Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union

[2011] FWA 2670

Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2011/4632) was lodged against this decision - refer to Full Bench decision dated 13 October 2011 [[2011] FWAFB 6761]for result of appeal.

[2011] FWA 2670

FAIR WORK AUSTRALIA

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.185 - Application for approval of a single-enterprise agreement

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union
(AG2010/20176)

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT O'CALLAGHAN ADELAIDE, 17 MAY 2011

Moyle Bendale Timber Pty Ltd Enterprise Bargaining Agreement 2010.

[1] This decision addresses an application lodged by the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union - Forestry and Furnishing Products Division (CFMEU) on 29 November 2010, through which it sought the approval of the Moyle Bendale Timber Pty Ltd Enterprise Bargaining Agreement 2010 (the Agreement).

[2] On 16 March 2011 I issued a decision 1 relative to this application. In this decision I foreshadowed that, on the approach adopted by a Full Bench of Fair Work Australia (FWA) in Australian Industry Group2 (AiG), the right of entry provisions in the Agreement represented an unlawful term and precluded the approval of the agreement. I invited Moyle Bendale Timber Pty Ltd (Moyle Bendale) and the CFMEU to provide a written undertaking that, notwithstanding the provisions of clause 7.12, the exercise of any right of entry under the agreement will be in accordance with Part 3-4 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the FW Act).

[3] The CFMEU subsequently requested a further hearing. Given the unusual nature of this matter and consistent with the objects of the Act a further hearing opportunity was provided. At this hearing, on 18 April 2011, the CFMEU was represented by Mr Irving, of counsel and Moyle Bendale by Mr Hayes.

[4] In summary terms, the position of the CFMEU was that it was not prepared to give an undertaking of the nature proposed, and it did not consider that, on a proper application of the FW Act and the AiG decision, that the right of entry provisions in the Agreement represented an unlawful provision which prohibited approval of the Agreement. The CFMEU proposed a different position to that initially argued to me. I have reviewed my decision of 16 March 2011 in the context of the position now argued by the CFMEU.

[5] Clause 7.12 of the Agreement states:

“7.12 Access to the Workplace

An official of the CFMEU-FFPD may have access to the Employer’s premises, at any time, for the following purposes connected to this Agreement:

to represent employees under any term of this agreement which creates a right to representation;

to deal with disputes and represent employees under the dispute resolution procedure set out in this agreement;

to represent employees and meet with the Employer about the negotiation of a replacement agreement;

to attend induction meetings for new employees of the company; and

for any other purpose connected to the relationship between the union and the employer.

Officials will not unduly hinder the productivity of the workplace. The union can, by agreement, hold paid meetings of union members for the purposes associated with this agreement identified above. Management will not unreasonably withhold agreement to paid meetings of union members.

However, nothing in this clause provides an official of the Union with a right to enter premises for a purpose which is within Part 3-4 of the Fair Work Act 2009.”

[6] Section 185 and section 186 of the Act deal with the requirements for the approval of an enterprise agreement. Section 186(4) of the Act requires that, in deciding whether to approve an agreement, FWA must be satisfied that the agreement does not include any unlawful terms.

[7] Rights of entry are included in the definition of unlawful terms in s.194 in the following manner:

“194 Meaning of unlawful term

A term of an enterprise agreement is an unlawful term if it is:

....

(f) a term that provides for an entitlement:

(i) to enter premises for a purpose referred to in section 481 (which deals with investigation of suspected contraventions); or

(ii) to enter premises to hold discussions of a kind referred to in section 484;

other than in accordance with Part 3-4 (which deals with right of entry)”

[8] Section 481 states:

481 Entry to investigate suspected contravention

(1) A permit holder may enter premises and exercise a right under section 482 or 483 for the purpose of investigating a suspected contravention of this Act, or a term of a fair work instrument, that relates to, or affects, a member of the permit holder’s organisation:

(a) whose industrial interests the organisation is entitled to represent; and

(b) who performs work on the premises.

Note 1: Particulars of the suspected contravention must be specified in an entry notice or exemption certificate (see subsections 518(2) and 519(2)).

Note 2: FWA may issue an affected member certificate if it is satisfied that a member referred to in this subsection is on the premises (see subsection 520(1)).

(2) The fair work instrument must apply or have applied to the member.

