking outside advice in the preparation of the review. There was a reference to a meeting with the Law Society on 21 October 2008 in which the complainants were advised ‘on the process for lodging a formal complaint’. There was also a reference to a meeting with a private lawyer who gave advice and spoke to the mortgagee’s solicitors.
125. The respondent wrote a three page letter to the complainants in response on 9 December 2008. It is useful to set out the last page of that letter in full:
...If the ACT Law Society has advised you that we should refund the fees and disbursements back to you, plus pay huge compensation, then they are wrong.
You will agree that the duty of the ACT Law Society is to advise the disgruntled clients of the avenues available for them to make a complaint against the Solicitor. Again, without knowing the full situation, the staff of the ACT Law Society are unable to make a determination that we were wrong and that we should pay back all the fees and disbursements paid by you plus the huge amount of compensation that you are seeking. Please note that it is only a court of law, not the ACT Law Society, who can order that we should pay any compensation, as demanded by you.
Any court of law will also hold the [mortgagee’s solicitor] liable for the delays occurred in your matter.
We believe we have been generous and forthright enough to accept responsibility to the matter, albeit [mortgagee’s solicitor] are also responsible for the delay, but unfortunately you would not want to accept this. We have been humbled enough to apologise to you. We have written to you promptly, despite our workload. We have tried to discuss the matter amicably with you to resolve it, but you have refused such contact. We offered to pay just compensation to your economic and other loss, but you are making demands that are most unfair, unjust and unreasonable.
Making a totally unreasonable, unjust and unfair claim for compensation, albeit maybe due to incorrect advice you have received from the ACT Law Society, makes it extremely difficult for the two parties to resolve this matter amicably.
As stated before, we are willing to pay majority of interest (say 75%) and for the full title search fee...Furthermore, to settle the matter amicably, in addition to the compensation, we will pay another $100... in good faith, if you agree to call off this matter completely and end it in a friendly, than hostile, manner.
126. The repeated references to incorrect advice that may have been given by the ACT Law Society and to the courts rather than the Law Society being the arbiter of compensation claims, are striking. The complainants had only referred to the ACT Law Society briefly as having given advice about the process for lodging a complaint. Nothing was said about advice about compensation. It is possible to read this letter as an attempt to divert the complainants away from that course by asserting that the Law Society was giving incorrect advice, or because only a court could deal with the complainant’s claim.
127. RC replied by email saying that they were not satisfied with the respondent’s response; ‘Possibly you are right that the Society will not be able to assist us with compensation. Our main objective is to prevent future clients from going through our experience.’
128. The respondent’s letter of 12 December 2008 then followed with its indication that the respondent was now considering writing to RC’s employer and its inference that RC’s claim ‘for the times you were allegedly doing work on this matter’ was perhaps improper, or in some way fraudulent.
129. These communications indicate that the respondent, at least initially, was taking a robust approach to the complaints. His letter of 20 November 2008 sets out a chronology of events, referring to the sending of the incorrect contract and the delay in locating the correct contract. There is no mention of apology and certainly no compensation offer. His final paragraph blaming the mortgagee’s solicitor for most of the delays is referred to above.
130. However, this letter was followed by the complainants’ response which referred to the drafting of a complaint to the Law Society. There followed the two letters of 21 November and 23 November 2008 written in a more conciliatory tone and making an unsolicited offer of compensation.
131. The timing of those letters invites the inference that it was the mention of complaint to the Law Society which changed the respondent’s approach. That is to say, in order to stave off the complaint, the offers to settle were made in order to reach an accommodation with the complainants which would result in withdrawal, or the “calling off” of any complaint.
132. Later correspondence from the complainants made it clear that a settlement with the complainants was not possible on the terms the respondent was offering, so that in the letter of 9 December and then 12 December 2008, stronger steps in bringing pressure to bear were needed.
133. The respondent was cross-examined at length about his motivations. He admitted that when he wrote the letter of 12 December 2008, he was angry; although he told the complainants that he was considering writing to the employer, he was not going to do so; and, wanted to ‘get the settlement thing happening’.
134. This evidence strongly suggests that the respondent threatened to contact RC’s employer in order to intimidate the complainants into dropping their complaint and accepting the respondent’s offer. The making of the settlement offer immediately after the advice that a complaint to the Law Society is to be made, links the offer to the complaint, and indicates a hope on the part of the respondent that a settlement would result in the complainant’s ‘calling off the whole thing completely’. This can only be read as a reference to the complainant calling off the foreshadowed complaint. When the complainants made it clear that compensation was not the main objective, a different tact was adopted by the respondent.
135. In his affidavit of 11 June 2010, the respondent says that he was attempting to demonstrate to the complainants that they were being unreasonable in the quantum of their claim for compensation. The Tribunal rejects that evidence. Threatening to contact a client’s employer could only be at least embarrassing for the client. It is impossible to see that such an experience could in some way educate the client as to the unreasonableness of an offer he had made.
136. In the circumstances of the case, and particularly in view of the sequence of correspondence between the parties between19 November and 23 November 2008, the Tribunal finds that Ground 3 is made out.
137. The threat was made by the respondent on only one occasion and was not carried out. However, it must be viewed seriously since it was an attempt to coerce and manipulate his clients to avoid a complaint. The Tribunal takes the view that this conduct constitutes professional misconduct.
………………………………..
Ms L. Crebbin
General President
On behalf of the members of the Tribunal
PUBLICATION DETAILS
TO BE PUBLISHED
To be completed by Tribunal Staff
PART A
FILE NUMBER:
LP 09/08
PARTIES, APPLICANT:
THE ACT LAW SOCIETY
PARTIES, RESPONDENT:
THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER
COUNCEL APPEARING, APPLICANT
Mr Beaumont
COUNCEL APPEARING, RESPONDENT
N/A
SOLICITORS FOR APPLICANT
MR PHELPS, PHELPS REID LAWYERS
SOLICITORS FOR RESPONDENT
N/A
TRIBUNAL MEMBERS:
MS L. CREBBIN, GENERAL PRESIDENT
MR G. LUNNY SC, SENIOR MEMBER
MS J. WESTAWAY, MEMBER
DATES OF HEARING:
28 & 29 April 2010, 4 May 2010, 15 & 16 July 2010
PLACE OF HEARING:
CANBERRA
PART B
RECOMMENDATION:
FULL REPORT ( ) CASE NOTE ( ) UNREPORTED DECISION ( )
COMMENTS:
5
2
2