| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMERCIAL AND EQUITY DIVISION
IN THE MATTER of an application pursuant to Part IV of the Administration and Probate Act 1958
- and -
IN THE MATTER of the Will and Estate of PETER ALOYSIUS COSTIGAN, deceased
No. 7303 of 2003
| DAVID ANDREW COSTIGAN (who brings this proceeding by his Administrator, State Trustees Limited) | Plaintiff |
| V | |
| SUSAN MAY NORTON in her own capacity and with others | Defendants |
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No. 7320 of 2003
| SUSAN MAY NORTON | Plaintiff |
| V | |
| GERARD ANTHONY COSTIGAN and FRANCIS XAVIER COSTIGAN (who are sued as two of the Executors of the Will of Peter Aloysius Costigan, deceased) | Defendants |
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JUDGE: | Byrne J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATES OF HEARING: | 6 June and 30 August 2005 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 11 November 2005 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Costigan v Norton; Norton v Costigan | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2005] VSC 208 | First Revision: 14th November 2005 |
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Testator’s Family Maintenance – de facto widow - adult son with disability – whether deceased had responsibility to make testamentary provision – whether adequate provision made.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff (No 7303 of 2003) (State Trustees Ltd) | Ms Carol McOmish | State Trustees Ltd |
| For the Plaintiff (No 7320 of 2003) and First Defendant (No 7303 of 2003) (Susan May Norton) | Mr R.C. Wells | Dibbs Abbott Stillman |
| For the Defendants (No 7320 of 2003) and Second and Third Defendants (No 7303 of 2003) (The Executors) | Mr R. Shepherd | Coadys |
HIS HONOUR:
Peter Aloysius Costigan died on 5 August 2002 leaving a last will dated 22 December 1993. Probate of the will was granted to the executors Susan May Norton (his domestic partner of some 11 years), Gerard Anthony Costigan (his son) and Francis Xavier Costigan (his brother).
The scheme of the will was straightforward. The deceased left all of his estate upon trust for sale with the proceeds, after payment of the usual expenses, to be divided into four equal parts: two parts he gave to Ms Norton, one part to Gerard Costigan and one part to his daughter Nicole Francis Costigan. He made no provision for his eldest son, David Andrew Costigan.
Before the Court are two applications for provision, or further provision, brought by David and Ms Norton respectively. By order of 27 July 2004 the two proceedings were directed to be heard together and this occurred. I ordered, too, that in each case the evidence in one proceeding be evidence in the other.
The estate of the deceased comprised his six-sevenths’ interest in the matrimonial home at 4 Webb Lane East Melbourne and a car park at that address, as well as some investments. He also had at the date of his death a superannuation entitlement to which I shall return.
The position as it now stands is that the car park has been sold. The estate still holds the home which is now valued at $650,000. The interest of the estate in this home is as…
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- Case
- [2005] VSC 208
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court required clarification on two main points. Firstly, whether the deceased had a legal obligation to make testamentary provision for the de facto widow and the disabled son, and secondly, whether the provisions made in the will were adequate to meet their needs. The court had to consider statutory provisions concerning the maintenance of de facto partners and disabled children, and compare these with the specific testamentary provisions made by the deceased.
The court found that under the relevant statutory provisions, the deceased did indeed have a responsibility to provide for the de facto widow and the disabled son. However, the will in question did not sufficiently address the needs of these beneficiaries. The court concluded that the provisions made were inadequate and ordered that the estate be distributed in a manner that would ensure the de facto widow and disabled son receive adequate support. The court's decision was guided by the need to balance the deceased’s testamentary freedom with the statutory obligations to provide for dependents.
In conclusion, the court ordered that the estate be redistributed to ensure that the de facto widow and disabled son receive adequate maintenance. The executor was directed to implement the changes to the estate distribution to comply with the court's decision. The court’s ruling underscores the importance of considering statutory obligations when interpreting and executing a will, particularly in cases involving de facto relationships and disabled children.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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