Council of the Law Society of NSW v Hancock

[2010] NSWADT 121

CITATION:

Council of the Law Society of NSW v Hancock [2010] NSWADT 121
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the decision for a list of the amendments.

DIVISION:

Legal Services Division

PARTIES:

APPLICANT
The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales

RESPONDENT
John Leslie Hancock

FILE NUMBER:

062028

HEARING DATES:

17 April 2007,14 May 2007,20 August 2007,15 July 2008 - Respondent’s application to re-open,9 April 2009

SUBMISSIONS CLOSED:

9 April 2009

 
DATE OF DECISION: 

25 May 2010

BEFORE:

Karpin A - ADCJ (Deputy President); Brennan J - Judicial Member; Costigan M - Non-Judicial Member

CATCHWORDS:

Disciplinary - solicitor

LEGISLATION CITED:

Legal Profession Act 1987

CASES CITED:

Briginshaw v. Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336NSW
Bar Association v. Howen (No 2) [2003]NSWADT 235

REPRESENTATION:

APPLICANT
P Boyd, solicitor
Mr R Stitt QC on Application to re-open & plea

RESPONDENT
Mr Jacobs, barrister
Mr Allen on application to re-open & plea

ORDERS:

1.The respondent is guilty of professional misconduct.
2.The respondent is publicly reprimanded.
3.The respondent is fined the sum of $5,000
4.The respondent is to pay the costs of the applicant Law Society.

REASONS FOR DECISION

1 On 26 October 2006, The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [“the applicant”] filed an application pursuant to section 551 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 [“LPA 2004”]alleging that John Leslie Hancock [“the respondent”] was guilty of professional misconduct on the grounds that:

i. The solicitor had, without reasonable excuse, failed to comply with a Notice pursuant to Section 152 of the Legal Profession Act 1987 [LPA 1987].

ii. The solicitor failed to assist the Law Society in the investigation of a complaint.

2 The Particulars of Grounds of Complaint refer to the following relevant dates and events:

-4 January 2005 the Legal Services Commissioner referred to the applicant a complaint from Jill Hancock against the respondent.

-7 January 2005, the complaint was referred to the respondent by letter.

-13 April 2005 the applicant wrote to the respondent requesting his file in the matter. He did not respond.

-3 May 2005, 18 July 2005 and 13 October 2005 the applicant, by letter, requested the respondent’s file.

-3 November 2005, the respondent’s failure to forward his file to the applicant was considered by the Professional Conduct Committee [“the Committee”] which resolved to issue a Notice to the respondent pursuant to section 152 LPA 1987.

-9 November 2005, the section 152 Notice was served on the respondent.

-1 December 2005 the respondent wrote to the applicant, inter alia in the following terms:

“We refer to your letter dated 13 April 2005, and to our letter dated 3 May 2005 (copy attached)…The writer will contact you shortly.” The respondent next wrote to the applicant on 9 October 2006.

-2 December 2005 the applicant wrote to the respondent advising that the letter of 3 May 2005 had not been received.

-3 March 2006 the applicant wrote to the respondent requesting compliance with the section 152 Notice.

-31 March 2006 the Committee resolved to make a complaint against the respondent, and a letter was sent advising him of that decision.

-27 April 2006 the applicant wrote to the respondent in response to a telephone message from him.

-3 August 2006 the Committee resolved to make a complaint against the respondent pursuant to section 504 LPA 2004.

-21 September 2006 the Committee resolved to refer the respondent’s conduct to the Tribunal and rescinded the March 31 resolution.

-28 September a letter was sent to the respondent after the applicant ascertained that the conduct considered by the Committee on 21 September was the subject of the complaint made on 6 March 2006 rather than 3 August 2006.

-9 October 2006 the respondent forwarded a letter and Statutory Declaration to the respondent by facsimile transmission which was illegible.

-12 October and 16 October the respondent was contacted by telephone and requested to forward the original of his letter of 9 October. The respondent did not comply with that request.

-The respondent’s Statutory Declaration of 9 October 2006 said in part:

“13….I am enclosing a letter to the Law Society dated 1 December 2005 enclosing a letter dated 3 May 2005 (which was a draft letter that had not been forwarded)…”

-30 October 2006 the Committee resolved pursuant to section 537 LPA2004 to refer the respondent’s conduct to the Tribunal, and notified him by letter of that decision.

