SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeal from a Master: Civil)
CONTACT 121 PTY LTD v BODEN
[2018] SASC 61
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Parker
15 May 2018
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - PLEADINGS - FORM OF PLEADING - GENERALLY
Appeal against a decision of a Master.
The respondent is an ex-director and former employee of the appellant company. The appellant commenced these proceedings in September 2014 in order to recover monies paid to the respondent as reimbursements for expenses. Since then, the parties have been embroiled in disputes over the Statement of Claim.
On 28 April 2017, the appellants sought permission to file what is now the ninth draft of the third Statement of Claim (‘proposed TSOC’). Permission was refused by a Master. That refusal forms the subject of this appeal.
Held, per Parker J, dismissing the appeal:
1. The Master gave adequate reasons for his decision (at [71]).
2. The proposed TSOC fails to properly plead the basis upon which both a loan agreement is said to exist and an indemnity is said to arise (at [72] and [74]).
3. Until such time as the appellant establishes a breach of fiduciary duty it cannot particularise the potential liabilities it asserts. Nevertheless, the appellant should clearly plead the basis upon which any liabilities are said to arise (at [76]-[77]).
4. The pleas with respect to the respondent’s employment contract and the appellant’s policies are unclear (at [78]-[79]).
5. The further application for permission to file the proposed TSOC was not an abuse of process. However, the failure by the appellant to make sufficient efforts to rectify deficiencies was relevant to the exercise of the Master’s discretion in respect of the subsequent application (at [82]).
6. A change in the facts being alleged by the appellant is, of itself, a matter for trial rather than a basis to refuse permission. However, a change in position that is not properly explained and which follows a long delay is relevant to the Court’s discretion to grant permission (at [84]).
7. Whether there has been any election and waiver is a matter to be decided at trial in light of all relevant evidence (at [87]).
8. The misleading and deceptive conduct claims cannot succeed because the communications between the respondent and the appellant were internal to the appellant company and therefore not within trade and commerce (at [91]).
9. The observation by the Master that these proceedings were not an audit of the respondent’s claims for expenses did not acknowledge that the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty were a matter for trial. However, because there are other significant deficiencies with the proposed TSOC that is not a basis to allow the appeal (at [94]).
10. If the appellant seeks permission to file yet another version of the proposed TSOC it should exclude those reimbursements that, on balance, it recognises are likely to be legitimate claims (at [95]-[97]).
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 98; Competition and Consumer…
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- Case
- [2018] SASC 61
- Decision Date
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The causes of action relied upon in the second SOC are breaches of ss 180 to 184 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), breaches of directors duties and the general law, breaches of the respondent’s employment contract and breaches of his fiduciary obligations.The sixth iteration of the third statement of claim The first draft of the proposed third SOC was provided to the respondent’s solicitors on 4 March 2015. Thereafter further iterations of the proposed third SOC were provided to the respondent’s solicitors. An application for permission to file the first draft of the proposed third SOC was filed on 20 April 2015 as FDN 13 (‘FDN 13’). That application came before the Master on 28 September 2016, by which stage the parties were in dispute over the sixth draft of the proposed third SOC. The sum claimed by the appellant from the respondent had increased to $1,142,475.40. That represented a refund of all payments made to the respondent by way of reimbursement of expenses since 1 July 2007. Senior counsel for the respondent made comprehensive submissions to the Master about the alleged defects in the sixth iteration of the proposed third SOC. Before hearing from counsel for the appellant the Master made clear that, in his view, there were many problems with the proposed third SOC. The Master indicated that he was inclined to adopt the submission by the respondent’s counsel that the application should be dismissed with the appellant being given the opportunity to make a further application to file an amended SOC. The appellant’s counsel stated “it is wasting my breath to argue against it”. On that basis the Master made orders granting the appellant liberty to make a further application to file an amended SOC and dismissing FDN 13. Mr Bill’s third affidavit Subsequently, the Master directed that Mr Bill file an affidavit in support of the appellant’s application to file a third SOC. In his third affidavit sworn on 14 March 2017, Mr Bill deposed that the appellant had made payment to the respondent’s credit card providers. Because of the alleged failure of the respondent to submit spreadsheets showing his expenses on a regular and timely basis it was not always possible to link the payments to the claims made by the respondent. Mr Bill stated that the first SOC had sought recovery of payments made to the respondent from July 2012 onwards when he ceased to submit claims for payment. However, because of the refusal by the respondent to provide documentation in respect of payments made prior to July 2012 the appellant was now seeking recovery of all payments that had been made to the respondent by way of reimbursement of expenses. Mr Bill further deposed that he had not referred to the appellant’s Travel Policy in his first affidavit as the claim then being advanced sought recovery of payments made to the respondent in respect of which there had been no claim that the payments were for business expenses.[1] In his view, the Travel Policy had not been relevant to that claim. Mr Bill stated that the appellant considered that because of the failure of the respondent to provide documents when requested to substantiate his expense claims, many of the expenses that he had claimed appear not to be bona fide business expenses.[1] The alleged terms of the Travel Policy appear at [18] below.