(3) The permit holder must reasonably suspect that the contravention has occurred, or is occurring. The burden of proving that the suspicion is reasonable lies on the person asserting that fact.

Note: A permit holder who seeks to exercise rights under this Part without reasonably suspecting that a contravention has occurred, or is occurring, is liable to be penalised under subsection 503(1) (which deals with misrepresentations about things authorised by this Part).”

[9] Section 484 states:

“484 Entry to hold discussions

A permit holder may enter premises for the purposes of holding discussions with one or more employees or TCF outworkers:

(a) who perform work on the premises; and

(b) whose industrial interests the permit holder’s organisation is entitled to represent; and

(c) who wish to participate in those discussions.”

[10] The CFMEU position is that the construction of s.194(f) and the scheme of the FW Act concerning right of entry terms in enterprise agreements is to the effect that:

• Part 3-4 does not establish an exclusive code dealing with rights of entry



• enterprise agreements may include terms granting additional rights of entry entitlements provided these terms are not unlawful under s.194(f)



• an enterprise agreement term is only unlawful if it grants a right of entry entitlement for the purposes referred to in ss.481 and 484 other then in accordance with Part 3-4, and accordingly



• if an agreement term grants rights of entry for purposes not specified in ss.481 or 484, it is not unlawful.

[11] The CFMEU submitted that if Part 3-4 of the FW Act is construed as creating an exclusive code, the resultant outcome would be inconsistent with the scheme of the Act and would frustrate its purposes and objects.

[12] The CFMEU position was that rights of entry were permitted matters and that s.194(f) limited the concept of unlawfulness to ss.481 and 484. Further, Part 3-4 granted rights of entry for two purposes, namely the investigation purpose in s.481 and the discussion purpose in s.484 rather than the provision of an overarching code dealing with all rights of entry issues. In this respect the CFMEU relied on the objects of Part 3-4, s.186(6), s.205 and s.737 which should be read such that a right of entry is a necessary adjunct of dispute resolution processes.

[13] The CFMEU also relied on the objects of the FW Act and the Explanatory Memorandum which states:

“834. Paragraphs 194(f) and 194(g) provide that certain terms of an enterprise agreement dealing with right of entry are unlawful.

835. Paragraph 194(f) provides that a term of an enterprise agreement is an unlawful term if it provides for an entitlement that is inconsistent with Part 3-4 in relation to:

* entry to premises for a purpose referred to in clause 481, which deals with investigation of suspected breaches; or

* entry to premises to hold discussions of a kind mentioned in clause 484.

836. The right of entry framework provides balanced and appropriate processes and requirements for entry for these purposes that must be complied with.

....

838. It is intended that agreements can include terms allowing for union officials to enter the employer's premises for purposes other than those set out in paragraphs 194(f) and (g). An agreement might, for example, provide an entitlement to enter the employer's premises for a range of reasons connected to the terms of the agreement, such as:

. to assist with representing an employee under a term dealing with the resolution of disputes or consultation over workplace change; or

. to attend induction meetings of new employees; or

. to meet with the employer when bargaining for a replacement to the current agreement.

[14] It continues to state:

“1919. This Division gives officials of organisations a statutory right to enter premises and exercise powers provided they satisfy various conditions. It is not intended to codify all of the ways in which entry can occur or provide an exhaustive list of the powers exercisable on the premises. The Division does not affect the ability of an occupier of premises to invite any person onto that premises, e.g., to meet with the employer about a particular matter.”

[15] The CFMEU also referenced the Report of the Standing Committee on Education, Employment and Workplace Relations on the Fair Work Bill 2008.

[16] With respect to the Full Bench decision in AiG, the CFMEU asserted that, in that matter, FWA was dealing with a very different enterprise agreement right of entry provision and that the undertaking ultimately required confirmed rights of entry consistent with ss.481 and 484 but did not otherwise impede the operation of the rights of entry provisions included in that particular agreement.

[17] The CFMEU relied on the decision of Lawler VP in ReACT Planning and Land Authority 3(ACT), issued subsequent to AiG. In that decision His Honour dealt with an agreement which similarly specified a number of rights of entry purposes. However, that agreement clause included a final paragraph in the following terms:

“H6.4 For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in clause H6.3 should be taken as conferring a right of entry that is contrary to, or for which there is otherwise, a right of entry under the FW Act.”

