Corbett and Oakley
[2015] FCCA 1959
•20 July 2015
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CORBETT & OAKLEY | [2015] FCCA 1959 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – De facto property – contributions – future needs – justice and equity. |
| Legislation: Family Law Act 1975, ss.4AA, 44(5), 90SB, 90SF(3), 90SM, Part VIII AB Division 4 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, rule 15.31 |
| Stanford v Stanford [2012] 247 CLR 108 |
| Applicant: | MS CORBETT |
| Respondent: | MR OAKLEY |
| File Number: | BRC 6109 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Howard |
| Hearing date: | 31 March 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 31 March 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 20 July 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Malcolmson |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Eatons Lawyers |
| The Respondent appeared in person |
ORDERS
That each party shall provide a copy of a proposed Final Order to each other party by 4:00pm on 27 July 2015.
That the parties shall attempt to reach an agreed position in relation to the wording of the Final Order (reflecting the Reasons for Judgment) and shall send a copy of same to the Court by no later than 4:00pm on 3 August 2015.
That in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreed position in relation to the wording of the Final Order (and send a copy of same to the Court) within the time frame stated in paragraph (2) – the matter shall be listed for Mention and each party shall attend personally along with their legal representative (if any) on a date to be fixed by the Court.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Corbett & Oakley is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRC 6109 of 2014
| MS CORBETT |
Applicant
And
| MR OAKLEY |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Background
The applicant, Ms Corbett, was born on (omitted) 1940 in (omitted), Victoria.
The respondent, Mr Oakley was born on (omitted) 1935.
The parties lived in a de facto relationship from January 1990 until March 2013. The parties have been unable to agree on how to divide their property. The applicant filed an initiating application seeking an alteration of property interests (essentially pursuant to section 90SM of the Family Law Act 1975). That initiating application was filed on 10 July 2014. The initiating application was therefore filed within the relevant time limit – namely, “within the period of two years after the end of the de facto relationship” (note section 44(5) of the Family Law Act 1975).
On 9 February 2015 the applicant filed a Notice to Admit Facts. On that same date the notice was served (by post) upon the respondent.
Such a notice is permissible under rule 15.31 of the Rules of the Federal Circuit of Australia (known as the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001).
The respondent failed to serve a notice disputing the facts and documents referred to in the said Notice to Admit Facts. Accordingly, pursuant to rule 15.31(2) of the Rules of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – the facts contained in the said Notice are deemed to be admitted for the purposes of the proceeding. Further, the documents referred to in the Notice are deemed to be authentic.
The Notice to Admit Facts relevantly provided as follows:-
“Take notice that you are required by the above named to admit for the purpose of these proceedings only:
1. That the parties were previously in a de facto relationship (as defined in the Family Law Act 1975) ‘the relationship’.
2. the relationship commenced in or about January 1990.
3. relationship ended approximately 17 March 2013.
4. During the relationship the applicant Ms Corbett inherited $70,000 from her mother (“the inheritance”).
5. during the relationship the applicant won $10,000 in a competition (“the competition win”)
6. the competition win was used to fund a trip by the applicant and respondent to (country omitted).
You are required to admit for the purpose of these proceedings only the authenticity of the following documents:
1. The medical records of the (omitted) Medical Centre enclosed with the letter Eaton lawyers to Mr Oakley dated 28 January 2015.
2. the pathology test results enclosed with the letter Eaton lawyers to Mr Oakley dated 28 January 2015.”
By reason of the deemed admission of facts the parties were in a de facto relationship (as that term is defined in section 4AA of the Family Law Act 1975) from January 1990 until 17 March 2013.
Even in the absence of the deemed admission as to the existence of the de facto relationship – there is ample evidence in any event to confirm that a de facto relationship existed between the applicant and the respondent from January 1990 until March 2013.
I note the content of sections 4AA(1) and 4AA(2) of the Act. Those sections state:-
“4AA DE FACTO RELATIONSHIPS
Meaning of de facto relationship
(1) A person is in a de facto relationship with another person if:
(a) the persons are not legally married to each other; and
(b) the persons are not related by family (see subsection (6)); and
(c) having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship, they have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis.
Paragraph (c) has effect subject to subsection (5).
