Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd

[2015] FWC 1071

[2015] FWC 1071

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.739 - Application to deal with a dispute

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union
v
BHP Coal Pty Ltd
(C2014/3497)

COMMISSIONER LEWIN MELBOURNE, 23 FEBRUARY 2015

Alleged dispute about any matters arising under the enterprise agreement and the National Employment Standards [s186(6)], regarding clause 37.1 - matter arising in the course of employment (disciplinary outcome) and Mr Julio Reyes.

Introduction

[1] This decision concerns an application to the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) for the Commission to deal with a dispute said to arise under the terms of the BMA Enterprise Agreement 2012 (the Agreement). The Agreement was approved by Senior Deputy President Justice Boulton on 26 October 2012. The dispute concerns the employment of Mr Julio Reyes by BHP Coal Pty Ltd (BHP Coal) at the Peak Downs Coal Mine in Queensland.

Legislative scheme

[2] The Commission’s jurisdiction to deal with a dispute of the kind said to exist in the application is subject to the following provisions of Part 6-2 headed “Dealing with disputes” of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act).

[3] Section 738 states:

“This Division applies if:

...

(b) an enterprise agreement includes a term that provides a procedure for dealing with disputes, including a term referred to in subsection 186(6);

...”

[4] Section 739 states:

“(1) This section applies if a term referred to in section 738 requires or allows the FWC to deal with a dispute.

(2) The FWC must not deal with a dispute to the extent that the dispute is about whether an employer had reasonable business grounds under subsection 65(5) or 76(4), unless:

(a) the parties have agreed in a contract of employment, enterprise agreement or other written agreement to the FWC dealing with the matter; or

(b) a determination under the Public Service Act 1999 authorises the FWC to deal with the matter.

Note: This does not prevent the FWC from dealing with a dispute relating to a term of an enterprise agreement that has the same (or substantially the same) effect as subsection 65(5) or 76(4) (see also subsection 55(5)).

(3) In dealing with a dispute, the FWC must not exercise any powers limited by the term.

(4) If, in accordance with the term, the parties have agreed that the FWC may arbitrate (however described) the dispute, the FWC may do so.

Note: The FWC may also deal with a dispute by mediation or conciliation, or by making a recommendation or expressing an opinion (see subsection 595(2)).

(5) Despite subsection (4), the FWC must not make a decision that is inconsistent with this Act, or a fair work instrument that applies to the parties.

(6) The FWC may deal with a dispute only on application by a party to the dispute.”

Dispute settlement procedure

[5] Clause 37 of the Agreement includes terms providing a procedure for dealing with disputes. Those terms are set out below:

“37.1 It is the intention of the Parties that any disputes arising in relation to the NES; or pertaining to this Agreement; or in relation to the application of the Accommodation Agreements (as referred to in clause 34 of this Agreement); or arising in the course of employment shall be dealt with in accordance with this clause.

37.2 Employees and their Employee Representatives agree that issues in relation to the employment of Employees covered by this Agreement should be ideally addressed at their source by those involved and without undue involvement of those not directly involved.

37.3 An Employee may nominate an Employee Representative (as defined in clause 38.1) to represent them at any stage of this procedure.

37.4 This procedure does not apply in relation to the exercise of rights or implementation of processes or systems provided for under this Agreement (for example, the right of the Company to have free and unfettered access to contractors) or under other relevant prevailing legislation.

37.5 Where the matter relates to:

(a) An issue arising under the IDPR process (clause 36); or

(b) An issue relating to a disciplinary outcome;

then clause 37.9 does not apply.

37.6 At all times work will continue without disruption and at the direction of the Company, subject to the relevant provisions of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld).

37.7 Matters affecting the majority of Employees across a crew, a department or a whole Mine may be raised by an Employee Representative and progressed in accordance with clause 37.10 where the disputed issue affects the Employees in substantially the same way.

37.8 Notwithstanding clause 37.7, the parties will address matters of an individual nature on an individual basis.

37.9 Where a matter arises:

(a) It shall be discussed between the Employee (and an Employee Representative if requested) and the immediate supervisor involved within 14 days.