[18] Finally, in terms of clause 7.12 of the Agreement currently before me, the CFMEU submitted that the final paragraph in this clause was “pellucid” and that it “specifically controls and limits the rights granted elsewhere in clause 7.12” 4 and thus ensures that the entirety of the clause grants no entitlement to enter premises for a purpose referred to in s.481 or to hold discussions of a kind in s.484 and accordingly, the clause is not unlawful such that an undertaking relative to it should not be sought.

[19] I note that Moyle Bendale did not express a view relative to the permissibility of this clause.

Findings

[20] I have concluded that clause 7.12 has application to CFMEU-FFPD officials who may, or may not be, permit holders pursuant to the FW Act. It provides full access to the Moyle Bendale premises at any time, for the purposes of:

• representation



• dealing with disputes and representing employees under the agreement dispute resolution processes



• representing employees and attending meetings about the negotiation of a new agreement



• attending induction meetings for new employees, and



• any other purpose connected to the relationship between the union and the employer.

[21] The last paragraph of clause 7.12 purports to characterise the clause as establishing arrangements for access to the workplace which are independent of, or separate from, those provisions set out in part 3-4 of the FW Act.

[22] In considering this clause I have adopted the principle endorsed by the High Court in the Amcor Case 5 in the following terms:

“It is trite that narrow or pedantic approaches to the interpretation of an award are misplaced. The search is for the meaning intended by the framer(s) of the document, bearing in mind that such framer(s) were likely of a practical bent of mind: they may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in ways likely to have been understood in the context of the relevant industry and industrial relations environment than with legal niceties or jargon. Thus, for example, it is justifiable to read the award to give effect to its evident purposes, having regard to such context, despite mere inconsistencies or infelicities of expression which might tend to some other reading. And meanings which avoid inconvenience or injustice may reasonably be strained for. For reasons such as these, expressions which have been held in the case of other instruments to have been used to mean particular things may sensibly and properly be held to mean something else in the document at hand."

[23] I have considered the extent to which the provisions of clause 7.12 are ambiguous such that I should interpret this clause in a fashion which permits approval of the agreement. I do not consider that, on its plain provisions, clause 7.12 is ambiguous. Rather, it purports to establish a regime of specified access rights which are separate from those encompassed within Part 3-4 of the Act. Unlike many other qualifying provisions in agreement rights of entry clauses, clause 7.12 is not qualified to the extent that it does not confer rights contrary to Part 3-4 of the Act. It simply establishes a separate right of entry regime.

[24] In AiG the Full Bench considered the relevant sections of Part 3-4 in the following terms:

“[5] Section 481(1) provides that a permit holder may enter premises for the purpose of investigating suspected contraventions of workplace laws, subject to some conditions. Section 484 provides that a permit holder may enter premises for the purposes of holding discussions with employees, also subject to some conditions. ....

....

[6] It follows from the operation of ss.186(4) and 194(f) that before approving an enterprise agreement Fair Work Australia must be satisfied that the agreement does not include a term that provides for an entitlement to enter premises for a purpose referred to in s.481 or to hold discussions of a kind referred to in s.484 other than in accordance with Part 3-4 of the Fair Work Act.”

[25] The Full Bench later continued to deal more generally with Part 3-4:

“[28] It is desirable to give an indication of the content of Part 3-4. The part is entitled “Right of Entry” It contains some 49 sections, arranged in 6 divisions as follows:

Division 1—Introduction

ss.478 – 480

Division 2—Entry rights under this Act

ss. 481 – 493

Division 3—State or Territory OHS rights

ss.494 – 499

Division 4—Prohibitions

ss. 500 – 504

Division 5—Powers of FWA

ss.505 – 511

Division 6—Entry permits, entry notices and certificates

ss.512 – 521

[29] Section 481 is in Division 2 of Part 3-4. It is part of Subdivision A which is entitled “Entry to investigate suspected contravention”. There are 4 sections in the subdivision, of which s.481 is the first. These sections deal in some detail with what a permit holder may or may not do in relation to entry, inspection and documents in connection with a suspected contravention of the Fair Work Act or a term of a fair work instrument. Section 484 is also in Division 2 of Part 3-4 and is the only section in Subdivision B. Subdivision B is entitled “Entry to hold discussions”.

