CORP and TOWN OF CAMBRIDGE
[2020] WASAT 130
•23 OCTOBER 2020
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT 2005 (WA)
CITATION: CORP and TOWN OF CAMBRIDGE [2020] WASAT 130
MEMBER: DR S WILLEY, SENIOR MEMBER
HEARD: 31 JULY 2020
DELIVERED : 23 OCTOBER 2020
FILE NO/S: DR 277 of 2019
BETWEEN: STUART ADRIAN CORP
Applicant
AND
TOWN OF CAMBRIDGE
Respondent
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Town planning - Costs application - Whether decisionmaker genuinely attempted to make decision on merits - Whether decisionmaker behaved unreasonably in conduct of proceedings - Residual dispute about planning conditions - Impacts of COVID-19 pandemic
Legislation:
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), Pt 4, Div 5, s 47, s 47(1)(c), s 48, s 48(2), s 87
Town of Cambridge Local Planning Scheme No 1
Result:
Application for costs is dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | Mr M Phillips |
| Respondent | : | Ms R Young |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | Thompson Geer - Perth |
| Respondent | : | Moharich & More |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Citygate Properties Pty Ltd and City of Bunbury [2005] WASAT 53; (2005) 38 SR (WA) 246
Corp and Town of Cambridge [2019] WASAT 65; (2019) 97 SR (WA) 252
Humphreys and City of Stirling [2011] WASAT 105
Madame Ma's Proprietary Limited and City of Perth [2019] WASAT 131 (S)
RK [2020] WASAT 53 (S)
Springmist Pty Ltd and Shire of Augusta-Margaret River [2005] WASAT 143 (S); (2005) 41 SR (WA) 207
Tran and Town of Vincent [2009] WASAT 123 (S); (2009) 65 SR (WA) 260
Western Australian Planning Commission v Questdale Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 32; (2016) ) 213 LGERA 81
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Introduction
This is a rather unusual application for costs. I say 'unusual' because it arises in circumstances where the matter was resolved by consent without the need for a final hearing. However, this matter does have some history.
The matter was the subject of a final hearing which the Tribunal determined in favour of the Town of Cambridge (Town or respondent).[1] The only issue that was in contest in that hearing was whether the proposed dwelling was a 'single house' for the purposes of the Town of Cambridge Local Planning Scheme No 1 (LPS 1).
[1] Corp and Town of Cambridge [2019] WASAT 65; (2019) 97 SR (WA) 252(Corp).
The Town refused an application for a dwelling which proposed separate (but identical) residential wings for each of the proposed inhabitants. Mr Stuart Adrian Corp (the applicant) and his partner (Ms Katavatis) could live 'together but separate'. In evaluating the proposed design, the Tribunal found that what was proposed was not a 'single house' and was therefore prohibited by LPS 1. In these reasons, the initial Tribunal proceeding will be referred to as the Previous Proceeding.
I pause here to reiterate that, in the Previous Proceeding, the Town's only reason not to support the proposed dwelling was that it did not regard the built form as a 'single house'. The Town agreed that if the Tribunal found that the dwelling was a 'single house' then the dwelling 'should be approved subject to conditions'.[2]
[2] Corp at [16].
Following the Tribunal's decision in the Previous Proceeding, the applicant again applied for the approval for 'fundamentally' the same built form but with a modified internal arrangement.[3] In particular, there was no longer a duplication of kitchens as was the case with the Previous Proceeding.
[3] Respondent's s 24 Bundle, page 30.
Nevertheless, on 17 December 2019 the Town refused the proposed dwelling (the Proposed Development), not on the basis that the Proposed Development was not a single house, but for the following built form and design reasons:
1.The proposal contravenes the minimum front setback distance specified under Clause 26(1)(b) of Town Planning Scheme No 1;
2.The proposal does not meet the Residential objectives of the Town of Cambridge Local Planning Scheme No. 1, nor satisfy subclauses 67(m) and (n) of the Planning and Development (Local Planning Schemes) Regulations 2015, as the proposed reduced primary street setbacks would have an adverse building bulk impact on the streetscape, would not be compatible with the surrounding development and local character, and therefore would not be in accordance with orderly and proper planning in the locality;
3.The proposal does not satisfy the design principles of Clause 5.1.3 Lot Boundary Setback of the Residential Design Codes Volume 1, as the proposed reduced rear setbacks would have an adverse impact on amenity the locality as it does not meet the objectives of the low density area; and
4.The cumulative impact of the proposed reduced primary street and rear setbacks would have an adverse impact of building bulk on the adjoining properties.