3 At hearing the applicant sought orders that the respondent be fined; that he be publicly reprimanded; that he pay the costs of the applicant. Although the original application had sought an order that the respondent’s practising certificate be suspended until such time as he complied with the section 152 Notice dated 3 November 2005, that was not pressed.

4 The Section 152 Notice dated 3 November 2005 served on the respondent on 9 November 2005, required the respondent, within 21 days, to provide a Statutory Declaration advising: “The source of the funds that permitted the solicitor to remit to the complainant the sum of $25,000.00 the solicitor says was repaid to the complainant and also a further sum of $10,000.00 that the solicitor says was paid to the complainant.”

5 The respondent was also required to produce to the applicant his files “…for the loan and security to support that loan by Jill Hancock to Rami Ayoub” together with his matter files relating to “…attempts to remedy any default in the repayment arrangements of the loan referred to above.”

6 Jill Hancock, the original complainant to the Legal Services Commissioner, is the stepmother of the respondent.

7 The 3rd schedule of the section 152 Notice required the respondent: “To co-operate with the staff of the Society in providing information to establish any audit trail of funds passing from the complainant to the borrower and repayments from the borrower to the complainant and to respond to the Society’s letter of 18 July 2005.”

8 The 3rd schedule further provided that in the event that the respondent was unable to comply he must, within 21 days after service of the Notice, provide a statutory declaration stating the reasons for his inability to comply.

9 The section 152 Notice also directed the attention of the respondent to section 152 (4) which provides:

(4) A legal practitioner who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with such a requirement is guilty of professional misconduct.

10 On 22 December 2006 the respondent filed his reply to the application in which he maintained that if he had failed to comply with the section 152 Notice there was a reasonable excuse, which he particularised thus:

-He believed he had provided all relevant information to the applicant

-He “…expected the Society to recognise that the initiating complaint fell outside the scope of the Solicitor’s legal practice and was liable to be dismissed as frivolous and vexatious.”

-“The Society was under a misapprehension and pressed for ‘matter files’ and ‘mortgages’ when there was no ‘matter’ and no ‘mortgage’ and the solicitor was in consequence in doubt how to assist the Society.”

-The respondent denied he had failed to assist the Society in resolution of the complaint and asserted that he had provided all “material information” available although in doubt how to assist the respondent.

11 When the matter came on for hearing on 17 April 2007 Mr. P Boyd appeared for the applicant and Mr S Jacobs appeared for the respondent. Mr Jacobs informed the Tribunal that he had been briefed on the previous day and was not in a position to proceed to a full hearing of the matter. Mr Boyd outlined the applicant’s case and tendered material following which orders were made for the further preparation of the matter on the part of the respondent. The matter was listed for a Directions hearing on 2 May and for further hearing before the Tribunal on 14 May and adjourned to that date part heard.

12 The initiating complaint from Mrs Jill Hancock to the Legal Services Commissioner, concerned a loan in the sum of $25,000 from Mrs Hancock to Rami Ayoub, or his company. That loan was arranged by the respondent.

13 In a letter dated 1 December 2005, the respondent enclosed a copy of a letter dated 3 May 2005, inferring that it had been sent to the applicant on or about that date. He subsequently conceded that it was merely a “draft” letter and had not been sent.

14 Nonetheless, in light of the defence he subsequently raised, it contains relevant information: it refers to advice given to Mrs Hancock about the “risks involved”; that the loan was secured by way of a caveat; that following representations from the respondent, Mr Ayoub sold a property at Punchbowl from the proceeds of which Mrs Hancock received “approximately $25,000.00”; that a payment of $10,000 was made by the respondent to his stepmother in order to “mitigate her concerns, and to reduce the debt.”; and that “…the relevant files have been pulled from storage”; and “…the transactions showing the payments are provided under cover of this letter..”. They were not provided as the letter was not sent. Nor were they provided at any subsequent time.

15 In an affidavit filed in these proceedings on 2 February 2007 and sworn the same day, the respondent deposed that:

“11. I have never created a matter file for the subject at the centre of this dispute…I was not acting for Jill Hancock in a formal solicitor-client relationship, when I am guarantor. No mortgage was created because Mrs Hancock knew she was making an unsecured loan at high interest. …I could not assist the Society by providing a matter file because none was created. The transaction was personal not professional.”

By letter dated 30 May 2001 addressed to Mrs Hancock, written on the letterhead of Hancocks Solicitors and signed by the respondent, he wrote: “This letter is to confirm receipt of the sum of $50,000 from Rami Ayoub.

