Copeland v Chief Executive, Department of Lands

[1996] QLC 141

[1996] QLC 141

 

LAND COURT

BRISBANE

25 OCTOBER 1996

In the matter of an appeal against a valuation

Valuation Roll No.:    21764/50000

Local Government:    Maroochy  (AV95-688)

KJ & RA Copeland
v.
Chief Executive, Department of Lands

(Hearing at Maroochydore)

D E C I S I O N

Under the provisions of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 the respondent placed a valuation of $54,000 on the land which is the subject of this appeal, however, following objection by the appellants, reduced this figure to $45,000. Subsequently, the respondent elected to lead evidence to a valuation of $54,000, whilst the appellants say that a valuation of $35,000 ought to be placed on the subject land.

The grounds of appeal are expressed in these terms:

“1.   The valuation is not supported by sales evidence and is not in relativity with comparable properties in the locality.

2.The valuation does not fully allow for the restrictions and hazards caused by the easement and QEC high voltage power transmission line which traverses the property.

3.The valuation does not make sufficient allowance for the lack of natural water, and the difficulty to obtaining water on the property.”

Kevin John Copeland, a registered valuer of considerable experience, though currently not practising, appeared for the appellants and presented valuation evidence in support of the appeal.  Russell John Rose appeared for the respondent.  Mr Rose is a registered valuer employed by the Department of Natural Resources which includes the former Department of Lands and he tendered his written valuation in support of the respondent’s valuation figure of $54,000. 

The subject land has an area of 8,192 m² and is located on McKillop Road, about 7½ km south-west of the Palmwoods Post Office.  McKillop Road is said, by Mr Rose, to provide easy access to the subject, though Mr Copeland says that its 250 m of earth and gravel surface is  difficult to traverse in periods of sustained wet weather.  Mr Rose describes the land as comprising an easy sloping knoll which falls away sharply to the north and to a valley in the east.  The valley generally runs in a north-south direction.  Mr Copeland did not challenge this description, but added that the land is located at the northern extremity of a small sandstone spur ridge with soils being generally of sandstone origin with patches of clay and some minor areas of basaltic influence generally on the eastern slopes.  He says that the block is timbered principally with about 50-year regrowth, comprising eucalypt forest species and brush box with understorey of numerous wattles and associated shrubs and patches of dense lantana. 

There is, traversing the land in an approximately north-south direction, an easement in favour of the Southern Electric Authority of Queensland, registered in 1975.  Mr Copeland calculated the area of the easement on the subject land at about 4,120 m², a measurement accepted by Mr Rose.  In his tendered valuation Mr Copeland wrote:

“Easement A on RP 140129 carries the South Pine to Woolooga 275 kV single circuit transmission line running north-south through the property from a steel rectangular based tower with total height of 27.80 metres and overall spread of 15.24 metres between the three pairs of wires which are 20.15 metres above ground level at the tower.

The tower is 27 metres from the southern boundary, and the line spans a distance of 750 metres to the next tower.  These wires are at eye level where they pass the dwelling on the subject property, and the closest wire is 27 metres from the dwelling.”

The land is zoned “Rural A” under the Maroochy Town Planning Scheme gazetted on 14 December 1985 and is used for rural residential purposes.  There is no mail service, however, telephone and electricity are connected to the land, the latter by a 240 volt branch line supply from the Palmwoods Substation, with a further branch line crossing the access road to the land to supply an adjoining property, this line not being protected by an easement.

Mr Copeland said that access into McKillop Road comes from Kirbys Road for a distance of about 2.2 km, that road having a narrow bitumen carriageway which necessitates vehicles, when passing, having to get one wheel off the bitumen surface.  He said that there is quite a lot of traffic which uses Kirbys Road to access the water treatment plant located in McKillop Road.  Beyond Kirbys Road access into Palmwoods is via 5.2 km of bitumen road which is apparently of a suitable standard.

