Conroy v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation
[2005] QSC 206
•21 July 2005
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Conroy v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2005] QSC 206
PARTIES:
BEVAN-JOHN: CONROY
(applicant)
v
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
SC No 50 of 2005
DIVISION:
Trial
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Townsville
DELIVERED ON:
21 July 2005
DELIVERED AT:
Townsville
HEARING DATE:
21 July 2005
JUDGE:
Cullinane J
ORDER:
1. Dismiss the application
2. Order that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed
CATCHWORDS:
INCOME TAX - OBJECTIONS AND APEPALS - OBJECTIONS - where the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation instituted proceedings against the applicant, claiming $357,000 for a debt said to be due in respect of taxation liabilities - where the applicant made an application to the Court seeking an order that the originating process be set aside - where the applicant challenged the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation’s power to bring these proceedings
INCOME TAX - OBJECTIONS AND APEPALS - OBJECTIONS - where the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation instituted proceedings against the applicant, claiming $357,000 for a debt said to be due in respect of taxation liabilities - where the applicant made an application to the Court seeking an order that the originating process be set aside - where the applicant also challenged the validity of the notice of assessment issued to him by the respondent
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 16, r 19
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Jetbird Holdings Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 66, cited
Goodman v J Eban Ltd (1954) 1 QB 550, considered
Joosse and Anor v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (1998) 159 ALR 260, considered
Money Tree Management Systems Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2000] SASC 54, considered
COUNSEL:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf
E Edler for the respondent
SOLICITORS:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf
Australian Tax Office for the respondent
This is a matter in which the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation has instituted proceedings against the applicant, claiming $357,000 for a debt said to be due in respect of taxation liabilities.
The applicant, who appeared for himself, has made application to the Court which, on the face of it, is under rule 16(a) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) seeking an order that the originating process be set aside.
The applicant has filed a conditional notice of intention to defend and, in an affidavit in support of the application, has raised issues which largely accord with the matters raised in the conditional notice of intention to defend.
Before me he has either foreshadowed or raised certain other matters, some of which, it is clear, are not relevant on this application and in support of which there is no material. Some are matters which, if this application fails, may be raised by him in the proceedings themselves.
It does not seem to me that rule 16(a) is appropriate because there is no doubt that the Court has jurisdiction to deal with money claims, whereas his challenge generally is to the right of the respondent to institute proceedings against him. There is, however, no obstacle to my dealing with the matter upon the basis of the issues raised rather than disposing of the matter on an issue of form.
It can be said that there are four issues which were raised. Two are very similar and they effectively allege that the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, being the delegate of the Commissioner of Taxation, who was in turn appointed by the Governor-General, can have no power to bring these proceedings. The argument is that the Governor-General was appointed by commission by the Queen as Queen of Australia and that there is no-one answering that description having any legal role in the constitutional or legal affairs of this country.
The argument is one which has been raised a number of times and it can, I think, be seen set out in somewhat more extensive form in the judgment of the Chief Justice of South Australia in Money Tree Management Systems Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2000] SASC 54.
The argument, wherever it has been raised, has been rejected. I, with respect, adopt what was said by the Chief Justice of South Australia in that case. The position is, in my view, clear that the Queen acts in her capacity as Queen of Australia using that style or title in exercising the relevant powers and I reject this argument. I also refer to the judgment of Hayne J in Joosse and Anor v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (1998) 159 ALR 260.
I also reject the argument that the great seal of Australia is not the correct seal for use by the Queen. This argument is based upon a similar premise to the first argument and, in my view, also has to be rejected.
There is a claim which I have had difficulty understanding, that because the respondent has issued a notice in the name Bevan Conroy in capital letters and whereas he has now (although there is no evidence in support of this) adopted the name Bevan-John: Conroy the proceedings are in some way invalid, it being said that his name has been capitalised and the notice refers to a body corporate or person. I reject this argument as it seems to me entirely without any basis.
Finally, it was argued, although somewhat faintly, that because the claim bore the signature by means of a stamped signature of the respondent it was not a valid signature for the purpose of rule 19 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). This argument, too, must be rejected. I refer to cases such as Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Jetbird Holdings Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 66.
It seems to me that the reasoning in Goodman v J Eban Ltd (1954) 1 QB 550 is applicable to this case, also; this argument must fail.
That means that the application fails. I dismiss the application.
I order that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed.
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