(b) The supervisor will not be involved in the discussion at 37.9(a) if the dispute directly relates to that supervisor. In such a case, the matter will progress to a discussion under clause 37.10(a) with the Company nominating an alternative representative to attend the discussion (or discussions) in lieu of that supervisor.

37.10 If the Employee considers the matter remains unresolved, the following process applies:

(a) The Employee and/or an Employee Representative if requested may refer the matter to the relevant superintendent. The Employee and/or an Employee Representative must set out the details of the matter in writing and provide this to the superintendent first within 14 calendar days. The matter will then be referred for discussion between:

(1) the Employee and an Employee Representative (if requested); and

(2) two representatives from the Company (the relevant supervisor and superintendent, unless otherwise agreed).

(b) If the matter remains unresolved after completion of clause 37.10(a), the Employee and/or an Employee Representative if requested may refer it in writing to the relevant department manager within 14 calendar days. The matter will then be referred for discussion between:

(1) the Employee and an Employee Representative (if requested); and

(2) two representatives from the Company (the relevant supervisor and department manager, unless otherwise agreed).

(c) If the matter remains unresolved after completion of clause 37.10(b) and the Employee wishes to escalate it, the Employee and/or their Employee Representative (if requested) may refer it in writing to one representative of the Company not based on that site within 14 calendar days. The matter will then be referred to a State Level Conference for discussion between (unless otherwise agreed) the following participants:

(1) the Employee, and if requested:

(A) an Employee Representative; and/or

(B) a District Official of the relevant Union; (collectively, the Employee’s Representatives); and

(2) up to three Company representatives (which includes the relevant supervisor and one representative of the Company not based on that site).

(d) Where the matter remains unresolved after completion of the other stages in clause 37.10 or where the parties agree to bypass the above stages in accordance with clause 37.15, the Company or Employee and/or their Employee Representative (if requested) may refer the matter in writing within 14 calendar days to FWA to conciliate the matter. Alternatively, by agreement of both parties, a matter may be referred to an agreed private arbitrator or mediator to conciliate on the matter.

37.11 At each stage of this process in clause 37.10, the Company will have 14 calendar days from the date of the last discussion with the Employee to respond to the Employee, or make contact with the Employee (and if they have requested one, their Employee Representative) to arrange a meeting to attempt to resolve the matter raised by the Employee, in accordance with clause 37.10; and

37.12 Where the Company fails to make contact with the Employee and their Employee Representative to arrange a meeting within the time limit specified in clause 37.11, the Employee may progress the matter to the next stage of the process.

37.13 Where an Employee (or their Employee Representative on the Employee’s behalf) does not seek to progress their matter within the time limits specified in 37.10 or respond within 14 calendar days to the Company’s attempts to arrange a meeting under 37.11, the matter in dispute will be treated as being withdrawn. Once this occurs, an Employee cannot seek to re-invoke this procedure in relation to that same matter.

37.14 Unless otherwise agreed between the participants, an HR representative will not attend the discussions at clauses 37.9, 37.10(a) and 37.10(b). For the avoidance of doubt, an HR representative may be involved in a discussion held in accordance with clause 37.10(c) and 37.10(d).

37.15 By mutual agreement, the Company, the Employee and their Employee Representative may bypass any of the above steps.

37.16 Subject to clause 37.15, provided that all the above steps have been exhausted FWA may conciliate or where conciliation has been exhausted and the dispute remains unresolved, arbitrate in relation to the matter. Where a matter involving an individual Employee progresses to this stage, the Employee will be permitted to attend FWA proceedings on the same arrangements set out in clauses 38.13 and 38.14. If proceedings are brought on more quickly by FWA, the travel plan must be submitted immediately upon the listing of the matter by FWA and before travel commences.

37.17 In the circumstances set out in clauses 14(e) or 14(g), or by agreement under clause 37.15, FWA may:

(a) Conciliate in relation to the matter; or

(b) Where conciliation has been exhausted and the dispute remains unresolved, arbitrate in relation to the matter.

The parties to the matter are not required to first exhaust the above steps for the purposes of this sub-clause.

37.18 During any conciliation or arbitration proceedings before FWA under this clause 37, either party may choose to be represented by a legal practitioner.

37.19 If FWA issues a decision in writing under this clause:

(a) the decision and reasons for the decision will be provided in writing to the parties; and

(b) the decision shall be binding on the parties to the matter in dispute and persons bound by this Agreement.