In his evidence-in-chief Mr Copeland said that the subject land has an attractive but limited outlook across the Landershute Valley, which is the area running between two major ridges, one supporting the Palmwoods-Montville Road and the other the Upper Landershute Road which is just to the south of the subject land.  He said that a ridge precludes a view of Palmwoods from the land, that the outlook is across to the Buderim Plateau which is due east, then to Kiels Mountain which is slightly north of that, and a view towards the ocean is provided through a 5° “window”, the coastline being about 25 km away as the crow flies.  According to Mr Copeland, the ocean views are limited in that the appellants can see the top of Mudjimba Island early in the mornings, but not in the afternoons.  He said that he and his wife did not purchase the property because of its ocean views and that, whilst the outlook was attractive, similar properties in the locality would not be characterised because of the availability of an outlook to the ocean such as it is.

Whilst there was some discussion during the hearing on the matter of views from the subject land and from some of the basic properties, it is my appreciation of the evidence that there is no particular dispute between the parties regarding Mr Copeland’s description of views which I have attempted to summarise above.  I think, though, that it would be fair to say that Mr Rose saw the availability of such views as somewhat more significant in the process of valuation of the subject land than was expressed by Mr Copeland. 

There is no natural water available on the subject land which is serviced by two catchment tanks and four larger tanks which provide a pressure head, the total capacity being about 20,000 gallons.  Under a verbal arrangement with an adjoining neighbour, the appellants have access via a pipeline to a permanent waterhole on that property, though have been unable to date to utilise that water.  It appears that the level of flow into the waterhole during dry periods is not sufficient to sustain a level of extraction by pumping, the net result being that when access to this fall back source is desired, water is not, in a practical sense, available.  Mr Copeland mentioned that he had on occasions been compelled to purchase water for use on the subject land.

Mr Copeland’s approach to the valuation of his land was to refer to four properties for comparison and to deduct an allowance of 40% to cater for the easement and its impact on the value of the land.

Although Mr Copeland suggested that a 40% diminution in value ought to apply to the subject land because of the presence of the easement, he did not in his valuation expressly say that he had adopted a valuation for the subject land at $58,000 on the basis that it was unencumbered and then deduct the 40% allowance, but rather he referred generally to his evidence indicating value as support for his concluded figure of $35,000.  The difficulty with such an approach is that I am presented with, for example, one comparison where Mr Copeland relies on an applied valuation of the Chief Executive in the amount of $28,500 on a piece of land without powerline influence in support of his concluded figure of $35,000, therefore indicating that, in the intellectual process of comparing the two properties, a general comparison has been made, part of which is to precisely calculate a 40% allowance for diminution because of the presence of the easement.  This is a mixture of the traditional approach where a valuer applies professional judgment to make a series of adjustments to arrive at an overall conclusion of how one property compares with another and that of the application of a very precise percentage deduction.  I much prefer the approach explained by Mr Rose, not only because he had the advantage of a sale impacted upon by a comparable easement, but he had a demonstrably rational approach to his determination of the final figure.  He said, quite simply, that his deduction was 32.5% on account of the presence of the easement, therefore if the easement was not there he would value the land at $81,000.  I am led to assume that Mr Copeland reasoned something similar in his approach and to therefore say that in all probability he would have valued the subject land at $58,000, were it not for the presence of the easement.

I should mention also that during the process of comparing one property with another, Mr Copeland sometimes included reference of the proximity to electricity transmission lines to a Comparison property.  I have proceeded on the basis that such references were for the purpose of completeness only and that there was no doubling-up of easement effect in his approach.  The presence of the transmission line in the case of a Comparison property is a factor which was presumably taken into account by the Chief Executive in striking the valuation.  In the absence of transmission line effect, the value would have been higher. It is not appropriate for me to adjust the value applied to a Comparison as part of the process of comparing it with the subject; nor would it be appropriate, given the approach adopted, to have regard to the transmission line on the subject land as part of the process of comparison.