The Town's decision on 17 December 2020 is the reviewable decision the basis of this proceeding. The applicant lodged his application for review on 24 December 2019.
The matter was finally resolved by consent on 24 June 2020 when the Tribunal made orders which finalised the proceedings. On 15 July 2020 the applicant made an application for costs pursuant to Div 5 of Pt 4 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act). The applicant claims the following costs:
a)the Tribunal's fee for commencing an application for review; and
b)all legal fees incurred (which total approximately $37,000).
The Town does not agree that its conduct is such that a costs order is appropriate. As a result, the matter now falls for my determination.
Chronology of events
Before I turn to consider the parties' submissions and the relevant principles on the question of costs, I set out the following chronology of how the matter progressed.
While this chronology is based only on the parties' submissions and the timeline of relevant Tribunal milestones, it does not appear to be in contest.
Date
Event
17 December 2019
Refusal of the application for development approval for the Proposed Development contrary to the officer recommendation.
17 January 2020
First directions hearing. The matter is brought to the Class 2 list to discuss concerns about estoppel and abuse of process.
28 February 2020
A further directions hearing. The Tribunal puts the Town on notice that should this matter proceed, it may be liable for costs.
6 March 2020
Following a Special Meeting the Council on 5 March 2020 the Town advises the applicant that it consents to a s 31 reconsideration order being made to approve the Proposed Development subject to 'appropriate conditions'.[4]
9 March 2020
Notice of the Council decision to approve the Proposed Development as per the original officer recommendation.
9 March 2020
The applicant puts forward a proposal to resolve the proceeding, including acceptable Crossover Conditions. [By way of background, the question of the vehicle crossover has been a contested issue between the applicant and the Town].
13 March 2020
The applicant made submissions to the Tribunal and to the Town indicating, amongst other things, that conditions 4 to 6 be amended.
24 March 2020
The Council failed to consider the approval of the Proposed Development at the meeting as scheduled, because the meeting did not go ahead due to a lack of quorum due to COVID-19 and it was adjourned to 26 March 2020.
26 March 2020
The Council met but several items had to be deferred to the meeting on 31 March 2020.
31 March 2020
The Council deferred consideration of the issue of the approval for the Proposed Development at this subsequent meeting, following a procedural motion to defer four items as the electronic form of the meeting (required by reason of COVID-19) was arduous for a councillor.
6 April 2020
The Tribunal made orders programming the proceeding through to a final hearing on 11 June 2020.
28 April 2020
The respondent proposed to reconsider the Proposed Development, pursuant to s 31 of the SAT Act and the parties agreed to consent orders. The Tribunal makes orders as requested.
28 April 2020
The Council made a decision to grant approval for the Proposed Development as per the original officer recommendation that was put to the Council when it refused approval.
8 May 2020
The Tribunal made orders formalising the grant of the Development Approval for the Proposed Development as per the consent orders agreed by the parties. The consent orders provided that Mr Corp challenged conditions 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
12 May 2020
The Town filed its Statement of Issues, Facts and Contentions (SIFC) and s 24 Bundle of Documents, reiterating its position for the retention of the conditions as per the original officer recommendation, including the Crossover Conditions. The respondent's SIFC addressed conditions 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
26 May 2020
The applicant filed its SIFC, confirming the only objection being to the Crossover Conditions. That is, the applicant withdrew his challenge to conditions 2 and 8 and suggested a small modification to condition 7.
24 June 2020
By orders of the Tribunal, the approval and the associated conditions were resolved by consent.
[4] Supplementary Affidavit of John Giorgi dated 18 August 2020, Attachment JG 6.
Applicant's submissions
The applicant's claim for costs refers to the chronology set out above. The applicant observes that it took the respondent:
(a)nearly five months to reverse its decision and grant approval; and
(b)nearly six months to ultimately grant development approval,
to the Proposed Development.
