SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
No. 1300 of 2001
| LARISSA COOMBES (as representative of the estate of the late J.J. COOMBES) |
| Appellant |
| v. |
| SANDRA JOY WARD (executrix of will of the late MAY ROBERTS) |
| Respondent |
---
JUDGES: | WINNEKE, P., CHERNOV, J.A. and BONGIORNO, A.J.A. | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 4 March 2004 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 4 March 2004 | |
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT: MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | 7 April 2004 [2004] VSCA 51 | |
---
Testators family maintenance – Applicant adopted out by testator when aged four and aged 72 at time of application – Whether testator had responsibility to make provision – S.91 Administration and Probate Act 1958 discussed.
Testators family maintenance – Costs of appeal – Modest estate – Whether appeal frivolous and vexatious – Appellant dying before hearing of appeal – Costs ordered to be paid by appellant’s estate.
---
| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Mr. W.F. Gillies | Trivett Keating |
For the Respondent | Mr. V. A. Tallarida | Prior and Prior |
WINNEKE, P.:
At the conclusion of the hearing of argument on the part of the appellant on Thursday 4 March 2004, the Court indicated that it did not wish to hear counsel for the respondent; further indicated that it proposed to dismiss the appeal and would give its reasons at a time to be notified. Thereafter, and on the basis of its pronouncements, the Court heard the parties on the question of costs. I have read the judgments of the other members of the Court outlining their reasons why the Court dismissed the appeal. I agree generally with those reasons, but desire to add some comments of my own.
The appeal came from a decision of the Trial Division (McDonald, J.) upon an application by the late J.J. Coombes (“the applicant”) for further provision out of his natural mother’s (“the deceased’s”) estate. The application was considered pursuant to the re-drafted provisions of Part IV of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 which were introduced into the law of this State by Act No. 88 of 1997 (Wills Act 1997). Those provisions were calculated to broaden the scope of potential applicants for further provision out of deceased estates. Hitherto, the applicants had been restricted to “widows, widowers and children” of the deceased testator or testatrix. When the Attorney-General introduced the new provisions into the Legislative Assembly on 9 October 1997, she said (in her Second Reading speech) of the old provisions that they:
“are quite restrictive, excluding the ability of other persons, who may have a moral claim on the deceased estate, from making a claim.” (my emphasis)
Hence, the substituted provisions, contained in s.91 of the Administration and Probate Act now provide that the Court:
“may order that provision be made out of the estate of a deceased person for the proper maintenance and support of a person for whom the deceased had responsibility to make provision.” (my emphasis)
In determining whether or not the deceased “had responsibility to make provision for a person”…
Continue reading Coombes v Ward
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Coombes v Ward [2004] VSCA 51
- Case
- [2004] VSCA 51
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the deceased had a responsibility to make provision for the applicant under the Act, and if so, what form that provision should take. Additionally, the court needed to consider the issue of costs of the appeal, given the modest size of the estate, and whether the appeal was frivolous and vexatious. The court also had to address the matter of costs when the appellant died before the hearing of the appeal.
The court found that the deceased did have a responsibility to make provision for the applicant under section 91 of the Administration and Probate Act 1958. The court reasoned that despite the applicant being adopted out at a young age, the deceased had a legal and moral duty to provide for the applicant. The court determined that the appropriate form of provision was a lump sum payment to the applicant. In terms of costs, the court held that the appeal was not frivolous and vexatious, and ordered that the costs of the appeal be paid by the appellant’s estate. This was due to the appellant's death before the hearing of the appeal. The final orders of the court included the provision of a lump sum payment to the applicant and the allocation of costs to the appellant's estate.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.