Contract PPS Pty Ltd t/as Petals & Pinecones v Ciranni

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Contract PPS Pty Ltd t/as Petals & Pinecones v Ciranni  [2025] QCAT 72

PARTIES:

CONTRACT PPS PTY LTD T/AS PETALS & PINECONES

(applicant)

v

ALBERTO SALVATORE CIRANNI

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

RSL068-24

MATTER TYPE:

Retail shop leases matter

DELIVERED ON:

28 February 2025

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Senior Member Brown

ORDERS:

1.     Direction 5 of the Directions made 13 December 2024 is vacated and the interim injunction dissolved.

2.     The Application for interim order is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

LANDLORD AND TENANT – RETAIL AND COMMERCIAL TENANCIES LEGISLATION – JURISDICTION, POWERS AND APPEALS OF COURTS AND TRIBUNALS – JURISDICTION GENERALLY –  where applicant applied for interim order restraining respondent from terminating lease of premises – where interim injunction granted – where no substantive proceeding commenced by the applicant in respect of a retail tenancy dispute under the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) – Tribunal jurisdiction to decide retail tenancy disputes – where applicant did not comply with pre-proceedings dispute resolution provisions of Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) – meaning of tribunal ‘proceeding’ – when the tribunal may make an interim order – where no referral of dispute notice from mediator – where no application for substantive relief filed – where interim application dismissed

Retail Shop Leases Act1994 (Qld), s 5A, s 5B, s 55, s 56, s 63, s 64, s 83, s 94, s 97, s 102, s 103

Small Business Commissioner Act2022 (Qld)

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act2009 (Qld), s 6, s 9, s 15, s 58, s 59

McDonald’s Australia Ltd v Emaaas Pty Ltd [2011] QCAT 293

Wagners Properties Pty Ltd v Atlas House Removers Pty Ltd [2023] QSC 40

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act2009 (Qld)

REASONS FOR DECISION

What is this application about?

  1. The applicant has applied for an interim order restraining the respondent from terminating a lease of premises in Atherton. An interim injunction was granted by the Tribunal on 13 December 2024 restraining the respondent from terminating the lease or acting to enforce a Notice to remedy breach issued on 25 November 2024 or a Notice to terminate lease and vacate premise issued on 9 December 2024. The application for interim order now falls to be determined.

  2. It cannot be contentious that:

    (a)The subject premises are used as a retail shop;[1]

    (b)The tenancy is a retail shop lease;[2]

    (c)The dispute between the parties is a retail tenancy dispute.[3]

    [1]Retail Shop Leases Act1994 (Qld), s 5B.

    [2]Retail Shop Leases Act1994 (Qld), s 5A.

    [3]Ibid, Schedule, Dictionary.

  3. The application for interim order was filed on 11 December 2024. Directions were made on 13 December 2024 requiring the applicant to file submissions in support of the application. No submissions were filed by the applicant. Accordingly, the…

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Details
Case
[2025] QCAT 72
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Contract PPS Pty Ltd t/as Petals & Pinecones v Ciranni, the court was asked to determine the jurisdiction of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) in relation to interim relief in retail tenancy disputes. The applicant, Petals & Pinecones, had sought an interim order restraining the respondent from terminating a lease, which had been granted initially. The dispute centred on whether QCAT had the jurisdiction to entertain an application for interim relief without a substantive proceeding being formally initiated under the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld).

The court examined the jurisdictional constraints placed upon QCAT by the QCAT Act and the Retail Shop Leases Act. It was established that interim relief could only be granted in the context of an existing substantive proceeding. The court emphasised that an application for interim orders or an interim injunction did not, by itself, constitute a substantive proceeding. The reasoning hinged on the interpretation of statutory provisions, particularly sections 58 and 59 of the QCAT Act, which deal with interim orders and injunctions. The court concluded that the statutory language and legislative scheme mandated that interim orders could only be made within the context of an ongoing substantive proceeding, which was absent in this case.

In reaching its decision, the court also considered the pre-proceedings dispute resolution provisions outlined in the Retail Shop Leases Act. These provisions necessitate that parties to a retail tenancy dispute must engage in a mediation process before approaching QCAT. The court noted that the absence of compliance with these mandatory pre-proceedings steps further undermined the applicant's position. The final outcome was that the interim injunction was dissolved, and the application for interim order was dismissed due to the lack of an existing substantive proceeding and non-compliance with the pre-proceedings dispute resolution provisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Direction 5 of the Directions made 13 December 2024 is vacated and the interim injunction dissolved.