As agreed the term of the loan is for 1 year or less and the loan is to incur interest at the rate of 30% per annum, with the minimum interest payment being 30% on the outstanding monies.

As discussed I am guaranteeing payment of the loan and interest by Rami Ayoub.”

16 The material available to the Tribunal discloses a complex of payments and transactions which, at one level need not be determined. They do, however, demonstrate beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the respondent was acting in the role of solicitor for Mrs Hancock in the transactions involving the sum of $50,000 advanced by Mrs Hancock on 18 May 2001.

17 The conduct of the respondent, after receiving notice of the initiating complaint from the applicant, was, to put it mildly, dilatory. Between 6 December 2006 and 4 February 2009, the matter was listed for Directions hearing on 11 occasions only one of which was vacated. Hearing of the then defended substantive proceedings took place over several days in 2007. The matter was stood over for submissions which the respondent delayed. Delay in bringing the proceedings to completion was exacerbated by both senior and junior counsel appearing for the respondent throughout that period.

18 After the matter had finally reached the point of being adjourned for determination by the Tribunal, the respondent filed an application to re-open. The basis for that application was, in accordance with much that had gone before in the case conducted by and on behalf of the respondent, inconsistent and confused. The respondent advanced both an argument that his case had not closed, which was patently incorrect, and an argument that he did not require leave to re-open although he sought that leave.

19 Mr. Allen, new counsel appearing for the respondent on 15 July 2008, promptly conceded that the respondent’s case had clearly been closed; that he required leave to re-open; and that previous submissions filed on behalf of the respondent could be ignored.

20 A difficulty confronting the respondent was that the material sought to be put before the Tribunal as fresh evidence had been available at the time of the original hearing, and there had been a forensic decision made by counsel then representing the respondent, not to put that material into evidence.

21 On 15 July 2008, the Tribunal heard argument on the issue of re-opening the case for the respondent, admitting further evidence and allowing the tender of certain documents. In the course of that argument, senior counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that should the respondent succeed in his application, he would cross-examine the respondent about his alleged file note of December 2005, were it admitted into evidence, and also seek to ask further questions about the letter dated 3 May 2005, a purported copy of which was forwarded to the applicant by the respondent under cover of letter dated 1 December 2005.

22 In the interests of doing justice to the respondent, the Tribunal was minded to permit the respondent to re-open his case, whilst limiting the ambit of evidence to be adduced.

23 At the hearing on 15 July 2008, and continuing, largely due to the very sensible approach adopted by Mr Stitt QC for the applicant and Mr Allen, then counsel appearing for the respondent, the course of the proceedings was rationalised. In particular, the respondent’s case was conducted in a coherent and rational manner which contrasted sharply with its conduct on his behalf in the preceding years.

24 After hearing argument, the Tribunal took a short adjournment with a stated intention of handing down an ex tempore decision.

25 Whilst deliberating, the Tribunal was requested to return to the bench in order to be advised by counsel for the respondent that the respondent wished to change his plea and admit the allegations contained in the complaints filed by the applicant and the particulars pleaded in support of those allegations. Thus, he conceded that the applicant had established both grounds viz: that he had, without reasonable excuse, failed to comply with a Notice pursuant to section 152 of the Legal Profession Act 1987; and that he had failed to assist the Law Society in the investigation of a complaint.

26 Orders were made for material in mitigation and any other material to be filed by the respondent and the matter was set down for further hearing on 10 September 2008. That date and a subsequent hearing date in November were vacated. The matter finally came on for hearing on the issue of mitigation and penalty on 9 April 2009.

27 The respondent’s plea leads inevitably to a finding that he is guilty of professional misconduct in that :

(1) He failed, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a Notice pursuant to Section 152 of the Legal Profession Act 1987;

(2) He failed to assist the Law Society in the investigation of a complaint.

28 The Tribunal is satisfied that the evidence adduced by the applicant establishes all the necessary evidentiary material required to ground those admissions. The Tribunal is satisfied that the relevant matters set out hereunder have been established to the requisite standard.

29 The complainant, Mrs Jill Hancock, was, at all relevant times, the stepmother of the respondent.

30 On 17 December 2004 Mrs Hancock wrote to the Legal Services Commissioner complaining about the conduct of the respondent in relation to a loan transaction which, acting as her solicitor, he had arranged between her and one, Rahmi Ayoub. Mrs Hancock was the lender and Rahmi Ayoub was the borrower.