37.20 Nothing in clause 37.19 removes the right of either party to a matter in dispute from appealing a decision of FWA, in accordance with the Act.

37.21 If a person who will be involved in any discussions, conferences or proceedings under this clause is not employed or reasonably available at the Mine, then that person may participate by teleconference or other remote means where possible, to expedite the process.

37.22 None of the arrangements in this clause otherwise limit the rights of the Parties at common law or under the Act.

37.23 The outcome of any matter dealt with in accordance with clause 37.10 will be recorded in writing but will not form a precedent for any other matter, either at that Mine or at any other Mine.”

Background

[6] The dispute comes before the Commission as provided for in cl 37.16 of the Agreement.

[7] The subject matter of the dispute is disciplinary action taken by BHP Coal in relation to events involving Mr Reyes, whereby Mr Reyes was verbally counselled in accordance with Step 1 of a disciplinary process, which was issued to Mr Reyes by BHP Coal under an established policy and procedure for managing the performance and conduct of employees of BHP Coal at the Peak Downs Coal Mine in Queensland. The policy and procedures are referred to as the BMA Guideline to Fair Play Policy, which contains a guide for decision-making by managers called the Just Culture Decision Tree.

[8] The events which gave rise to the disputed action of BHP Coal occurred during the night of 19 August 2013. On that night, Mr Reyes was driving a water tanker operating in the Peak Downs Coal Mine. The mine is open cut and it is necessary to suppress dust on the roads travelled by mining equipment including trucks hauling the extracted material. An accident occurred that night. Another water tanker slipped on a road within the mine and toppled onto its side. The accident led to the driver of the affected water tanker suffering injuries which, fortunately, were not fatal. The water tanker was damaged beyond repair and was replaced at a cost to BHP Coal of $1,200,000.00

[9] BHP Coal conducted extensive investigations of the accident in accordance with mining safety legislation and more generally.

[10] The CFMEU and BHP Coal called evidence concerning the events of the night and of the investigation. On my evaluation of the evidence, there is substantial convergence upon a finding that more probably than not, the major casual factor of the accident was that there was an excess of water on the mine road on which the accident occurred. The driver of the subsequently toppled water tanker lost control of it. There is no contest in the evidence that Mr Reyes was the operator of the water tanker which applied water to the section of the road where the accident occurred in the period before the accident.

[11] Mr Reyes maintained that when applying the water he followed the standard procedure for doing so and therefore any disciplinary action was inappropriate.

[12] At this point it is convenient to set out extracts from the Fair Play Policy, which outlines a disciplinary procedure as follows:

“Except for instances of serious misconduct, the following four step disciplinary process will be applied.

The application of the Just Culture Decision Tree together with the particular circumstances and severity of each case will determine the appropriate disciplinary action Step to be taken with respect of an Employee. The relevant Steps are as follows:

Step 1 An employee will be verbally counselled by their Supervisor. Where requested by the employee, the Supervisor will conduct their counselling in the presence of an employee representative. Written notice of the verbal counselling will be provided to the employee and a copy placed on the employee’s file; or

Step 2 An employee will be counselled by their Supervisor in the form of a formal warning. Where requested by the employee, the Supervisor will conduct the counselling in the presence of an employee representative and have the warning confirmed in writing. A copy will be provided to the employee and a copy placed on the employee’s file; or

Step 3 An employee will be issued a final warning by their Supervisor and Department Manager/Superintendent. Where requested by the employee, the company representatives will conduct the counselling in the presence of an employee representative, and have the final warning confirmed in writing and the employee will be advised that dismissal may result from any further misconduct. The employee can also be placed on a period of suspension without pay for a period of up to twenty-one (21) calendar days. A copy will be provided to the employee and placed on the employee’s file; or

Step 4 Disciplinary action, which is commensurate with the severity and/or frequency of the act/s of misconduct, will then be taken.”

[13] And from the Just Culture Decision Tree:

“In order to ensure a consistent and fair approach and to provide a clear consequence for actions the below decision tree will guide in the appropriate discipline level when inappropriate behaviour occurs. However, each situation will be ultimately determined on a case by case basis, taking into account the particular circumstances and severity of each case and the relevant disciplinary procedure.

