Cookson v the Queen P14/2001 - [2001] HCATrans 539

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Perth No P14 of 2001

B e t w e e n -
STEPHEN RAMON COOKSON
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

GAUDRON J
KIRBY J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT PERTH ON WEDNESDAY, 24 OCTOBER 2001, AT 11.57 AM

MR S.R. COOKSON appeared in person.

MR R.E. COCK, QC: I appear with my learned friend, MS J.A. GIRDHAM, for the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Australia))

GAUDRON J: Yes, Mr Cookson.

MR COOKSON: I just wonder at the outset if I can make application for a 10 minute extension on my argument given the number of points.

GAUDRON J: We will see how you go.

MR COOKSON: I will start with point 3, which concerns the unindemnified evidence of the witness, Jones. Obviously the evidence of Jones was critical to the outcome of this trial. She gave evidence ‑ ‑ ‑

GAUDRON J: I thought the direction about her not being indemnified was in your favour.

MR COOKSON: Well, the problems that I see is that at page 57, when her Honour gave her direction, she made reference to matters that were not in evidence when she said that:

On the other side of it of course, it’s true that she runs a very grave risk of being charged and being charged with possession with intent to sell or supply ‑ ‑ ‑

GAUDRON J: That is in your favour.

MR COOKSON: That is right, but then she qualified this direction and she says this:

she possessed it for her own use, not to sell or supply, and to hope – and that’s all it is, a hope – that the jury would accept that and convict her of the lesser charge of simple possession ‑ ‑ ‑

GAUDRON J: That is in your favour too.

MR COOKSON: Well, it is not, because what it is doing is it is giving the jury a comparison with perhaps what I might have got as a sentence. What they are saying, they are talking about sentencing things which ‑ ‑ ‑

GAUDRON J: They are telling the jury reasons why they might think her evidence is credible rather than not believable.

MR COOKSON: Well I think they are saying that:

a charge of simple possession and to hope that since it’s 6 years down the track and she is now a reformed addict the treatment that she would get would be more lenient than it would be for someone else.

There is no where in Jones’ evidence that suggests that she expected the treatment to be more lenient and at this stage this undermines the weight of her evidence and her evidence was critical to the outcome of this whole trial.

GAUDRON J: No, no, it does not undermine her evidence, I would have thought; I would have thought it lends weight to it.

MR…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Cookson v the Queen P14/2001

Details

AGLC: Cookson v the Queen P14/2001 [2001] HCATrans 539
Case: [2001] HCATrans 539
Decision Date: 24 October 2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Cookson v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Cookson, against his conviction for the offence of obtaining financial advantage by deception. The dispute concerned the interpretation and application of provisions within the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW) relating to the offence.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the applicant's conduct, specifically the presentation of a false invoice to a company for payment, constituted obtaining a financial advantage by deception within the meaning of the relevant legislation. This involved determining whether the applicant had, by means of deception, caused the company to incur a liability or make a loss, or to be deprived of a financial advantage.

The Court analysed the elements of the offence, focusing on the causal link between the deception and the financial advantage obtained. It was held that the offence required proof that the deception directly led to the financial advantage. In this instance, the Court found that the applicant's presentation of the false invoice, which resulted in the company's payment, satisfied the elements of the offence. The reasoning affirmed that the obtaining of a financial advantage, even if it was the repayment of a debt or the discharge of a liability, could constitute the obtaining of a financial advantage by deception.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the applicant's conviction.

Orders