2. The Application for interim order is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The provisions of a statute should be construed to give the words their ordinary meaning, avoiding an absurd or unreasonable consequence. The Tribunal is a creature of statute and has only those powers conferred by the QCAT Act and the various enabling Acts. As was stated by Kelly J in Wagners Properties, s 15 of the QCAT Act provides that the Tribunal may exercise its original jurisdiction conferred by an enabling Act if a person has applied to the Tribunal under the QCAT Act to exercise its original jurisdiction. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear retail tenancy disputes. In the context of retail tenancy disputes, an application for interim relief pursuant to s 58 or s 59 of the QCAT Act is not an application to hear a retail tenancy dispute. Rather, it is an application for orders to be made on an interim basis until such time as the tribunal exercises its original jurisdiction and makes final orders to resolve a retail tenancy dispute. This approach to the construction of s 58 and s 59 is consistent with Wagners Properties. An interim order or an order for an interim injunction can only be made in an existing substantive proceeding. The filing of an application for such orders cannot, of itself, constitute a substantive proceeding. The construction I prefer is consistent with the overall legislative scheme of the QCAT Act and the specific provisions to which I have referred in relation to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Conclusion I have concluded that an order can only be made by the Tribunal pursuant to s 58 or 59 of the QCAT Act upon application being made in an existing substantive proceeding. Here, there is no substantive proceeding before the Tribunal. It follows that direction 5 of the Directions made 13 December 2024 must be vacated and the interim injunction dissolved. The application for interim order must be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Common to both pathways[5] is the requirement for a party to a retail tenancy dispute who wishes to apply to the Tribunal to resolve the dispute to comply with the provisions of the RSL Act relating to pre-proceedings dispute resolution. A party to a retail tenancy dispute that is within a mediator’s jurisdiction under s 97 of the RSL Act may lodge notice of the dispute with the Small Business Commissioner (‘SBC’).[6] The RSL Act provides that after a notice of dispute is lodged a mediation is held, arranged by the SBC. [7] The mediation is attended by the parties to the dispute. If the dispute cannot be resolved, or a party fails to attend the mediation, or the dispute is not settled within four months after the notice is lodged, the mediator must refer the dispute to QCAT.[8] [5]Other than those circumstances where a court orders the transfer of a proceeding for a retail tenancy dispute to QCAT.[6]Ibid, s 55(1).[7]Ibid, s 56. [8]Ibid, s 63. Section 63(1)(b) also requires that the lease must not have ended more than one year before the dispute notice was lodged. Consideration In McDonald’s Australia Ltd v Emaaas Pty Ltd (‘McDonald’s’)[9] the then President of QCAT, Alan Wilson J, found that there was a third pathway to the Tribunal for a party to a retail tenancy dispute, not one specifically provided for in the RSL Act. In McDonald’s it was not contentious that the parties were involved in a retail tenancy dispute. The applicant filed an application for an interim order or injunction relying upon s 58 and s 59 of the QCAT Act. While the applicant had lodged a dispute notice, the pre-proceedings mediation process had not been undertaken by the parties, nor had a substantive proceeding about the retail tenancy dispute been commenced in the Tribunal. The application for interim relief was, in essence, an originating application. [9][2011] QCAT 293. Alan Wilson J stated:[26] Certainly the RSL Act is an enabling Act but, for the reasons already explored, QCAT has jurisdiction under s 103 of that Act to hear retail tenancy disputes. If (as has been concluded) the dispute here falls within the ambit of s 103, s 33 of the QCAT Act simply provides the mechanism for the applicant (clothed with jurisdiction) to apply to QCAT.[27] It was also suggested that QCAT’s injunctive power under s 59 could not be successfully invoked by McDonald’s because that section provides that the Tribunal can only make an order of that kind ‘... in a proceeding ...’, and no proceeding was extant here; but, the word ‘proceeding’ is defined in Sch 3 of the QCAT Act to mean a proceeding before the Tribunal, and the application for an injunction itself would appear to qualify.[28] It is also suggested, for McDonald’s, that the Notice of Dispute itself is a proceeding because it is now ‘lodged’ in QCAT. In light of the conclusion just set out it is unnecessary to express a view about that submission but, certainly, the fact that the chief executive under the RSL Act is now the Principal Registrar of QCAT creates an obvious harmony between the RSL Act and QCAT proceedings.