Working out if persons have a relationship as a couple
(2) Those circumstances may include any or all of the following:
(a) the duration of the relationship;
(b) the nature and extent of their common residence;
(c) whether a sexual relationship exists;
(d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them;
(e) the ownership, use and acquisition of their property;
(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;
(g) whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory as a prescribed kind of relationship;
(h) the care and support of children;
(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.
(3) No particular finding in relation to any circumstance is to be regarded as necessary in deciding whether the persons have a de facto relationship.
(4) A court determining whether a de facto relationship exists is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case.
(5) For the purposes of this Act:
(a) a de facto relationship can exist between 2 persons of different sexes and between 2 persons of the same sex; and
(b) a de facto relationship can exist even if one of the persons is
legally married to someone else or in another de facto relationship.
When 2 persons are related by family
(6) For the purposes of subsection (1), 2 persons are related by family if:
(a) one is the child (including an adopted child) of the other; or
(b) one is another descendant of the other (even if the relationship between them is traced through an adoptive parent); or
(c) they have a parent in common (who may be an adoptive parent of either or both of them).
For this purpose, disregard whether an adoption is declared void or has ceased to have effect.”
For the sake of completeness I make the following findings:-
a)The parties were not legally married to each other;
b)The parties are not related by family;
c)The parties lived together as a couple on a genuine domestic basis for 23 years in the following towns or regions – (omitted), (omitted) and (omitted).
d)The parties lived in a common residence – initially in (omitted) in a caravan; subsequently in (omitted) in a Housing Commission unit; then in a shed/dwelling on a five acre property at (omitted) and finally in a house in (omitted).
e)A sexual relationship did exist between the parties. I note that in approximately 2003 the respondent had his testicles removed because of cancer. The parties had, therefore, engaged in sexual intercourse over a 13 year period up until the time of the removal of both of the respondent’s testicles. Beyond that date I find that sexual intimacy did still exist between the applicant and the respondent. In this regard I accept the evidence of the applicant contained in paragraph 14 of her affidavit filed 18 February 2015.
f)The parties did intermingle their funds. The respondent gave evidence that when the parties commenced living together Centrelink split his disability pension so that the applicant received one half thereof. I accept the evidence of the applicant that she contributed equally to the weekly cost of outgoings for the couple.
g)The respondent owned the property at Property I and the property in Property G. In respect of both of those premises the applicant paid for the furnishings and used her best endeavours to make both of those dwellings into a home for the couple.
h)I find that the parties were mutually committed to a shared life. They took care of each other when they were ill. The respondent took care of the applicant after her numerous operations (in particular in relation to her legs). The applicant took care of the respondent by performing the vast majority of the homemaking contributions. In addition, the applicant would accompany the respondent to various appointments. I note that there is a letter from a doctor Dr D annexed to the affidavit of the respondent filed 25 November 2015. I accept that, on occasions, the respondent was able to attend consultations without assistance. Certainly, it seems that once a person becomes used to the manner in which the respondent speaks then there is no problem with communication provided the respondent is using his hearing aid. I note that Dr D “never had a problem understanding the respondent.” During the course of the proceedings there were times when there was some difficulty in understanding the respondent but, as explained later in these reasons for judgment, he was indeed able to make himself understood. Once I became used to the manner in which the respondent speaks I did not have difficulty in understanding the respondent.
i)The parties were known by friends and acquaintances as a couple. They attended Church at the (omitted) together on each Sunday in (omitted). They attended around the town of (omitted) as a couple.
j)The parties were dancing partners together on a regular basis for many years up until a point in time when the issues relating to the applicant’s legs prevented her further involvement as the respondent’s dancing partner.
k)In the respondent’s affidavit filed 25 November 2014 he states in the second paragraph (of attachment “A”) that his will “was made out to Ms Corbett”.
Therefore, even in the absence of the deemed admission concerning the existence of the de facto relationship I have no doubt whatsoever that a de facto relationship existed for the reasons stated.