The decision tree will assist leaders to make sure that human error is addressed in a clear and consistent manner. The decision tree should only be used for one action at a time. In cases where there are multiple actions that led to the event, each action should be treated separately. There may be an incident where an Employee does not follow an isolation procedure, is not wearing the correct PPE and does not follow a broader safe-working procedure/job safety analysis.

Each of these acts should be treated separately as each one may have different underlying causes and lead to a different outcome. The decision-maker will then need to exercise judgement to determine an appropriate course of action including mitigating circumstances and previous safety breaches.

Where an investigation finds that human error contributed to the incident, the just culture tree shall be applied to ensure the behaviour is corrected; separate from the investigations. Note we are talking about the human error not the consequence e.g. failure to call up versus excavator hitting the dozer.

Questions to be asked are:

• Was the error intentional or unintentional?



• Was a safe operating procedure violated? If yes, were the procedures adequate and available?



• Could an equally competent person make the same mistake? If no, were the deficiencies in training, experience or selection?



• Is there history of unsafe acts in the individual or group?



• For unintentional violations, was the error due to a mistake, slip or lapse and has the individual made similar errors before?



• For intentional violations, was the error due to cultural violation (generally not complied with) or was it due to a deviant violation (an individual deliberately chose not to comply with a requirement).”

Consideration

[14] As previously observed, it was decided by BHP Coal that Mr Reyes should be subject to the Step 1 form of discipline, in respect of the accident involving the water tanker. The decision to do so was taken in accordance with the Just Culture Decision Tree, extracted above.

[15] The Just Culture Decision Tree requires that the person responsible for application of its provisions to a given factual situation must evaluate whether an action of an employee which might give rise to disciplinary action was done intentionally or unintentionally.

[16] Having considered all of the evidence, I have reached the conclusion that there was excessive water on the section of the mine road on which the accident occurred and that Mr Reyes applied that water, but did so unintentionally. By this I mean that Mr Reyes did not set out to ensure that there was excessive water on the road as his object or design, which, in the circumstances, is the ordinary meaning of the word “intention” to be applied. In this respect, on the evidence before me, I think Mr Perry, who is the Superintendant - Production Pre -Strip at the Peak Downs Mines, wrongly construed the relevant action of Mr Reyes as intentional.

[17] Taking into account this finding, the Commission should now objectively evaluate the action of Mr Reyes on the night in question and determine if the verbal counselling as described as Step 1 of the disciplinary process was fair and reasonable management action in all the circumstances. In doing so, I will treat any such error of Mr Reyes applying water to the road in question as unintentional.

[18] Before doing so it is appropriate to refer to a consideration which is relevant to the submission of Mr Reyes that the issuing of the verbal counselling was unfair and unreasonable in the circumstances.

[19] This concerns the situation relevant to provisions of the Fair Play Policy and the Just Culture Decision Tree process and outcomes for Mr Reyes of previous applications of the Fair Play Policy and the Just Culture Decision Tree extant at the time that the accident occurred on 19 August 2013.

[20] For reasons unrelated to the events of 19 August 2013 Mr Reyes was at that time at what is referred to a Step 2 of the Fair Play Policy.

[21] The consequence of the issuing of the verbal counselling as decided upon by Mr Perry was that Mr Reyes advanced to Step 3 of the Fair Play Policy disciplinary process.

[22] As I discern it, the CFMEU submits, or at least infers, that this consequence of the issuing of the verbal counselling is relevant when considering the reasonableness or otherwise of the decision to issue the verbal counselling.

[23] I consider this submission or inference to be unpersuasive in the particular circumstances for the following reasons:

• The events which brought Mr Reyes to Step 2 of the Fair Play Policy are not the subject matter of the dispute before me, although they have been to some extent described and explained and have a feature that I will address later, which problematises the CFMEU’s submissions in this respect. Moreover, I am not asked to make decisions about the validity or reasonableness of the disciplinary actions which brought Mr Reyes to Step 2 before the accident on 19 August 2013.



• There is nothing before me therefore which would lead me to conclude that the decisions which led to Mr Reyes being on Step 2 of the Fair Play Policy at the time of the accident on 19 August 2013 were anything other than appropriate.



