Cooney & Cooney
[2022] FedCFamC1F 399
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Cooney & Cooney [2022] FedCFamC1F 399
File number(s): TVC 1351 of 2020 Judgment of: BAUMANN J Date of judgment: 20 May 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Assessment of contributions – Three pool approach Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Cases cited: Hickey & Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143
Stanford & Stanford [2012] HCA 52
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 46 Date of hearing: 16 and 17 May 2022 Place: Townsville Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Lawrence Solicitor for the Applicant HCM Legal Counsel for the Respondent: Mrs Bassano Solicitor for the Respondent MK Family Law ORDERS
TVC 1351 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS COONEY
Applicant
AND: MR COONEY
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
BAUMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 MAY 2022
THE COURT ORDERS:
1.That these proceedings be adjourned for pronouncement of final property orders at 9.30am on 27 June 2022 in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) at Brisbane.
2.That both parties and their legal representatives have leave to appear by telephone on 27 June 2022 by using the Microsoft Teams conferencing system as follows:
(a)They shall click the below link (if accessing this Order electronically) to join the Microsoft Teams conferencing system, by 9.25am on 27 June 2022; or
(b)They shall each telephone 02 … by 9.25am on 27 June 2022;
(c)They shall each then enter the pass code …#; and
(d)Hold the line until the Court is ready to connect and proceed with the matter.
IT IS NOTED:
A.That if a form of order, consistent with the Reasons for Judgment delivered 20 May 2022, and evidence of procedural farness to the superannuation funds is provided to chambers before the next Court date, the Court will consider making orders in chambers and vacating the next Court date.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Cooney & Cooney has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BAUMANN J:
INTRODUCTION
These reasons relate to a conflict between the parties as to how to divide or otherwise equitably deal with a modest pool of assets arising from a relationship that ended with separation in January 2013. As these Reasons will reflect, sadly the financial circumstances of the parties at this stage are far from good and the options open to the Court very limited.
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
Statements of fact hereafter should be construed as findings of fact.
The husband is 47 and the wife is 46. Both are of Country J descent. Before the parties commenced cohabitation in November 2006, the husband, who had immigrated to Australia earlier, had acquired – and it will be dealt with later in these reasons – an interest in a property at 1K Street, L Town, in B County, and a property in C City. After cohabitation, the parties purchased a property at D Town, which has since been sold.
In early 2008, both parties appear to have lost their employment for a period, although it did not prevent the parties from marrying in 2008. Their first child, Y, was born in 2008. She is approaching her 14th birthday. Their second child, X, was born in 2009, and is now 12 years of age.
It seems that further financial decisions were made to acquire property during the course of this relationship. In 2008, the parties purchased a property at E Street for $300,000; a property at R Street in 2010 for $230,000 and a property in S Street in 2012. They also bought, it seems, around the time of separation or shortly thereafter, a property in Brisbane for $358,000. As these Reasons will reflect, some of these properties have now been sold and, sadly, very little is left to show for it.
There was a period when the wife sought to maintain a business, but it also did not prove successful. The tensions in the relationship were such that it is agreed that the parties separated in or around January 2013. At that time, they did have discussions about how they would equitably manage their assets, but those discussions did not result in any formalised agreement which binds the Court.
By April 2013, the husband was made redundant in Brisbane, and he returned, it seems, to U City to work in around about August 2014. During all this period post‑separation, the wife has continued to reside in the property she now lives in.
I am satisfied that in 2014, the husband received a loan from his mother for the equivalent of approximately AUD$45,000, which he says, and I accept, were used to meet some joint credit card debts. He also says he received some funds from his sister of about AUD$12,000, although I have no confirmation from his sister.
In September 2017, the husband returned to Country J because his father was unwell. The mother also suffered some ill health and she also returned temporarily to Country J for a period. In September 2018, the husband, after holidays in Australia, decided to remain here. I should note that the husband has Australian citizenship now. In May 2019, the husband moved to V Town for work, and around that time, having maintained, largely consistent with their obligations, the payments on a number of mortgages over a number of properties, the husband ceased making further payments. I heard evidence at the trial that suggested the husband did so because the wife was not prepared to cooperate with him. I make no finding about that aspect. It seems, on all the evidence, that the extent of the mortgages were then overwhelming.
