Corica v Throssell - [2017] WASCA 209

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION: CORICA -v- THROSSELL [2017] WASCA 209

CORAM: BUSS P
MAZZA JA
BEECH JA

HEARD: 14 SEPTEMBER 2017

DELIVERED : 14 SEPTEMBER 2017

PUBLISHED : 15 NOVEMBER 2017

FILE NO/S: CACR 64 of 2017
CACR 124 of 2017
CACR 125 of 2017

BETWEEN: SALVATORE CORICA
Appellant
AND
JONATHAN THROSSELL
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram  :McKECHNIE J
File No  :SJA 1055 of 2012, SJA 1056 of 2012

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Application for leave to appeal against decisions of single judge of the Supreme Court in appeals against sentence and conviction - Failure to comply with direction under s 214(3) of the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) - Whether prosecution was commenced by an authorised person - Where appeals were commenced over four years out of time

Legislation:

Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 20
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA), s 214

Result:

Application dismissed
Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: In person
Respondent: Mr A Wadham

Solicitors:

Appellant: In person
Respondent: McLeods Barristers & Solicitors

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Bardsley v The Queen [2004] WASCA 251; (2004) 29 WAR 338
Corica v Shire of Mundaring [2017] WASCA 42
Corica v Throssell [2012] WASC 393
Hopes v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] WASCA 108
Lancaster v The Queen [1989] WAR 83
Palmer v City of Gosnells [2014] WASCA 102
Robertson v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 83
Wimbridge v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 196

REASONS OF THE COURT: The appellant filed three appeals and seeks leave to appeal against decisions made by McKechnie J on 21 September 2012: see Corica v Throssell.[1] The appeals were filed grossly out of time.
[1] Corica v Throssell [2012] WASC 393.
On 8 September 2017, the appellant filed an application in each appeal seeking various orders.
On 14 September 2017, we made these orders in each appeal:
1.The appellant's application filed 8 September 2017 seeking various orders is dismissed.
2.The appellant's application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
3.The appeal is dismissed.
At the time, we said we would publish our reasons at a later date. These are our reasons.

