Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 762

Citation: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 762
Parties: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION v BHP COAL PTY LTD
File number: QUD 204 of 2011
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 2 August 2013
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – claim of adverse action pursuant to s 346 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – presumption in s 361 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) that adverse action taken for prohibited reason unless employer proves otherwise – employees in their capacity as union officials had conversations with a third employee at the mine in relation to his decision to resign from the union – third employee claimed aggressive conduct and intimidation – conduct of employees not unlawful – decision-maker purported to terminate employment of employees based on findings of fact in separate District Court defamation proceedings between relevant mine employees – involvement of respondent in defamation proceedings defending third employee – unexplained harsh treatment three years after relevant conduct of employees – unexplained failure of decision-maker to consider contemporaneous internal investigation where investigators found no substance to complaint concerning dismissed employees – unexplained failure of decision-maker to consider significant number of unsubstantiated complaints made by third employee – dismissed employees credible witnesses – failure to discharge onus of proving that adverse action not taken against employees for a proscribed reason
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 341(2)(c), 342(1) Item 1(a), 346(a) and (b), 347(b)(ii), (iii) and (v), 360, 361, 362
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 793
Cases cited: Adams v Cramond (unreported, District Court of Queensland, McGill DCJ, 24 June 2011) cited
Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 86 ALJR 1044; [2012] HCA 32 applied
Date of hearing: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 February 2012 and 16 March 2012
Place: Brisbane
Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 126
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr MM Stewart SC
Solicitor for the Applicant: Hall Payne Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Kenzie QC with Mr C Murdoch
Solicitor for the Respondent: Herbert Smith Freehills Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

QUD 204 of 2011

BETWEEN:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
Applicant

AND:

BHP COAL PTY LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 AUGUST 2013

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.The respondent has contravened s 346 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in respect of Kevin Adams by terminating his employment because he is and was an officer of an industrial association.

2.The respondent has contravened s 346 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in respect of Justin Winter by terminating his employment because he is and was an officer of an industrial association.

AND THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

3.The respondent treat as null and void the termination of…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 762
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union and two individual union officials, brought proceedings against BHP Coal Pty Ltd (the respondent) in the Federal Circuit Court. The applicants claimed that the respondent had taken adverse action against them, namely dismissing the officials from their employment, in contravention of section 346 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The applicants sought orders for the respondent to reinstate the officials to their positions and to pay compensation for the loss of income and legal costs. The central issue before the court was whether the dismissals of the officials constituted adverse action under section 346 of the Fair Work Act and whether such action was taken for a proscribed reason, specifically, their protected industrial activity. The court needed to consider the evidence and arguments presented by both parties to determine if the respondent had discharged its onus of proving that the dismissals were not taken for a proscribed reason.

The court found that the dismissals of the officials did constitute adverse action under the Fair Work Act, as defined in section 346. The court also noted that there was a presumption under section 361 of the Act that the adverse action was taken for a proscribed reason unless the respondent could prove otherwise. The court examined the evidence presented by both parties, including the internal investigation conducted by the respondent, the separate District Court defamation proceedings, and the credibility of the witnesses involved. The court found that the respondent had failed to discharge the onus of proving that the dismissals were not taken for a proscribed reason. The court was particularly critical of the unexplained harsh treatment of the officials three years after the relevant conduct, the failure to consider the contemporaneous internal investigation, and the failure to consider the significant number of unsubstantiated complaints made by the third employee.

The court concluded that the dismissals of the officials were taken for a proscribed reason, and therefore, constituted adverse action under the Fair Work Act. The court ordered the respondent to treat the termination of employment of the officials as null and void, and to reinstate them to their positions. The court also ordered the respondent to pay compensation for the loss of income and legal costs incurred by the applicants.

