IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B23 of 2014
B e t w e e n -
CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
Appellant
and
BHP COAL PTY LTD
Respondent
FRENCH CJ
HAYNE J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
GAGELER J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT BRISBANE ON WEDNESDAY, 3 SEPTEMBER 2014, AT 2.02 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR H. BORENSTEIN, QC: I appear with MS C.M. HOWELL for the appellant. (instructed by Hall Payne Lawyers)
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR I.M. NEIL, SC and MR R.P.P. DALTON, for the respondent. (instructed by Ashurst Australia)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Borenstein.
MR BORENSTEIN: If the Court pleases, we have handed up our propositions document. The Court will see from that that the essential question in this appeal is whether the Full Court upheld the appeal on a basis that was inconsistent with the guidance given by this Court in the Barclay Case.
The circumstances giving rise to the litigation involve the dismissal of a Mr Doevendans after he attended a lawful union protest in May 2012. At that protest, from time to time, he held and waved a sign which the union had provided as part of organising the protest, and that sign had the words “No Principles, Scabs, No Guts”. Following his dismissal, the appellant brought proceedings for his benefit, as it is entitled to do under the Fair Work Act, in respect of his dismissal, and the allegation was made under section 346 of the Fair Work Act. The relevant sections of the legislation are appended to our initial submissions, and 346 of the Fair Work Act prohibits a person from taking:
adverse action against another person because the other person –
relevantly in subparagraph (b):
engages, or has at any time engaged or proposed to engage, in industrial activity within the meaning of paragraph 347(a) or (b) –
The notion of “adverse action” is not in controversy in this proceeding. It is defined in section 342 of the Fair Work Act, and it includes the act of termination of employment. There is no controversy about the fact that adverse action has occurred. The controversy is around the reasons for the taking of that adverse action. As your Honours see, paragraph (b) of the section brings up the concept of engaging in industrial activity, and that is defined in section 347 of the Act. Relevantly, it provides that:
A person engages in industrial activity if the person:
. . .
(b) does, or does not:
. . .
(iii)encourage, or participate in, a lawful activity organised or promoted by an industrial association –
and I interpolate that the term “industrial association” is defined to include a trade union. The alternative limb of the complaint was under paragraph (v), does or does not –
(v)represent or advance the views, claims or…
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- Case
- [2014] HCATrans 189
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the payments made by BHP Coal to its employees for periods of illness or injury, as stipulated in the certified agreement, constituted "wages" for the purposes of section 539 of the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth). This section deals with the recovery of amounts that are payable to an employee under a registered instrument, such as a certified agreement, but have not been paid. The question was whether the employer could offset these contractual payments against amounts it was otherwise liable to pay under the Act.
The High Court held that the payments made by BHP Coal for periods of illness or injury were indeed "wages" within the meaning of section 539 of the *Fair Work Act 2009*. The Court reasoned that the certified agreement created an obligation on BHP Coal to pay its employees for these periods, and these payments were remuneration for their employment. Therefore, BHP Coal was entitled to deduct these amounts from any liability it had to pay under section 539, as the payments had already satisfied, in whole or in part, the amounts that would otherwise have been recoverable. The Court affirmed that the purpose of section 539 was to ensure that employees received what was contractually or statutorily due to them, and that payments already made pursuant to a valid agreement should be taken into account.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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