Background

The appellant was charged by a prosecution notice filed in the Midland Magistrates Court and issued by the respondent in his capacity as Chief Executive Officer and employee of the Shire of Mundaring with an offence contrary to s 214(7) of the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA). As amended, the charge read:
Between 11 July 2010 and the date of the signing of this prosecution notice, both dates inclusive, [at an address in Greenmount] [the appellant] failed to comply with the direction to him under s 214(3) of the Planning and Development Act 2005 requiring him to remove fill from the land within the time specified in the direction.
The prosecution notice was signed by the respondent and witnessed by a justice of the peace on 17 November 2010.
It was alleged by the respondent that the appellant placed extensive amounts of fill on his property without the authorisation of the local authority, the Shire of Mundaring. The appellant sought retrospective planning approval for the fill. This application was refused. The appellant deposited further fill on the property. On 10 May 2010, the Shire gave the appellant a formal direction under s 214(3) of the Planning and Development Act requiring him to reduce the level of fill. The appellant did not comply with this direction.
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. A trial date of 17 November 2011 was scheduled. On the morning that the trial was scheduled to commence, the appellant, who was represented by experienced counsel, pleaded guilty and was duly convicted. The record of proceedings reveals that the plea was entered by the appellant after negotiations with the respondent's lawyers. The magistrate adjourned sentencing the appellant to another date. The purpose of this adjournment was to, in effect, give the appellant an opportunity to mitigate the penalty to be imposed by performing certain works.
On 15 February 2012, prior to the sentencing, the appellant applied to set aside his guilty plea and enter a plea of not guilty. It is unnecessary for present purposes to set out the reasons proffered by the appellant for this proposed change of plea. They are set out in some detail between [10] ‑ [20] of McKechnie J's reasons.
On 12 April 2012, the magistrate dismissed the application. He took the view that the Magistrates Court had no jurisdiction to allow the proposed change of plea, but had there been, the magistrate would not have allowed the change of plea because the appellant understood the charge and the consequences of his plea, and that the plea was not entered under any kind of duress.[2]
[2] Corica v Throssell [27] ‑ [28].
The magistrate fined the appellant $15,000 and imposed daily penalties that totalled $6,500.
The appellant sought leave to appeal to the General Division of the Supreme Court of Western Australia on both conviction and sentence. The appeal against conviction relied upon grounds which, in essence, alleged that the learned magistrate should have set aside the plea of guilty and entered a plea of not guilty. The appeal against sentence alleged, in essence, that the magistrate did not take into account mitigating circumstances and that the fine and the total daily penalty were manifestly excessive. McKechnie J granted leave to appeal in each case and dismissed the appeals.
In respect of the appeal against conviction, his Honour found that the magistrate erred in concluding that he had no power to set aside the pleas of guilty. However, having regard to the magistrate's findings concerning the entry of the plea of guilty there was no basis to set it aside.[3]
[3] Corica v Throssell [45] ‑ [49].
In respect of the appeal against sentence, his Honour rejected the appellant's claim that the magistrate failed to take into account mitigating factors and concluded that the fine and total daily penalty were not manifestly excessive.[4]
[4] Corica v Throssell [60] ‑ [63].
In addition to dismissing the appeals, his Honour ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs in both appeals fixed in the total sum of $5,000.
On 13 March 2017 (in CACR 64 of 2017) and then on 7 June 2017 (in CACR 124 of 2017 and CACR 125 of 2017), the appellant filed notices of appeal. These notices appear to challenge his Honour's decisions in respect of conviction, sentence and costs.
CACR 64 of 2017 was filed approximately 4 years 6 months out of time, while CACR 124 of 2017 and CACR 125 of 2017 were filed approximately 4 years 9 months out of time. Extensions of time are required in each case. By any standard, the delay is gross. Where there has been a lengthy delay, the court requires exceptional circumstances to be shown before granting an extension of time for leave to appeal, unless it can be shown that there will be a miscarriage of justice if an extension is not granted: see Lancaster v The Queen[5] and other cases including Robertson v The State of Western Australia[6] and Wimbridge v The State of Western Australia.[7] The affidavits filed by the appellant on 13 March 2017 and 7 June 2017 in support of an extension of time fail dismally to adequately explain the delay.
[5] Lancaster v The Queen [1989] WAR 83, 85 (Malcolm CJ).
[6] Robertson v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 83 [9] (Buss JA).
[7] Wimbridge v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 196 [19], [20] (Wheeler JA).
In Bardsley v The Queen,[8] and later in Wimbridge v The State of Western Australia, Wheeler JA recognised the possibility that there will be applications for an extension of time within which to appeal in which the delay is so long and inadequately explained that they ought to be refused even though the applicant has demonstrated the existence of a ground that would have led to the appeal being successful if made in time.[9] Ultimately, it is unnecessary to decide whether the present case should be decided on this basis. Not only is the delay in each appeal gross and unexplained, but none of the 20 proposed grounds of appeal has any merit.
[8] Bardsley v The Queen [2004] WASCA 251; (2004) 29 WAR 338.
[9] Bardsley v The Queen [108] ‑ [114]; Wimbridge v The Queen [25].
The proposed grounds of appeal in each case are identical. They are annexed to these reasons.
Insofar as the grounds and the arguments in support of them are comprehensible, they do not challenge the correctness of McKechnie J's or the magistrate's reasons for decision. Instead they challenge the authority of the respondent, his employer, the Magistrates Court, the General Division of the Supreme Court and this court to exercise their functions.
Some of the appellant's arguments reflect the arguments which this court rejected in Corica v Shire of Mundaring.[10] We note that an application by the appellant for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia was dismissed on 11 October 2017.
[10] Corica v Shire of Mundaring [2017] WASCA 42.
Other proposed grounds are really nothing more than scandalous and unfounded allegations of criminal conduct against the respondent and the Shire of Mundaring, their lawyers and the courts in this State. Still other proposed grounds of appeal seek to ventilate eccentric and irrational constitutional theories and theories about standing which this court has rejected in such decisions as Palmer v City of Gosnells[11] and Hopes v Australian Securities and Investments Commission.[12]
[11] Palmer v City of Gosnells [2014] WASCA 102.
[12] Hopes v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] WASCA 108.
The only potentially tenable point raised by the appellant is an allegation that the respondent was not authorised to bring the prosecution against the appellant. There is no merit in this point.
The Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) provides that a prosecution for an offence may be commenced by, and only by, amongst others, an authorised person in relation to the offence: s 20(3). An authorised person includes a person who is a public authority or an employee of a public authority: s 20(1)(b)(i). Section 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act defines a public authority to include a local government or a regional local government. The Shire of Mundaring is a local government and is a responsible authority as defined in s 4 of the Planning and Development Act. It has the power to bring prosecutions under that Act.
As we have already observed, the prosecution notice which commenced the prosecution against the appellant was duly signed by the respondent as Chief Executive Officer and employee of the Shire of Mundaring. There is no evidence before this court or the court below, capable of rebutting these facts. Accordingly the respondent was an authorised person as defined by s 20(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act and was authorised by s 20(3)(a)(i) of that Act to commence the prosecution against the appellant.
Save for the point that the respondent was not authorised to commence the prosecution against the appellant, the proposed grounds are frivolous, scandalous or vexatious.