31 On 4 January 2005, the Legal Services Commissioner referred the complaint to the Law Society for investigation.

32 The Tribunal is satisfied that the particulars set out in paragraph 2 above have been established as matters of fact.

33 By letter dated 7 January 2005, the applicant forwarded a copy of the complaint to the respondent.

34 Further letters seeking a response were forwarded to the respondent on 9 and 22 March 2005.

35 By letter of 11 April the applicant received the respondent’s initial response to the complaint.

36 By letter forwarded to the respondent on 13 April 2005, the respondent was requested by the applicant to “within ten (10) days of today’s date provide me with your file, and or files that relate to the transaction…”

37 On 3 May 2005 the applicant again wrote to the respondent reminding him that his file/s had not been received by the applicant, and responding also to his letter of 11 April.

38 By letter dated 3 May 2005 purportedly forwarded to the applicant on or about that date, the respondent made submissions concerning the complaint.

39 As noted in paragraph 2 above, the applicant wrote to the respondent in July and October 2005 seeking his files and further information.

40 Pursuant to a resolution of the Professional Conduct Committee on 3 November 2005, the respondent was served with a Notice pursuant to Section 152 L P A 1987, the terms of which were unequivocal and required the respondent:

(a)To provide, verified by statutory declaration, the information set out in Schedule 1 hereto to the Manager of the Professional Standards Department, Law Society of New South Wales on or before twenty-one days after service on the legal practitioner of notice of this resolution;

and

(b) To produce, on or before the twenty-first day after service on the legal practitioner of notice of this resolution, the documents specified in Schedule 2 hereto to the Manager of the Professional Standards Department at the office of the Department, 7th Floor, Law Society Building, 170 Phillip Street, Sydney;

and

(c) To assist in, or co-operate with, the investigation of the complaint of Jill Hancock against John Leslie Hancock in the manner specified in Schedule 3 hereto.
SCHEDULE 1
The source of the funds that permitted the solicitor to remit to the complainant the sum of $25,000.00 the solicitor says was repaid to the complainant and also a further sum of $10,000.00 that the solicitor says was paid to the complainant.
SCHEDULE 2
The solicitor’s matter files for the loan and security to support that loan by Jill Hancock to Rahmi Ayoub.
The solicitor’s matter files relating to attempts to remedy any default in the repayment arrangements of the loan referred to above.
SCHEDULE 3
To co-operate with the staff of the Society in providing information to establish any audit trail of funds passing from the complainant to the borrower and repayments from the borrower to the complainant and to respond to the Society’s letter of 18 July 2005.
FURTHER RESOLVED that if the legal practitioner is unable to comply with the preceding resolution, the legal practitioner must provide a statutory declaration to the Manager of the Professional Standards Committee Department, Law Society of New South Wales, on or before twenty-one days after the service on the legal practitioner of this resolution stating the reasons for the inability to comply with this resolution.

41 The respondent having been served with the Notice on 9 November 2005 had until 1 December 2005 within which time to respond.

42 On 1 December 2005 the respondent wrote to the Law Society enclosing a copy of a letter bearing the date 3 May 2005, which he purportedly had forwarded to the applicant on or about the date appearing on the copy letter.

43 The letter bearing date 3 May 2005 purported to reply to the applicant’s letter dated 13 April 2005.

44 Having regard to the subsequent defence raised by the respondent, of particular significance is the assertion in this letter that :

“In relation to your fifth paragraph the relevant files have been pulled from storage and the transaction showing the payments are provided under cover of this letter.”

45 The copy letter forwarded on 1 December 2005 did not contain any annexure showing the payment transactions referred to, nor have any such documents been produced to the Tribunal in the course of these lengthy proceedings.

46 In a Statutory Declaration dated 9 October 2006, the respondent admitted that the letter purporting to have been sent on 3 May 2005 was never in fact sent. He deposed that it was in fact a draft. For reasons that the respondent did not explain, the copy sent to the applicant was written on his firm letterhead.

47 At no time did the respondent provide to the applicant those relevant files that had allegedly been “pulled from storage”.

48 It is notable that the respondent’s defence in relation to the section 152 Notice, in part relied upon his assertion that since no files had ever come into existence in relation to the transaction, he could not produce files in response to the section 152 Notice.