The applicant submits that the respondent has 'failed' to meet the expectations of the SAT Act in that:
(a)its initial refusal of the Proposed Development was not a genuine attempt to make a decision on the merits;
(b)it unreasonably prolonged the proceeding by taking nearly five months to properly reconsider its position; and
(c)its subsequent decision to grant development approval (and then also amend a condition relating to the vehicle crossover) was not based on any change in circumstances and is indicative that the original decision was unsubstantiated and without merit.
The applicant submits that the respondent's conduct has been unreasonable and was taken to disadvantage the applicant. The respondent's conduct resulted in the applicant incurring costs by having to:
(a)seek review of the decision in the Tribunal and participate in the proceeding for three months before the respondent reconsidered and granted development approval;
(b)continue to participate in the proceeding for a further two months and prepare for final hearing while the proposed conditions were adequately resolved; and
(c)unnecessarily prepare a final hearing on proposed conditions that were unmeritorious.
The respondent has, at every stage, maintained a position that was unsubstantiated and without merit. This has resulted in the Proposed Development (including the applicable conditions) being conceded at a late stage, leading to the applicant incurring unreasonable costs.
The applicant further submits that the 'prolonged' series of events cannot be put down to the difficulties that arose in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic which became an issue as 2020 progressed. The Town was able to conduct Council meetings electronically and also had the capacity to call Special Council Meetings.
The applicant's claim for costs is supported by a witness statement from the applicant in which he outlines some background to the Proposed Development and also the conduct of the proceeding in the Tribunal (including events addressed in the chronology set out above).
Respondent's submissions
The respondent does not concede the question of costs. The respondent notes that the applicant's claim is for all of his costs. That is, costs are being sought on an indemnity basis.
The respondent rejects the contention that its decision on 17 December 2019 was a not a 'genuine' decision on the merits. The decision was made on matters of concern to the Council in relation to built form and setback issues. Such matters are matters of proper planning principle. However, it was later identified that the decision made did not accord with the position that the Town had adopted in the Previous Proceeding.[5]
[5] Corp at [16].
The Town rectified the problem at its meeting on 5 March 2020 and that decision was communicated to the Tribunal and the applicant on 9 March 2020. Any 'unreasonableness' in the Town's initial decision was addressed in a timely manner.
The Town also submits that it did not unreasonably prolong the proceeding. Any delays after the 6 March 2020 were related to the need to resolve the applicable conditions that would attach to the approval. Ultimately, the Town submits that both it and the applicant 'compromised' on the applicable conditions.
The Town also identifies that the majority of the work that comprises the costs application (some $24,191.26 of the initial claim of $25,824.76) was for invoices issued after 6 March 2020. That is, the work was done in the context of the 'dispute' as to conditions.
The Town further submits that the efforts to negotiate and settle the conditions must take account of the circumstances of the COVID19 pandemic.
The Town's submissions referred to two affidavits of John Giorgi, the Town's Chief Executive Officer sworn on 8 April 2020 and a supplementary affidavit sworn on 18 August 2020 (respectively). Mr Giorgi's affidavits were directed to the Town's processing of the Proposed Development and the conduct of Council meetings during the relevant period.
Legal principles in costs applications in the Tribunal
The effect of s 87(1) of the SAT Act is that each party bear its own costs unless the Tribunal orders otherwise. As the Tribunal recently observed, having regard to s 87(1) of the SAT Act, 'there is no role for the presumptive starting position, which applies in curial litigation, that a successful party is prima facie entitled to his or her costs'.[6]
[6] RK [2020] WASAT 53 (S) [22]; Western Australian Planning Commission v Questdale Holdings Pty Ltd [2016]WASCA32;(2016) 213 LGERA 81 (Questdale Holdings) [50] (Murphy JA, Martin CJ and Corboy J agreeing).
The usual approach in proceedings that arise under Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) reflects the position set out in s 87(1) of the SAT Act.[7] However, pursuant to s 87(2) of the SAT Act, the Tribunal may exercise its discretion and make an order for the payment by a party of all or any of the costs of another party. As the Court of Appeal[8] has explained:
Section 87(2) is to be construed in the context that the legal rationale for an order for costs is not to punish the person against whom the order is made, but to compensate or reimburse the person in whose favour it is made. That rationale is evident in s 87(3) of the SAT Act. Accordingly, even in a statutory context where the presumptive position is that no costs will be ordered, generally speaking, the question is whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, it is fair and reasonable that a party should be reimbursed for the costs it incurred. The onus is on the party seeking an order in its favour.