The respondent had asserted that the sexual relationship between the parties had ceased 16 months after the de facto relationship commenced. He therefore concluded that the de facto relationship was at an end from that point in time. I do not accept the evidence of the respondent that the sexual relationship ended 16 months after the commencement of the de facto relationship. I find that he has lied to the court in that regard. I prefer the evidence of the applicant in relation to this issue. As noted, I accept the evidence of the applicant contained in paragraph 14 of her affidavit filed 18 February 2015 to the effect that sexual intimacy (as opposed, of course, to sexual intercourse) did exist between the parties after the time that the respondent had both of his testicles removed because of cancer.
Exhibit 3 is an alleged agreement dated 1 March 1994. In that document it is stated that the parties commenced cohabitation on 2 January 1992. That is incorrect. The parties commenced cohabitation on 2 January 1990. Later, in these reasons for judgment, I provide reasons as to why the “agreement” is not enforceable. I make reference to it at this stage because it is at least evidence – from the respondent – as it was the respondent who has brought this “agreement” to the attention of the Court – that as at the date of the purported agreement (namely 1 March 1994) – recital A states that the parties were in a de facto relationship as at 1 March 1994. This is well and truly more than 16 months after 2 January 1990. It is also significantly longer than 16 months after 2 January 1992 (which seems to be the approximate date from which the husband contended that the de facto relationship commenced).
The document which is exhibit 3 confirms my own view that it is the applicant who is telling the truth in relation to the existence of a sexual relationship and the existence of a de facto relationship (beyond the 16 month relationship alleged by the respondent).
Noting the findings made by the Court concerning the length of the de facto relationship – there is no question that section 90SB(a) is satisfied – namely that the length of the de facto relationship was at least two years.
Further, I note that the Court has concluded that the de facto relationship ended on 17 March 2013. The application for an alteration of property interests pursuant to section 90SM of the Act was filed by the applicant on 10 July 2014. This is well within the time limit stipulated by section 44(5) of the Act – which notes that such an application must be made “within the period of 2 years after the end of the de facto relationship”.
Further Background, the Pool and Contributions
In an application such as this for an alteration of property interests pursuant to section 90SM of the Act the Court must adopt the well-known four step process. The four step process must be considered in light of the decision of the High Court of Australia in Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108. That case related to property settlement proceedings under section 79 of the Act. The principles laid down in Stanford are equally applicable to proceedings concerning de facto couples under section 90SM of the Act.
At the outset, I find that the parties no longer live in a de facto relationship. The applicant now lives interstate and the respondent remains living in (omitted). Their relationship has broken down irretrievably. It is therefore just and equitable for a property settlement order to be made pursuant to section 90SM of the Act.
As noted, the parties commenced living in a de facto relationship on 2 January 1990. At that time the parties were living at (omitted) Caravan Park. The applicant was employed as a (omitted) at (employer omitted) at (omitted) Queensland. But the applicant gave up that job to move in to live with the respondent in a caravan as his partner and carer.
The respondent is profoundly deaf and is fully dependent on his hearing aids to hear as it seems he lost his hearing after a motorcycle accident at the age of 18 years. The respondent also had an accident at the (employer omitted) when he was 36 years of age and broke his back. The respondent was in receipt of a disability pension up until the time he became eligible for the age pension. I am satisfied that the respondent, Mr Oakley, was able to hear adequately during the course of the proceedings. He provided a special microphone to assist with his hearing. The respondent informed the Court that by sitting in the witness box he was able to look directly at each person who was speaking in the Courtroom and this made it easier for him to hear everybody in the Courtroom. He therefore sat in the witness box for the majority of the trial apart from when the applicant was giving evidence. During that time the applicant had in front of her the special microphone that assisted the respondent in hearing the applicant’s speech. The respondent did not appear to have great difficulty in hearing what was said in the Court room – although I do note that, on occasions, he would ask for matters to be repeated. There was no difficulty in conducting the hearing in this way.
After living in a caravan for some years the parties moved into a housing commission unit at (omitted). They continued to live there for several more years. During this time the respondent bought a houseboat on the (omitted). He paid approximately $28,000 for the houseboat.
Over the course of the next several years the respondent made improvements to the houseboat. During this time the applicant performed the vast majority all of the home-making contributions including cooking, washing, cleaning and ironing.