[30] Subdivision C of Division 2 of Part 3-4 is entitled “Requirements for permit holders”. It contains 8 sections regulating the times at which and manner in which permit holders may enter particular premises. Section 486 provides, relevantly, that Subdivisions A and B do not authorise a permit holder to enter or remain on premises or exercise any other right if he or she contravenes Subdivision C in exercising that right.

[31] Division 4, as its name suggests, contains a number of prohibitions in relation to the exercise of rights by a permit holder. The prohibitions deal with hindering or obstruction by or of a permit holder, refusal or delaying the entry of a permit holder, misrepresentations and unauthorised use or disclosure of information obtained, relevantly, on entry to investigate a suspected contravention.

[32] Division 6 regulates the issue of entry permits and the giving of entry notices. It is not necessary to deal with those provisions in any detail.

[33] This summary of the legislative provisions indicates that the Fair Work Act regulates the exercise of entry rights by a permit holder in a comprehensive way. There cannot be any doubt that if cl.44 had been drafted so as to apply to a permit holder it would have been clearly inconsistent with the regime established by Part 3-4. It should be noted, however, that s.194(f) does not strike at agreement terms which deal with a permit holder as such, but at agreement terms which deal with an entitlement relating to particular types of entry to premises.”

[26] The Full Bench concluded:

“[34] In order to be an unlawful term within s.194(f) an agreement term must have three elements. The agreement term must provide for an entitlement, the entitlement must be to enter premises for a purpose referred to in s.481 or to hold discussions of a kind in s.484 and the term must purport to permit entry other than in accordance with Part 3-4.

[35] We have no doubt that cl.44 provides for an entitlement. Subject to compliance with the prescribed conditions an authorised NUW representative may enter the premises at any time. Provided the conditions are complied, with there is nothing that Dunlop Foams can do to prevent or restrict entry. It is also clear that the entitlement, being unrestricted by reference to purpose, includes entry for the purpose referred to in s.481, namely investigation of suspected contraventions. Equally the entitlement extends to the holding of discussions with employees, the matter dealt with in s.484. Finally it is clear that cl.44 is not limited in its operation by reference to the provisions of Part 3-4. As we have seen, those provisions establish a regime of regulation of entry to premises based on the requirement to obtain a permit and to observe a number of procedures and rules.”

[27] The specified purposes in clause 7.12 involve representation of employees generally and relative to disputes and for meetings and discussions. Hence, each of the specified purposes has the potential to substantially overlap the purposes set out in ss.481 and 484. For example, a right of entry for the purpose of representation of employees and meetings about the negotiation of a new agreement is indistinguishable from a right of entry for purposes of discussions. As a matter of practical reality, representation must involve discussions.

[28] I have initially considered whether the provisions of clause 7.12 obviate the need to apply the test set out in AiG on the basis that this clause establishes rights of access for purposes separate from those set out in ss.481 and 484. The capacity for an agreement to incorporate the detailed and specific purposes in clause 7.12, read in the context of the purported differentiation of these purposes from those that are specified in Part 3-4 of the FW Act is dependent on whether a right of entry regime under the agreement can operate independently of Part 3-4 of the FW Act.

[29] The last paragraph in clause 7.12 is critical in this respect. Absent consideration of the last paragraph in clause 7.12 there can be absolutely no doubt that this clause establishes rights of entry which include rights of entry for purposes encompassing the investigation of suspected contraventions and the holding of discussions which is dealt with in s.484.

[30] Clause 7.12 may only be considered to be consistent with s.196 so as to avoid consideration of the AiG test if the last paragraph is taken as establishing a series of access provisions which are separate from those set out in ss.481 and 484.

[31] The last paragraph in clause 7.12 means that the clause is quite different from that considered by Lawler VP in ReACT. I have noted that in ADJ Contracting Pty Ltd 6 (ADJ) Acton SDP also considered Re AiG in the context of an agreement clause which again differed somewhat from the clause under consideration here. Her Honour stated:

“[37] Accordingly, I am satisfied clause 15.2(k), excluding the last paragraph of the clause, is not an unlawful term within the meaning of s.194(f) or s.194(g). While the clause provides for an entitlement, the entitlement is to enter premises for the purpose of representing an employee under the dispute resolution clause of the ADJ Agreement and not for either a purpose referred to in s.481 or to hold discussions of a kind referred to in s.484 or for the exercise of a State or Territory OHS right.