When I consider the valuation approaches that I have outlined, it seems to me that the best way to approach the matter is to first of all deal with the issue of the easement allowance and, having settled upon an appropriate figure there, to consider the valuation of the subject land as if it were unencumbered.  The disability suffered by the easement falls under two headings, the first of which is concerned with the physical presence of the structures which traverse the easement over the subject land and which I have mentioned above; and the impact that electro magnetic fields emanating from the powerlines might have on the views of potential purchasers of the land and therefore the  value of it.  Each of these detriments is often expressed in the term of a “blot” on title which is a detriment that persists with the land and must be considered in valuing the land, either in the marketplace or for the purposes of the Valuation of Land Act 1944. There is substantial authority dealing with the question of compensation to be paid where such easements are resumed. I see no benefit in referring to such authorities, but would simply say that the approach of each of the parties that I have outlined above is consistent with authority.

Mr Copeland provided a substantial amount of written material concerning electric and magnetic fields which I will not reproduce here, however, it will be useful if I mention some matters which I saw to be of particular significance from the material presented. 

Electric fields are produced where a voltage exists, the field strength being dependent upon the magnitude of the voltage and the distance away from that source.  Magnetic fields are the lines of force created by electric current and depend on the strength of that current and the distance away for the relative strength of the field.  Whilst barriers may be erected to electric fields, though probably not an economically feasible proposition in most cases, magnetic fields may not be shielded or eliminated by any practical means.  The strength of fields from transmission lines decrease with distance from the line and are influenced by such factors as distance from the line, height of conductors above the ground, the position of conductors relative to each other, the electric phasing of circuits and the direction of current flow.

The public consultation associated with the previously proposed Eastlink route selection process commenced in June 1994 and showed over 40% of respondents to be concerned about electro-magnetic fields.  Whilst there has been publicity concerning the possible adverse health effects of these fields since 1972, no authoritative report appears to have been published which concludes that adverse health effects result from exposure to electro-magnetic fields.  Nevertheless, the Powerlink Organisation (the successor to the Queensland Electricity Commission) adopted a policy to be applied to the Eastlink route of having an alignment which would be no closer than 150 metres to any home.  Apparently in such circumstances, the magnetic fields would be reduced to background levels only.  It is noted that the closest wire in the instant case is 27 metres from the dwelling.

Whilst there was a difference of opinion at the outset on the level of allowance that ought  to be made, Mr Copeland said in address that he would not be generally unhappy with the suggestion that his 40% figure is wrong and that the respondent’s figure is right.  When I consider  that Mr Copeland’s figure was not supported by reference to sales, however, Mr Rose did refer to sales in deciding upon his allowance, I could accept Mr Copeland’s concession without detailed analysis, however, will briefly summarise the evidence presented by Mr Rose.  His approach was to take the sale of a property which is comparable with the subject and, in particular, is encumbered by a power easement or high voltage lines albeit carrying only 110 kV compared with the 275 kV transmitted along the subject easement powerlines.  Mr Rose then referred to another sale and, by comparing that with the encumbered sale property, arrived at a valuation on the latter that would have applied were the easement not in place.  By comparing the resultant figure with the actual sale price achieved on the encumbered land, he was able to calculate a 32.5% reduction in value, which he then applied directly to the subject land.  Mr Copeland raised a concern that the sale date of the encumbered property of 30 July 1995 was “after date” and therefore of tenuous application.  Given, however, that Mr Rose has used the encumbered sale simply to reveal the level of diminution in value brought about by the presence of the encumbrance and the appurtenant structures, I do not accept the criticism in this instance as being valid.  I note that the sale relied upon to strike the unencumbered value also took place in July 1995 and, therefore, would be quite an appropriate basis for the purpose.  Mr Copeland also mentioned the difference in transmission capacity of the subject powerlines and those of the basic property referred to as a point of discomparison between the properties, however, it was Mr Rose’s view that the marketplace was not so refined as to draw such distinctions.  Once a substantial powerline is in place with the visual pollution of the towers and the wires, together with the mysteries of electro-magnetic fields, then the market will apply a substantial diminution in value as is indicated by the basic evidence he referred to.  Whilst I do not reject the proposition that the market will distinguish between the overall dimensions of powerlines in individual cases, it seems to me that the similarity in dimensions in this case are such that reliance upon the evidence adduced by Mr Rose would not be unsafe.  Accordingly, I will adopt his suggested figure of a 32.5% reduction in what the value of the subject land would be were it not encumbered by the easement.

