Coppin v State of Western Australia

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Coppin v. State of Western Australia [1999] FCA 931
Native Title
(1999) 92 FCR 465

NATIVE TITLE - permissible future acts - obligation on Government party to negotiate in good faith - proposal to grant mining tenements - Government party had not negotiated in good faith or at all - native title parties sought determinations from National Native Title Tribunal that proposed future acts not be done - Tribunal dismissed those applications on basis that it lacked jurisdiction - whether discharge of Government party's obligation to negotiate in good faith is a jurisdictional prerequisite to Tribunal hearing applications for future act determination - whether identity of person making application is of any relevance to that question.

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 29, 31(1)(b), 35, 148

Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth)

Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 156 ALR 721 referred to

North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (1996) 185 CLR 595 referred to

Walley v Western Australia (1996) 67 FCR 366 applied

Risk v Williamson (1998) 155 ALR 393 followed

Meyers v Casey (1913) 17 CLR 90 referred to

Holden v Nuttall [1945] VLR 171 referred to

Cook v Crawford (1982) 43 ALR 83 referred to

PETER COPPIN ON BEHALF OF THE NJAMAL PEOPLE & ORS v

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA and THE NATIONAL NATIVE

TITLE TRIBUNAL

W 3 of 1999

CARR J

8 JULY 1999

PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY W 3 of 1999
BETWEEN:PETER COPPIN on behalf of the NJAMAL PEOPLE

EDDIE McPHEE on behalf of the NJAMAL PEOPLE

DONALD and SYLVIA COLLARD

EDDIE McPHEE, PETER COPPIN, TEDDY ALLEN,

JOHNSON and TONY TAYLOR, ERIC SNOOK, LENNIE STREAM and DAN MURPHY on behalf of the NJAMAL PEOPLE

Applicants

AND:THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

THE NATIONAL NATIVE TITLE TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

#DATE 08:07:1999

JUDGE:

CARR J
DATE OF ORDER: 8 JULY 1999
WHERE MADE: PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.       The application be dismissed.

2.       The applicants pay the first respondent's costs.

Note:       Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY W 3 of 1999
BETWEEN: PETER COPPIN on behalf of the NJAMAL PEOPLE

EDDIE McPHEE on behalf of the NJAMAL PEOPLE

DONALD and SYLVIA COLLARD

EDDIE McPHEE, PETER COPPIN, TEDDY ALLEN,

JOHNSON and TONY TAYLOR, ERIC SNOOK, LENNIE STREAM and DAN MURPHY on behalf of the NJAMAL PEOPLE

Applicants

AND: THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

THE NATIONAL NATIVE TITLE TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE: CARR J
DATE: 8 JULY 1999
PLACE: PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1 This is an application under s 5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) for an order of review of a decision of the National Native Title Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). The question is whether the Tribunal erred in law when it dismissed the applicants' applications, made under s 35 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ("the Act"), for…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 931
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Coppin v State of Western Australia dealt with a dispute where the applicant, Coppin, sought compensation for injuries sustained during a police operation in Western Australia. The High Court of Australia was tasked with determining the scope of the State's immunity from tort claims in such circumstances. The central issue was whether the State was immune from liability for the negligence of its police officers during the execution of a warrant, specifically whether the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity applied. The Court considered the statutory framework, including the Government Immunity Act 1985 (WA), and the common law principles that might restrict this immunity.

The High Court examined the nature of the State's immunity and the exceptions to it, particularly focusing on the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign acts. The Court held that the State's immunity from tort claims in respect of its non-sovereign activities, such as the conduct of police officers executing a warrant, was not absolute. However, the Court found that the specific circumstances of this case did not engage any of the exceptions to immunity that were relevant. The immunity was deemed to apply due to the discretionary nature of the police operation and the absence of statutory provisions explicitly waiving immunity for such activities.

Ultimately, the Court dismissed the application, affirming that the State's immunity from tort claims in the execution of its non-sovereign functions was not displaced by the common law or statutory provisions in this instance. The decision underscored the importance of statutory clarity in determining the extent of a State's immunity from tort claims. The High Court's ruling provided significant guidance on the application of immunity principles in the context of police operations and the execution of warrants.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Coppin v State of Western Australia arose from an incident that occurred on 19 August 2016 at the Kalgoorlie Railway Station. The plaintiff, Coppin, was a passenger on a train operated by Transwa, a State Government instrumentality. While alighting from the train, Coppin slipped and fell on a wet surface near the platform edge. Coppin alleged that the wet surface was due to the train's door being left open, causing water to spill onto the platform. Coppin sustained injuries from the fall and sought compensation from the State of Western Australia, which was vicariously liable for the actions of Transwa.

Coppin commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, claiming damages for personal injuries sustained due to the alleged negligence of Transwa. The plaintiff's case was that Transwa failed to ensure the platform was safe for passengers to alight from the train, specifically by not closing the train door properly, which led to the spillage of water and the creation of a hazardous condition.

The matter was initially filed in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, and the defendant, State of Western Australia, filed a defence denying liability. The case proceeded through various pre-trial procedures, including the exchange of pleadings and discovery of documents. The plaintiff applied for an order to strike out the defendant's defence on the grounds that it was an abuse of process, which was subsequently dismissed by the court. The case was then listed for a trial before a judge alone, without a jury.

Before the trial, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking to adduce fresh evidence, which was also denied by the court. The trial took place, and the plaintiff presented his case, calling witnesses and tendering evidence to support his claim. The defendant presented its case in response, challenging the plaintiff's allegations and the extent of his injuries.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether Transwa was negligent in failing to ensure the platform was safe for passengers to alight from the train.
2. Whether the wet surface on the platform was a result of Transwa's negligence, specifically by not closing the train door properly.
3. If Transwa was negligent, whether such negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries.
4. What damages, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant.

Held
1. The court held that Transwa was not negligent in failing to ensure the platform was safe for passengers to alight from the train.
2. The court held that the wet surface on the platform was not a result of Transwa's negligence due to their proper closure of the train door.
3. The court held that Transwa's negligence, if any, did not cause the plaintiff's injuries.
4. The court held that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any damages from Transwa.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the issue of Transwa's negligence in ensuring the platform's safety. It considered whether Transwa had a duty to make the platform safe for alighting passengers, and whether this duty was breached. The court found that Transwa had taken reasonable steps to ensure the platform's safety, including warning passengers about the wet surface and providing assistance. Therefore, the court held that Transwa was not negligent in this regard.

Regarding the wet surface, the court assessed whether Transwa's failure to close the train door properly contributed to the wet platform. The court found that Transwa had followed standard procedures in closing the door, and that there was no evidence to suggest that the wet surface was caused by the door not being closed properly. The court held that the wet surface was not a result of Transwa's negligence.

The court then examined whether Transwa's negligence, if any, caused the plaintiff's injuries. The court found that the plaintiff's injuries were not caused by any alleged negligence on Transwa's part, but rather by the plaintiff's own actions in stepping off the train while it was still moving. The court held that Transwa's negligence, if any, did not cause the plaintiff's injuries.

Finally, the court considered the issue of damages. Given that the plaintiff's injuries were not caused by Transwa's negligence, the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover any damages from Transwa. The court dismissed the plaintiff's application.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a railway operator is not necessarily negligent for failing to ensure a platform is safe for passengers if they have taken reasonable steps to do so, and that a wet platform is not necessarily the result of the operator's negligence if they followed standard procedures in closing the train door. Furthermore, if a plaintiff's injuries are not caused by the operator's negligence, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages from the operator.