Application filed 8 September 2017

The appellant filed an application in each appeal which, in effect, alleges that the Shire of Mundaring has committed offences under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The application is supported by an affidavit sworn by the appellant on 7 September 2017. The contents of the affidavit are frivolous, scandalous and vexatious. In any event, this court has no jurisdiction to make the orders sought.

Conclusion

For these reasons we made the orders set out at [3].

ANNEXURE

Appellants Grounds of Appeal:
The Appellant, aggrieved on the following grounds:
1. The Appellant a Real Living Human Being was denied True Justice when he was forced to appear as a Statutory Body before a Commercial Court a Magistrate Court and the Supreme Court a 'Trading Corporation's' under State Acts and Statutes a Company with a A.B.N. 70 598 519 443 the Department of the Attorney General and owned by the Vatican Trading as 'UNIDROIT AGREEMENT'.
The Appellant demands to be heard before a Court of 'TRUTH' and a Court of Competent Jurisdiction under Chapter 111 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 and under Common Law of the High Court of Australia under Commonwealth Jurisdiction which is Binding on all Judges of all Court in all States of Australia
2. The Shire of Mundaring a Body Corporate Constituted under Section 2.5 of the Local Government Act 1995 (WA) brought the applicant under a 'Purported Act' using Western Australian Acts and Statutes to prosecute a criminal matter without Crown Authority and outside the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901.
3. The Appellant was forced under duress, by threat and intimidation of arrest, was brought before a Magistrate sitting as a 'CORAM' and sitting outside Chapter 111 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 without the knowledge of the Applicant and without disclosure by the Prosecution, the Magistrate and the Prosecution, and the prosecuting council, and the prosecuting lawyer all unconscionably, knowingly acted without jurisdiction engaged in an act of Treason to deceive the Appellant.
4. The Appellant was brought before a court of no jurisdiction as no court in the State of Western Australia sits under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 and or under Chapter 111 to invoke 'CROWN' jurisdiction and Crown authority under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901.
5. All legal proceedings brought against the Appellant in this matter and in all matters Civil and Criminal in the State of Western Australia are brought before a court with Magistrates and Judges sitting as a 'CORAM' without 'CROWN' authority and sit and act without 'JURISDICTION' engaging in an Act of 'TREASON' and 'TREASON and 'MISPRISON of TREASON' to serve their masters and their own interests for financial gain.
6. The Appellant which is a Real Living Human Beings and not a Legal Fictitious 'Persons' 'treated at law as artificial' and - or fictitious persons, was brought before a 'CORAM' in the Magistrate Court of Western Australia by the Prosecutor the Shire of Mundaring, by a 'Person' a (Fictitious Person) issuing the Prosecution notice, that Person 'JONATHAN THROSSELL' the fictitious person, the Person in capital letters who's Official Title Chief Executive Officer and 'employee' of the Shire of Mundaring and witnessed by a Justice of the Peace, a Person and - or a private individual has no Lawful Jurisdiction under the Crown to sign a Prosecution Notice when the Person and - or the private individual is and 'Employee' of a Trading Corporation under the Fair Work Act 2009 and under Section 51 (xx) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901.
7. The Appellant was brought before a 'CORAM' under the following acts, to be prosecuted before the Magistrate Court of Western Australia and under the Prosecution Notice the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 and the Criminal Procedure Regulations 2005 Form 3. and under the Court Hearing Notice Form 5.