[38] I am concerned, however, that the last paragraph of clause 15.2(k) provides for any dispute about entry to the workplace to be dealt with in accordance with clause 15, rather than in accordance with Division 5 of Part 3-4 of the FW Act where the dispute is about the operation of Part 3-4. I will return later to whether it is appropriate for me to accept a written undertaking from ADJ in respect of the last paragraph of clause 15.2(k).”

[32] I have considered the premise that Part 3-4 does not comprehensively cover the matter of rights of entry and that it is possible to establish another series of entry rights for officials of the CFMEU which is not constrained or regulated under Part 3-4.

[33] Section 194 must be read so that it refers to entitlements in agreements for the purposes specified in ss.481 and 484. If an agreement establishes entitlements for persons other than permit holders for purposes referenced in those sections that term must extend beyond the provisions of Part 3-4. If the entitlement is limited to permit holders, the test must simply reflect that prescribed in AiG.

[34] The objects of Part 3-4 are set out in s.480.

“480 Object of this Part

The object of this Part is to establish a framework for officials of organisations to enter premises that balances:

(a) the right of organisations to represent their members in the workplace, hold discussions with potential members and investigate suspected contraventions of:

(i) this Act and fair work instruments; and

(ii) State or Territory OHS laws; and

(b) the right of employees and TCF outworkers to receive, at work, information and representation from officials of organisations; and

(c) the right of occupiers of premises and employers to go about their business without undue inconvenience.”

[35] There is nothing in this provision which recognises that a different or ancillary right of entry regime could be established pursuant to the terms of an agreement and independent of this part of the FW Act.

[36] The Explanatory Memorandum states:

“838. It is intended that agreements can include terms allowing for union officials to enter the employer's premises for purposes other than those set out in paragraphs 194(f) and (g). An agreement might, for example, provide an entitlement to enter the employer's premises for a range of reasons connected to the terms of the agreement, such as:

. to assist with representing an employee under a term dealing with the resolution of disputes or consultation over workplace change; or

. to attend induction meetings of new employees; or

. to meet with the employer when bargaining for a replacement to the current agreement.”

[37] This extract from the Explanatory Memorandum lends support to the position put by the CFMEU. However, regard can only be had to the Explanatory Memorandum in certain circumstances. The majority decision in JJ Richards explored these circumstances in some detail. Whilst it is not necessary that I recite the consideration of this issue, the majority concluded:

[29] Drawing these principles together, the task of statutory interpretation is concerned with ascertaining the intention of the legislature as manifested by the text of the legislation. Context (using that word in its widest sense to include such things as the existing state of the law and the mischief which, by legitimate means, one may discern the statute was intended to remedy) and the purpose or object underlying the legislation must always be considered. These must be considered in the first instance, not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise. The text of a provision, read in context and having regard to the object and purpose of the provision, is always the surest guide. Moreover, the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed. Resort to explanatory memoranda and other extrinsic material may only be had for the purposes stated in s.15AB(1)(a) and (b) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.

[30] It is erroneous to look at extrinsic materials before exhausting the application of the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation. Statements as to legislative intention made in explanatory memoranda or by Ministers, however clear or emphatic, cannot overcome the need to carefully consider the words of the statute to ascertain its meaning. Section 15AB does not permit recourse to explanatory memoranda or other extrinsic material for the purpose of departing from the ordinary meaning of the text unless either the meaning of the provision to be construed is ambiguous or obscure or in its ordinary meaning leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable.

[31] One may observe in the decisions of this and other tribunals a tendency when interpreting statutory provisions to have resort to the relevant explanatory memorandum without observing the full rigour of these principles. Nevertheless, when, as occurred in this appeal, objection is taken to resort to the explanatory memorandum there is no excuse for not giving full effect to these principles.”

[38] In applying this approach I am unable to discern a basis upon which consideration of the Explanatory Memorandum, or, for that matter, the Standing Committee Report on the Fair Work Bill 2008, can be sustained so as to override the plain words of the FW Act. The provisions of the FW Act are clear and there is no ambiguity, obscurity or manifestly absurd result such that I would need to consider the Explanatory Memorandum. There is no provision of the FW Act which permits a right of entry regime on a separate basis from that which is set out in Part 3-4 so as to circumvent the provisions of s.196.