Eventually, in about 1999 or 2000 the respondent decided that he would swap the houseboat and in exchange he received five acres of land at Property I, near (omitted), Queensland. In addition, he received the sum of $10,000. The parties then moved to the land at Property I. They initially lived in a shed on that property at Property I. The respondent made improvements to the shed and made it a liveable dwelling. Throughout this period the applicant continued to provide the lion’s share of the home-making contributions.
Whilst the parties were still living at the property at Property I the applicant’s mother died and left her the sum of $70,000. The applicant had also purchased her own mother’s (vehicle omitted). The applicant had borrowed $250 from the respondent to complete this purchase. The respondent now owns and drives that vehicle.
In relation to the inheritance received by the applicant, I note that the applicant gave evidence in paragraph 23 of her affidavit filed 10 July 2014 as to what happened to the inheritance that she received. The applicant stated:
“23. The $70,000 inheritance was used to buy –
a. purchase of a car for $18,000
b. purchase of the caravan $10,000
c. purchase of annex caravan $1000
d. long weekend at (omitted) for Mr Oakley and myself $500
e. furniture for Property G property $13,870
The rest of the inheritance is been spent over the years on general living expenses for Mr Oakley and myself”
Essentially therefore the inheritance received by the applicant was contributed by her for the benefit of the family as constituted by her and the respondent.
Also, while the parties lived at Property I the respondent (as noted) had both of his testicles removed because of cancer.
The parties moved to the property at Property C in approximately 2008. The property is registered in the name of the respondent. The respondent was able to purchase that property after he sold the property at Property I. In respect of the property at Property I the applicant had also made curtains and bought carpet for the dwelling and had also (as noted) provided the furnishings for the dwelling. In addition, the applicant had provided the lion’s share of the home-making contributions whilst the parties lived for nine years in the dwelling on the property at Property I. The property sold for approximately $265,000. The applicant was not provided with any of the funds realised from that sale.
The property at Property C was purchased using approximately $243,000 from the sale proceeds of the sale of the Property I property. As noted, the respondent purchased the property in his own name.
I note paragraph 25 of the applicant’s affidavit filed 10 July 2014. In that paragraph the applicant notes:
“25. When we moved to (omitted) I bought all quality new furniture with my savings, except for two beds and a washing machine. I used the inheritance money. As I recall I spent:
a. Fisher and paykel refrigerator $600
b. Large fridge/freezer pair $1400
c. Pantry Cupboard $200
d. Extending dining table and 4 chairs $800
e. Large hutch $800
f. Glass and crystalware $500
g. Kitchenware and electrical $500
h. Small TV $400
i. 2 x recliners $2000
j. 3 seater lounge $800
k. Large TV and stand, set top box $1000
l. Book case plus books $500
m. 2 x round carpets $500
n. 3 x coffee tables $100
o. 2 x occasional tables $50
p. Cupboard full of sewing material $400
q. 1 double bed mattress $200
r. Set bunk beds $100
s. Computer desk $50
t. Small desk $20
u. Engagement and eternity rings $2000
v. Lge industrial fan $150
Total $13,870”
I accept all of this evidence provided by the applicant. I found the applicant to be an honest and credible witness.
The parties are, generally, in agreement in relation to the composition of the pool except for one issue. The respondent says that the applicant has $141,000 of undisclosed funds. This is simply not true. The respondent is acting under a misapprehension – or he is deliberately lying to the Court. The respondent read the applicant’s financial statement filed on 10 July 2014. In that document in the summary in Part B on page 2 it notes that the applicant has assets of $141,000. The respondent therefore concluded that the applicant had cash of $141,000. In fact, even a cursory perusal of the document would have revealed that the applicant was counting a one half share (which she claims to own on an equitable basis) in the property situated at Property C. There are no missing funds. There are no undisclosed funds as suspected or contended for by the respondent. There is absolutely no evidence upon which to base such an assertion.
The house at Property C was valued by a registered valuer who was the joint expert. The valuation is exhibit 2 and shows a value of $190,000. The property pool is therefore as follows:
Assets
Ownership
Value
Property C
Respondent
$190,000
(omitted) bank account
for (omitted)Respondent
$4,300
(omitted) bank account
for (omitted)Respondent
$28,000
(omitted) motor vehicle
Respondent
$900
Caravan
Applicant
$7,000
(omitted) motor vehicle
Applicant
$12,000
(omitted) bank account
for (omitted)Applicant
$6,115.22
(omitted) bank account
for (omitted)Applicant
$10,053
(omitted) bank account
for (omitted)Applicant
$738.92
TOTAL
$259,107.14
Further Discussion in relation to Contributions
The parties were together for 23 years.