• The application of the Just Culture Decision Tree in this matter resulted in a Step 1 warning involving only the events of the accident of 19 August 2013, namely, Mr Reyes’ watering of the road on the day the accident occurred. Consideration of the reasonableness of that action by the Commission should be based entirely upon its particulars rather than some extended set of criteria which are invented or superimposed over those circumstances.



• The collateral effect of a reasonable application of the Just Culture Decision Tree upon earlier separate and unconnected events which had brought Mr Reyes to Step 2 prior to the accident might become relevant if the consequence of the Step 1 verbal counselling issued in relation to the events of 19 August 2013 was severe and gave rise to what may be considered a highly significant consequence, such as the termination of Mr Reyes’ employment. In that case, a more holistic view may lead to a conclusion that the aggregate effect of the Step 1 arising from the events of 19 August 2013 had consequences for Mr Reyes, which looked at all round were harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

[24] The nature and consequence of the verbal counselling for Mr Reyes was relatively benign. The Fair Play Policy operates so that the verbal counselling later lapsed and Mr Reyes returned to Step 2 when it did.

[25] In my view, on the evidence, the water which Mr Reyes applied shortly before the accident was excessive in the relevant conditions and had not dispersed adequately by the time the accident occurred. It is perhaps unfortunate that the water tanker which overturned did so within a time frame that meant the water had not adequately dispersed or evaporated. However, that situation was a manifestation of the risk emanating from the application, unintentionally, of an excess of water for the conditions shortly beforehand.

[26] I do not discount that the skill and experience of the driver of the affected water tanker may have been a contributing factor. However, I conclude that at the very least a conjunction of the state of the road and the driver’s ability, more probably than not, was involved in the accident. It is reasonable to conclude that the conditions were not conducive to the necessary level of absorption and evaporation which Mr Reyes had allowed for when he watered the road before the affected water tanker arrived at the surface area on which the accident occurred. The surface in that particular location may also have been less absorbent than other parts of the road. Mr Reyes’ evidence is that he maintained a steady stream of water over all sections of the road.

[27] It seems to me that in deciding to issue the verbal counselling for failing to operate the water truck appropriately to the prevailing conditions Mr Perry concluded that Mr Reyes had paid insufficient attention and deficient judgement to the task of watering the road.

[28] In essence, the question embedded in consideration of the decision required and made by Mr Perry is whether there was some injustice, unreasonableness or harshness in the decision. In order to answer that question, I consider it appropriate to determine whether the decision was disproportionate to the consideration upon which it was based.

[29] In my view, the nature of the verbal counselling and its consequences are relevant. The first observation I make is that it cannot be said that the facts did not give rise to any basis to consider whether Mr Reyes should be subject to some sanction. It was Mr Reyes’ responsibility to water the road and to do so carefully and diligently. There was an excess of water on the road which either caused or significantly contributed to the accident. Mr Reyes was required to exercise skilful judgement of the application of water to the road. It may well have been the case that the water would have dispersed or evaporated from the relevant section of the road in due course. However, that possibility is uncertain and how long that would have taken cannot be determined with certainty. The evidence suggests that the water had not adequately dispersed when other persons had arrived to investigate the accident some time after it had occurred.

[30] The severity of the sanction comprised of verbal counselling becomes the critical focus for consideration in these circumstances. The verbal counselling issued to Mr Reyes is the first step, beyond which no action whatsoever would be taken in relation to Mr Reyes’ involvement with the circumstances of the accident. Step 1 is the lowest level of disciplinary action in the Fair Play Policy. Moreover, there would be and was no effect on the continuity of Mr Reyes’ employment or his terms and conditions of employment. The verbal counselling would lapse and extinguish as part of Mr Reyes’ employment profile within the time frame of 12 months and indeed has elapsed uneventfully at the time of the decision in this matter.
[31] The Commission’s functions are to be performed as prescribed by the following provisions of the Act.

[32] Section 577 of the Act prescribes the manner of the performance of the Commission’s functions and is set out below:

“577 Performance of functions etc. by the FWC

The FWC must perform its functions and exercise its powers in a manner that:

(a) is fair and just; and

(b) is quick, informal and avoids unnecessary technicalities; and

(c) is open and transparent; and

(d) promotes harmonious and cooperative workplace relations.”