[39] It may be that an agreement provision can establish rights of entry which are not unlawful but, if those provisions establish entitlements for a purpose referred to in ss.481 or 484 the constraint in s.196 must apply.

[40] Notwithstanding this, I have considered the extent to which, if the right of entry obligations under Part 3-4 must be applied to the CFMEU representation functions under the agreement, the legitimate dispute resolution and negotiation provisions are in some way undermined.

[41] This cannot be the case. Firstly, a right of representation does not generally necessitate unrestrained rights of access. Secondly, as a matter of practicality, issues of access relevant to dispute resolution are generally agreed between employers and union officials. It is in both their interests to do so. Thirdly, where restrictions on rights of entry are argued to impact on the resolution of disputes under an agreement, the capacity exists for these issues to be addressed through dispute resolution provisions and Part 3-4 makes specific reference to the function of FWA in these respects.

[42] In terms of the other purposes specified in clause 7.12, I am unable to conclude that the conduct of rights of entry consistent with Part 3-4 renders those functions unworkable, such that it supports the need for an independent right of entry regime under the agreement.

[43] Hence, relative to the initial issue of whether clause 7.12 obviates the need to apply the test in AiG because it establishes rights of access for purposes separate from those specified in ss.481 and 484, I have concluded that there is no capacity to establish a right of entry regime which permits the avoidance of the obligation set out in s.196 by simply asserting that the purpose of the right of entry is separate from that specified in Part 3-4. The rights established by the agreement enable officials of the CFMEU to enter the Moyle Bendale premises and must therefore be considered against the purposes set out in ss.481 and 484.

[44] This means that the test set out in AiG becomes critical to consideration of the Agreement. There are three elements to this test. Firstly, clause 7.12 provides for an entitlement. It is an entitlement that CFMEU-FFPD officials can enter the Moyle Bendale premises at any time to represent and meet with employees and engage in discussions for specified purposes. In terms of the second element of that test, these discussions and meetings have the capacity to be for the purpose of investigating a suspected contravention of the FW Act or of the agreement. Further, the discussions and meetings for the purposes set out in clause 7.12 are nevertheless discussions which must be of a kind encompassed within s.484. Section 484 refers to the purpose of holding discussions. Clause 7.12 must be read as permitting discussions which relate to representation generally, dispute resolution, negotiation of a new agreement, induction, or other purposes relative to the relationships between the union and the employer. Accordingly, the rights of entry established by clause 7.12 include the purposes more generally expressed in s.484.

[45] Finally, clause 7.12 permits entry other than in accordance with Part 3-4. The entry is at any time. There is no requirement to give notice or an entry notice. There is no requirement for a suspected breach or onus to establish that breach. There is no requirement to produce authority documents pursuant to s.489. There is no limitation on where meetings and discussions may be held.

[46] Consequently, in terms of the test in AiG, clause 7.12 must represent an unlawful term.

[47] In my decision of 16 March 2011 I reached the same conclusion, albeit on the basis of substantially different submissions. This second decision fundamentally arises from the refusal of the CFMEU to provide an undertaking in the terms I proposed.

[48] Notwithstanding this, I consider it appropriate to provide a second opportunity to Moyle Bendale to provide a written undertaking that, notwithstanding the provisions of clause 7.12, the exercise of any right of entry under the agreement will be in accordance with Part 3-4 of the FW Act. I again confirm that if such an undertaking is provided and endorsed by the CFMEU as the only nominated employee bargaining representative, the Agreement will be approved.

[49] Absent the provision of such an undertaking and endorsement within the next 10 days, an order dismissing the application will be issued.

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT

Appearances:

M Irving counsel and R Read for the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union - Forestry and Furnishing Products Division.

G Hayes appearing for Moyle Bendale Timber Pty Ltd.

Hearing details:

2011.

Adelaide:

April 18.

 1   [2011] FWA 1652 (PR507618)

 2   [2010] FWAFB 4337

 3   [2010] FWA 8761

 4   CFMEU Outline of Submissions Pn 30

 5 (2005) 222 CLR 241

 6   [2011] FWA 2380

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