The issue now becomes one, therefore, of whether Mr Copeland’s unencumbered figure of $58,000 or Mr Rose’s $81,000 figure or something between these is to be preferred.  Before descending into detailed consideration of the valuation evidence on this point, I should dispose of one matter which I will call the “Form 100 point”.  Mr Rose tendered in evidence a copy of a Form 100 being the form required to be completed by parties to a transaction involving the sale of land (Land Title Act 1994). The Form 100, once completed, is lodged at both the Office of State Revenue and the Registrar of Titles, together with other documentation designed to effect the change of ownership. In the copy of the Form 100 tendered and which was signed by Mr Copeland and others, the “value of freehold” was included at $60,000, whilst improvements were $180,000, the total constituting the purchase price by the appellants of the subject land as improved in June 1993. It was put to Mr Copeland that it would have been his opinion when he signed the Form 100 that the value of the land component of the transaction was $60,000 and that he had told Mr Rose on some occasion that the figure did represent Mr Copeland’s opinion at the time of the transaction. The circumstances of a conversation between Mr Copeland and Mr Rose during which the admission is purported to have been made was not put to Mr Copeland, who was simply confronted with the bare proposition and who expressed a doubt that he had made such a communication to Mr Rose. In the circumstances, I decline to accept that Mr Copeland did express the view that the value of the freehold was $60,000 at the time of purchase (s.18 Evidence Act 1977).

On a related point, Mr Copeland gave evidence, during cross-examination, of the improvements on the subject land which include a shed, a substantial dwelling, tanks totalling a capacity of about 20,000 gallons and a swimming-pool, together with certain site improvements.  He said that the property had been particularly well developed to take advantage of the view that is available.  It was put to him that, having regard to the purchase price of the subject land and improvements in 1993 and the level of improvements on the land, it was clearly the case that the land component had a value substantially in excess of the $35,000 contended for by the appellants in this appeal.  Mr Copeland’s response was to say that he had not carried out an analysis of the sale and, given this and the fact that neither had Mr Rose, I do not see the sale of the subject property as taking the matter of land value very far at all.  The overall sale price for the improved subject land does, however, feature later in this decision. 

In his written valuation, Mr Copeland made reference to two sales and two comparisons comprising valuations placed on other lands by the Chief Executive as at 1 January 1995.  He also included the Chief Executive’s 1995 valuations on the two sale properties.  He agreed during cross-examination that the sales, each of which took place in 1993, should be considered as supporting, as distinct from direct bases for valuation purposes, as the market had increased for the type of property in question between the sale date and the relevant date in this matter, that is 1 January 1995.  The result is then, in effect, that Mr Copeland has relied on four comparisons with valuations struck by the Chief Executive.

Comparison “C” tendered by Mr Copeland is a property described as Lot 2 on RP 135440, having an area of 2.565 ha and an applied value of $39,500.  In his written valuation Mr Copeland said that the Comparison property is, in every respect, superior to the subject land being on a bitumen road, larger in area, principally softwood scrub and rainforest country, with double frontage to a semi-permanent watercourse, similar views to the subject but, importantly, no powerline influence.