The conflict between the parties by late 2019 had reached the level that the wife found it necessary to obtain a Domestic Violence Order, which she did on a temporary basis, and it was made a final Order in April 2021. The tensions over the financial issues clearly, on all the evidence including a family report which the Court observed for the purpose of the parenting part of these proceedings, contaminated the relationship between the father and the children. Thankfully, on first day of trial for this matter on 16 May 2022, the parents entered into final parenting consent orders which provide for the children to have substantial and significant time with the father, whilst they continue to live with the mother.
In September 2020, the mother filed an Application in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as it was then known), seeking various orders, and when the matter came before Judge Riethmuller (as he then was), his Honour shortly thereafter transferred the matter to the Family Court of Australia (as it was then known) because of what he saw were complications in the pool of assets, including, it seems, some actions taken by the husband inappropriately with self‑managed superannuation funds.
On a number of occasions after the matter had been transferred to this Court, the Court had raised with the parties, who were then unrepresented, the concerns the Court had about what actual orders could be made in terms of the lack of any real net property pool. The emotions between the parties were such that despite attempts at a conciliation conference and even the Court trying to negotiate with the parties, agreement could not be reached. Because of the existence of the Domestic Violence Order, when the matter was listed for trial and proceeded to trial, the parties had the benefit of lawyers under the s 102NA cross‑examination scheme.
I pay tribute to the lawyers in a difficult case, in the way that they managed the circumstances of this case, although it should be noted that the first lawyers appointed for the trial that was to commence in February 2022 withdrew after those proceedings were adjourned, and new lawyers for the wife, at very short notice, took up the matter on behalf of the wife and retained Ms Lawrence of Counsel. I pay tribute to the way in which they managed the case in such short a time. The husband had the benefit of a consistent solicitor and Counsel in Mrs Bassano and, again, they did the best they could to resolve matters, and even though the parenting case was resolved by consent, the property proceedings needed to proceed.
The competing applications that the parties had were tendered. Exhibit 1 was the orders sought by the wife. In effect, she sought and seeks a period of almost two years to try and arrange with the secured mortgagee bank retention of the property at S Street, Suburb Q, in which she and the children live. Otherwise, she accepted that the other properties should be sold. In terms of a superannuation splitting order, the wife sought an order that all superannuation benefits of the husband in the self‑managed superannuation fund be rolled over to the wife.
The husband’s minute of order is set out at Exhibit 2 and, effectively, he seeks that all properties, including the property occupied by the wife, be sold. In that respect, it is noted at proposed order 5 that the husband says that the parties ought to be given the chance to “bid at the public auction” in respect of the sale of properties. In terms of superannuation splitting, the husband’s proposal is that the wife receive $20,000 of his superannuation in what seems to be W Super Fund, and my understanding from the evidence is his superannuation is in M Super Fund, which may have changed its name, but nonetheless, he seeks to preserve the entirety of his self‑managed superannuation benefit.
As can be seen, the issues were quite narrow, and the parties’ cross‑examination by Counsel took less than two hours.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Shortly stated, but more concisely and elaborately described in the Full Court decision in Hickey & Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143 (dealing with a married couple), in a property settlement case, the Court must adopt a well-known four-step process, essentially (for de facto property applications):
(a)to identify the pool of assets and liabilities generally and the legal and equitable interest, and usually at the time of hearing;
(b)to assess the relative contributions of both the financial, non-financial, direct and indirect nature as specified by s 90SM(4) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”);
(c)to consider the factors as are relevant contained in s 90SF(3) of the Act; and
(d)finally, consider the ultimate analysis to determine whether the order the Court proposes to make is just and equitable to both parties.
I find that it is just and equitable to make an order pursuant to section 79(2) of the Act (see Stanford & Stanford [2012] HCA 52). Both parties said that was the agreed position.