Orders

Orders of the court

3. The respondent treat as null and void the termination of the employment of Kevin Adams.

4. The respondent treat as null and void the termination of the employment of Justin Winter.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In my view, the applicant has substantiated its claim against the respondent. Before explaining my reasons for so finding it is useful to explain the background in more detail.BACKGROUND At all material times BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd (“BMA Coal”) operated an open-cut coal mine at Peak Downs in Central Queensland (“the mine”). BMA Coal operated the mine under appointment by the BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance (“BMA”), an incorporated joint venture between the BHP Billiton group and the Mitsubishi group. The respondent is a corporate entity related to BMA Coal and BMA. It employs labour, and contracts with others for the provision of labour at the mine. Mr Adams commenced employment with the respondent as a production worker at the mine on 23 June 1997. At all material times Mr Adams was a member of the applicant and vice president of the Peak Downs Lodge of the applicant. Mr Adams’ functions as vice president included dealing with industrial issues that arose, advocating for and providing advice to members of the applicant, and keeping an eye on membership levels of the applicant at the mine. Mr Winter commenced employment with the respondent as a production worker at the mine on 21 August 2005. At all material times Mr Winter was a member of the applicant. In August 2008, Mr Winter was the secretary/treasurer of the applicant’s Peak Downs Lodge. His duties included being responsible for all correspondence received by the Lodge, keeping the minutes of meetings, recruiting new members and processing membership applications. Mr Winter resigned as secretary/treasurer of the Peak Downs Lodge in November 2009, and since then has held the position of co-delegate on the A Crew Post Strip. His duties include providing industrial advice to members in A Crew and representing members of A Crew who are involved in industrial disputes. In August 2008 Mr Robert Cramond was a production worker at the mine. He was a member of the D Crew and reported on a day-to-day basis to the shift supervisor Mr Jamie Bray. From 11 October 2006 to 4 August 2008 Mr Cramond was a member of the Peak Downs Lodge, paying union dues of about $48.00 per week. Prior to his employment with the respondent, Mr Cramond worked in the construction industry and was a member of the Australian Workers Union. When Mr Cramond commenced employment at the respondent’s mine, permanent employees were entitled to housing benefits under the respondent’s Moranbah Housing Policy 2004 (“2004 Housing Policy”). At the time that he became a permanent employee of the respondent in October 2006 he received an accommodation subsidy of $267.00 per week from the respondent under the 2004 Housing Policy. At material times Mr Cramond lived with his wife in a caravan in a caravan park, and used $94.95 of the weekly subsidy to pay caravan park fees, and the balance for his living expenses. The 2004 Housing Policy was renegotiated between the applicant and the respondent in 2007 and early 2008. It appears that objectives of the applicant in renegotiating the housing policy were (inter alia) to require BMA to build new houses, purchase houses in Moranbah for employees, or pay increased rental housing subsidies.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In summary, Mr Cramond gave evidence that:·Mr Adams came into the pre-start room and said, “I’m looking for Robert”. When Mr Cramond identified himself, Mr Adams stated, “I want to talk to you”.·Mr Cramond and Mr Adams moved to the breezeway, where other employees were coming and going due to the shift changeover. Mr Adams said, “Why did you leave the union. The union got you your job”.·Mr Cramond replied that he had got the job on his own merit, that the union had let him down by giving away the housing subsidy, and that the union had done nothing for him.·Mr Adams said he could not do anything for Mr Cramond since he was not a member of the applicant. Mr Adams said, “Why don’t you go and get a house and put your caravan in the backyard and live in that. The respondent is paying for it”.·Mr Adams said that there was going to be a housing meeting on 25 August 2008, but that the applicant would not be able to do anything for Mr Cramond at the meeting as he was not a member of the applicant. Mr Cramond replied that he did not want to be a member and that Mr Adams was wasting his time.·Mr Adams said, “It’s not going to be easy for you here because you are taking a free ride from these other union members. It’s going to come down on you really heavy. No one will be talking to you”.