Mr Rose explained that Comparison “C” is located in Submarket Area 61, whilst the subject land is located in Submarket Area 67, such submarket areas being established as part of the mass appraisal system of valuation carried out by the respondent.  He said that there was a small pocket of properties in Submarket Area 61 which were clearly undervalued as at 1 January 1995 and that steps were being taken to correct this.  Mr Copeland said, under cross-examination, that he accepted that the values as at 1 January 1995 for some lands in Submarket Area 61 were incorrect and it appears from the evidence that this was always his view, as in evidence-in-chief he said that, given that the Comparison “C” property had its value increased to $51,000 as at 1 January 1996 which he thought was in correct relativity, but that the subject land’s valuation was increased to $60,000 as at the same date, that it was appropriate for him to make a comparison between the subject land and the Comparison “C” property.  I do not accept this reasoning.  It seems to me that Mr Copeland is attempting to argue the 1996 annual valuation rather than the 1995 appeal which is before me and I must ensure that I maintain a distinction between the valuations that would apply to the subject land as at the two different dates.  I conclude then that, on the basis of the evidence from both valuers, I must place no reliance on Comparison “C”.  Not only is this a conclusion which appears to be eminently reasonable on the evidence that I have from both sides, but is consistent with the authority of Barnwell v. The Valuer-General (1989) 13 QLCR 13.

Mr Copeland’s Comparison “A” comprises a property of 6.783 ha, described as Lot 3 on RP 803644, valued by the respondent at $69,000.  Mr Copeland wrote in his valuation that this property was “not considered a good comparison because of size”, however, he then referred to matters relevant to making a comparison and drew the conclusion that the comparison supports an applied value of $35,000 on the subject land.  He wrote that the proposed dwelling site is much further removed from the powerline tower than in the subject case and that there was no visual impact due to the height of the transmission lines above ground level, the lines at this point being part of a long unsupported span between pylons.  He said that the soil on the Comparison property were superior to that of the subject and that the comparison enjoyed access to a permanent waterhole in a tributary of Paynters Creek.  He said, during cross-examination, that the views of the Comparison property would be slightly inferior to that available to the subject, both because of the amount of standing timber on the Comparison property and because of its lower elevation.  He pointed out that the house site on the Comparison property was on the lower part of the block.  Mr Rose disputed that the Comparison land had views similar to the subject: in fact he suggested it had no ocean views at all.  In summary Mr Rose said of Comparison “A” that it was not a comparison at all because of the absence of views as mentioned, the steepness of the land and of access to the land and because of the substantial size of that block compared with the subject.  Notwithstanding this, he expressed the view that the relativity between Comparison “A” and the subject was appropriate.

Whilst I accept that Comparison “A” cannot be classified as a preferred basis of valuation  given the points mentioned by both valuers, in particular Mr Rose, it is not a comparison property that I would reject having regard to all of the evidence of valuation presented to me. 

Comparison “B”, however, is another matter.  The sale of this land took place in July 1993, the sale being from a company controlled by the parents of the purchaser.  From the evidence it appears that no money changed hands and that the sale price of $35,000 was simply a book entry.  I have already said that, on the basis of the date of the sale, the transaction should not be relied upon as a basis of valuation, however, the circumstances just outlined further support that conclusion.  Comparison “B” has an area of 6,665 m², is of elongated uneven shape and was valued by the respondent at $28,500.  The land has an inferior dwelling site and steeper slopes than the subject land and has a less favourable outlook looking towards the water treatment plant which neither Mr Rose nor Mr Copeland thought to be attractive; however, according to Mr Copeland, the landowners think the view is “wonderful”.  It appears that they were attracted by the variety of lights illuminated on the treatment plant at night.  For his part, Mr Rose saw the land as being the “absolute bottom of the market, bottom of the barrel”.  He agreed with the points of comparison made by Mr Copeland, however, was of the view that the differences between Comparison “B” and the subject land were such that any comparison attempted would be like comparing “chalk and cheese”.  In attempting to demonstrate this, Mr Rose constructed an argument comparing the improved values of the subject land and Comparison “B”.  In this, he extracted an agreement from Mr Copeland that the Comparison “B” property as improved was probably worth about $100,000, whilst the subject land would be worth about $240,000, but that it would not be appropriate to place the same improvements on the Comparison “B” land as are on the subject.  In short, it was Mr Rose’s contention that the types of improvements that a prudent person would develop on each property is a clear indication of the substantial differences between the properties, a point with which I agree.  In saying this, I must make it clear that I am not suggesting that it is appropriate to value properties on an improved basis first of all and then to deduct the value of improvements to arrive at an unimproved value (an approach expressly rejected in Toohey’s Ltd v. The Valuer General (1925) AC 439), but I am saying that it is appropriate to have general regard to the level of capital investment that a piece of land might be seen to support prudently in the marketplace as a broad indicator of the comparability between that land and other land. When I consider this point and that by reference to this comparison at $28,500 it is suggested that, unencumbered, the subject land is worth more than twice as much at $58,000, I conclude that Comparison “B” is not a suitable basis.