These Forms were signed by an 'employee of a Trading Corporation which has no Crown authority, the 'employee' is' not in the service of the Crown, the Prosecutor the Shire of Mundaring a Trading Corporation A.B.N 20 431 487 930 a body Corporate under Section 2.5 of the Local Government Act 1995 (WA), all these Acts are Purported Acts, although established as a body corporate, local authorities include no 'CORPORATORS' the Chief Executive Officer JONATHAN THROSSELL in capital letters comes under the Corporation Act 2001 (Cth) as an employee of a Trading Corporation, what has to be considered is the fact that the Shire of Mundaring and it is impossible to ascertain who is Trading as the Shire of Mundaring under the Corporation Act 2001 (Cth) when the Shire of Mundaring has no A.C.N, and no 'Corporators' to manage and run the Trading Corporation the Shire of Mundaring Trading as who or what.
8. McLeods A.B.N. 28 199 679 234 a Trading Corporation without a A.C.N, and without a 'Corporators' under the Corporation Act 2001 (Cth) it is impossible to ascertain who is Trading as McLeods.
McLeods the Council for the Prosecutor the Shire of Mundaring, McLeods brought the Appellant before a 'CORAM' without disclosure and without giving notice of this fact and withheld this fact by deception for their financial gain and interests, as a Trading Corporation, McLeods cannot use Western Australian Acts and Statutes which are (Purported Acts) in a Prosecution when a Trading Corporation comes under Section 51 (xx) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901, McLeods has no Crown Authority to represent a Trading Corporation that is the Shire of Mundaring in a Prosecution this is aiding and abetting in a crime to pervert the course of justice under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) and aiding and abetting to over throw the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 and act of Treason.
9. Mr David Peter Gillett the Prosecuting Lawyer for the Shire of Mundaring a Trading Corporation without a A.C.N, and without a 'Corporators' under the Corporation Act 2001 (Cth) it is impossible to ascertain who is Trading as the Mr David Peter Gillet.
Mr David Peter Gillett the Prosecuting Lawyer for the Prosecutor the Shire of Mundaring, Mr Gillett brought the Appellant before a 'CORAM' without disclosure and without giving notice of this fact and withheld this fact by deception for his personal financial gain and interests, as a Trading Corporation Mr Gillett cannot use Western Australian Acts and Statutes which are (Purported Acts) in a Prosecution when a Trading Corporation comes under Section 51 (xx) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901. Mr Gillett has no Crown Authority to represent a Trading Corporation that is the Shire of Mundaring in a Prosecution this is aiding and abetting in a crime to pervert the course of justice under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) and aiding and abetting to over throw the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 and act of Treason.
10. The unlawful Prosecution by the Shire of Mundaring was brought before the Magistrate Court of Western Australia and before a 'CORAM' the Magistrate Court Act 2004 (WA) has no provision for a 'CORAM' to exist the Magistrate Court is owned and run by the Department of the Attorney General A.B.N. 70 598 519 443 a Trading Corporation under Section 51 (xx) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901. The Department of the Attorney General and all Courts in Western Australia cannot use Western Australian Acts and Statutes (Purported Acts) the Department of the Attorney General is under Federal Jurisdiction under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 190 land has no Crown Authority.
11. The Prosecutor the Shire of Mundaring forced the Appellant under duress to appeal the prosecution charges to the full bench of the Western Australia Supreme Court to the Full Court of Appeal the presiding judges of appeal who sat as a;
'CORAM' were BUSS. P, MAZZA.JA, MITCHELL.JA. as well the Council McLeods and the Prosecuting Lawyer Mr David Peter Gillett.
That any Natural Person and - or a Real Living Human Being who impersonates the position and - or the Commission of a Magistrate and a Judge of the Supreme Court under Chapter 111 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901, that any Supreme Court Judge who acts without Jurisdiction is engaged in an Act of Treason;
The Appellant brought before the 'CORAM' were BUSS. P, MAZZA.JA, MITCHELL.JA- as well the Council McLeods and the Prosecuting Lawyer Mr David Peter Gillett, deceived the applicants by misleading and - or deceptive conduct by the Treasonous Acts to conceal the Crime of Treason to obtain financial gain and to further their interests.

