HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Dixon C.J., Fullagar, Kitto, Menzies and Windeyer JJ.
THE CONTROLLER OF ENEMY PROPERTY AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v. THORNTHWAITE
8 November 1960
National Security
National Security—Enemy property—State of war—Enemy subject—Property held by local agent—Controller of Enemy Property—Power to order sale of property—Power to order account of property sold—Claim by Controller for proceeds of sale—Demurrer—Defence (Transitional Provisions) Act 1946 (Cth), s. 8 (4)—National Security (Enemy Property) Regulations 1939, regs. 3, 8 (1)—National Security (Enemy Property) Regulations 1942, regs. 3 (2), 6, 11.
Decision
November 8.
THE COURT delivered the following written judgment:-
This demurrer by the defendant to the plaintiffs' statement of claim was supported with a good deal of ingenuity upon a number of grounds. (at p173)
2. In the first place, the allegation that the plaintiff, the Controller of Enemy Property, is a corporation sole constituted by the National Security (Enemy Property) Regulations 1939 was challenged. (at p173)
3. Under the 1939 Regulations, a Controller of Enemy Property was appointed, who by force of reg. 3 became a corporation sole. When the 1939 Regulations were repealed by the National Security (Enemy Property) Regulations 1942, it was provided by reg. 3 (2) that notwithstanding the repeal, "the Controller of Enemy Property appointed under the repealed Regulations shall continue to hold office as if he had been appointed under these Regulations". In the 1942 Regulations, "the Controller" was defined to mean "the Controller of Enemy Property holding office under these Regulations", and reg. 6 provided: "(1) For the purposes of these Regulations, there shall be a Controller of Enemy Property, who shall be appointed by the Governor-General and shall hold office during his pleasure. (2) The Controller of Enemy Property shall be a corporation sole under that name with perpetual succession and an official seal, and shall be capable of suing and being sued". Notwithstanding the overlapping that probably results from the unreflecting repetition of reg. 3 of the 1939 Regulations in reg. 6 of the 1942 Regulations, we have reached the conclusion that the corporation constituted under the 1939 Regulations became the Controller of Enemy Property under the 1942 Regulations. When by virtue of reg. 3 (2) the Controller of Enemy Property continued to hold office, he became the Controller of Enemy Property for the purposes of the 1942 Regulations, and reg. 6 (2), included ex abundanti cautela, did not have the effect of consituting a second corporation. Accordingly, after the coming into operation of the 1942 Regulations, there was but one corporation sole with incorporation dating from the first appointment under the 1939 Regulations. There is, however, a further complication. The Defence (Transitional Provisions) Act 1946, which continued the operation of the 1942 Regulations, did so with the omission inter alia of reg. 3 which, it will be recalled, continued the office of the Controller of Enemy Property appointed under the 1939 Regulations. This Act provided by s. 8 (4) that each authority constituted under the provisions of any…
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- Case
- [1960] HCA 78
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Controller of Enemy Property had the legal right to retain and deal with the assets in question, which had been vested in him under enemy property legislation. Specifically, the court had to determine the extent of the Controller's powers and the validity of his claim to the property against the former owner.
The High Court considered the nature of enemy property legislation and the powers conferred upon the Controller. The court reasoned that the legislation was designed to vest enemy property in the Controller for the duration of the war and for a period thereafter, with the intention of managing and ultimately disposing of it. The court applied principles of statutory interpretation to ascertain the scope of the Controller's authority, concluding that his powers were broad enough to include the retention and disposition of the vested assets. The court affirmed the validity of the vesting orders and the Controller's entitlement to the property.
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