Cook (Trustee), In the matter of Benson

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cook (Trustee), In the matter of Benson [2000] FCA 1777

BANKRUPTCY - application by trustee of bankrupt estate for declarations and orders in respect of payments made by bankrupt to respondents prior to date of commission of act of bankruptcy - whether each such payment was void against the trustee by force of ss120 or 121 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) - whether there was a disposition of property of the bankrupt within two years before the commencement of the bankruptcy and if so, whether that disposition was not in favour of a purchaser for valuable consideration - whether s116(2)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) applied so that payments were excluded from the operation of ss120 and 121

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss116(2)(d), 120, 121

N M Superannuation Pty Ltd v Young (1993) 41 FCR 182 referred to
Barton v Official Receiver (1986) 161 CLR 75 applied

PETER ROBERT BENSON (a Bankrupt) and PAUL JOHN COOK (as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of PETER ROBERT BENSON) v PETER ROBERT BENSON, LEGAL & GENERAL SUPERANNUATION SERVICES PTY LTD, PRUDENTIAL CORPORATION AUSTRALIA LIMITED (ACN 066 649 241) and MERCANTILE MUTUAL CUSTODIANS PTY LTD (ACN 008 508 496)

VG 7527 OF 1998

MARSHALL J
MELBOURNE
12 DECEMBER 2000


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VG 7527 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

PETER ROBERT BENSON
A BANKRUPT

PAUL JOHN COOK (as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of PETER ROBERT BENSON)
APPLICANT

AND:

PETER ROBERT BENSON
FIRST RESPONDENT

LEGAL & GENERAL SUPERANNUATION SERVICES PTY LTD
SECOND RESPONDENT

PRUDENTIAL CORPORATION AUSTRALIA LIMITED (ACN 066 649 241)
THIRD RESPONDENT

MERCANTILE MUTUAL CUSTODIANS PTY LTD
(ACN 008 508 496)
FOURTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 DECEMBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.It is declared that the payment made at the direction of the first respondent to the second respondent in the sum of $20,000 in September 1990 be void against the applicant.

2.The second respondent pay the applicant the sum of $20,000 plus any further amounts standing to the credit of the applicant referrable to the investment of $20,000.

3.It is declared that the payment made at the direction of the first respondent to the third respondent in the sum of $40,000 in September 1990 be void against the applicant.

4.The third respondent pay the applicant the sum of $40,000 plus any further amounts standing to the credit of the applicant referrable to the investment of $40,000.

5.It is declared that the payment made at the direction of the first respondent to the fourth respondent in the sum of $20,000 in September 1990 be void against the applicant.

6.The fourth respondent pay the applicant the sum of $20,000 plus any further amounts standing to the credit of the applicant referrable to the investment of $20,000.

7.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of, and incidental to, the application including reserved costs.

8.Liberty to apply be reserved with respect to the second, third and fourth respondents’…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1777
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Cook (Trustee) versus Benson, the applicant, Mr Paul John Cook, acting as the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Mr Peter Robert Benson, sought declarations and consequential orders concerning certain payments made by the bankrupt to other respondents. The payments in question were made by the bankrupt to various entities, which were not purchasers for valuable consideration, prior to his bankruptcy. The case required the court to determine whether these payments could be considered voidable dispositions under sections 120 and 121 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The court found that the payments were indeed dispositions of the bankrupt’s property made within two years prior to the bankruptcy and were not made in favour of a purchaser for valuable consideration, thus satisfying the criteria under section 120. The court further ruled that the payments were void against the trustee as they were dispositions of property within the specified timeframe. As a result, the court declared the payments void and ordered the respective respondents to repay the amounts to the trustee, along with any accrued interest. Additionally, the first respondent was ordered to pay the trustee's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. It is declared that the payment made at the direction of the first respondent to the second respondent in the sum of $20,000 in September 1990 be void against the applicant.

2. The second respondent pay the applicant the sum of $20,000 plus any further amounts standing to the credit of the applicant referrable to the investment of $20,000.

3. It is declared that the payment made at the direction of the first respondent to the third respondent in the sum of $40,000 in September 1990 be void against the applicant.

4. The third respondent pay the applicant the sum of $40,000 plus any further amounts standing to the credit of the applicant referrable to the investment of $40,000.

5. It is declared that the payment made at the direction of the first respondent to the fourth respondent in the sum of $20,000 in September 1990 be void against the applicant.

6. The fourth respondent pay the applicant the sum of $20,000 plus any further amounts standing to the credit of the applicant referrable to the investment of $20,000.

7. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of, and incidental to, the application including reserved costs.