12. The Appellant was forced to appeal to the Supreme Court of Western Australia and were brought before a 'CORAM' the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) has no provision for a 'CORAM' to exist.
The Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA)
Section 7A Appointment of Judges, Judges of Appeal, Chief Justices and President the appointment of a judge, a judge of appeal, the Chief Justice, or the President, is to be by a commission under the Public Seal of the State issued by the Governor in Council, under the Letters Patent, By Warrant under the Queen's Sign Manual dated 29th Oct 1900.
Judge sitting as a 'CORAM' is not a judge a 'CORAM' does not form part of a commission under the Public Seal of the State and - or the 'Crown' issued by the Governor in Council under the Letters Patent therefore any judge who sits as a 'CORAM' is committing 'TREASON' and 'TREASON in MISPRISON of TREASON' by impersonation contrary to the Letters Patent for the Office of the Governor in Council.
13. The Prosecutor the Shire of Mundaring a 'Statutory Body' brought the Appellant before a 'CORAM' and before a Magistrate Court a Court of Statute and before the Supreme Court also a Court of Statute A.B.N.70 598 519 443 both a Trading Corporation under Section 51 (xx) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901under the following invalid Purported Acts and Statutes and Schemes Regulations and Rules when all the Magistrate and the Judges were employees of a Trading Corporation under the Corporation Act 2001 (Cth) and the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).
1.Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) a (Purported Act)
2.Criminal Procedure Act (WA) 2004 a (Purported Act)
3.Criminal Procedure Regulations 2005 (WA) a (Purported Act)
4.Local Government Act 1995 (WA) a (Purported Act)
5.Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (WA) a (Purported Act)
6.Shire of Mundaring Local Planning Scheme No 3 and No 4 (WA) a (Purported Act)
7.Building Act 2011 (WA) a (Purported Act)
8.Magistrate Court Act 2004 (WA) a (Purported Act)
9.Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) a (Purported Act)
10.Land Administration Act 1997 (WA) a (Purported Act)
11.Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) a (Purported Act)
12.Property Law Act 1969 (WA) a (Purported Act)
13.Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) a (Purported Act)