POOL OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
Both Counsel adopted the preliminary view identified by the Court that this is a case where it may be appropriate to constitute three separate pools. Appendix One to these Reasons is the findings of the Court in relation to Pool One, being property interests after debt, showing a deficiency of at least $186,278; Pool Two, being superannuation interests which I calculate the total to be $158,423; and Pool Three, being the property in Country J at 1K Street, L Town, B County, which has an uncertain equity to the husband for the reasons which I will now explain.
In respect to the pools of interests set out in Appendix One to these Reasons, I make the following findings on the evidence.
There is a disagreement as to the value for the S Street property currently occupied by the wife and the children, as has been the case since separation in 2013. The wife says the property is worth $240,000; the husband says it is worth $260,000. No proper or probative valuation evidence was adduced, and as a result of the orders, the market will ultimately determine the market value of the property.
Considering it is over nine years since the parties separated, ignoring current bank accounts (or credit card liabilities) which was the preliminary position advanced by the Court, was adopted by the parties. The vehicle 1 is unregistered; in the possession of the wife and not the subject of any valuation evidence. I adopt the husband’s estimate of $2,000.
By describing the “deficiencies” in the Pool One interests as “at least $186,278”, this acknowledges that there will be costs of sale (perhaps greater if the currently unsatisfied mortgage, ANZ Bank, was to exercise its rights to sell, and the mortgage debts (and possibly outstanding rates, etcetera) will continue to increase, thus making the deficiency greater.
SUPERANNUATION
The husband’s entitlements and member benefit under any superannuation scheme was vague until, at the Court’s request, the husband obtained on the day of the trial, and tendered, documents which formed Exhibit 4 (the self‑managed superannuation fund) and Exhibit 5, (M Super Fund) which, after the husband was given leave to be further cross‑examined, it became clear that:
(a)the balance at the time of trial of his M Super Fund benefits from the screenshot he produced was $19,945;
(b)the limited M Super Fund statements provided revealed that in the year ended 30 June 2020, the husband accessed in some way over $120,000 of his accumulated superannuation in M Super Fund;
(c)the husband, seemingly contrary to law, used some of the funds to make share purchases in his own name – he says to increase his wealth and to help meet payments to the mortgagee;
(d)at least by 8 December 2020, when these proceedings were before Judge Riethmuller in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, it became clear that some of the superannuation funds had been used privately by the husband for share trading. His Honour gave the wife leave to bring an oral application “to set aside the transactions by way of transfer of monies” to the husband’s self‑managed super fund, and made a superannuation flagging order pursuant to section 90XU(1)(a) of the Act;
(e)the financial statements for the self‑managed superannuation fund to 30 June 2021 reveal that during that year, the husband deposited $125,000 into the self‑managed superannuation fund which, it is clear, accounts for his member benefit at the time of hearing – save, of course, that there was likely to be some small adjustment to the member balance since 30 June 2021 as a result of interest accrued and expenses of the fund. I adopt the figure of $123,478 being the best evidence available;
(f)there is no evidence to suggest the husband’s gymnastics with the superannuation funds caused him to incur penalties, and as the funds were restored, it appears any audit issues were satisfied. Of course, what did occur is that in the 2020/2021 tax year, the husband was assessed personally on a net capital gains tax (from share trading) of $10,025 from a total current year capital gain of $28,284 (see Exhibit 6 – being the husband’s income tax return produced on the day of the hearing);
COUNTRY J PROPERTY
The wife has consistently asserted the husband held an interest in property in Country J – the country of origin of both parties. When both parties were unrepresented, the husband’s response was a complete denial. The totality of the evidence (although deficient in some respects and lacking in authentication in other respects) was expanded by the filing of an affidavit from the husband’s Country J resident parents, Mr Z and Ms F, filed 7 May 2022. The husband’s 81 year old mother, Ms F, a retired health professional, was required for cross‑examination by the wife and was cross‑examined by telephone. I found her evidence was totally believable and frank. In summary, relevantly, the evidence which I accept is:
(a)in June 2003 (before the parties in this matter had commenced cohabitation), the husband’s parents funded the purchase of the property known as 1K Street, L Town, B County, for €235,000. A deposit was paid by the parents, and total funds of €194,000 were borrowed from G Bank;
(b)a further sum of €51,013.94 for “expenses” since the time of acquisition has been paid by Mr Z and Ms F, although this list of expenses includes “loan to be paid back” of €24,864 which I referred to in the description as monies lent to the husband so he could defray credit card debts at the time. The list of expenses also includes “legal fees” of €3248, the purpose for which is unclear;
(c)the husband has never resided in the property “at any time since its purchase, nor did he pay the initial deposit, the mortgage, the fit‑out expenses in relation to the property”. This is the evidence of his mother which I accept. It is consistent with the evidence of the husband;
(d)the property has been rented since the initial purchase, and the current tenants are under a government assistance scheme, where the local council (H City and County Council) pay €1170 a month to Ms F, who then pays the rent off the mortgage liability. Documents were attached to the affidavit of the husband’s parents, confirming these transactions;
(e)the property is affected by “reactive pyrite” which has caused damage to the property, needing “remediation”. Ms F says that she has no estimates of cost for completing the remediation, but that the works to be undertaken would require the property to be vacant for four to five months causing, clearly, loss of income;
(f)the loan balance of the mortgage and “top‑up” loan as at 31 December 2021, are a combined total of €92,787. At paragraph 93 of the husband’s evidence‑in‑chief, he deposes that in November 2019, his mother obtained a “desktop valuation” for the property. Annexure MC2 is an unsworn (and, therefore, untested) opinion by estate agents J Realtors of L Town that the property at that time had a market value – on the basis that the pyrite fee certificate be provided – of €240,000; without pyrite free/core testing, €195,000 to €200,000;
(g)although an authenticated “folio” certificate for 2K Street has been produced by the wife, which suggests a further property interest in the joint names of the husband and his mother, on the basis of an acquisition in 2006, the husband and his mother dispute any interest is held. The wife did not press such an assertion at the hearing. I cannot be satisfied that any further property is owned in Country J by the husband.
In summary, taking the evidence above into account, if the property still has a value (before remediation) of €200,000 then after allowance for the mortgage balance of €98,787 and the other expenses which Ms F claims against her son of €51,013, an equity of around €50,000 might be available. Without complicating this matter by arguments around constructive trusts or the like, the evidence given honestly by Ms F under cross‑examination, that she is happy for her youngest son, the husband, to sell the property provided she gets her money back of course, should be accepted. Of course, even if, as calculated, there is an equity of around €50,000, this does not take into account the initial deposit paid by the husband’s parents. It is worth observing that the acquisition at a price of €235,000 19 years ago is still more than the value now in its unremediated state. Clearly, it was hardly a good investment. In all the circumstances, although the husband may at some time in the future get something out of the property, it is not possible to be satisfied when or how much.
CONTRIBUTIONS
The parties’ cohabitation for just over six years is less than the period between the separation in January 2013 and the hearing, a period of nine years. The wife gives little evidence in her affidavit used for the trial directly as to her financial contributions. However, between cohabitation and the hearing, the evidence such as it is supports the following findings, namely:
(a)the parties worked as a team at least between 2006 and 2019 to try and create a secure financial position for themselves and their family;
(b)the husband’s initial financial contributions, whilst modest, were superior to those of the wife;
(c)during the relationship, the husband’s direct and indirect financial contributions were superior to those of the wife, as he continued to be employed and was the breadwinner; and
(d)during the period to separation and particularly since separation, the wife’s contributions of a non‑financial character, and particularly as homemaker and parent, were superior to those of the husband. The roles undertaken by the husband and wife were consistent with the way they agreed to run their family.
An unusual feature of the post‑separation relationship is that these parties continued in essence to support each other for many years post‑separation by:
(a)the husband making mortgage and other payments to around 2019. Although the wife is highly critical of the husband in ceasing payments in 2019, she fails in my view properly to give some credit to him in trying to keep their property portfolio afloat. Of course, apart from his generally consistent payments of child support, the preservation of mortgage payments allowed the wife and the children to remain living in the family home “rent free”;
(b)the husband’s mother sent over the equivalent of €24,804 in February 2016 which was, at that time, the equivalent of approximately AUD$39,000. I am satisfied that the husband’s evidence that he used these funds to defray some credit card liabilities should be accepted. The husband says he also obtained the equivalent of AUD$12,000 from his sister, although the corroboration of that sum has not been provided to the Court. The wife, who had little income at the time, in an indirect way if not direct way, benefited from these credit card liabilities being reduced; and
(c)the husband took some action to try and support the wife during her cancer diagnosis, although my impression is the wife feels he could have done more. I also note that there was a period of time around separation when the husband was living in Brisbane, that the wife’s brother was provided with some opportunity to rent a room. As I say, all these factors show that the parties were to their credit, notwithstanding their disastrous financial position, trying to support each other to some degree.
Despite the parties’ hope that the property market in North Queensland would result in such an improvement or increase in value that the loans obtained would be covered, sadly, unlike some areas in Australia, that did not prove to be the case. By 2019, the disastrous financial position caused any trust or mutual respect between the parties to almost entirely evaporate. The tensions clearly affected the capacity for the wife to support the husband’s relationship with the children – who shared their mother’s obvious and understandable distress that they could lose their home. The wife’s decision in September 2000 to commence proceedings was, I am satisfied, entirely motivated by what she felt was fair, and trying to preserve the home.
The relief the wife initially sought was that:
(a)she retain the S Street property unencumbered;
(b)the husband pay the wife $80,000;
(c)the wife receive the motor vehicle, and
(d)the wife receive 90% of the husband’s superannuation.
The wife was legally represented at the time. The initial application was, on the evidence now, entirely unrealistic and unable to be achieved. Despite numerous pleas (some from this judicial officer) that the wife try and reach some agreement with the secured mortgagee bank that might allow her to retain the home, the disastrous financial position of the parties as now revealed in the pools earlier identified, make that impossible.
Taking all of the contributions into account as set out earlier, I find the parties have made an equal contribution to the Pool One interests, the husband (because of post‑separation contributions to his superannuation) a slightly greater share than 50% to the Pool Two interests and that, really, neither party has made a contribution to the Country J property.
SECTION 75(2) FACTORS
The parties are of similar age, and although the wife in cross‑examination asserted she has back pain, there was no probative evidence offered to the Court to assist in understanding the extent of her back issues, its prognosis for the future and the effect it has on the future employment opportunities for her.
Although the wife has a degree in fine arts, there is no evidence that those qualifications have created any past employment in a field where the degree is useful. At best, it might allow the Court to infer she has the intellectual capacity to complete her current study towards a certificate in aged care. I am prepared to accept she is a resourceful lady with the desire to improve her financial security, and will, when these proceedings finish, pursue employment as she can. If she does not do so, she will be limited to support from government benefits and casual part‑time employment well into the future.
The husband’s evidence is he is not currently employed, having had a period of self‑employment, but is seeking work, recently applying for a position as a professional (for which he is qualified) in his qualified industry, commanding a salary around $95,000 per annum. He has had employment in his qualified industry since deciding to migrate to Australia in early 2007 – although there have been periods of redundancy. He generates some income from casual work, although how much income is generated from this source, after involving cash transactions, is unclear. I am comfortably satisfied, however, that the husband’s future earning capacity is grossly superior to that of the wife, which would in a very small pool of interests, command a meaningful adjustment to the wife.
Initially, although the two children, Y now aged 14 years, and X now aged 12 years, the wife retains the majority of care. The husband has continued, when employed, to pay child support as assessed, the wife’s recent financial statement deposing to receiving $250 per week. Sadly, both parties are confronted by the real prospect of personal bankruptcy, which makes the availability of their modest superannuation and the capacity to add to it through future employment, critical. The husband will be in a much better position to accumulate future superannuation over the coming years than will the wife.
The husband’s interests, as earlier discussed, in the property in Country J does not compel, in my view, any sizable adjustment. How orders achieve justice and equity for both parties where, realistically, the only interest capable of alteration is superannuation is discussed now.
WHAT ORDERS ACHIEVE JUSTICE AND EQUITY
The wife asserts that it is just and equitable that she receives all of the husband’s interests in both the self‑managed superannuation fund and, as I understand it, the M Super Fund policy. I do not agree. To do so would be to ignore the contributions the husband has made to try to preserve the assets, and although he has been entirely unsuccessful, it is not proper to attribute all the losses to him.