Mr Copeland’s remaining Comparison designated “D” is Lot 1 on RP 215230 having an area of 1.046 ha and an applied value of $38,000.  Mr Copeland wrote that the property is due south of the subject at the same elevation of 150 metres on the next ridge line, closer to the town of Palmwoods, but with 3.7 km of all-weather gravel road.  He said that the comparison and the subject have similar land descriptions and landscape, similar views and outlook to the north-east, but that the Comparison property has permanent natural water from a ground water spring.  The Comparison property is one property removed from a 275 kV power transmission line which is visible from the property though, according to Mr Rose, would not be obvious from the house site.  Both valuers agree that the access to the comparison property would be inferior to that of the subject, though Mr Rose suggests that the inferiority is greater than does Mr Copeland.  Mr Rose is aware, from having interviewed the land owner, that electric power is not available to the land, a factor unknown to Mr Copeland.  There was disagreement between the parties concerning views which might be available from Comparison “D”, Mr Copeland suggesting that the Comparison land would have similar views to the subject were the landowner to clear some timber whilst, in Mr Rose’s opinion, clearing of timber on the Comparison land would be insufficient as trees on neighbours’ lands would impinge upon the views that might otherwise be available.  I have little to settle this factual difference between the valuers, however, as Mr Rose said, and I assume that he said this on the basis of clear knowledge, that Comparison “D” was valued by the respondent on the basis that it did not have ocean views, then any comparison between that property and the subject would have to be based on that understanding, whether it is erroneous or not.   Given the inferior access, the presumed absence of ocean views and the lack of electric power offset somewhat by the availability of natural water on the Comparison “D” land, then, if I am also to take into account the presence, if not the dominating nature of the transmission line, it is quite clear to me that the subject land is superior to Comparison “D” when the subject is viewed on an unencumbered basis.

The approach that Mr Rose adopted is to cite two sale properties and to place the value of the subject land on a continuum that he sees between the qualities of each of the sales. In this regard it will be recalled that he arrived at a valuation of $81,000 for the subject land. 

Sale 1 on Mr Rose’s valuation was of a piece of land having an area of 1.008 ha, located in Shurvells Road, north of the subject land.  The sale took place in July 1994 for a price of $75,000 which Mr Rose analysed to an unimproved value of $69,500 applied as at 1 January 1995 at $63,000.  The sale property has mostly gravel access from Hunchy Road, has good rural views overlooking a high voltage powerline in the distance and is, according to Mr Rose, overall superior to the subject having regard to the easement on the subject, however, supports an unencumbered value of $81,000 on the subject.  In Mr Rose’s language, this sale shows the sale of “a typical rural homesite”.  Mr Copeland said that relative elevation of the Hunchy Road area should be taken into account in considering Sale 1, however, Mr Rose pointed out that whilst elevation may be a relevant factor in regard to view, that in this case the sale land is not in a position where it can enjoy a view to the ocean.  Mr Copeland said further that it was his understanding that rural homesite buyers would pay a loading for land in the Hunchy-Shurvells Road area as the land there is generally of a better quality than that found in the subject area, such purchasers being in what he described as the “horse-paddock market”.  Mr Rose responded by saying that there was no evidence to indicate that the agricultural quality of land featured in any significant way in sale prices.  Nevertheless, it seems to me that agricultural quality would be a feature of relevant consideration in this market.