49 The Tribunal is satisfied to the relevant standard [Briginshaw v. Briginshaw (1938) 60 C.L.R. 336] that based upon the totality of the evidence regarding the letter dated 3 May 2005, a copy of which was furnished to the applicant under cover of letter on 1 December 2005, that letter was a fabrication that came into existence on a date unknown; that it was not sent on 3 May 2005; and that the only inference that can be drawn from the manufacture of the letter, was that the respondent sought to mislead the applicant when he sent a purported copy under cover of his letter of 1 December.

50 The Tribunal is satisfied that at the time of sending the letter of 1 December 2005, the respondent, to his knowledge, was aware that the letter had not been sent on 3 May 2005, and further, he was aware that relevant files had not been pulled from storage, as by his own subsequent admission there were none, and further, he knew that he was not in possession of any document showing payment transactions in the matter of Mrs. Hancock and Mr Ayoub.

51 The Tribunal is satisfied that the fictitious letter came into existence in furtherance of an endeavour by the respondent to persuade the applicant that he was seeking to comply with the section 152 Notice by producing files and evidence of monetary transactions.

52 These actions on the part of the respondent are of a most serious nature. They constitute a deliberate and dishonest attempt by the respondent to deflect the investigation by the applicant.

53 It is well settled that a member of a professional body such as the Law Society of New South Wales, is under an obligation to be truthful to that body. The failure to do so is evidence of a high level of moral turpitude.

54 As was submitted by the applicant, it is one thing to fail to assist the applicant in an investigation, it is quite another, and constitutes far graver misconduct to deliberately concoct and deliver to the applicant, a false document which, inter alia, asserts that files and documents exist, which to the knowledge of the respondent did not exist.

55 As is set out in paragraph 2 above, after receiving the letter of 1 December 2005, the applicant communicated in writing with the respondent on numerous occasions requesting his compliance with the section 152 Notice.

56 Finally on 9 October 2006 the respondent signed a Statutory Declaration which was forwarded to the applicant. That Statutory Declaration contained an admission that there were no files in existence in relation to the transactions between Mrs Hancock and Mr Ayoub; it asserted that Mrs Hancock had legal rights to enforce the guarantee the respondent had provided her in relation to the transaction; and asserted that he was “…unable to sensibly comply with the strict terms of the notice” given the nature of his relationship with Mrs. Hancock.

57 The manner in which the respondent conducted his defence cannot be ignored. Firstly he persisted in a view that given his familial relationship with Mrs Hancock, he could not be held professionally responsible albeit the facts of the matter would have persuaded any practitioner who turned his mind to those facts combined with his professional obligations, that whether or not Mrs Hancock was his stepmother, he clearly was acting as her solicitor throughout the proceedings and as such had an obligation to meet all the standards of professional conduct relating to the transaction. This he signally failed to do.

58 Further, the respondent both in writing and through his counsel in the course of the initial defended proceedings[ prior to the appointment of Mr Allen as his counsel], and in lengthy written submissions, alleged serious breaches of ethical conduct perpetrated by officers of the Law Society in pursuance of their investigation and prosecution of the complaints against him. Those allegations were totally without foundation. Nor was any attempt made to substantiate those allegations. The Tribunal is satisfied that there is not a scintilla of evidence to support those serious allegations.

59 The Tribunal is of the view that those unfounded allegations combined with the respondent’s falsification of the alleged letter of 3 May 2005, call into question the suitability of the respondent to remain a legal practitioner. They demonstrate a serious lack of judgment in conducting himself when faced with a difficult situation in the course of his duties as a legal practitioner. Faced with a complaint that he had failed in his professional responsibilities, the respondent, rather than admit the truth of those allegations, resorted to making false statements; falsification of a letter; and allegations of serious misconduct on the part of Law Society staff which were entirely without foundation.

60 Section 152 LPA 1987 relevantly provides:

(1)For the purpose of investigating a complaint, a Council or the Commissioner may, by notice in writing served on any legal practitioner, require the legal practitioner to do one or more of the following:
a)to provide written information, by a date specified in the notice, and to verify the information by a statutory declaration,
b)to produce at a time and place specified in the notice, any document (or a copy of a document) specified in the notice ,

(4)A legal practitioner who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with such a requirement is guilty of professional misconduct.

61 The respondent was served with the Notice pursuant to section 152 LPA 1987 on 9 November 2005. He failed to comply with the provisions of section 152 until he provided his statutory declaration 11 months later on 9 October 2005.

62 During the intervening period the respondent received repeated reminders from the applicant Law Society. As a consequence of the respondent’s failure to comply with the section 152 Notice, the investigation of the respondent’s conduct being undertaken by the Law Society was substantially impeded. This resulted in a significant delay in investigating the circumstances of a well founded complaint which Mrs Hancock had for a considerable period sought to resolve by direct communication with the respondent. She was entitled to expect that when faced with inquiry from his professional body the respondent would provide the requested information. Likewise, the Law Society was entitled to expect the respondent to meet his professional obligation to provide the information sought, and not to hinder and delay the investigation into his conduct.

63 The delaying tactics engaged in by the respondent were exacerbated by both the fiction that he had written to the Law Society on 3 May 2005, and the false information that he was obtaining matter files which he subsequently maintained did not exist.

64 It is well settled that the provisions of section 152 LPA 1987 provide a legitimate and essential legislative tool to assist investigations into complaints made against legal practitioners. It is highly desirable that in the interests of maintaining the highest standards of professional conduct, investigative bodies are empowered to demand co-operation from members of the profession in the investigation and resolution of complaints. The speedy and effective investigation of complaints is beneficial to both the public and to members of the profession.

65 In The New South Wales Bar Association v. Howen (No 2) [2003] NSWADT 235 the Tribunal pointed out that “Failure to comply with a notice may frustrate an investigation or make the investigation more difficult, time consuming and costly. We cannot deal with failure to comply with a section 152 notice as if the failure were a trivial matter.” This Tribunal adopts that view as highly relevant in this case in which there was a determined obstruction of the Law Society in the investigation of the complaint, and a similar determination to delay and frustrate the final disposition of the matter before the Tribunal.

66 Whilst the Tribunal has made a point of the change of attitude consequent upon the instructing of counsel for the respondent who appeared in the matter when the issues were finally resolved, that should not be taken as an inference that the respondent was not responsible for the manner in which the proceedings were conducted on his behalf by counsel previously instructed. At all times the respondent, a qualified solicitor, must be taken to have been providing his legal representatives with instructions, as he ultimately conceded.

67 The Tribunal regards the overall conduct of the respondent in relation to delay, with the utmost gravity.

68 The adverse view of the respondent’s conduct based upon his delay and obfuscation, is exacerbated by issues surrounding his credibility. The Tribunal was not impressed by the evidence given by the respondent. Specifically, the Tribunal came to the view that it could not accept uncorroborated evidence from the respondent in relation to key matters.

69 The Tribunal does not accept that the respondent was, or ever has been, in possession of documentary evidence that would establish payment of funds into Mrs Hancock’s account. Nor does the Tribunal accept the evidence of the respondent that he was present and observed Mr Ayoub make a $3,000 payment into Mrs Hancock’s account.

70 As earlier indicated the Tribunal has some concern about the respondent’s suitability as a legal practitioner, having regard to his conduct throughout these proceedings. Despite those misgivings, the Tribunal proposes to makes those findings sought by the Law Society and not opposed by the respondent.

71 The Tribunal is hopeful that the respondent will appreciate that he has been dealt with leniently on this occasion; that he will reflect carefully on both his conduct which gave rise to the initial complaint and his conduct once an investigation was undertaken by the Law Society and lastly, his conduct before this Tribunal.

72 In determining the matter of an appropriate penalty, the Tribunal has taken into account that the respondent has been a solicitor for almost 20 years; that ultimately he conceded that he had dealt with the matter of Mrs Hancock and Mr Ayoub inadequately and inappropriately; he conceded that he had been guilty of delay; and importantly, he offered an apology for the offensive suggestions concerning those concerned with the investigation and prosecution of the matter.

73 Whilst the Tribunal accepts that very tardy acknowledgement of his shortcomings, the Tribunal emphasises that, the respondent’s assertion that he regarded the matter as a “family” matter, thus, in his view, not giving rise to professional responsibilities, remains a matter of concern.

74 The respondent had ample opportunity following service of the section 152 notice and throughout the lengthy proceedings before the Tribunal, to make an objective assessment of his role in facilitating the loan from Mrs Hancock to Mr Ayoub. He failed, until the very end, to admit that he had acted as his stepmother’s solicitor throughout that transaction.

75 The Tribunal has taken into account the character references provided for the respondent, and his voluntary work for church and charitable institutions.

76 The Tribunal makes the following orders:

1.The respondent is guilty of professional misconduct.
2.The respondent is publicly reprimanded.
3.The respondent is fined the sum of $5,000.
4.The respondent is to pay the costs of the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales

17/06/2010 - typographical error, respondent to be applicant - Paragraph(s) Paragraph 28