[33] Section 578 of the Act identifies the matters which the Commission must take into account when performing its functions or exercising powers under the Act and is set out below:

“578 Matters the FWC must take into account in performing functions etc.

In performing functions or exercising powers, in relation to a matter, under a part of this Act (including this Part), the FWC must take into account:

(a) the objects of this Act, and any objects of the part of this Act; and

(b) equity, good conscience and the merits of the matter; and

(c) the need to respect and value the diversity of the work force by helping to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental disability, marital status, family or carer’s responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin.”

[34] Of these statutory directions I consider those prescribed by s 578(b) of the Act to be foremost in this case.

Decision

[35] I am not satisfied that the issuance of the verbal counselling to Mr Reyes was unfair or unreasonable in the circumstances. Moreover, I do not think it would give rise to any injustice for the Commission to refrain from intervening in relation to the issuance of the verbal counselling.

[36] It is relevant to note that more severe disciplinary action than the verbal counselling was the subject of discussion and was actively contemplated during the Just Culture Decision Tree process. Mr Perry judged that any greater action would be excessive to the facts and its effects on Mr Reyes. Rightly so in my view. I judge that Mr Perry was required to make an important and finely balanced decision in onerous circumstances. The accident could have been fatal. The damage was very significant. Anything greater than Step 1 would have placed Mr Reyes’ employment in jeopardy. On the evidence, I am satisfied that Mr Perry weighed this consideration and decided against more severe disciplinary action. In this respect, there was clearly no injustice.

[37] Mr Reyes’ continued employment would have been an issue if a more severe sanction under the Fair Play Policy had been adopted. In my objective judgement the decision Mr Perry made was carefully and finely calibrated and appropriate. I am not satisfied on all that is before me that a decision to take no disciplinary action in relation to Mr Reyes in accordance with the Fair Play Policy and the Just Culture Decision Tree was the only outcome reasonably and fairly available. Indeed, on that evidence, I consider it would have been inappropriate not to verbally counsel Mr Reyes absent the need to exercise diligent operator discretion when watering the roads of the mine.

[38] In my view, some action by BHP Coal to reinforce due diligence, care and careful exercise of judgement in all prevailing conditions and circumstances by Mr Reyes was reasonable.

[39] The earlier incident which lead to Mr Reyes being on Step 2 under the Fair Play Policy, characterised by inattention to prevailing rules for vehicular operations and movements, had caused some damage to equipment at the time. If anything, this fortified the appropriateness of the Step 1 counselling under the Fair Play Policy.

[40] I consider the verbal counselling was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

[41] Over the last five years or so, the decisions of courts and tribunals have been critical and sometimes scathing of corporate human resource management policies and procedures or the failure of management to apply them properly. The policies and procedures in this mine are well developed and the human resources management practice is commendable. There is always a need for well trained and diligent application of such policies and practices in order that they lead to appropriate outcomes. The application of good policies and procedures affecting the management and performance of employees also requires time, effort, good judgement and a fair process for employee participation. In my observation, those qualities were present throughout the Fair Play Policy and Just Decision Tree process and the application of the dispute settlement procedure under the Agreement which brought this matter before the Commission.

[42] I would like to take the opportunity here to thank the representatives of the parties for the thoroughness and professionalism with which this matter was brought before the Commission. I would like to further add to my observation of the diligent efforts of BHP Coal and the CFMEU in relation to issues of safe mine operations and the application of the Fair Play Policy and the Just Decision Tree Process.

Determination

[43] For the reasons set out above, the Commission determines the dispute by arbitration in accordance with the provisions of cl 37.16 of the Agreement as follows:

a) The decision to issue verbal counselling to Mr Reyes in relation to the operation of a water truck on 19 August 2013 was reasonable management action carried out in a reasonable manner. The decision was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable in all the circumstances.

b) No change to that action is required.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

Ms S Fentiman, of Hall Payne Lawyers, for Mr Reyes.

Mr J Hall, of Ashurst Australia, for BHP Coal.

Hearing details:

6 and 7 November 2014, Mackay.

Final written submissions:

12 January 2015 for Mr Reyes.

12 January 2015 for BHP Coal.

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