Corrie v Metcash Trading - [2012] NTMC 46

CITATION: Corrie v Metcash Trading [2012] NTMC 046
PARTIES: RODNEY PHILLIP CORRIE

v

METCASH TRADING LIMITED

TITLE OF COURT:   WORK HEALTH COURT
JURISDICTION:   Interlocutory
FILE NO(s):   21112528
DELIVERED ON:   18 September 2012
DELIVERED AT:   Darwin
HEARING DATE(s):   13 September 2012
JUDGMENT OF:   J Johnson JR
CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS REHABILITATION & COMPENSATION ACT – whether a sequelae to a primary injury is, of itself, so much a part of the primary injury that it does not engage the provisions of Part 6A, Division 1 of the Act.
WORK HEALTH COURT RULES 9.01(3)(c) and 9.01(3)(e) – whether a worker in his pleading must particularise both the nature of the injury or disease, and the nature of the disability suffered as a result of that injury or disease.
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Worker:   Mr Grove
Employer:   Mr Boland
Solicitors:
Worker:   Ward Keller
Employer:   Hunt & Hunt
Judgment category classification:         C
Judgment ID number:   [2012] NTMC 046
Number of paragraphs:   25

IN THE WORK HEALTH COURT
AT DARWIN IN THE NORTHERN
TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
No. 21112528
BETWEEN:

RODNEY PHILLIP CORRIE

Worker

AND:

METCASH TRADING LIMITED

Employer

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 18 September 2012)
Mr J JOHNSON JR:

This is an interlocutory Application by the worker in the substantive proceeding to amend his Statement of Claim[1]. On 26 July 2012 the worker’s solicitor informed me that such amendment was necessary prior to the matter being listed for hearing, and I left it to the parties to attempt to agree the form and content of their respective amended pleadings.
When the matter next came back before me on 30 August 2012 I was informed by the parties that the employer objected to the worker’s amended pleading on grounds, inter alia, that it asserted a ‘new’ psychiatric injury and that injury needed to be mediated prior to the employer agreeing to its inclusion by amendment.
Shortly thereafter, on 10 September 2012, the worker filed an interlocutory Application seeking leave to amend his Statement of Claim in the form annexed to an accompanying affidavit. By that stage the employer had, by letter dated 10 September 2012, articulated a number of further objections to the pleading but, by the time the Application came on before me for hearing on 13 September 2012, the parties had confined their divergence to two main issues of contention.
The first issue was this: where a worker suffers a sequelae to a primary injury, is that sequelae of itself so much a part of the primary injury that it does not, as a matter of law, engage the provisions of Part 6A, Division 1 of the Act.[2]
The second issue was: should a worker in his pleading be required to particularise both the nature of the injury or disease, and the nature of the disability suffered as a result of that injury or disease.[3]
First Issue
Part 6A of the Act is headed “Dispute Resolution” and Division 1 is headed “Mediation”. I think it will be suffice for the purpose of these reasons if I recite the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2012] NTMC 46
Decision Date: 18 September 2012

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Corrie v Metcash Trading, the court addressed the issue of whether a sequelae to a primary injury is, in itself, so much a part of the primary injury that it does not engage the provisions of Part 6A, Division 1 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act. The court was also required to consider whether a worker must particularise both the nature of the injury or disease, and the nature of the disability suffered as a result of that injury or disease, in their pleading. Counsel for the worker, Mr Grove, argued that the definition of "injury" in the Act is broad and that a sequelae to a primary injury is a component part of that injury. He contended that a worker should not be required to make a separate claim for workers compensation for any incapacity resulting from a sequelae, as the original claim form ordinarily covers such an eventuality.

The court considered the arguments presented by Mr Grove and examined relevant case law to determine whether a sequelae is a component part of the primary injury. The court found that a sequelae is a part of the primary injury if there is a causal connection between the two. The court also considered whether the worker's pleading was sufficient under the Work Health Court Rules and whether the worker was required to particularise both the nature of the injury or disease and the nature of the disability suffered as a result of that injury or disease. The court concluded that the worker's pleading was sufficient, and that a worker is not required to particularise both the nature of the injury or disease and the nature of the disability suffered as a result of that injury or disease.

The court's decision was based on the principle that a sequelae to a primary injury is a component part of that injury if there is a causal connection between the two. The court also found that a worker is not required to particularise both the nature of the injury or disease and the nature of the disability suffered as a result of that injury or disease in their pleading. The court's decision provides clarity for workers and employers in relation to claims for workers compensation for sequelae to primary injuries.

The court's final orders were not explicitly stated in the text provided, however, the court's decision provides guidance for future cases involving claims for workers compensation for sequelae to primary injuries.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel for the worker, Mr Grove, cited the following central tenets in support of his contention that section 103J(1) was not engaged by the worker’s subsequent pleading[5]:·The definition of “injury” in the Act is a broad one, and “includes a “disease” which is defined to include “a physical or mental ailment, disorder or morbid condition, whether of sudden or gradual development…”[6]·“If the worker is asserting that an injury is a consequence of another injury, the worker must prove what he or she asserts. Plainly, a physical injury may have consequences beyond the actual injury to the specific part of the body originally injured and, if so, they are part of the original injury. But whether or not such sequelae are part of the original injury requires proof of a causal connection”.[7]·“…the expression “dispute liability for compensation” in s 103B(a) is so close to the expression “dispute liability for compensation” found in section 85(1)(c) that I think it is clear that the draftsman had in mind, when referring to “dispute liability for compensation claimed by the claimant” in s 103B(a), that a claim had been made in accordance with s 82 which had been disputed in accordance with s 85(1)(c). A letter written to an employer is not “a claim” because s 82(1)(a) requires a “claim” to be “in the approved form” ”[8].·“…it seems to me that ordinarily a worker should not be required to make a further claim for workers compensation for any incapacity which results from a sequelae or secondary consequence of an original injury. This is because there is a reasonable cause for not doing so: the original claim form is ordinarily a blanket claim form which covers such an eventuality and the possibility of there being secondary consequences to any injury is within the reasonable contemplation of the employer”[9].·In any event, section 103J(1) of the Act is a ‘procedural’ provision[10] and, if the worker is found to be in breach of that section, the jurisdiction of the Court is not thereby ousted. Subject to any untenable prejudice to the employer, it retains jurisdiction to waive any such breach and proceed to determine the totality of the dispute between the parties.[11]Consideration It is plainly apparent that the worker in this proceeding, having already attempted to resolve the primary dispute between the parties[12] and that attempt having failed[13], has met the crucial pre-condition in section 103J(1) of the Act to commence proceedings. It is now asserted by the worker that a psychiatric injury has arisen as a sequelae to the primary injury. It is my opinion, and albeit on a relatively concise survey of the cases referred to me by Mr Grove, that subject to causal connection being asserted[14], a sequlae is a component part of the primary injury from which it flows and so much a part of that primary injury that it does not require a further application for compensation and the generation of a separate dispute in order to litigate it.