These Acts are inconsistent with the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 and never have being Proclaimed and - or being assented into law and no Proclamation Certificate with the Royal Identifier has been issued in the name of;
'Her Most Excellent Majesty Elisabeth the Second by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Our Other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith'.
There is no person or Head of Power that has authorised the assent of these Acts in Western Australia into Lawful Law under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901.
'Any law that originates from the Constitution is lawful, any purported law that does not originate from it is a fictional law without validity, the true test of any Australian law is whether it was created according to lawful process or outside of the lawful process'.
I submit that all Acts and Statutes in Western Australia have never being assented Lawfully by any person with Crown Authority from the Queen her Majesty Elisabeth the Second as above under sworn oath of Allegiance and the Respondent has refused to produce proof when asked to do so but stands in 'SILENCE'.
14. The Shire of Mundaring by bringing a unlawful prosecution and - or bringing the Appellant before a Court that has no Competent Jurisdiction in or interest in the course of Action under Chapter 111 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 and without Crown Authority by using Western Australian Acts and Statutes ( Purported Acts) to remove the fundamental rights of land ownership under the Original Deed of Grant established in Australia under the Letters Patent of Western Australia for the Office of Governor in Council dated 29th October 1900 (Letters Patent) By Warrant under the Queen's Sign Manual.
The Local Government Act 1995 and the amendment of the Western Australian Constitution Act 1889 by amendment No 88 of 1979 An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1889 - 1978 Western Australia by inserting the Local Government at Section 52 ,53 without the authority of the Imperial Parliament, the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly of the Western Australian Parliament assembly have no 'CROWN' authority to change the Constitution Act (WA) 1889 an Act of 'Treason' no Constitution Act can be Changed by any Government and - or Parliament of the State the Act of 'TREASON'.
15. The Shire of Mundaring by Forcing the Appellant under duress threat and intimidation of arrest to appear before a Magistrate Court that does not sit in Jurisdiction and before a 'CORAM' that does not have Jurisdiction under the Magistrate Act 2004 and the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) and under Chapter 111 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 the Shire of Mundaring has being established as a Local Government Body under the Local Government Act 1995 under Section 2.5 as a Body Corporate under the Western Australia Constitution Act 1889 which has been changed under 'TREASON', therefore the Shire of Mundaring has being established under 'TREASON' and is invalid under Commonwealth Laws and under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 as a Body Corporate a 'TRADING CORPORATION' under Section 51 (xx) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 without a A.C.N, and only established under a A.B.N, the Shire of Mundaring has no 'CROWN' Authority to exist in its Capacity or use Western Australian Acts and Statutes under Federal Jurisdiction.
16. The Shire of Mundaring A.B.N 20 431 487 930 a Trading Corporation by 'Treason' forced the Appellant before a 'CORAM' and before the Magistrate Court A.B.N.70 598 519 443 a Trading Corporation the Council for the Shire of Mundaring McLeods A.B.N. 28 199 679 234 and Mr David Peter Gillett A.B.N. 28 199 679 234 forced the Appellant under deception and without disclosure of the fact into the Magistrates Court under Treason for his personal financial gain and for the interests of his masters in crime.
The exclusive Legislative Authority of the Federal Parliament wipes out the Shire of Mundaring and the Magistrate Court and also the Supreme Court of Western Australia, the Western Australian Constitution Act 1889 does not apply to a Trading Corporation that is the Shire of Mundaring a Body Corporate No Western Australian Act or Statute or Scheme or Regulation or Rule can empower a 'Trading Corporation' in the State.
A Body Corporate comes under the exclusive legislative authority of the Federal Parliament this 30 wipe out the Shire of Mundaring as a Body Corporate and all Court in Western Australia under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 the Act of 'Treason 'by the Shire of Mundaring, McLeods, Mr David Peter Gillett and the Courts.
17. The Applicant brought before the Courts of the State of Western Australia by a 'Trading Corporation' challenges the party's that has attempted to assert Jurisdiction over the Natural Real Living Human Beings, the burden of proof of Jurisdiction lies with the Asserter the Court is only to rule on the sufficiency of the proof tendered, this was denied to the Appellant by Bias and Corruption of Mi' David Peter Gillet and the C.E.O. Jonathan Throssell in their attempt to hide their 'TREASON'
The Respondent is not the Respondent in this matter and can never be the Respondent it has never invoked the Jurisdiction of a competent court of 'TRUTH' sitting under Chapter 111 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (Cth).
The Respondent lacks standing as an aggrieved person in an individual that is Natural Real Living Human Beings or a representative capacity, some interest in the subject matter of the Action to bring in the Prosecution in the proceedings 'A want of standing to Prosecute'
The Shire of Mundaring is not involved in genuine controversy a fraud on a Chapter 111 Court of its standing under a 'CORAM' and a fraud on the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901by over throwing the Constitution under 'TREASON'.
18. The Appellant has been aggrieved by Bias and deceptive assumptions and conduct and mislead by this Supreme Court which has allowed unlawful Western Australian Precedent's in Case Judgments at 'COMMON LAW' of the State of Western Australia to form and use as part of the process in Judgments handed down against the Appellants, in past Cases.
COMMON LAW of the State used in the Appellants Cases is not an Australian Common Law Precedent it is unlawful for a State Court to use State Court precedents in any case which perverts the course of Justice and is Prejudicial to the Appellant.
For a State Magistrate or Judge bound by the authority of his or her own Full Court or Court of Appeal of the State to conclude that the Common Law of the State is fixed by that appellate 10 decision of the Supreme Court is misleading and bias.
The High Court of Australia is the final appellate court for the nation. When a Case or an appeal is dealt with in this Court, and its reasons are published, those reasons will form part of the COMMON LAW of Australia and Binds all courts in the Country; Verbatim in:
Lipohar v R [1999] HCA 65; 200 CLR 485; 168 ALR 8; 74 ALJR 282 (9 December 1999)
19. The appellant has been aggrieved by the Magistrate Court and this Supreme Court by the refusal for the Magistrates and Judges sitting as a 'CORAM' to apply High Court Judgments at Common Law to the appellants cases.
The principle by which judges are bound to precedents is known as stare decisis. This has been refused to the appellant which is binding on or persuasive, for a court to stand by a decision of the High Court of Australia the doctrine that a trial court is bound by appellate court decisions precedents on legal questions which is raised in the lower court.
Reliance on such precedents is required of trial courts until such time as an appellate court changes the rule, for the trial court cannot ignore the precedent (even when the trial judge believes it is 'bad law') and bluntly with bias refuses it.
20. The Appellant has been aggrieved that the Magistrate Court and the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal has allowed a Miscarriage of Justice and ignored the Lawful Fact that as members of the Legal Profession they should know the Law and administer the Law and not stand in silence as they do when they sit as a 'CORAM'.
All Magistrates and Judges know they are employed under the Fair Work Act 2009 and that the employees of Local Governments are also employees under the Fair Work Act 2009 and in turn come under Section: 51 (xx) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 without exception within the limits of the Commonwealth.
At Section: 30A of the Act it goes into detail as to employees of Local Government.
I submit that the following Sections of the Fair Work Act 2009 enforces my Grounds in this Appeal Section: 30A, 30B, 30C, 30D, 30E, 30F, 30G, 30H, Section: 35, 37, 38, Section 37 binds the Crown in each of its capacities Local Government employees are bonded to the Crown as part of their employment to a Trading Corporation under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 and cannot deny this fact.