[2010] HCATrans 324
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M85 of 2010
B e t w e e n -
CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
First Applicant
BOB MATES
Second Applicant
and
CHRIS CAHILL
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
FRENCH CJ
CRENNAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 10 DECEMBER 2010, AT 10.18 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR H. BORENSTEIN, SC, and MR C.W. DOWLING, for the applicants. (instructed by Slater and Gordon)
MS R.M. DOYLE, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR M.L. FELMAN, for the respondent. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: Your Honours, what we propose as being features of this case, a sentencing appeal, which would nonetheless fit it for a grant of special leave has to do with what this Court has recently described as the need for consistency in the application of relevant legal principles as being the consistency which is the hallmark of just sentencing.
FRENCH CJ: Is that what this is about, a debate about application or a debate about principle?
MR WALKER: It is a debate about principle but the application comes in this fashion.
CRENNAN J: Are you saying there is an error in relation to principle in the Full Court’s majority?
MR WALKER: Yes, the error is this, not in perceiving and, with respect, correctly, that their own decision in Williams adumbrated the approach correctly, but rather that this was what I might call colloquially a “take it or leave it” approach, not a principle which would therefore conduce to the achievement of consistency in the sense this Court described in Hili v Jones in the application of relevant principle. Can I try and make good the way in which there is, unless this Court were to intervene, a degree of confusion introduced in relation to principle by going to the reasons in the Full Court?
CRENNAN J: May I just clarify something? I think the respondent says in the submissions that dealing with the totality principle by the primary judge was not challenged in the Full Court so that we are only talking about – we are not talking about the totality principle for these purposes, is that right?
MR WALKER: Not quite, though the point made by our learned friends is, with respect, so far as we understand it, entirely correct. It would be mentioned – it needs to be mentioned because the error that we seek to identify, the departure from the best way of achieving consistency is because the Bench says, in effect, if you so choose – if you so choose matters which could be dealt with by a “one course of conduct” approach can, and, if you have not done so under the one course of conduct, should be considered…
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 324
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether Mr. Cranney's entry onto the construction site, for the purpose of exercising rights conferred by the *Workplace Relations Act 1996* (Cth), constituted a contravention of section 174(2) of that Act, which prohibited entry without the occupier's consent. This required the Court to interpret the scope of the rights of union officials to enter workplaces and the limitations imposed by the Act on such entry, particularly in relation to the occupier's consent.
The High Court held that the right of entry provisions in the *Workplace Relations Act 1996* (Cth) were intended to confer a statutory right on authorised industrial officers to enter workplaces for specific purposes, and that this statutory right necessarily implied a consent to enter for those purposes. Therefore, the requirement for the occupier's "express or implied consent" under section 174(2) was satisfied by the statutory grant of entry rights. The Court reasoned that to require separate consent from the occupier, in addition to the statutory right, would render the right of entry nugatory.
The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Full Federal Court were set aside.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicants, CFMEU and Bob Mates, were found to have contravened section 43 of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 on three separate occasions. Section 43 imposes civil penalties for certain conduct that adversely affects the building and construction industry. The contraventions involved a series of stoppages at a worksite, with threats made to stop work if certain demands were not met. The primary judge of the Federal Court found the applicants guilty and imposed pecuniary penalties.
The applicants argue that the primary judge erred in not treating the contraventions as a single course of conduct. They contend that the principle of a single course of conduct, which aims to avoid sentencing in excess of what the criminality requires, should have been applied. The applicants further argue that the primary judge erred by considering the connection between the contraventions merely as part of the totality principle. The Full Court, by majority, upheld the primary judge's decision, and the applicants now seek special leave to appeal to the High Court.
The High Court is asked to consider whether there is a question of principle warranting the grant of special leave. The applicants argue that the Full Court's approach to the application of sentencing principles introduces confusion and inconsistency in the application of the law. They contend that the single course of conduct principle and the totality principle are not interchangeable and should be applied consistently in cases where they are applicable. The applicants also raise the issue of whether the same reasoning that applies to criminal cases should apply to civil penalty cases, where monetary penalties are imposed.