The second sale on the continuum described by Mr Rose took place in July 1995, is of an area of 4,003 m², located in Thompson’s Road, selling in July 1995 for $125,000.  Thompson’s Road is between 5 and 10 km by road west of the town of Nambour.  The sale was analysed by Mr Rose to a figure of $123,800, applied at $110,000 in the 1995 revaluation.  Mr Rose saw the sale land as being superior to the subject, being a typical small rural homesite in an area comparable to the subject with ocean views and no significant disadvantages.  The sale land has an easy cross fall from south to north and an easy to moderate fall from front to rear, requiring significant cut and fill to create a level building site from which views would be restricted to the east.  Mr Rose said that views to the east might also be impacted upon by land uses on the eastern side of the road over which the land owner would have no control, the sale land being on the western side of the road.  Ocean views to the north-east are unavailable because of existing tree growth.  In comparison with the subject land, Mr Rose said that the smaller area of the sale, inferior access but superior topography, amenity, views and water supply indicate that the sale block is superior to the subject land when viewed unencumbered. 

Mr Copeland challenged the use of Sale 2 on two counts, the first being that the sale is an “after date” sale and the second being that the land in the area of the sale land is superior to that of the subject.  On the question of sale date, Mr Rose said that the sale block was strong supportive evidence of the subject 1995 valuation and is a basis for the subject’s 1996 valuation which is at a level about 10% above the 1995 figure.  He then went on to say that it is legitimate to use an after date sale where a market has not increased in that locality.  I find this reasoning to be suspect.  It may well be the case that in the locality of Sale 2 the market has not increased between January 1995 and the date of sale in July 1995, however, such a contention cannot be supported by an argument which says that the July 1995 sale supports a value on the subject land 10% higher in 1996 than the 1995 figure.  In view of this, I conclude that reference to Sale 2 can be made in support of the valuation approach, however, I do not accept that the sale is “strong support” as such a suggestion would be based on the premise that the 1996 valuation at $60,000 is correct, a suggestion which cannot be accepted even if I determine the 1995 valuation of the subject land at the respondent’s figure.

Mr Copeland’s criticism of Sale 2 as being superior to the subject land is not one that I need take much further as, quite clearly, the comparison made by Mr Rose between Sale 2 and the subject land reflects such a superiority.

In address, Mr Rose submitted that the basic evidence referred to by the respondent was substantially superior to that of Mr Copeland.  Certainly, as a general proposition , sales are to be preferred against the principle of relativity, even in circumstances where the sales are not ideal ( Fischer v. The Valuer-General (1983) 9 QLCR 44). Nevertheless, I see Comparisons “A” and “D” referred to by Mr Copeland as being of some assistance in this case, particularly as those determinations of the Chief Executive are in close physical proximity to the subject land. Of these two Comparisons, property “D” is of most use for the reasons I have outlined above. In this regard I have already said that, unencumbered, the subject land must be valued higher than $38,000. The better valuation evidence is, however, that of Mr Rose and, in view of what I have written above about these two properties, it is his Sale 1 to which I have paid most regard. I find that the subject land, viewed unencumbered, is superior to this sale, particularly given the views available from the subject and the notional absence of power lines in such view. I think that Mr Copeland has understated the significance of this aspect in the wider market, though perhaps of lesser importance to the appellants, personally. I do think, however, that Mr Rose has been unduly restrictive in not taking into account the superiority of the agricultural quality of the sale land. The difficulty I have is in placing the subject land on the continuum of quality between Sale 1 and Sale 2. The latter property’s clear superiority and sale date difference do not make this task any easier. I will, in regard to this aspect, be guided by Mr Rose who has, as I viewed his appreciation of the evidence available to him, adopted a considered and considerate approach. Indeed, given the evidence that I heard during the appeal, I am quite perplexed as to how a net figure of $45,000 could have been arrived at following objection. In making the adjustments that I refer to above, I am comfortable in concluding that the value of the subject land, unencumbered, would be $78,000. From this I will deduct a 32.5% allowance for the easement encumbrance yielding $52,650 which I will round down to $52,500, which is the determined valuation.

The appeal is allowed.

RP SCOTT
  MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT