Corke v Corke - [1994] FCA 944

JUDGMENT NO. ........ ....,,...J

994 CiLf-

W-

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOI]TtI WALES REGISTRY	-	NO NG 536 of 1994
GENERAL DIVISION

TASWAWIAN CONSERVATION	TRUST
IN~ORPORATED Applicant
*AND:*
MINISTER FOR RESOURCES *AUD*	ANOR
Respondent

CORAMa

SACllVILLE J.

PLACE

a SYDNEY

DATE

17 -

1994

HIS HONOUR: Mr Basten has tendered a statement contained in a paragraph of a letter dated 10 January 1994. That letter is addressed to the executive director of the Australian Heritage Commission and it is signed by Mr Ross Dalton who is described as acting assistant secretary, forests branch, land resources division. The statement that is tendered consists of two sentences. The first refers to the sources of saw logs to be processed by Gunns which is the second respondent in the present proceedings. That statement asserts that the sources are the same as those considered for two licences granted to two other companies.

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The second sentence states a belief framed with the words "we believe". The belief expressed is that should the Minister issue a licence to Gunns, including the export of wood chips from logs harvested from certain National Estate areas, there would be an adverse effect on the National Estate in relation to logging operations and hence he would need to formally consult with the you, that is with the Austranlian Heritage Commission, in

. .

accordance with 8.30 of the Australian Commiss~on Acf

1975. Although some argument was directed to the possible application of s.7B of the Evidence Act 1905 (Cth) as the basis for supporting the admissibility of this statement in the letter,

Mr Basten ultimately rested his submission on the proposition

that the statements should be regarded as admissions, admissible as such as against the Minister, but not as against the second respondent. Technically speaking, that would produce the consequence that the statement would be admissible against the first respondent only but not against the second respondent. As Mr Hale has pointed out it may be that that is a distinction that will be more theoretical than practical in its application to the circumstances of this case. Be that as it may, I should deal with the matter as a suggested admission.

Mr Basten referred to the decision of Smiles v Commissioner of

m a t i o n (1992) 35 FCR 405, at 414, in support of his proposition that Mr Dalton should be taken as having authority to make an admission on these matters as against the interests of the Minister. In that case it was held by Davies J. that a Mr Mitchell, who was found to be the person in charge of the

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prosecution of Mr Smiles on behalf of the Australian Taxation Office was in a position to make an admission as to the reasons for the institution of the p&secution. Mr Basten submitted that

M1: Dalton was in a similar position vis a vis the Minister in the

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Corke v Corke

Details

AGLC: Corke v Corke [1994] FCA 944
Case: [1994] FCA 944
Decision Date: 17 Nov 1994

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Corke v Corke is a legal dispute adjudicated by the Federal Court of Australia in the New South Wales registry. The matter involves a judicial review application brought by the Tasmanian Conservation Trust Incorporated against the Minister for Resources. The primary contention revolves around the admissibility of specific statements made by Mr. Ross Dalton, acting assistant secretary of the Forests Branch, Land Resources Division, in a letter dated January 10, 1994. The Trust's application seeks to challenge the Minister's decision to grant a logging license to Gunns, which includes the export of wood chips from certain National Estate areas.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the statements made by Mr. Dalton could be admitted as evidence against the Minister. The applicant argued that these statements should be considered admissions and therefore admissible against the Minister, but not against Gunns. The applicant relied on the principle that such statements could be treated as admissions in the context of judicial review proceedings. Conversely, the respondent argued that Mr. Dalton did not have the authority to make such admissions on behalf of the Minister. The court was required to determine whether Mr. Dalton had the requisite authority to make these admissions and, if so, whether the statements should be admitted as evidence.

Justice Sackville, after reviewing the evidence, concluded that Mr. Dalton had the authority to make admissions regarding factual matters connected to the application he was involved in. The court found that Mr. Dalton, as Acting Assistant Secretary, had the requisite authority to make factual admissions on behalf of the Minister. However, the court rejected the admission of Mr. Dalton's opinion expressed in the second sentence of the statement. The court held that while expressions of opinion by senior officers can sometimes be admissible, the opinion in question did not pertain directly to the jurisdictional facts necessary for the applicant's case. Therefore, the court admitted the first sentence of the statement as an admission against the Minister but rejected the second sentence as inadmissible.

The final orders of the court reflect the decision that the first sentence of the statement made by Mr. Dalton is admissible as an admission against the Minister, whereas the second sentence, expressing an opinion, is not admissible for the purposes of the applicant's case. This decision ensures that the judicial review process remains focused on factual admissions and excludes opinions that do not directly impact the jurisdictional issues at hand.

Orders