·During the conservation Mr Adams was standing close to Mr Cramond, and waving his arms in an angry manner. Mr Adams’ tone was very aggressive. Mr Cramond believed Mr Adams was trying to force him to rejoin the applicant, and he felt physically threatened. Mr Cramond was trying not to cry during the conversation and had tears in his eyes.·At some point during the conversation, Mr James Eastley (a dispatch supervisor at the mine with whom Mr Cramond worked on a regular basis) walked past and asked Mr Cramond if he was all right.Evidence of Mr Eastley In his affidavit sworn 31 January 2012 Mr Eastley deposed that at the beginning of his day shift on 21 August 2008, he observed Mr Cramond and Mr Adams outside the pre-start room in the breezeway. Mr Eastley stated that Mr Adams was physically standing over Mr Cramond, waving his arms and yelling quite loudly. As Mr Eastley walked past on his way to the pre-start room he asked Mr Cramond if he was all right. Mr Cramond said he was. Approximately 10 minutes later Mr Eastley walked from the pre-start room to return to his office. Mr Cramond and Mr Adams were still standing outside the pre-start room. Mr Eastley thought Mr Cramond looked intimidated and had tears in his eyes. Mr Adams was yelling at Mr Cramond and Mr Eastley thought Mr Cramond was being threatened. Mr Eastley again asked Mr Cramond if he was all right. Mr Cramond said he was. Mr Eastley made a diary note relating to these events. Mr Eastley had no knowledge of Mr Adams prior to this incident.The Winter Incident Prior to August 2008, Mr Cramond and Mr Winter had never met nor spoken to each other. Mr Winter gave evidence that in late August 2008, Mr Clinton Lacey, vice president of the Peak Downs Lodge, informed him that Mr Cramond had resigned as a member of the applicant over the 2008 Housing Policy.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The conduct of this industrial activity is not disputed by the respondent. However Mr Craig deposed that, prior to his decision to terminate the employment of Mr Adams and Mr Winter, he was not aware whether their rosters had coincided with industrial activity at the mine and whether they had organised, encouraged or participated in industrial action (affidavit of Brandon Kyle Craig affirmed 13 December 2011).District Court Judgment On 24 June 2011 McGill DCJ dismissed Mr Adams’ defamation action against Mr Cramond in the District Court of Queensland. During the course of the judgment his Honour made the following comments:Credibility[31] There were a number of features of the plaintiff’s evidence that I thought were unsatisfactory and which were damaging to his credibility. He spoke with apparent pride of the existence of 100% union membership for a long time at that site (p 11), and that he was passionate about the union (p 53), but claimed that he did not care if a particular person (such as the defendant) was a union member or had resigned from the union. Those two states of mind do not readily co-exist. He gave as his motivation for speaking to the defendant to find out what his position was in relation to the housing agreement, but at another point he said that he was concerned to find out whether he was still a member (p 94), which presumably meant whether he had rejoined the union, or was going to. He referred to the meeting with Mr Low as producing some indication that the defendant may rejoin, as explaining the approach on 21 August: p 95. Given that he maintained that, while the defendant was not a member of the union, he and the union could do nothing for him in relation to the housing agreement, and he said he told the defendant this that day (p 87), there was no point in finding out what the defendant’s position was in relation to the housing agreement unless he had rejoined or would rejoin the union. There was also the consideration that he had said at one stage (p 11) that one of his roles as the vice president, indeed the second one he mentioned, was keeping an eye on the levels of people in the union. It would be consistent with that for his role to include attempting to persuade people to join the union where something of that nature was required, but he denied that: p 83, p 92.[32] There were other things that he said which seemed odd. He gave as an explanation for his not placing significance on Mr Coleman’s statement that he did not believe there was much substance in the allegations that had been made against him, that you learn to take very little notice of statements from the human resources department: p 48. But this was really a statement by Mr Coleman against interest, and I can think of no reason why in the circumstances Mr Coleman would have made a statement of this nature unless it were true. The plaintiff said he did in fact speak to a company official about the defendant’s position under the new agreement, after the incident on 21 August (p 72-3, p 80), and his statement, Exhibit 8, refers to this and says that he told the defendant what the official said, but the plaintiff gave no evidence of any later meeting with the defendant for this purpose, and could not explain this inconsistency: p 79. There was also some inconsistency about whether he had assistance in drafting Exhibit 8: p99, p 3.