It will be noted that the respondent paid approximately $28,000 for the purchase of the houseboat. This was while the parties were living together in (omitted). He also made contributions to improve the houseboat and then prudently swapped the houseboat for five acres of land at Property I and received an additional payment of $10,000.
That was indeed a prudent swap for the respondent to make because eventually the respondent was able to sell the Property I land for $265,000 and use those funds to buy the house in Property C.
Throughout the relationship the respondent was in receipt of a Centrelink pension either by way of a disability pension or an age pension and he contributed those funds for the benefit of the parties.
The applicant also made significant financial contributions including the inheritance she received from her mother in the sum of $70,000. I accept the applicant’s evidence in relation to how the inheritance was spent. I find that it was spent for the benefit of the parties as sworn to by the applicant.
I also find that the applicant provided the vast majority of the home-making contributions. The respondent maintained that he in fact was responsible for performing most of the cooking, cleaning, washing and ironing. I do not accept that evidence of the respondent. I find that the respondent was not telling the Court the truth in relation to those issues. The respondent was not a credible witness.
I do note that the respondent did assist the applicant for a total period of nine months during the 23 year relationship. During those nine particular months the applicant was recuperating from surgery. Most of the surgery related to her legs and there was also surgery in relation to her shoulder.
Having regard to the contributions made by the parties and noting that (on the basis of the allowable evidence) neither party seemed to have much by way of assets at the commencement of the relationship I have come to the conclusion that the contributions based entitlements of the parties are equal. That means that each party has contributed 50% to the pool as found and/or to the welfare of the family as constituted by the applicant and the respondent.
Section 90SF(3)
In this particular case both parties are elderly. The applicant is currently aged 75 years and the respondent is aged 80.
The applicant suffers from arthritis. She has had no fewer than five operations on her legs. She has had an operation on her shoulder. She recently had a mastectomy. She now lives in Victoria near her son. She is in receipt of Centrelink pension.
The respondent is profoundly deaf and has a back injury. He is eligible for the age pension. Indeed I note exhibit 3. This is a letter from the Queensland Government which notes that the respondent is approved as eligible to receive permanent residential care. Alternatively (I infer) that if he chooses, he is eligible to receive “residential respite care at a low level”. In the alternative it seems that he is eligible to receive care at home. This is described as “home care package level 1 and 2”:
“Residential Care
Permanent residential care – This approval does not lapse.
Residential respite care at a low level – This approval does not lapse. However, if your care needs change you should request an ACAT reassessment. This approval allows you up to 63 days of subsidised residential respite care in a financial year. If you find that you need respite care for longer than this, you should apply to an ACAT for a 21 day extension.
Care at Home
Home Care Package Level 1 and 2 – This approval does not lapse.”
The respondent told the Court that there are five retirement homes in or near (omitted). Apparently they all have a similar waiting period of up to four years.
I must say that the respondent’s evidence in that regard was somewhat uncertain. There was no clear evidence on what the requirements for entry to the retirement homes actually comprised.
In any event, there is no doubt that both parties are elderly and they both have health issues. I have come to the conclusion that the 90SF(3) factors cancel each other out.
Accordingly, I do not consider there should be any uplift in favour of either side concerning the question of the Section 90SF(3) factors.
Justice and Equity
The respondent, during submissions, drew the Court’s attention to an agreement which he says the parties had entered into. Because the respondent was self represented I granted the respondent leave to tender the agreement into evidence even after his case had closed. He at no time attached this agreement to an affidavit. The agreement is exhibit 3. The respondent informed the Court that he had handed to the Court a copy of this “agreement” at an earlier mention date. As noted, at no time did the respondent annexe a copy of this “agreement” to an affidavit. There is no evidence that would lead the Court to conclude that such an “agreement” was enforceable. The respondent did not put the “agreement” to the applicant during cross examination. There is no confirmation that the document was signed by the applicant. There is no admission made by the applicant in relation to the document. The applicant was not asked to admit that she signed the document.