8. Liberty to apply be reserved with respect to the second, third and fourth respondents’ costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, Mr Paul John Cook, is the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Mr Peter Robert Benson (“the bankrupt”). Mr Cook has applied pursuant to ss120 and 121 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (“the Act”) for declarations and consequential orders in respect of certain payments made by the bankrupt to the other respondents in the proceeding.Factual background On 21 July 1992 a sequestration order was made against the estate of the bankrupt by Registrar Cooper in Hobart. The Registrar’s order records the date of commission of the act of bankruptcy as 18 September 1991. From July 1972 until 20 April 1990, the bankrupt was employed by Industrial Sales and Service (TAS) Pty Ltd (“ISAS”). During that employment, the bankrupt was a member of ISAS’s superannuation fund and he accrued benefits in that fund. In January 1990, Bridge Wholesale Acceptance Corporation (Australia) Limited (“Bridge”) commenced a proceeding in the Supreme Court of Victoria against the bankrupt and R F Benson Pty Ltd. Bridge made a claim for the sum of $222,588.32 plus interest and costs regarding a floor plan bailment agreement concerning a tractor dealership business. ISAS was wound up on 4 June 1990. On account of the termination of his employment, the bankrupt obtained a vested interest in a benefit in the company’s superannuation fund in the sum of $96,192.36. Although it was disputed by his counsel, the bankrupt received that sum as an eligible termination payment. Annexed to Mr Cook’s first affidavit is a true copy of the declaration of trust of ISAS by which its superannuation fund was established. Clause 13(b) of the declaration of trust provides that if a member of the fund leaves the service of his employer prior to his normal retirement date and such retirement is accepted by the employer as “early retirement”, the benefits held in the scheme in respect of the member are to be transferred to him. That is what happened in this case. The bankrupt left the service of ISAS before his normal retirement age. He was in his forties at the time. In September 1990, the bankrupt authorised Norwich Union Life Australia Ltd (“Norwich”) to pay the greater part of the funds which were transferred to him to each of the three corporate respondents as “roll-over” institutions. This is apparent from the Australian Taxation Office’s Statement of Termination Payment Form signed by the bankrupt which authorised Norwich to pay the funds which had been transferred to the bankrupt onto the following entities in the following amounts:· The second respondent in the sum of $20,000.00.· The third respondent in the sum of $40,000.00.· The fourth respondent in the sum of $20,000.00. A further sum of $16,192.36 was paid to the Macquarie Bank. The trustee has admitted at least two proofs of debt in respect of the estate of the bankrupt. One relates to the action by Bridge (now known as Textron Financial Corporation Australia Limited). That claim is in the sum of $133,341.00. The other claim relates to the sum of $43,057.00 owing to Esanda (Wholesale) Pty Ltd as a consequence of judgment being entered in favour of that company against the bankrupt in the Supreme Court of Tasmania on 16 May 1990. The writ in that matter was served on 8 May 1990.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MARSHALL J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MARSHALL J

Mr Denton also submitted that there was no evidence upon which the Court could find that fraud had occurred within the context of s121 of the Act.Consideration I accept the following submissions made by Mr Bigmore:· the bankrupt’s entitlement to his eligible termination payment was a chose-in-action which belonged to the bankrupt; and· the chose-in-action attracted no relevant exemption under s116 of the Act. Section 116(2)(d) of the Act, as it applied at the relevant time, only made reference to policies of life assurance and endowment assurance and not superannuation per se: see N M Superannuation Pty Ltd v Young (1993) 41 FCR 182 at 190, per Hill J. Under s120 of the Act, it must be shown by the trustee that there was a disposition of property of the bankrupt within two years before the commencement of the bankruptcy. The relevant disposition here occurred about one year prior to the date of bankruptcy. Next, it must be shown that the disposition was not in favour of a purchaser for valuable consideration in the context of s120 of the Act. I accept Mr Bigmore’s submission that the respondents, other than the bankrupt, did not give any consideration for the payment to them of the relevant sums. What occurred was that each of those respondents pledged to manage and preserve the funds given to each such entity in return for management fees or charges. The second, third and fourth respondents were not “buyers” in a commercial sense of the relevant interests passing to them: see Barton v Official Receiver (1986) 161 CLR 75 at 86, per Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson & Dawson JJ. I also reject Mr Denton’s submission that the funds which were “rolled-over” were immediately dissipated. What occurred was that the bankrupt became entitled to them and then authorised their investment elsewhere. It is unnecessary to consider whether the payments made to the second, third and fourth respondents were void against the trustee having regard to s121 of the Act, it being plain that the payments were void against the trustee having regard to s120 of the Act.Orders The appropriate orders to be made in the circumstances are:1.It is declared that the payment made at the direction of the first respondent to the second respondent in the sum of $20,000 in September 1990 be void against the applicant.2.The second respondent pay the applicant the sum of $20,000 plus any further amounts standing to the credit of the applicant referrable to the investment of $20,000.3.It is declared that the payment made at the direction of the first respondent to the third respondent in the sum of $40,000 in September 1990 be void against the applicant.4.The third respondent pay the applicant the sum of $40,000 plus any further amounts standing to the credit of the applicant referrable to the investment of $40,000.5.It is declared that the payment made at the direction of the first respondent to the fourth respondent in the sum of $20,000 in September 1990 be void against the applicant.6.The fourth respondent pay the applicant the sum of $20,000 plus any further amounts standing to the credit of the applicant referrable to the investment of $20,000.7.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of, and incidental to, the application including reserved costs.8.Liberty to apply be reserved with respect to the second, third and fourth respondents’ costs.