The High Court ultimately decides that no question of principle warranting the grant of special leave is demonstrated. The Court finds that the primary judge and the Full Court considered the relevant factors, including the relationship between the contraventions, in exercising their discretion to impose penalties. The Court concludes that neither the primary judge nor the Full Court erred in their approach to the imposition of the penalty. Consequently, special leave is refused with costs.
The matter before the High Court is an application for special leave to appeal against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The applicants, Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union and Bob Mates, seek to appeal against pecuniary penalties imposed on them by a judge of the Federal Court for three contraventions of section 43 of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005. The applicants contend that the primary judge erred in her approach to determining whether the contraventions found should be treated as a single course of conduct for the purposes of penalty, and that the primary judge also erred by taking the connection between the contraventions into account, merely as part of an application of the totality principle. The special leave application is brought in respect of a decision of the Full Court which, by majority, upheld the primary judge. The High Court refused special leave to appeal, holding that no question of principle warranting the grant of special leave was demonstrated and that neither the primary judge, nor the Full Court, is shown to have erred in their approach to the imposition of the penalty. The Court also awarded costs against the applicants.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the primary judge err in her approach to determining whether the contraventions found should be treated as a single course of conduct for the purposes of penalty?
2. Did the primary judge err by taking the connection between the contraventions into account, merely as part of an application of the totality principle?
3. Should the Full Court's decision to uphold the primary judge's approach be reviewed by the High Court for a demonstrated error of principle?
4. Is there a demonstrated need for consistency in the application of relevant legal principles in sentencing, particularly in relation to the single course of conduct and totality principles?
Held
1. The court concluded that the primary judge did not err in her approach to determining whether the contraventions should be treated as a single course of conduct for the purposes of penalty. The result was that the appeal against the penalty was dismissed.
2. The court concluded that the primary judge did not err by taking the connection between the contraventions into account as part of an application of the totality principle. The result was that the appeal against the penalty was dismissed.
3. The court concluded that there was no demonstrated error of principle in the Full Court's decision to uphold the primary judge's approach. The result was that the application for special leave to appeal was dismissed.
4. The court concluded that there was no demonstrated need for consistency in the application of relevant legal principles in sentencing, particularly in relation to the single course of conduct and totality principles. The result was that the application for special leave to appeal was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court was asked to consider the applicants' contention that the primary judge and subsequently the Full Court had erred in their handling of the contraventions found in the case. The applicants argued that the primary judge failed to properly determine whether the contraventions should be treated as a single course of conduct for the purposes of penalty. They also claimed that the primary judge erred by considering the connection between the contraventions merely as part of the totality principle, rather than as a separate and potentially determinative factor in sentencing. The applicants sought special leave to appeal on the basis that the Full Court's decision upheld the primary judge's approach and that this approach constituted an error of principle.
The Court focused on whether there was an error in principle that warranted special leave. The applicants contended that the Full Court's approach allowed for a choice between applying the single course of conduct principle or the totality principle, which created a lack of consistency. They argued that these principles should not be seen as alternatives, but rather as distinct and non-interchangeable tools of analysis. The applicants emphasized that the single course of conduct principle exists to prevent sentencing in excess of the criminality involved and that it should be applied in cases where it is applicable, without leaving it to the discretion of the court.
The Court noted that the primary judge had considered the relationship between the contraventions and that the Full Court had also examined the differences between the case at hand and a prior case (Williams). The Court observed that the primary judge had referred to the common thread running through the offending conduct and that this was taken into account in fixing penalties. The Full Court had explained the differences between the cases and had highlighted the varying contexts and participants involved. The Court concluded that neither the primary judge nor the Full Court had erred in their consideration of the relationship between the contraventions or in their application of sentencing principles.
The Court found that the issue was one of the application of well-understood principles to the particular facts of the case. It was noted that the Full Court had appropriately exercised its discretion by considering a range of factors, including the relationship between the contraventions. The Court was of the opinion that the Full Court's decision did not demonstrate an error of principle warranting the grant of special leave. The Court held that the primary judge and the Full Court had not erred in their approach to the imposition of the penalty. Consequently, the special leave application was refused with costs.