Even if the applicant signed the document – it is apparent on the face of the document that the same solicitor witnessed both signatures. The solicitor’s name appears to be, “Andrew Fogg”. The document is said to have been made in contemplation of marriage.
The document, on its face, purports to have been signed on 1 March 1994. Obviously, that was prior to the commencement of the provisions of Part VIII AB – Division 4 of the Family Law Act 1975. That Division relates to financial agreements between de facto partners. That division commenced in March 2009.
Further, the “agreement” is not an agreement made pursuant to part 19 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). Those provisions (in particular under sections 264, 265 and 266 of the Property Law Act 1974) only commenced in Queensland in 1999.
The agreement is therefore not binding upon this Court in these proceedings.
In any event a serious injustice would be caused to the applicant if the Court allowed the respondent to rely upon the “agreement”. As noted, the document was not even put to the applicant in cross-examination. Further, there is no evidence that the applicant obtained independent legal advice at the time the “agreement” was entered into. There is no evidence before the Court as to whether or not all of the parties’ then existing assets were listed in the agreement.
The applicant provided significant financial and non-financial contributions to the de facto relationship. Even if there had been evidence (which there is not) that the parties willingly entered into such an agreement on the date that the document bears – a failure by the Court to intervene would result in this case in a serious injustice to the applicant as a result of the reasons I have already noted.
Further, it should be pointed out that a serious injustice would be inflicted upon the applicant if the respondent was entitled to even argue in favour of the enforceability of the agreement. In view of the fact that the respondent made no reference to this “agreement” in any of his affidavit material and in view of the fact that the respondent made no mention of the “agreement” during the course of the trial – until after all the evidence had closed and the Court was hearing submissions – leads me to conclude that there is simply no way the Court should entertain any submission from the respondent claiming that the “agreement” is valid or enforceable.
For the reasons I have noted the document is not enforceable and a serious injustice would be caused to the applicant if the Court came to any other conclusion. I place no weight on the document which is exhibit 3.
Having regard to the age of the parties, the length of time the parties were together and the extent of the contributions made by both parties to this relationship – I have come to the conclusion that it is indeed just and equitable in the circumstances of this case for the property pool between the parties to be divided equally between them.
I should point out that I was not impressed with the respondent as a witness. I consider that, on occasions, he blatantly lied to the Court. The respondent’s assertions that he had provided all of the homemaker contributions was clearly a lie.
In addition, the respondent made scandalous allegations against the applicant during the course of the proceedings including (but not limited to) the following:
a)That the applicant had worked as a prostitute from the parties’ home at Property C in (omitted); and
b)That the applicant had contracted a sexually transmissible disease.
I utterly reject these scandalous allegations made by the respondent. I accept all of the evidence put forward by the applicant. As noted earlier, I found the applicant to be a witness of truth.
I also should point out that I accept the applicant’s evidence in relation to the issues of family violence referred to in her affidavit material. I reject the respondent’s denials in relation to the family violence perpetrated by him. I find that the respondent did, on occasions, treat the applicant in an appalling manner by verbally abusing her and making scandalous allegations against her. There is also, as I have just noted, evidence of the physical family violence. In relation to that evidence I have, of course, accepted the evidence of the applicant.
The respondent’s conduct in making such scandalous allegations is reprehensible.
I note that the applicant sought, in her initiating application filed 10 July 2014, a property settlement order whereby she would receive 65% of the net pool of property and the respondent would receive 35% of the net pool of property. In his response document filed 25 November 2014 the respondent sought a final order whereby the “net property of the parties be divided in the proportions of 65% to the respondent and 35% to the applicant”. At the final hearing the applicant sought an order that the property be divided 55% in her favour and 45% to the respondent. The respondent, on the other hand, sought an order at the final hearing that each party keep what they currently own. The approach contended for by the respondent at the final hearing is clearly not just and equitable.
As noted, I have come to the conclusion that the proposed final property settlement order whereby each party receives 50% of the pool of property (as referred to herein) is, just and equitable.
I certify that the preceding sixty-six (66) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Howard
Date: 20 July 2015
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