(footnotes omitted)
[7] Citygate Properties Pty Ltd and City of Bunbury [2005] WASAT 53; (2005) 38 SR (WA) 246 (Citigate) [28].
[8] Questdale Holdings [51] (Murphy JA, Martin CJ and Corboy J agreeing).
The power to make a costs order includes the power under s 87(3) of the SAT Act to make an order for the payment of an amount to compensate a party for any expenses resulting from the proceeding. The effect of s 87(3) of the SAT Act is that the expenses that may be recovered are not limited to the traditional notion of legal costs, but can include other expenses and loss in connection with the conduct of the proceedings before the Tribunal.[9]
[9] Springmist Pty Ltd and Shire of Augusta-Margaret River [2005] WASAT 143 (S); (2005) 41 SR (WA) 207 [64]; Madame Ma's Proprietary Limited and City of Perth [2019] WASAT 131 (S) [16].
Costs orders are generally only made in review proceedings where a party has acted unreasonably. That includes where a party has failed to meet the expectation expressed in s 87(4) of the SAT Act.[10]
[10] Tran and Town of Vincent [2009] WASAT 123 (S); (2009) 65 SR (WA) 260 [35]; Humphreys and City of Stirling [2011] WASAT 105 [27].
The relevant expectation in s 87(4)(b) of the SAT Act that the Tribunal must have regard to in determining a costs application is whether the decision-maker has genuinely attempted to make a decision on its merits. However, s 87(4) of the SAT Act does not limit the matters which might be considered under s 87(2) of the SAT Act.[11]
Consideration
[11] Citygate [32].
It must be said that the Town's decision to refuse the Proposed Development was a poor one. Given the position the Town took in the Previous Proceeding, the applicant was entitled to consider that no issue would be taken by the Town with the proposed built form on a subsequent application.
However, in the exercise of discretion, and for the four reasons which I will now explain, I decline to award the applicant costs.
The first is that while the decision made by the Town on 17 December 2019 was, in effect, a change in position from the position it took in the Previous Proceeding, there was nothing in the Town's planning officer report which made reference to the range of considerations the Town could reasonably consider in relation to the Proposed Development which had a 'fundamentally similar' design.
Furthermore, from the materials I have reviewed, I can see nothing to suggest that the Town had taken legal advice on the question of raising built form as an issue in the wake of the Previous Proceeding. While it would have been desirable for the Town's planning staff to make it clear that it would be very difficult for the Council to take issue with the built form (in the context of the Previous Proceeding), town planners are not lawyers.
In addition, the Town's planning officer report stated:
Through the SAT process and based on the amended plans submitted to the SAT, by the time of the final hearing, the only issue in dispute was in relation to the land use and whether or not the proposed building was a single house. The proposed reduced primary street, secondary street and rear lot boundary setbacks, the removal of the existing street tree, and the crossover width, which were issues that formed part of the Council's refusal decision, did not form part of the SAT's decision.[12]
[12] Respondent's s 24 Bundle, page 30.
While the report does go on to outline that the proposed built form was 'fundamentally similar to the previous proposal', with regard to the external appearance, nowhere does it suggest that there may be any actual or implied limitation or restriction on the issues that Council may properly consider in the exercise of planning discretion.
And that is for good reason. I reiterate that town planners are not lawyers and I consider it is unfair to expect town planners to be aware that following the position taken at the Previous Proceeding, that there may be any restraint or limitation in its assessment of any subsequent application.
Further, the Town's planning officer report set out that 'the only issue in dispute was in relation to the land use and whether or not the proposed building was a single house' and that various built form issues 'did not form part of the SAT's decision'.[13]
[13] Respondent's s 24 Bundle, page 30.
To me, that advice does not equivocally say that the Town had but one issue with the Proposed Development. Rather it suggests that the Tribunal's decision only addressed one issue. Nowhere does the Town's planning officer report suggest that because the Town previously advised the Tribunal at a final hearing that it had no issue with the built form, that it would be very difficult (or unfair) for the Town to now raise built form issues in the exercise of planning discretion.
As much as it is not reasonable to expect the Town's planning staff to be versed in questions of abuse of process, that observation, at least in general terms, applies equally to the Town's elected councillors.
Only after the receipt of legal (or other professional) advice in the context of a question of an abuse of process, would a decision of the Council to the refuse the Proposed Development in the context of the Previous Proceeding, be conduct that falls within the scope of s 87(4) of the SAT Act. However, as I have explained, from what I can ascertain, that is not the case in this instance.
It was not unreasonable for the Town's professional planning staff not to be alive to issues such abuse of process arising from the Previous Proceeding. While the applicant had every right to be disappointed and frustrated by the Town's decision on the 17 December 2019, that decision does not, of itself, attract a costs order. There is no reasonable basis on which I could find that the Town did not genuinely attempt to make a decision on the merits.
Second, to the extent that the applicant's witness statement references the comments made by Senior Member Eddy at a directions hearing on 28 February 2020, as being an indication of the nature of the Town's unreasonable conduct, Senior Member Eddy's comments must be construed in their full context.[14]
[14] Witness statement of Stuart Adrian Corp dated 15 July 2020 at para 15.
As set out in the above chronology, having lodged his application on 24 December 2019, the matter was first listed for directions before the Tribunal on 17 January 2020. The matter originally appeared before Member Connor in the 'class 1' directions list. The question of estoppel or abuse of process was raised in the context of the Town's position in the Previous Proceeding.
The matter was then urgently listed for directions before Senior Member Eddy and myself later that day. The applicant appeared in person. The Town was legally represented. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Tribunal was forthright with the Town's counsel as to what position the Town might be in if this matter proceeded to a final hearing.
There was discussion about s 48 of the SAT Act on the question of proceeding being conducted to cause disadvantage. However, the Tribunal explained that the question of engaging powers under s 48 of the SAT Act required 'careful' consideration: ts 10, 17 January 2020.
However, the Tribunal made orders providing that if the applicant did seek to request the Tribunal exercise its powers under either s 47(1)(c) or s 48(2) of the SAT Act, then any such application was to be made within seven days. The matter was listed for further directions on 14 February 2020. The date of 14 February 2020 was subsequently adjourned for two weeks because the Town could not secure legal representation (as its solicitors had discontinued to act).
At the directions hearing on 28 February 2020, the applicant again appeared for himself. The Town was represented by counsel. Senior Member Eddy was presiding. Senior Member Eddy was again (appropriately in my view) forceful with the Town. Counsel for the Town properly gave the Tribunal frank answers and advised that 'there was no clear reason … as to why the setback issues were not raised in the primary proceedings': ts 4, 28 February 2020.
Counsel for the Town then outlined that in order to consider a proceeding to fall within the terms of either s 47 or s 48 of the SAT Act, at the very least the Town needed an opportunity to outline what its case would be on the question of built form (through, at least, the filing of a SIFC) before finding under either s 47 or s 48 of the SAT Act could properly be made.
Senior Member Eddy, correctly in my view, ultimately accepted that submission. However, whilst she agreed it would not be appropriate to immediately exercise powers under either s 47 or s 48 of the SAT Act, she then outlined to counsel for the Town that she would be very 'displeased' if the Town, in effect, conducted the proceeding in a way that sought to resile from the position it had previously taken in the Previous Proceeding: ts 5, 28 February 2020.
Senior Member Eddy further outlined that, in terms of the ongoing conduct of the matter, that if the matter was to progress she would consider exercising power that the Town pays the applicant's costs on an indemnity basis (including the Tribunal's costs): ts 7, 28 February 2020.
True it is that Senior Member Eddy made her displeasure at the Town's decision known in very frank terms. Quite properly in my view, she did not mince her words. She also expressed sympathy for the applicant who was not legally represented at the hearing.
However, the Senior Member's comments on that day must be considered in their proper context. One should not read Senior Member Eddy's more forceful comments in isolation or divorced from their proper context. What the Senior Member did suggest was that if the Town proceeded towards a final hearing and sought to, as it were, relitigate issues or to resile from the position it took on the built form in the Previous Proceeding, and should the Town be unsuccessful in that argument, then the Town was on notice that a fairly significant cost order may follow. Properly considered, the Senior Member said no more than that.