[33] The plaintiff’s reaction to cross-examining counsel was also a little unusual. The cross-examination was thorough and at times persistent, but did not strike me as unusually aggressive. Yet on more than one occasion there was a notable reaction towards counsel for the defendant. For example, on p 61 the plaintiff said that he had taken offence at cross-examining counsel’s posture, which did not at the time strike me as being unusual in any way, and at another point he addressed cross-examining counsel by his Christian name, which I do not recall ever having heard a witness do before. My impression of the demeanour of the plaintiff in the witness box, particularly during cross-examination, was that there was a touch of arrogance about him.[34] I should add that the plaintiff is a solidly built man with strong arms and a face which in the witness box appeared to fall naturally into a frown. It occurred to me that anyone talking to him in a conversation which was not in a friendly context could easily see him as hostile and intimidating, particularly if his voice were raised and he were waving his arms around. Overall my assessment of the plaintiff’s credibility in the witness box was not favourable.[35] On the other hand, I was favourably impressed by the defendant’s credibility. He seemed to me to give his evidence in quite a genuine way. He did at times become obviously overcome in the witness box, apparently by the unpleasantness of the recollection, in a way which struck me as genuine: p 78, p 85. In other respects he made reasonable concessions under cross-examination, significantly about whether he had said the things that were recorded in the crucial file note. Overall I was favourably impressed by the defendant’s demeanour in the witness box and he did strike me as a reliable witness. In view of my assessments of their credibility and in the light of the other matters referred to earlier, I prefer the evidence of the defendant to the evidence of the plaintiff as to what happened in the incident between them.[36] The same applied broadly speaking to the other defence witnesses, though I was conscious of the fact that they were giving evidence about things which might not at the time have seemed to them as important as they did to the defendant. I thought that at times their evidence was perhaps not entirely reliable as to matters of detail, but I accept that their evidence was reliable in relation to the more important features of it. I think that the other defence witnesses were all honest. With regard to the plaintiff’s other witnesses, there was nothing in their demeanour which particularly reflected adversely on their credibility, though it will be apparent from my analysis of the content of their evidence that I do not regard Mr Winter’s evidence as reliable. As well, his evidence that he spoke to the defendant as he wanted to find out if he could help him (p 37, p 51) was inconsistent with his position, as expressed at the time, that he could not help the defendant if he was not in the union: p 53. He also agreed he was passionate about the union (p 45, p 54) but claimed that the defendant’s resignation did not worry him one way or the other, and denied that the purpose of the conversation was to try to get him to rejoin: p 51; but see p 58. I prefer and accept the evidence of the defendant as to what passed between him and Mr Winter. Given that I otherwise accept the evidence of the defendant, I also prefer the defendant’s evidence to the evidence of Mr Low where they are inconsistent. The remaining plaintiff’s witness, Mr Leggett, said nothing of significance, so I need say nothing about his credibility.What imputations are proved?…[45] I accept that the plaintiff was on this occasion standing quite close the defendant, was waving his arms around, and was speaking and behaving quite aggressively towards him, and that that physical behaviour of the plaintiff did threaten the defendant. I do not consider that in order to show that the imputation was substantially true it is necessary for the defendant to show that there was an express threat of physical harm, or that there was an actual attempt on that occasion to cause physical harm to the defendant. What matters is whether on the occasion in question the plaintiff’s behaviour in fact physically threatened the defendant. I find on the evidence of the defendant and Mr Eastley that it did. Accordingly the defence of justification is made out in respect of the only imputation relied on which was in fact conveyed by the words published. If follows that the action fails…(Footnotes omitted.)Actions of the respondent following the District Court Judgment

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.