During the relationship, I am satisfied the parties decided on the joint endeavour of creating wealth through the accumulation of property, negatively geared. For some years, they benefited no doubt from the tax benefits flowing from this strategy. Considering all the findings made, I have decided that the wife should receive:
(a)a splitting order for 100% of the husband’s M Super Fund policy; and
(b)a splitting order of a fixed sum of $100,000 from the husband’s benefit held in the self‑managed superannuation fund.
This would mean the wife would secure approximately 85% of the total superannuation at the time of trial. The wife’s superannuation will then be the wife’s current N Super Fund of $15,000; 100% of the husband’s M Super Fund of $19,945; a split of the husband’s self‑managed superannuation fund interest of $100,000, so $134,945. This amount represents approximately 85% of the combined superannuation of $158,423.
The husband will have just over $20,000 left in his self‑managed superannuation fund to build on. Otherwise, in this sad case, I adopt the orders proposed by the husband, requiring all real estate to be sold. The husband should receive and retain possession of Vehicle 1 which he says, and I accept, he sees as being a project for him and X to work on.
I see no utility on the evidence in giving the wife false hope, either within a timeframe of a month or two, or two years, as her orders sought, that she could secure financial support to retain the current home. I know that that has been her hope since 2013, one it seems clearly shared initially by the husband. However, no evidence has been produced (and the wife has had nearly 12 months to do so) from the secured mortgagee, the ANZ Bank, that they are prepared to support the wife retaining the home. She has limited income, and her future employability is not clear. At best, the actions of the husband between 2013 and 2019 gave the wife and the children the opportunity to remain in the home.
Of course, if I am wrong, then when the property comes up for sale, as the husband’s proposed order sets out, the parties may, if they have financial capacity to do so, bid at that auction. However, I must give recognition to the statutory goal of finality prescribed by section 81 of the Act. This must now be achieved. What the ANZ Bank chooses to do against either party is a matter for the bank.
There is no evidence to support the splitting orders that:
(a)procedural fairness has been offered to M Super Fund; and
(b)how, in a practical way, the split of $100,000 in the husband’s benefit in the self‑managed superannuation fund can be undertaken. That’s accepting, of course, that as the sole trustee of the fund, he can be shown to have had procedural fairness by these orders.
It is appropriate before I pronounce final orders, therefore, as set out in these Reasons, that some attention to the form of orders be given in relation to the superannuation and procedural fairness of M Super Fund by the lawyers on the record for the parties. If everybody works diligently, accompanied by the future evidence as to procedural fairness, it should be possible to pronounce final orders within a month.
Accordingly, I propose to list this matter for pronouncement of orders at 9.30am on 27 June 2022, with the parties to be able to appear by telephone. If the form of order, consistent with these Reasons, and the evidence of procedural fairness is provided to chambers before the next date allocated, the Court will consider making the orders in chambers and vacating the next date.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Baumann. Associate:
Dated: 8 June 2022
APPENDIX ONE
POOL ONE Assets Ownership Property Value Joint P Street, Suburb Q, $210,000 Husband S Street, Suburb Q, $240,000 Husband Motor vehicle 2 $7,500 Wife Motor vehicle 3 $5,000 Husband Vehicle 1 $2,000 $464,500 Liabilities Joint Residual debt – D Town property $58,659 Joint Mortgage – P Street property $266,805 Husband Mortgage – S Street property $294,972 Joint ANZ “top up” loan $24,297 $644,733 Joint Rates arrears – P Street property $2,432 Joint Rates arrears – S Street property $3,613 TOTAL LIABILITES $650,778 DEFICIENCY (at least) $186,278 POOL TWO – SUPERANNUATION INTERESTS Wife N Super Fund $15,000 Husband M Super Fund $19,945 Husband Self-Managed superannuation fund – Mr Cooney Super $123,478 TOTAL SUPERANNUATION $158,423 POOL THREE – PROPERTY In Country J Husband 1K Street, L Town, B County Uncertain
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