To the extent that the applicant refers to Senior Member Eddy's comments at that directions hearing to mean that the Town would be paying him costs on an indemnity basis going forward no matter what transpired, that assumption was ill-founded.
As it turned out, the Town (of its own volition) reconsidered its position shortly thereafter (on 5 March 2020) and by 9 March 2020 the applicant became aware that the Town was not going to be contesting the built form issues in a final hearing.
Following the directions hearing on 28 February 2020 the Town acted promptly to address the situation. Having made its position clear on 6 March 2020 (communicated by 9 March 2020), the Town confirmed this upon a formal reconsideration made pursuant to orders from the Tribunal on 28 April 2020. By 9 March 2020, the nature of any dispute changed to being a dispute about conditions. That is the issue to which I turn next.
Thirdly, the majority of the costs claimed by the applicant arise in the context of proposed conditions that would attach to the Proposed Development. As I have explained above, almost all of the legal costs incurred by the applicant were in the context of the dispute about the Town's proposed conditions and the preparation for a hearing on those disputed conditions.
The chronology shows that there was a range of discussions and positions put on the conditions between the Town and the applicant, including conditions relating to the crossover (which was a contested issue between the parties).
However, in my view, an important point in all this seems to have been glossed over. That point is that the conditions in the Previous Proceeding were never agreed between the parties. Because the Tribunal ultimately determined that the proposed dwelling was not a 'single house' there was no need for the Tribunal to address the question of conditions. However, what is clear in the applicant's response to the respondent's draft without prejudice conditions is that only four of the 10 proposed conditions were not in contest.[15] The applicant opposed a number of the Town's proposed conditions including conditions relating to the proposed crossover.
[15] DR 12 of 2019, Exhibit 9, tendered by Martin Flint.
Whatever maybe said about the Town's initial decision to refuse the Proposed Development on 17 December 2020, the question of conditions that would attach to any approval had always been a live issue between the parties. It was a residual issue left unresolved in the Previous Proceeding.
There is absolutely nothing unreasonable in the Town seeking to impose the conditions its sees as appropriate to regulate the built form and ongoing use of the land. In no way can the Town's conduct in this regard be said to fall within the scope of s 87(4) of the SAT Act.
Fourth, on the question of whether the Town unreasonably prolonged the dispute, I do not find that to be the case. As I have explained, following the directions hearing on 28 February 2020 the Town promptly reconsidered its position on the matter.
Whilst there was some delay in the Town formally reconsidering the matter and dealing with conditions, I also think that some latitude needs to be shown to take proper account of circumstances surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic. From late February 2020, the effects of the COVID19 pandemic were felt across Australia and impacted almost all households and organisations. The practice of 'social distancing' was introduced and public meetings (such as Council meetings) were cancelled. Organisations (including local governments) had to find new ways of conducting business, many businesses closed and many others had staff working from home.
I therefore find it entirely reasonable that the Council meeting on 24 March 2020 did not proceed due to a lack of a quorum on account of COVID-19 pandemic. Consideration of the Proposed Development was twice deferred because a councillor found dealing with the new concept of virtual Council meetings 'arduous'.[16] I, for one, have some sympathy with that councillor's experience. All of these events, which were completely out of the Town's control, took additional time and prolonged the resolution of this matter. However, none of that can be said to be unreasonable conduct on the part of the Town.
Conclusion
[16] Affidavit of John Giorgi dated 8 April 2020 at paras 1922.
In light of the applicable principles on the question of costs set out above, I find there is an insufficient basis on which to award costs. The Town's initial decision on 17 December 2019 was far from ideal but is not such so as to attract an adverse costs order. The Town's subsequent conduct in dealing with the Proposed Development does not attract a costs order.
Of course, the applicant is entitled to feel frustrated and disappointed about how these matters transpired. However, in light of the applicable principles, there is no basis on which I should award costs.
The costs application is dismissed.
Orders
The Tribunal Orders:
1.The application for costs is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
DR S WILLEY, SENIOR MEMBER
23 OCTOBER 2020
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